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Abstract 
The effect of national culture on the performance of teams is becoming an increasingly 
important issue in advanced western countries.  There are many interlinked reasons for this, 
including the increasing globalisation of companies and the use of joint ventures for the 
development of expensive platforms.  A further issue relates to the export of complex socio-
technical systems, where a culture clash between designer/manufacturer and user can lead 
to significant problems.  
This report describes research work that was carried out to analyse the cultural factors that 
influence the performance of teams (including researchers, designers, operators and crews), 
and to determine whether these factors could be captured in a tool to provide assistance to 
team managers and team builders.  The original point of interest related to the development 
of increasingly complex sociotechnical systems, for example nuclear power stations, oil 
refineries, offshore oil platforms, hospital systems and large transport aircraft.  Answers that 
might be sought, in particular by the senior managers of global companies, include (1) the 
best teams (or best national locations) for fundamental research, industrial research & 
development, product/system improvement and other key activities, and (2) the implications 
for system performance and, as a result, for system design, of targeting an eastern Asian 
market, a South-American market, etc. 
A literature review was carried out of the effects of culture on team performance, of culture 
measures and tools and of task classifications; in addition, empirical evidence of the validity 
of measures and tools was sought. Significant evidence was found of the effects of culture 
on teams and crews, but no national culture-based team performance prediction tools were 
found.  Based on the results of the literature review, Hofstede’s original four-dimension 
cultural framework was selected as the basis for the collection and analysis of empirical data, 
including the results of studies from the literature and the researcher’s own empirical studies.  
No team or task classification system was found that was suitable for the purposes of linking 
culture to team performance, so a five-factor task classification was developed, based on the 
literature review, to form the basis of the initial modelling work. 
A detailed analysis of results from the literature and from the author’s pilot studies revealed 
additional culture-performance relationships, including those relating to cultural diversity.  
Three culture-performance models were incorporated into software tools that offered perfor-
mance prediction capabilities.  The first model was primarily a test bed for ideas; the second 
model incorporated a task/behavioural approach which achieved limited success; the third 
and final model was evaluated against a range of team and crew performance data before 
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being tested successfully for acceptability by users. 
The research results included the discovery that the effects of cultural diversity must be 
sought at the individual cultural dimension level not at the composite level, that the effects of 
national culture on team performance are consistent and strong enough to be usefully 
captured in a predictive culture tool and that the relationship between culture and behaviour 
is moderated by contextual factors. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Acronym 
or term Meaning 
Anglo A person of British descent, typically taken to include British, Australians, Canadians, Irish, New Zealanders, Anglo-Americans and Anglo-South Africans.  
ATP Air transport pilot (licencing). 
BEA Bureau d’Enquetes et d'Analyses pour le Securite de l'Aviation Civile (France). 
BFU Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung – the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation. 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority (UK). 
COL (or 
COLL) 
Collectivism – a cultural dimension, a term sometimes used to represent the opposite 
‘end of the scale’ to ‘individualism’. 
CRM Crew resource management. 
CVF Competing Values Framework – a model and framework for interpreting many organisational phenomena. 
DCI Design and Creativity Index. 
EPO European Patent Office. 
ESS Europe Social Survey – an academic-based social survey and database to track and explain interactions and attitudes within Europe. 
FAA Federal Aviation Authority (USA). 
FLE Full (hull) loss equivalent, refers to aircraft accidents and incidents. 
FMC Flight management computer. 
GCI Global Creativity Index 
GII Global Innovation Index 
GS Google Scholar 
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System. 
IDV Individualism (versus collectivism) - a cultural dimension. 
IJV International joint venture 
IND Indulgence (versus restraint) – a cultural dimension. 
IVS Indulgence vs. restraint – a cultural dimension. 
LOSA Line Operations Safety Audit – An approach to pilot technical skill rating, which records all threats and errors, how they were managed and their outcomes. 
LTO Long term orientation – a cultural dimension. 
LTO-WVS The ‘new’ version of long term orientation. 
MAS Masculinity (versus femininity) – a cultural dimension. 
MODAF Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework. 
NEO-FFI A five-factor personality scale. 
OCAI Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument – based on the theoretical model that underlies the Competing Values Framework (CVM). 
OGC Office of Government Commerce (UK). 
PRA Pragmatic (versus normative) – a cultural dimension 
PDI Power distance – a cultural dimension. 
PMBOK Project Management Body of Knowledge. 
R&D Research and development. 
RAE The UK’s Research Assessment Exercise, applied periodically to universities. 
RAE2008 The UK’s 2008 Research Assessment Exercise. 
SOP Standard operating procedure. 
TEM Threat and Error Management – a flexible approach to practical risk management aimed at improving aviation safety. 
UAI Uncertainty avoidance – a cultural dimension. 
USPTO United Stated Patent and Trademark Office. 
WVS World Values Survey 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Multinational companies design and produce complex sociotechnical systems (large 
transport aircraft, ships, nuclear power plants, oil refineries, etc.) that are utilised and/or 
installed round the World.  As such companies grow, they acquire subsidiaries in increasingly 
diverse regions, and these subsidiaries become increasingly viable options for research, 
development, product design and manufacture.   
The area of particular interest for the work of thesis relates to the interplay of cultures.  
Engineers and designers are products of their cultures - their approaches to research, 
development, design and manufacture are culture-bound, and they build their cultural 
assumptions into their products, systems and procedures.  Users of sociotechnical systems 
are similarly culture-bound and, therefore, culture-related problems can occur when designer 
and operator cultures differ. 
Teams, in particular project teams, are increasingly being utilised to develop sociotechnical 
systems and their sub-systems.  In Europe and in Anglo1 countries, such teams are often 
multicultural due, in particular, to the influx of foreign graduate engineers and scientists.  
Elsewhere, project teams are often created at subsidiaries by multinational companies and 
may be of a single culture (or dominant culture) that is different to that of the companies’ 
base country.  Sociotechnical systems are, in turn, operated by organised action teams such 
as aircrews or refinery crews who are typically (but not always) nationals of the countries 
where or from which they operate.   
Although there now exists a large amount of practical experience and theoretical under-
standing of teams, much of this body of knowledge relates to North European and Anglo 
teams, and has been amassed by researchers and practitioners from within those cultures; 
as a result, many of the tacit assumptions behind this body of knowledge are culture-bound.  
Although Anglo and North European companies began to use multicultural teams (and 
different culture teams via their subsidiaries) increasingly widely in the 1980s, the effects of 
                                            
1 Anglo refers to people of British descent, e.g. British, Irish, Canadian, Anglo-American, New 
Zealander, Australian and Anglo-South African.  
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differing cultures on team performance were not well understood, and early experiences of 
different-culture teams and multicultural teams were not very positive.  For managers, the 
development of multicultural teams, in particular, has been fraught with problems (Wolf, 
2002) and the performance outcomes have been discouraging (Hambrick, Davison, Snell, & 
Snow, 1998). 
Note that the terms ‘multicultural’ and ‘multinational’ are not synonymous.  There are single 
nationality teams (e.g. comprising USA Hispanics and USA Anglos) whose members have 
significantly different ethnic cultures; there are multinational teams (e.g. comprising Belgians 
and French) whose members have very similar ethnic cultures.  In addition, cultural 
misunderstandings and conflicts in many team-based projects have arisen from differing 
organisational and professional cultures, rather than differing ethnic cultures.  
The work described in this report was centred on teams (single- or multicultural) and the 
effects of cultural differences – whether internal or external to the team, i.e. whether these 
differences were associated with other individuals in the team or were built into the systems 
that the team members utilise.  The primary aims of the research were to gain an under-
standing of the culture-related factors that influenced the effectiveness of single- and multi-
cultural teams, and to develop a methodology and tool that could assist managers to predict 
the effects of culture on existing and proposed teams, and that could also function as part of 
an educational suite on teams and team working. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 The increasing importance of ‘other culture’ teams and 
multicultural teams 
Technically advanced companies have faced higher competition and an accelerating pace of 
change over the last few decades, and have increasingly adopted team-based approaches to 
task execution and problem solving.  Originally, these work teams were typically homogen-
eous, single-cultural and, as experience and analysis brought a better understanding of the 
dynamics of such teams, they proved increasingly useful for bringing a sharp focus to bear 
on important or urgent tasks and problems.  However, these single-culture work teams have 
been increasingly replaced by multicultural and ‘other culture’ work teams, and this trend 
shows no sign of abating, particularly in the UK.  Some of the key factors contributing to the 
increasing incidence of multicultural work teams in the UK are listed below:  
• The annual output from the UK’s universities, of engineers and scientists who choose 
to enter engineering/science-related occupations, has been in decline for more than a 
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decade; this has necessitated the recruitment of foreign engineers and scientists to fill 
the indigenous gap between the supply of graduates and industrial requirements.  
• The huge costs associated with bringing new high technology products to market 
have resulted in an increasing trend towards major international joint ventures aimed 
at the global market, for example between international vehicle manufacturers; this 
necessitates the utilisation of multinational, multicultural teams.  
• Global companies are increasingly choosing to place research and development 
operations at foreign subsidiaries due to differential skills, costs and subsidies. 
Similar factors apply in most Western European countries, and in other Anglo countries.  
Therefore the utilisation of ‘other culture’ teams and multicultural teams is becoming the 
norm, rather than the exception for multinational companies. 
1.2.2 ‘Other culture’ teams and multicultural teams - problem areas 
Individuals and groups are heavily ‘programmed’ by their cultures (based on a combination of 
ethnic, organisational and professional cultural backgrounds).  Culture affects values, 
attitudes, expectations, interaction styles, signals, behaviours and emotions.  Therefore, 
when individuals of two or more cultures meet, or even when they interact remotely, their 
differing actions, signals, etc., will tend to be misinterpreted to negative effect, unless there 
are joint understandings of their cultural differences and effective means of addressing these 
differences.   
It has become increasingly clear that the nature of interactions between individuals of 
different cultures is more complex than those between individuals that share the same or a 
similar culture; assumptions that are taken for granted by members of single-culture teams 
are no longer valid, and team members cannot rely on informal processes to come into play 
to enable a team ethos to form.  Snow et al. (1996) carried out a two-year study of multi-
cultural teams at thirteen companies; they came to the conclusion that a precondition for 
multicultural team effectiveness was the development of clear processes for communicating, 
for decision-making and for handling conflicts and disagreements . In the absence of 
adequate measures to remedy or ameliorate such problems, multicultural teams typically 
underperformed when compared to single-culture teams, despite the wider range of 
experience that they could often bring to tasks and projects.  However, where effective 
integration was achieved within multicultural teams, they could perform as well as, and in 
some cases better than, single-culture teams; in particular, their wider range of thinking 
styles could result in higher creativity and innovation, improved decisions and higher 
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performance (DiStefano & Maznevski, 2000; Earley & Gibson, 2002). 
Our limited understandings applied not only multicultural teams, but also to ‘other culture’ 
teams (teams with members of a culture different to ours).  Complex sociotechnical systems 
exported from the West were typically crewed or operated by ‘other culture’ teams, i.e. teams 
of different national culture to those that designed the systems.  In addition, research & 
development work has been increasingly delegated to foreign subsidiaries, to be carried out 
by ‘other culture’ teams.  
Theories of motivation and teaming that were developed in the West (in particular in the 
Anglo countries) contained cultural assumptions that were not universal.   For example, 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1943; Maslow 1997, Ch. 5) placed self-actualisation at 
the top of the hierarchy, whereas group actualisation would be more important for the 
collectivistic majority in the World.  The second element of Tuckman’s forming, storming, 
norming, performing model of team development (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977) would not be 
acceptable in collectivistic cultures due to the risks of loss of face.  Some of Belbin’s team 
roles (R M Belbin, 1993) would have been difficult to fill, or even unacceptable in collectivistic 
societies, for example the shaper role, which included arguing, disagreeing and displaying 
aggression in the pursuit of goals. 
1.2.3 Sociotechnical systems – problem areas 
As stated earlier, cultural mismatches between complex sociotechnical systems and their 
operators occurred due to the cultural assumptions that designers built into their complex 
systems and standard operating procedures.  Designers’ default assumptions were typically 
that the system operators would behave similarly (i.e. have the same cultural values) as 
them.  These assumptions resulted in degraded operational effectiveness and reduced 
safety. 
1.3 Initial assumptions 
The initial assumptions included the following: 
• The cultural properties (i.e. ‘cultural profiles’) of teams could be usefully modelled2 by 
quantifying team member cultural values along a limited number of ‘cultural 
dimensions’. 
                                            
2 In this context, ‘usefully modelled’ implied that the cultural profiles captured the differences between 
teams that influenced relative team performance. 
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• The tasks that teams performed3 (i.e. their task profiles) could be modelled in terms 
of factors that were directly affected by team culture. 
• Relationships between culture dimension scores and the performance of task factors 
could be established. 
• Models that incorporated team cultural profiles and task profiles could be used to 
predict the effect of team culture on team performance.  
One or more of the above initial assumptions could have been shown to be false in the 
literature review or subsequent data collection exercises; in this case, the programme of 
research would have been adapted to account for this. 
1.4 Aims and objectives of the research 
The primary aims of the research were to develop an improved understanding of the cultural 
factors that influenced the effectiveness of teams, and to create a methodology and toolset 
for the evaluation of project teams and sociotechnical system operators and crews.  
 The associated objectives were as follows:  
• To identify the culturally-related factors that contributed most to variances in team 
performances.   
• To identify a task classification relevant to culturally-moderated team performance 
• To build a model that incorporated the above factors for the prediction of the effects 
of culture on team performance when tackling specified types of task. 
• To develop tools that encompassed the above model in order to: 
o Facilitate the creation of successful work teams in given situations. 
o Enable the prediction of the effects of culture on team performance, and likely 
success or failure, of existing or proposed teams. 
1.5 Main contribution to knowledge 
The main contribution to knowledge was intended be a cultural theory of work team 
performance and a validated, quantitative methodology and tool that would enable the 
culturally-based assessment and improvement of teams. 
                                            
3 Many complex sociotechnical systems are highly automated and, for most of the time, crews are 
acting as monitors rather than operators.  To be useful, a task/mission model must capture the 
functionalities and capabilities required at critical times, e.g. when performing complex tasks or dealing 
with emergencies. 
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1.6 Stakeholders and potential users 
The main stakeholders and potential users of the outputs of the research were considered 
to be: 
• Organizations that designed or built complex sociotechnical systems 
• Organisations that utilised complex sociotechnical systems 
• Organizations that utilised multicultural (or different culture) teams for project and 
problem-solving work 
• Education and training organisations 
1.7 Scope and boundaries of the work 
1.7.1 Culture 
The primary area of focus for the research described in this thesis was that of culture and its 
effects on teams, products and systems.  Personality, leadership, qualifications, training, 
experience, age, health and many other factors impinge on the performance of teams; where 
beneficial to the research, the effects of these additional factors was to be explored to a 
limited degree, inasmuch as they affected an individual’s and team’s culture.  
The research was not primarily concerned with the technical skill sets required to complete 
specific tasks.  
1.7.2 Team types 
A further limitation to the scope of the research related to the types of team under consider-
ation.  The primary focus of the research was on formal work teams, not informal or ad-hoc 
groups; such work teams:  
• Were formally created for one or more purposes, 
• Existed within a work environment, and 
• Either: 
o Included individuals who were involved in activities that could be associated 
with the creation of sociotechnical systems or products (e.g. research, 
development, design, planning, manufacture), 
o Included individuals that were operating sociotechnical systems (e.g. crewing 
aircraft or power plants) 
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1.7.3 Tasks 
The research was not concerned with analysing and categorising tasks other than from the 
point of view of the constraints and demands that they placed on culture-moderated aspects 
of team organisation, communication and performance. 
1.8 Background to the research methodology 
Most of the articles and books covering multicultural and ‘other culture’ teams were 
anecdotal and qualitative.  In contrast, the development of predictive cultural models required 
a quantitative, statistical approach.  Coverage of the topics proposed in this thesis therefore 
required a mixed methods research approach, i.e. combining the (largely) inductive 
reasoning of qualitative methods and the (largely) deductive reasoning of quantitative 
methods; this resulted in the inductive-deductive research cycle.  
It was important that the outputs of the research had potential applicability and, to that end, a 
compromise between explanatory power and usability was required.  The researcher there-
fore adopted the approach known as dialectical pragmatism, where the value of a theory was 
judged on the basis of its ‘workability’, i.e. its applicability and predictive power:  
“Theories are viewed instrumentally (they are “true” to differing degrees based on how well 
they currently work; workability is judged especially on the criteria of predictability and 
applicability).” 
The research methodology is described in more detail in Chapter 2.   
1.9 Structure of this report 
This chapter (Chapter1) provides an introduction to the problem area, general research 
hypothesis, aims and objectives, scope and research methodology.  Chapter 2 discusses the 
problem area and research methodology in more detail, introduces the proposed problem 
solution in terms of theories, methodologies and software-based tools and lists the main 
areas to be studied in the literature review of Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 explores the current state of knowledge and opinion about the effects of national 
culture on teams, the tools that are available to evaluate and predict the performance of such 
teams, and the empirical evidence that is available to support such tools. 
Chapter 4 describes research decisions that were based on the literature review of Chapter 
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3.   A specific cultural framework was selected as the basis for data collection, analysis and 
tool-building, and a measure of cultural diversity was defined.  A detailed set of culture-
affected team/task/mission factors was described, and a set of task/mission dimensions was 
also proposed as an alternative basis for the quantitative description of team tasks.  Three 
research questions relating to specific cultural factors were also asked in Chapter 4, because 
qualitative and quantitative studies in the literature relating to the effects of these cultural 
factors had been found to be limited and contradictory. 
Chapter 5 describes the collection of statistical data from the literature, the collection of 
anecdotal information via questionnaire and interview, and the generation of statistical data 
by the author from pilot studies; this data was combined and utilised for the evaluation of the 
research questions of Chapter 4 and for the development of models of culture/task-perfor-
mance relationships that would be utilised by the team culture tools described in later 
chapters.  
Chapter 6 describes a first team culture model and tool that utilised the team cultural profile 
to predict, directly, the team culture-related performance for a limited range of team and task 
types.  Chapter 7 describes a second version of the model and tool that took account of the 
issues and limitations that were revealed during the evaluation of the first model.  This 
second model and tool used an extended team cultural profile and a task profile based on 
the set of detailed team/task/mission factors developed in Chapter 4.  The second model and 
tool used a different approach to prediction to that of the first model and tool; prediction was 
based on the discrepancies between the actual team cultural profile and a ‘desirable cultural 
profile’ generated from the task profile.  Chapter 8 describes the third and final version of the 
model and tool.  The third model and tool utilised the team cultural profile of the second 
model, but utilised a different, dimension-based approach for mission representation; this 
was, in part, because users had found this aspect of the second model to be problematic. 
Chapter 9 presents an overview of the work and a discussion and analysis of the research 
results, models and tools; Chapter 10 offers conclusions and recommendations for further 
work. 
Figure 1-1 presents an overview of the thesis structure and contents. 
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Figure 1-1:  Thesis organisation 
Chapter 3: Review of the literature and state-of-the-art
Chapter 5: Collection and detailed analysis of data, answering of 
research questions, building of culture/-performance models
Chapter 4:  Selection or development of frameworks, structures, 
outstanding research questions, etc.
Chapter 6: The first 
model and team culture 
tool (performance 
prediction based)
Chapter 8: The third model 
and team culture tool (cultural 
discrepancy based plus 
dimension-based mission)
Chapter 7: The second 
model and team culture 
tool (cultural discrepancy 
based)
Chapter 10: Conclusions 
and further work
Chapter 9:  Discussion 
and analysis
Chapter 2: Initial problem statement and research methodology
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2 General problem statement and research methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the problem area, problem statement (in detail) and 
research questions, to describe the proposed research methodology and to detail the 
solution approach.  This includes the boundaries of the literature review, the selection or 
development of research tools, the collection and analysis of data from the literature, from 
interviews and from the author’s pilot studies, and the building and evaluation of culture-
based performance prediction models and tools. 
2.2 The problem area 
2.2.1 Background 
All humans are products of the cultures in which they are immersed; culture heavily colours 
what people perceive (particularly in social situations), how they interpret what they perceive, 
how they react to it and how they behave towards each other.  The products and systems of 
various cultures are increasingly exported to customers of different cultures, and people of 
differing cultures now intermix and collaborate more than ever before.  Therefore, issues 
arising from differing culturally-based world views are impinging on a wide range of 
organisations, for example:  
• Companies exporting complex sociotechnical systems to other parts of the 
World:  Such systems include oil refineries, power generation systems and 
commercial transport aircraft.  As systems have become more complex, formal 
systems modelling methods have improved; however, these methods primarily 
capture the specification and design of the technical subsystems; the human 
components of such systems are captured in much less detail, and cultural aspects 
are not formally captured at all.  To compound the problem, cultural assumptions are 
unconsciously built into sociotechnical systems; these assumptions lead to reduced 
performance and safety when such systems are exported to culturally-distant 
countries (see next paragraph).  
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• Operators (or crews) of complex sociotechnical systems:  Cultural differences 
between designers and operators of complex sociotechnical systems with regard to 
communication, handling uncertainty, prioritising and decision-making result in 
differing safety performances in the operation of complex sociotechnical systems;  
these differences can be seen, for example, in the safety records of national airlines. 
An improved understanding of the effects of cultural traits on the factors that contribute to 
performance and safety would enable system designers, planners and implementers to take 
account of culture in system design, standard operating instructions, training, etc.  
2.2.2 An initial problem statement 
For several decades, multinational companies have been outsourcing a growing proportion 
of their research and development (R&D) activities to foreign subsidiaries; international joint 
ventures have also become more common over this period, for example to develop new 
multi-company vehicle platforms. Such companies have faced increasing choices when 
placing a new R&D project.  It has become clear that different countries (with differing 
national cultures) tend to offer differing strengths that fit better with particular types of R&D 
than others.  In addition, many teams have become internally more diverse, thus introducing 
further complexities.  The R&D location decision has become more complicated. 
A further issue relates to the safe and effective operation of complex systems.  Although 
accidents involving safety-critical sociotechnical systems have occurred infrequently, they 
have typically been associated with high costs in terms of loss of life and destruction of 
resources.  Worldwide, approximately seventy percent of sociotechnical system failures have 
been assigned to human error (Hollywell 1996; Amalberti 2001); however there have been 
clear differences in the error rates (and the corresponding accident rates) of operators of 
different nationalities.  In particular, the accident rates amongst operators of similar cultures 
to those of the (typically European or North American) original system designers have tended 
to be low, whereas the accident rates amongst those of significantly different cultures have 
been much higher.  Although there are methodologies and tools to aid in the specification 
and design of the technical aspects of complex systems and systems-of-systems, there are 
no equivalent methodologies or tools to aid in the specification or definition of the cultural and 
social aspects of these systems; as a result, designers have unwittingly built their own 
cultural assumptions into such systems.  Evidence is presented in the literature review of 
significant variations in accident rates amongst users of different cultural backgrounds. 
The problems of particular interest to the author are detailed in the following subsections.  
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The research therefore covered these areas, but was not limited to them because, in order to 
develop models of the general relationships between team member cultural traits and team 
performance, it was necessary to utilise data from a wide variety of team types.  
a) The project team, including the sociotechnical system design team 
The primary focus of interest was the effect of team member culture on the ability of the team 
to achieve a satisfactory level of performance. 
Performance-limiting problems that could arise in single-culture teams (depending on the 
ethnic, professional and organizational cultures of the team) included:  
• Reluctance to suggest or support new ideas 
• Excessive consensus-seeking (“groupthink”) 
• Low creativity 
Additional problems that could arise in multicultural teams included:  
• Poor communication, misunderstandings and conflict 
• Fragmentation and social loafing 
• Poor decision-making 
A multinational company might have many national branches that have the resources 
(human, physical, organisational) required for product design.  However, differing cultural 
backgrounds could result in different branches performing better at specific stages of 
research and development processes, such as ‘blue-skies’ research, focused research, new 
system/product development, product mid-term upgrade or detailed process improvement. 
b) The sociotechnical system operator team or crew 
The primary focus of interest was the potential mismatch between system designers’ default 
cultural assumptions about system operators and the cultural reality. 
Problems arising from this included:  
• Inadequate representations (or specifications) of the operators of socio-
technical systems:  As a result, unanticipated problems could arise during 
operation, including those that increase the risk of catastrophic failure.  
• Unrecognised cultural assumptions built into products and systems:  These 
assumptions related not only to the physical equipment and software of the product or 
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system, but also to the associated standard operating procedures, training and 
support systems.  As a result, users who were culturally distant from system builders 
operated such systems and products less effectively and also suffered higher 
accident and failure rates.  
2.2.3 The primary stakeholders 
It was important, in defining the problem area and scope, to consider the primary 
stakeholders (listed below); this encouraged a more focused approach.     
• Organisations that designed or built complex sociotechnical systems:  It was 
important that the designers and engineers (in particular systems engineers) of such 
organisations were aware of their own cultural traits, and that they were enabled to 
specify the cultural traits of the system users, and to take these traits into account in 
their systems. 
• Organisations that utilise complex sociotechnical systems:  These would be 
interested in the effects of culture on the training requirements, safety and 
performances of their operators or crew 
• Organisations that utilise different culture or multicultural teams for project or 
problem-solving work:  These organisations (which may also be the sociotechnical 
system designers of the first point, above), would have an interest in the effects that 
team culture had on creativity, decision-making, etc.   
• Education and training organisations:  Many of these organisations had a respon-
sibility to impart team-working experience and training to their students.  Most Anglo 
and European university engineering undergraduate courses included at least one 
team-based project during the students’ second and third years.  These teams were 
often culturally mixed, therefore an introduction to culture and a hands-on investi-
gation of its effects, via the tools that form an output of this research, would help 
students to understand, respect and take advantage of cultural differences. 
In particular, it was intended that outputs from the proposed research should provide 
assistance or guidance in two ways: 
• Enabling engineers to take into account the effects of user (operator, crew) culture on 
the performance of their systems, when specifying and designing those systems.  
• Enabling managers to compose or select single-culture or multicultural systems/-
product design teams that could potentially deliver the best results; this might be at 
the level of assembling a new team at a particular location, assembling a virtual team 
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distributed across the globe, or assigning work to an existing team based at one of 
many locations across the globe. 
2.3 Purpose statement, research questions and delimitations 
2.3.1 Purpose statement 
Based on the problem descriptions of the previous subsections, the purpose statement was 
as follows: 
The purpose of this research is to investigate relationships between team cultural 
traits and team performances for teams associated with the design and operation of 
sociotechnical systems, and to capture those relationships in a methodology or tool to 
assist in the design and operation of sociotechnical systems. 
2.3.2 Research question 
The associated research question was stated as: 
Is it feasible to predict, to a practicable degree, the performances of teams involved in 
the design or operation of sociotechnical systems, on the basis of those teams’ 
members’ national cultures?  
2.3.3 Research sub-questions 
The above research question provided three sub-questions, to form the basis of the literature 
review and subsequent research activities: 
1. What do we know about ‘different culture’ and multicultural teams? 
2. What tools are available to evaluate them? 
3. What empirical evidence is available about the validity of such tools? 
2.3.4 Delimitations of scope 
The proposed research and tool took account of situations where no information was 
available about the individuals who would make up a team, other than their likely national 
cultures and, perhaps, their educational attainments.  Therefore, factors associated with 
individual team members’ personalities, their experiences and skills would not be 
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investigated.  As a result the following topics were not, in themselves, of interest4:  
• Cultural/intercultural competence and the associated measurement tools and 
methods. 
• Individual team member personalities and their effects on team performance. 
• The effects of informed leadership on team performance (e.g. inter-culturally 
competent team leaders). 
In addition, when designing complex sociotechnical systems, it was unlikely that detailed 
information on the organisational and safety cultures of user organisations would be 
available; therefore, the following topics were not of primary interest5: 
• Safety culture and the associated measurement/assessment tools and methods. 
• Organisational culture and the associated measurement/assessment tools and 
methods. 
2.4 Research methodology 
Many of the most relevant articles retrieved during the literature review described in this 
thesis, including those on team or crew attitudes to automation in complex sociotechnical 
systems and those on the efficacy and effectiveness of multicultural teams, were found to be 
highly anecdotal and qualitative in nature.  Other articles, for example many of those that 
examined cultural traits, were quantitative in their approach.  In addition to this reliance on 
both qualitative and quantitative research sources, the work described in this thesis also 
relied on qualitative and quantitative methods in order to collect evidence, to develop and 
evaluate hypotheses and to create demonstration tools.   
The main implication of the findings described in the above paragraph was the necessity to 
apply a mixed method research approach, as described in Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009).   
As described earlier in this thesis, the issues and problems associated with multicultural and 
‘different culture’ teams had important consequences for many organizations.  It was there-
fore important that the theories and tools that arose out of this work could offer practical 
predictions or guidance with regard to the conduct and performance of multicultural teams.  
The culture-moderated interactions between operators and their sociotechnical systems were 
                                            
4 Except where the associated methods or tools could be adapted to the prediction or assessment of 
the effects of national culture on relevant aspects of team performance. 
5 As above. 
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highly complex, as were the internal interactions of multicultural teams and groups; a very 
wide range of qualitative and quantitative factors could be considered (and had been 
considered elsewhere) as candidates for new theories of culture-moderated team perfor-
mance.  Although it would have been very valuable to develop a theory that was highly 
explanatory, there was little benefit in developing a toolset that incorporated so many factors 
that it was unusable in typical situations due to the unavailability of data or due to the 
restrictions of data protection laws.  It was therefore necessary to adopt the pragmatist 
approach in order to develop a theory that could form the basis of a practical toolset, see 
Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009), Table 4.1, p.74.  Point (5) of this table stated the pragmatist 
principle:  
“Theories are viewed instrumentally (they are “true” to differing degrees based on 
how well they currently work; workability is judged especially on the criteria of 
predictability and applicability).” 
The above statement concurred with the view the philosophy of science scholar Laudan; he 
advocated that the criteria for assessing the development of a theory should relate to that 
theory’s problem-solving effectiveness, rather than to its falsifiability (Laudan, 1978). 
The toolset had to balance the effort of application against the value of the answers that it 
produces.  To that end, it might be possible to reduce the number of factors required in the 
toolset, or at least to enable them to make trade-offs between accuracy and cost/effort.  
2.5 The study design 
The central subject area of the research related to sociotechnical systems, and the driving 
rationale behind the research activities was to develop and test a tool.  The study design was 
intended to reflect the associated requirements.  An outline of the study design is presented 
in Figure 2-1. 
Based on the three research sub-questions, the literature review provided insights as to the 
effects of national culture on team activities, the availability of culture-based tools to predict 
various aspects of team performance, and the validity of such tools. Based on the outputs of 
the literature review, gaps and limitations were identified and several hypotheses were 
generated.  Appropriate methodologies were adapted from the literature, where available, 
and initial conceptual models were proposed.  Selected case study material from the 
literature was supplemented via the collection of qualitative anecdotal data and by studies 
carried out by the author; the studies were statistically analysed, in part to answer earlier-
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generated hypotheses.  Based on the results, sets of relationships between team national 
cultures and team performance factors were generated to form the basis of the team 
performance prediction methodologies. 
 
Figure 2-1: Study design 
A first prototype tool was produced as a proof-of-concept.  Following an analysis of this, a 
second tool was developed; this was validated and tested with real data prior to a subject-
based evaluation.  Following user feedback, a final version of the tool was developed, and 
similarly validated, tested and subject-evaluated.  
Finally, the results were analysed and the limitations of such tools (and the underlying 
theories and assumptions) were discussed within a wider context.  Conclusions were drawn 
and recommendations were made for further work. 
2.6 Approach adopted and activities undertaken 
The high-level requirement for any culture tool developed by the author was that it should 
enable the prediction of the effects of team cultural traits on team performance (as measured 
or evaluated externally).  In order to achieve this capability, it would be necessary, firstly, to 
obtain or develop a capability to capture team cultural traits, based on no more than team 
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member nationalities and educational levels6.  Secondly, it would be necessary to obtain or 
develop a capability to capture the culture-affected task, skill or mission factors that were 
associated with key aspects of teams’ performance.  Thirdly, it would be necessary to 
associate specific cultural trait levels or scores with optimum achievement of these factors.  
Finally, it would be necessary to be able to assess any team based on its closeness to the 
ideal represented by the above cultural trait levels or scores. 
It was difficult to establish a set of detailed requirements at the outset because an 
examination of academic sources revealed little literature on cultural tools other than a range 
of cultural frameworks; these frameworks were typically based on cultural dimensions or 
attributes that enabled the placing of groups or populations in cultural space.  There were, in 
addition, a number of academically-developed questionnaire-based tools that assessed 
individual team members’ cultural intelligence (or similar) on the basis of their personalities 
and cultural attitudes, based on their questionnaire responses.  The author also examined 
non-academic sources of various commercial and community-produced ‘culture tools’.  Such 
tools were typically intended for the provision of advice or training to individuals who were 
travelling to other cultural zones, for the assessment of individuals’ cultural preferences, for 
the assessment of individuals’ cultural competences or for the assessment of companies’ 
organisational or safety cultures.  
The author discussed aspects of the requirements with, amongst others, Geert Hofstede 
(developer of the most widely used cultural framework) and Peter Richerson (joint author of 
the book ‘Not by Genes Alone – How Culture Transformed Human Evolution’).  
No tools were found that enabled the effective assessment of the performance of various 
types of team on the basis of (default) team national culture.  Although this finding 
demonstrated that there was a dearth of such tools, it was still necessary to obtain evidence 
of the effects of culture on performance (and of a corresponding need for culture tools) and 
to define the detailed requirements for such a tool. 
The first part of the literature review (‘what we know about multicultural teams’) revealed 
empirical evidence of the effects of culture on the performance of various types of teams, 
e.g. research/design team creativity and innovation performance, sports team performance 
and operator/crew safety and accident rates.  In addition, evidence was found on the effects 
of culture on skill or task factors associated with team performance, for example, communi-
                                            
6 A key potential application of any culture tool produced by the author was as an adjunct to a suite of 
system design tools; as such, the only information available about potential operators or crew would 
be their nationalities and likely educational levels. 
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cation, management and leadership, training and situation awareness.  However, no 
evidence was found to suggest that the effects of team culture were specifically taken into 
account to-date by designers of complex systems and standard operating procedures. 
The second part of the literature review (‘the tools that are available to evaluate them’) 
revealed very little information on tools that could utilise team member national culture to 
estimate or predict team performance.  There were many cultural frameworks that enabled 
the positioning of individuals (or teams consisting of ‘same culture’ members) in culture 
space, but only one national culture-based model and one national culture-based tool 
attempted to provide further analysis of likely performance, or optimum team cultural traits; 
neither of these provided an effective capability to predict team performance in a range of 
sociotechnical situations. 
As the second part of the literature review had revealed that there were no relevant 
theoretical models or practical tools, the third part of the literature review (‘empirical evidence 
about the validity of the tools’) examined the validity of various tools, models, frameworks 
and taxonomies that could provide the building blocks of such a tool.  
Based on the literature review, a widely-used cultural framework was selected as the basis 
for scoring team members default cultural traits, algorithms were developed to produce team 
cultural trait and cultural diversity values from these scores, and a five factor skill/task set 
was developed.  
Detailed results from the literature review were combined with further data collection and 
analysis by the author in order to assign optimal cultural dimension scores to sub-factors of 
the above five factors.  In addition, questionnaires were employed to gather anecdotal 
information about individuals’ cross-cultural experiences in order to ascertain the degree to 
which they observed and reacted according to their country-level scores.  Long, unstructured 
interviews were held with several experts who had significant experience in various team 
types, in order to ascertain their personal observations about cultural effects on team 
member performances. 
The process of detailing and testing the requirements included the building of an initial ‘Aunt 
Sally’ tool in order to ‘test the water’, i.e. a tool that captured a cultural representation of a 
team, a representation of the required tasks/skills and produced a measure of team 
performance based on culture.  This initial tool attempted to generate an absolute measure 
of a team’s effectiveness, expressed as a percentage; however, the potential complexity of 
the equations, and the difficulty associated with justifying the weightings chosen in the 
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equations, convinced the author that this approach could not be extended satisfactorily, and 
would be extremely difficult to update in the light of improved knowledge.  Although the tool’s 
measure of effectiveness was unsatisfactory, it did demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
method that had been developed to produce a team cultural profile.  As a result of building 
and testing this initial culture tool, a revised requirement for establishing cultural ‘fitness for 
purpose’ was devised, which was based directly on the level of discrepancy between actual 
and optimum or desirable culture trait scores. 
The second tool utilised a similar team cultural profiling method to the first, but utilised the 
earlier-developed five task/skill factors as the basis for establishing a ‘desirable cultural 
profile’, and (as stated above) produced a ‘cultural discrepancy score’, which indicated the 
degree of mismatch between a team’s actual and desirable cultural profile.  The use of a 
discrepancy score avoided the complexity problems of the first tool and allowed the use of a 
more detailed set of task skill sub-factors.  Individual factor and sub-factor discrepancies 
could be analysed to highlight the types of problems that the discrepancies signified. This 
tool was verified and validated before being user-tested.  Feedback from the users indicated 
that some had difficulties when scoring the task/skill factors; this was unsurprising in 
hindsight, as this scoring task required a high level of understanding of skill requirements that 
would only develop with training and experience in team selection.  
The third tool was developed in order to overcome user difficulties with the second tool’s 
task/skill scoring requirement.  Based on the task/skill factors used in the second tool, the 
author produced optimal scores for a range of teams for each of two cases: organised action 
teams (e.g. airline crew, ship crews, power station operators), and sociotechnical system 
design/project teams.  Instead of having to assign scores to the various task/skill factors, 
users were presented, in each case, with a two dimensional matrix containing a range of 
teams, and were required to select the location that represented their team via a process of 
comparison with other teams that were pre-located on the matrix. 
2.7 Summary of problem statement and research methodology 
Section 2.2 defined the main problem area of research interest to include sociotechnical 
system design teams and sociotechnical system operator teams; the main stakeholders were 
identified as the designers and users of complex sociotechnical systems, their managers, 
and education and training organisations. 
A mixed method research methodology was chosen, and a pragmatist approach was 
selected for theory development to ensure that it could form the basis of a reliable, practical 
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toolset. 
The proposed solution approach included the selection of relevant areas of the literature to 
review and, from these, the identification of methodologies that could be utilised and gaps 
that required to be filled or circumvented, the collection of and analysis of data and, on the 
basis of the analysis results, the development of a culture-based theory of team 
performance; this theory was incorporated in culture-based performance prediction 
methodologies and tools.   
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3 Review of the literature and state-of-the-art 
3.1 Introduction 
The state-of-the-art literature review was based on the three-stage review process as 
described by Levy & Ellis (2006), see Figure 2-1 below.  
 
Figure 3-1:  The three-stage literature review process of Levy & Ellis 
The review question was: 
Is it feasible to predict, to a practicable degree, the performance of teams involved in the 
design or operation of sociotechnical systems, on the basis of those teams’ members’ 
national cultures?  
The state-of-the-art review was split into three areas, see below: 
1. What we know about different-culture teams7 and multicultural teams 
2. What tools are available to evaluate or predict the performance of such teams 
3. What empirical evidence is available to support the validity of evaluation and 
prediction tools 
The number of relevant publications varied greatly within and between the three areas.  For 
example, many publications were retrieved on studies into the effects of culture on team 
performance and on cultural frameworks, but few publications were retrieved on the topic of 
                                            
7 In this thesis, the term ‘different-culture teams’ is used to denote single culture teams (or largely 
single culture teams) of various national backgrounds, in particular in situations where the designs of 
the systems they use, or the standard operational procedures that they are expected to follow, have 
been designed by persons or teams of different cultures.  
1. Know the literature
2. Comprehend the literature
3. Apply the literature
4. Analyse the literature
5. Synthesise the literature
6. Evaluate the literature
1. Input 3. Output
2. Processing
- What is, and what is 
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culture-based performance prediction tools, and those that were found were concerned with 
safety culture or organisational culture, not national culture. 
Key findings that directly affected subsequent research towards the aims and objectives of 
this thesis are detailed in this chapter’s summary.  
3.2 An overview of the literature review 
3.2.1 The literature review design 
As stated above, the literature review was split into three major parts.  For the first research 
sub-question, a small number of key authors and their publications (journal papers and 
academic books) was initially identified, read and commented.  Following this activity, 
potentially relevant forward and backward citations8 were followed.  Sets of key words and 
phrases (and their synonyms) were then selected, based in part on the most relevant 
publications on each topic and sub-topic; in addition, after initial evaluative literature 
searches, key ‘exclusion words’ were identified.  This enabled complex search logic state-
ments to be built up, e.g. culture AND (framework OR tool OR methodology) AND team AND 
performance NOT “safety culture” NOT “organizational culture”9.  These keywords (and their 
synonyms) and phrases were utilised in several citation databases and search engines.  In 
sub-topic areas where many publications were amassed then, following reading and 
commentary, the sets of subjects and authors were pruned to enable more focused citation 
and keyword searches to be carried out.  See Appendix 1B for more details of keyword 
searches. 
For the second part of the literature review, only one relevant article was initially found in the 
search for national culture-based team performance prediction models, methods and tools, 
despite widening the search and evaluating a wide range of articles and websites.  As a 
result, the search was broken into ‘sub-searches’ for potential components of such models, 
methods and tools.  At this stage, the literature review process followed that of the first part 
of the review, except that the range of published materials was extended to include 
professional magazines, commercial tools, websites, blogs, etc. 
For the third part of the literature review, the search for material was driven by the tools 
found in the second part of the literature review. 
                                            
8 Potential relevance was identified via comments in the text of the citing paper, by cited paper title 
and/or by author. 
9 Note that the various citation databases and search engines differed in the form and complexity of 
logic that they could interpret; in some cases, only the simplest of logic statements could be used. 
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3.2.2 Literature review sources – databases and search engines 
A range of citation/database sources was initially accessed via the university library portal, 
and new sources were added to these as they became available.  These sources were 
evaluated by searching for a range of previously identified papers in relevant areas and via 
keyword searches.  The evaluated sources are listed below; more details of the results of the 
evaluation of sources are presented in Appendix 1A. 
• CiteSeerX: Initial test searches on the CiteSeerX demonstrated that it performed 
poorly across the range of topic areas.  
• EBSCO:  Initial test searches on the EBSCO database confirmed that it would only 
retrieve literature from a limited range of subject areas. 
• ERIC (Education Resources Information Center):  Although many ERIC thesaurus 
descriptors were related to culture, few relevant papers were returned by the ERIC 
database, due probably to its extreme focus on education-related research. 
• Google/Google Scholar:   The ability to express the search logic very precisely in 
Google/Google Scholar enabled the author to ‘tune’ the search to cope with the very 
wide range of sources and forms of data that were available (compared to all other 
search engines).  The author was able to discover relevant blogs, wikis, bulletin 
boards, discussion forums, newsletters, etc., as well as the more usual academic 
sources of information.  Overall, Google/Google Scholar was the most useful single 
source of information for the literature review.  In addition, Google Scholar’s ‘live’ 
author citation-tracking facility enabled the author of this thesis to track new citations 
of key authors, e.g. Salas, Helmreich and Hollenbeck. 
• Mendeley:  Mendeley was the reference manager system used by the author for the 
latter half of the PhD project due to recurring problems with the original reference 
manager, which had been recommended by the university.  Although the Mendeley 
database was by no means comprehensive, it was convenient to use it to search for 
previously-identified papers because successful search results could be entered into 
the author’s list of references at the touch of a button. 
• PubMed:  Although limited to the MEDLINE references and abstracts database, 
PubMed produced a surprisingly high return rate of relevant articles. 
• PsycINFO:  The student was only able to access a limited subset of the PsycINFO 
database, as the university did not have a full subscription to the database. 
• Scopus:  The Scopus bibliographic database provided abstracts and citations for a 
 25 
 
very wide range of disciplines, but it appeared to have less coverage of pre-1985 
articles than the Web of Science. 
• SSCI (Social Science Citation Index):  Accessed as part of the Web of Science. 
• Web of Science:  The Web of Science provided advanced search facilities for its 
‘core’ collection, but only basic search facilities for the full collection.  Its forward and 
backward citation following facilities proved very effective and fast.  In addition, the 
search facility was efficient, producing a higher proportion of relevant articles than 
most search engines (including Google/Google Scholar). 
• Individual journal searches:  In the late stages of the literature review, the student 
subjected two journals of high relevance to his research to a 100% article-by-article 
examination of abstracts (when in doubt, the whole paper was perused).  Out of 108 
articles deemed as relevant to the student’s research, 98 had already been retrieved; 
of the previously omitted 10 articles, only one was deemed to be of sufficient 
importance to be cited in the thesis. 
To summarise the literature search sources:  The most useful sources were found to be 
Google/Google Scholar, which retrieved a significantly wider range of publications than all 
other sources, and Web of Science, which not only accessed a wide (though lesser) range of 
publications, but also included useful forward and backward citation-chasing capabilities.  
3.2.3 Key authors 
Based on prior reading and knowledge, a small number of key authors, and their most 
relevant publications, were initially identified for each research sub-question; the literature 
review was then extended via forward and backward citations. 
The first literature review topic was “What we know about different-culture teams and multi-
cultural teams”.  For this topic, the initially-identified authors were Helmreich, Merritt, 
Sherman and Harris (for sociotechnical system operators and crew), Shane, Barjak, Herbig 
and Jones (for design innovation teams) and Stahl et al. (2010) for studies concentrating on 
multicultural teams. 
The second literature review topic was “What tools are available to evaluate or predict the 
performance of such teams”.  An initial search revealed no relevant national culture tools; 
however, a range of cultural frameworks had been developed and, for these, the initially-
identified authors were Hofstede, House et al., Triandis, Schwartz and Earley & Gibson; 
academic books detailing many of these frameworks were available, and represented a 
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useful starting point.  The initially-perused academic books associated with these authors 
included “Culture’s Consequences” (G H Hofstede, 1980), “Cultures and Organizations” 
(Geert Hofstede, 1991), “Culture, Leadership and Organizations” (House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004), “Culture and Social Behavior” (Triandis, 1993), “Beyond  
Individualism/Collectivism” (S H Schwartz, 1994) and “Multinational Work Teams: A New 
Perspective” (Earley & Gibson, 2002).  Academic papers by these authors, and reviews by 
other authors of their work were then retrieved and examined before expanding the literature 
review via forward- and back-citations.  Detailed forward and backward citation searches 
revealed no publications on methodologies and tools for the assessment or prediction of 
national culture’s effects on the performance of teams, and a subsequent extensive search of 
the academic literature, utilising a wide range of search terms, only revealed one publication 
on this topic (other than the author’s own publications).  As a result a further search was 
carried out in order to retrieve academic publications on safety culture/organisational culture 
tools, and non-academic sources of culture tools.  The intention of this activity was to 
examine any culture- and task-related factors utilised in these tools, and to determine 
whether any of them could be re-used in a national culture tool.   
The third literature review topic was “What empirical evidence is available to support the 
validity of evaluation and prediction tools”.  As no relevant tools had been found, this section 
was devoted to an examination of the validity of the cultural frameworks, diversity indices and 
team/task/behaviour classifications.  As any evaluations of such frameworks and classifi-
cations would cite the relevant developers, the initial starting points for this third topic was 
similar to the second, i.e. tracing citations of the same key papers; indeed many relevant 
papers had been retrieved during the literature search activity for the (above) second topic.  
The keyword searches employed for this third review topic included additional search terms, 
e.g. ‘evaluation’, validity’, ‘criticism’ and ‘limitations’. 
For this third literature review topic, the research was spread across a very wide range of 
fields, with limited cross-connection.  As a result, the author of this thesis had to rely heavily 
on keyword searches.  Appendix 1C provides an incomplete list of journal papers, learned 
society and professional society publications that were cited in this thesis. 
3.3 What we know about ‘other culture’ teams and multicultural 
teams 
This section is divided into two parts.  The first part reviews the literature that addresses 
‘external’ aspects of team performance, i.e. how effectively teams of various cultures 
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performed in terms of their missions; the second part reviews the literature that addresses 
‘internal’ aspects of team performance that are affected by culture, e.g. communication and 
decision-making.  These divisions are somewhat artificial, but assist in identifying 
intermediate variables that could be used later in the research. 
Note that many of the references in this section refer to ‘cultural dimensions’ such as 
individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity.  Descriptions of these 
cultural terms are provided in Tables 4-1 to 4-4. 
3.3.1 Evidence of the effects of culture on external aspects or measures 
of team performance 
Particular attention is paid to the two key areas of interest for this research thesis, i.e. 
complex sociotechnical system design, and sociotechnical system operation. 
Expanded descriptions of the material in this section can be found in Appendix 1D. 
a) Teams involved in creativity and innovation 
Complex, automated sociotechnical systems are the products, of various levels of research, 
invention and technical development.  As producers of sociotechnical systems have become 
increasingly multinational (e.g. via expansion, takeover or merger), they have gained access 
to a wider range of choices when placing research, development and manufacturing 
activities.  This subsection examines evidence about relationships between national cultural 
traits (or scores) and various levels of research and innovation performance. 
Western cultures have tended to associate creativity with the creation of new knowledge, 
paradigms, novel systems, products or processes, whereas eastern cultures have tended to 
associate creativity with the search for, or a revealing of, a truth that is temporarily hidden 
from view.  Morris & Leung (2010) claimed that there was evidence that westerners 
prioritised novelty over usefulness whereas easterners prioritised usefulness over novelty.  
The lack of a universal classification or agreement about the various forms of knowledge 
creation and application e.g. about differentiating between academic/fundamental/blue-skies 
research10, industrial research & development (R&D), creativity/creation, inventiveness, 
innovation, improvement and implementation, has made it difficult to accurately categorise 
differing forms and levels of creative output.  Could we identify differing human capabilities 
                                            
10 In many ways, blue-skies research could be associated with the eastern view of creativity, i.e. the 
search for, or a revealing of, a truth that is temporarily hidden from view. The (western) creative 
aspects of fundamental research are perhaps associated with the development of tools to carry out 
the research, rather than with the research itself. 
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associated with each of these dimensions?  The author has chosen the western view of 
‘creativity-as-novelty’ (rather than creativity-as-usefulness’) in order to differentiate between 
creativity and innovation, each of which required different skill sets as suggested earlier. 
The primary purpose of education in high-individualism nations has been to ‘learn how to 
learn’, whereas the primary purpose in low-individualism (highly collectivist) nations has been 
to ‘learn how to do’ (Geert Hofstede, 1986); most nations could be placed somewhere on the 
continuum between the above two ‘educational extremes’.  ‘Learning how to learn’ 
encouraged the search for new ideas, i.e. western-type creativity and innovation, whereas 
‘learning how to do’ encouraged the implementation of prior innovations and improvements in 
tangible products and services.  In support of this view, Herbig & Palumbo (1996) suggested 
that western cultures favoured breakthrough innovations, and eastern cultures fostered 
incremental innovations. 
Published studies on the effects of national culture on the generation and development of 
new ideas (by both academic and industrial teams) are examined in this subsection.  Such 
studies covered basic (or blue skies) research, applied research, product and process 
development and improvement. 
i) Research 
Barjak (2006) reported on a study of the effects of cultural and disciplinary diversity on the 
performance of academic research teams in the life sciences.  The outperforming teams had 
20-25% of foreign-educated members11; low cultural diversity teams and high cultural 
diversity teams (those containing 40-45%) performed less well, resulting in an inverted ’U’-
shaped performance curve.  Barjak & Robinson (2008) subsequently carried out a larger 
study, the results of which indicated that the most successful academic life science research 
teams had a strong domestic base (with a minority of foreign team members – representing a 
Shannon’s diversity index of less than 0.38), a moderate amount of collaboration with foreign 
research teams and a small proportion of research students.  They also found that small 
teams (optimum size seven members) produced the maximum number of publications per 
capita, and the highest number of citations per paper. 
Kedia et al. (1992) carried out a study of industrial and academic research units that revealed 
higher research productivity for high masculinity/low power distance countries than for low 
masculinity/low power distance countries, i.e. high masculinity appears to contribute to help 
                                            
11 Foreign-educated in the sense that the team member’s last degree was obtained outside the host 
country. 
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researchers contribute to ideas initiation.  
ii) Industrial research & development 
Cozzi & Giordani (2011) carried out an analysis of the effects of ambiguity aversion on 
countries’ R&D performances; they discovered a strong negative relationships between 
national uncertainty avoidance scores and research performance as exhibited by the level of 
R&D intensity and the proportion of researchers in each country; they also found that this 
negative correlation was stronger across European countries than across OECD or a wider 
range of countries.  Niebuhr (2010) found that innovation performances in the various 
German regions implied that diverse cultural backgrounds in the team or workforce 
enhanced R&D performance.  Because Niebuhr’s work was carried out at the regional, rather 
than team level, there were issues with its validity. 
Jones & Davis (2000) produced a taxonomy of company (or subsidiary) R&D focus, with 
associated optimum cultural scores (all other things being equal) based on their analysis of 
studies as follows:  Locally-supported support/adaption – high power distance (PDI), low 
individualism (IDV), high masculinity (MAS), high uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and high long 
term orientation (LTO);  locally-orientated R&D – low/medium PDI, medium/high IDV, low/-
medium MAS, low/medium UAI and high LTO; globally-orientated R&D – low PDI, high IDV, 
low MAS, low UAI and high LTO. 
Rinne et al. (2013) found a strong positive relationship between individualism and the Global 
Creativity Index (GCI) and the Design and Creativity Index (DCI) indices, but no significant 
relationship between power distance, uncertainty avoidance and these creativity indices.   
iii) Innovation 
Herbig and Miller (1992) found that higher order innovation was best served by high 
individualist, low uncertainty-avoidance societies.  Shane (1992) found that power distance 
(negative) and individualism (positive) had strong correlations with per-capita inventiveness 
and innovation.  Willems ( 2007) found that individualism had the highest correlation 
(positive) with innovation, as measured in terms of European and US patents, followed by 
power distance (negative), masculinity (positive) and uncertainty avoidance (negative).   
Bouncken & Winkler (2008) found that differences in power distance among team members 
were particularly damaging to the performance of bicultural global innovation teams.  
Rothwell & Wissema (1986) identified characteristics associated with low power distance, 
long term orientation and low uncertainty avoidance as promoting technical innovation.  
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Herbig & Dunphy (1998) found that high individualism, low power distance and low 
uncertainty avoidance scores as promoting technical innovation. 
Halkos & Tzeremes (2011) found that masculinity was positively correlated with innovation 
up to a score of 70-80.  The emphasis on relationships and agreement-seeking within a low-
masculinity culture, rather than on externally-measured goals, was similar to that of low-
individualism communities; such an emphasis could lead to reduced performance when 
faced with high creativity or blue-skies research goals.  The same authors later found, from a 
study of twenty-five European countries, that high uncertainty avoidance had the greatest 
effect on innovation, followed by high power distance – in both cases, the effects were 
negative (G. E. Halkos & Tzeremes, 2013).  As part of a three-decade multi-level review of 
the application of Hofstede’s cultural framework, Taras, Kirkman & Steel (2010) found that 
uncertainty avoidance was strongly negatively related to innovation. 
Efrat (2014) examined the impacts of national culture on innovation in 35 countries for the 
years 1998, 2004 and 2008; innovation output measures were based on patents, journal 
articles and high-technology exports (obtained from the World Bank database).  He found 
that power distance had little effect, high individualism contributed positively to publications 
but negatively to patents, uncertainty avoidance had a general negative effect, and that high 
masculinity contributed negatively to publications and positively to patents.  There were a 
number of issues with the results of Efrat’s study.  Firstly, the results were based on national, 
not team values; research teams often contain many foreign members, therefore the default 
national default values may not be accurate.  Secondly, journal articles tend to be produced 
by academic research teams, patents by industrial innovation teams, and high technology 
exports (the end of a long chain) often depend significantly on lower level process and 
product improvements; these three outputs represent significantly different levels of creativity 
or innovation, and should be distinguished from each other.  
iv) Product development (initiation) 
Nakata & Sivakumar (1996) split the product development process into two stages, as 
suggested by Johne (1984), i.e. initiation (idea generation, screening, concept testing) and 
implementation (product development, test marketing, product launch); They found that the 
best-performing national cultures at the initiation stage had high individualism, low power 
distance, low uncertainty avoidance and low masculinity scores (i.e. as in Nordic cultures); 
the low masculinity scores contrast with the findings of Kedia et al. and Halkos & Tzemeres.   
D’Iribarne et al. (1998, Ch.IV) reported on a joint venture between Renault of France (high 
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power distance, high masculinity and high uncertainty avoidance) and Volvo of Sweden (low 
power distance, low masculinity and low uncertainty avoidance); the hierarchically-organised 
French team members produced the most innovative designs and defended them 
aggressively; the democratically-organised Swedish team members sought consensus to 
such a degree that they were limited in the range of ideas that they could even conceive.  
The joint venture failed and was subsequently dissolved. Geert Hofstede referred to this case 
during a conversation with the author of this thesis at a Loughborough University workshop 
(Fellows, 2011), highlighting the Swedish high femininity (low masculinity) score; he 
suggested that this had caused the need for consensus to overrule the purpose of the joint 
venture.  This low masculinity/inadequate product development result contradicts that of 
Nakata & Sivakumar (above). 
Rinne et al. (2012) investigated the effects of national culture on innovation in 66 countries, 
as measured by the 2008-2009 Global Innovation Index (INSEAD, 2009); they reported that 
power distance was strongly negatively related to innovation performance, individualism was 
strongly positively related, but no statistically significant relationship with uncertainty 
avoidance was found.  Kaasa and Vadi (2010) analysed the effects of culture on innovation 
in European countries, using patenting activity as a measure.  They found a strong negative 
(but non-linear) relationship between national uncertainty avoidance scores and indicators of 
patenting intensity; power distance and masculinity were negatively correlated with inno-
vation, but their effects could be counteracted to some extent by high individualism. 
Shane (1993) investigated the effects of national culture on the innovation rates of 33 
countries over the period 1975 to 1980, using trademarks filed in the USA as a measure of 
the countries’ innovation rates.  He found that low uncertainty avoidance was the most 
important cultural variable, followed by low power distance and high individualism.  Shane 
later examined the effects of culture on attitudes towards the role of innovation champions, 
finding, again, that a low uncertainty avoidance score was an indicator of high support 
(Shane, 1995).  Shane’s measures of innovation performance were different from those used 
by Rinne et al. (see earlier), and it is therefore unsurprising that the results of the two investi-
gations, in terms of cultural influences, differed to some extent. 
v) Product and process implementation 
Herbig & Miller (1992) proposed that low-IDV, high PDI (collectivist) societies were pre-
eminent in lower order innovations, in particular those societies with high MAS.  Ambos & 
Schlegelmilch (2008) carried out a study of 139 R&D laboratories (located in 21 countries) 
and found that the optimum ‘cultural environment’ for capability-exploitation laboratories 
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(those whose aim was to bring that technology to market) was high power distance, low 
individualism, high masculinity and high uncertainty avoidance. 
Nakata & Sivakumar’s (1996) literature review found that the best-performing national 
cultures at the implementation stage had low individualism, high power distance, high 
uncertainty avoidance and high masculinity scores (e.g. Japan, Taiwan and Mexico).  Lin’s 
(2009) study of detailed process development and implementation in major car manufac-
turers in fourteen countries revealed that high uncertainty avoidance and (high) long term 
orientation positively influenced performance.   
Herbig and Jacobs (1998) explained the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese research 
and development.  Japan excelled in improving process and product technology but, with the 
exception of a small number of scientists, did not produce radical innovations or extend basic 
knowledge - technology transfers to Japan from the USA and Europe were almost four times 
greater than transfers from Japan.  In the case of Japan, the country’s history and its cultural 
combination of high power distance, low individualism, high uncertainty avoidance and high 
masculinity resulted in a fierce competitiveness at the company level, rather than at the 
individual level. 
vi) Acceptance and promotion of new technologies 
Although this subsection does not specifically refer to project teams, such teams are typically 
involved in the adoption and implementation of new technologies.  
Hasan and Ditsa (1999) found that West Africans were more favourable to the adoption of 
information technology than were Middle Easterners, and considered that this was due to the 
much lower level of uncertainty avoidance in West Africa.  Van Everdingen and Waarts 
(2003) concluded, from a study of ten European countries, that high national scores for 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity negatively influenced the adoption of 
enterprise resource planning; individualism appeared to play a positive role in only the early 
adoption of enterprise resource planning software. 
Based on a study of the literature on entrepreneurship, Menzel et al. (2006) proposed an 
ideal supportive culture consisting of very low power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
scores, medium individualism and masculinity scores, and medium-to-high long-term 
orientation scores. 
vii) Complex projects involving significant political or social issues 
Most large, complex sociotechnical projects have been unique and, in addition to technology 
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issues, many such projects have had significant additional complexities imposed on them 
due to political or social issues (D. Hodgson & Cicmil, 2008), e.g. due to multiple customer 
stakeholders or partners, for example in the negotiation of large international defence 
contracts involving commercial rivals and civil service organisations.  Many smaller projects 
have also had significant cultural, personal and vested interests (often undisclosed), typically 
adding to complexity, time delays and costs.  It was almost impossible to analyse such 
projects on a comparative, quantitative basis, as there was no equivalent of a ‘level playing 
field’ on which we could gauge their performances.  We could, however, examine 
qualitatively the key reasons why complex projects have often failed. 
A large proportion of complex technical and social projects failed to a greater or lesser 
degree – cost and time overruns were ‘the norm’; the 2012 UK Olympics project was (of 
course) delivered on time, but the costs had escalated by 200% over the original estimates.  
The Bull Survey (Spikes Cavell Research Company, 1998) revealed that the largest single 
cause of project failure was poor communications between the relevant parties on the 
project.  The UK government’s OGC best practice report entitled ‘Common Causes of Project 
Failure’ (Office of Government Commerce, 2005) identified two of the eight major causes of 
failure in government-funded projects as lack of understanding/lack of contacts at senior 
levels, and lack of project team integration between clients and supplier team.  Anderson 
(2011) identified bad communications as the largest single root cause of project failure.  It 
appears from the above (and from many other references) that failures in communication and 
understanding, particularly across departmental and organisational boundaries, were the 
leading causes of failure in complex projects. 
Buckle & Thomas’ (2003) study of the Project Management Body of Knowledge, PMBOK, 
(PMI, 2000) revealed an embedded masculine set of values.  Masculine cultures tended be 
highly competitive assertive and aggressive (G H Hofstede 2001, Ch.6), and tended to apply 
impersonal problem-solving approaches (Daley & Naff, 1998) and decision-making styles 
(Baxter Magolda, 1992); contrastingly, feminine cultures tended to value relationships and 
seek consensus (G H Hofstede 2001, Ch.6).  However, project management typically 
attracted masculine-orientated individuals (Cartwright & Gale, 1995), even from within more 
feminine cultures.  Given the earlier-described primary causes for the high rates of project 
failure, it is probable that personnel with lower masculinity scores, perhaps applying 
alternative project management methods, e.g. the Scandinavian approach (Lichtenberg, 
1983), would perform more effectively in socially or politically complex projects. 
 
 34 
 
Researchers Creativity/innovation type 
Optimum cultural dimension 
scores (low, high, or [optimum 
value]) 
PDI IDV MAS UAI Cult’l div’ty 
HIGH CREATIVITY – RESEARCH, INVENTION AND EARLY INNOVATION      
Kedia et al. (1992) Academic R&D Low N/E* High Little effect N/E 
Barjak (2006) Academic R&D N/E N/E N/E N/E 20-25%** 
Barjak & Robinson (2008) Academic R&D N/E N/E N/E N/E Low/M 
Jones & Davis (2000) Globally orientated R&D Low High Low Low N/E 
Rinne et al. (2013) National creativity Little effect High N/E 
Little 
effect N/E 
Shane (1992)  Inventiveness Low High N/E N/E N/E 
Rothwell & Wissema (1986) [B] Technological developments Low N/E N/E Low N/E 
Cozzi & Giordani R&D (including patenting) N/E N/E N/E Low N/E 
INDUSTRIAL R&D/HIGH LEVEL INNOVATION      
Niebuhr (2010) Industrial R&D N/E N/E N/E N/E Low 
Kaasa & Vadi (2010) Industrial R&D Low High Low Low N/E 
Kedia et al. (1992) Industrial R&D Low N/E High Little effect N/E 
Herbig & Dunphy (1998) Lifestyle-changing innovation Low High N/E Low N/E 
Halkos & Tzeremes (2011) Innovation efficiency N/E N/E High N/E N/E 
Halkos & Tzeremes (2011) Innovation  Low N/E N/E Low N/E 
D’Iribarne/Hofstede Industrial R&D/innovation N/E N/E NOT low N/E N/E 
Herbig & Miller (1992) High order innovations Low High N/E Low N/E 
Nakata & Sivakumar (1996) New product (initiation) Low High Low Low N/E 
MEDIUM CREATIVITY/INNOVATION      
Taras, Kirkman & Steel Innovation N/E N/E N/E Low N/E 
Rinne et al. (2012) Innovation Low High Little effect 
Little 
effect N/E 
Willems (2007) Innovation Low High High (Low)  
Shane et al. (1993) Industrial innovation (Low) (High) Little effect Low N/E 
Jones & Davis (2000) Locally-supported R&D Low/med 
Med/-
high 
Low/-
med 
Low/-
med N/E 
Lin (2009) Industrial innovation (Low) Little effect 
Little 
effect High N/E 
LOW CREATIVITY/PRODUCT & PROCESS IMPROVEMENT      
Herbig & Miller (1992) Lower order innovation activities N/E Low High Any N/E 
Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2008) Exploitation laboratories High Low High High N/E 
Nakata & Sivakumar (1996) New product (implementation) High Low High High N/E 
Jones & Davis (2000) Locally-supported adaptation High Low High High N/E 
Lin (2009) Process & product improvement No effect 
No 
effect 
No 
effect High N/E 
Herbig & Jacobs (1998) Process & product improvement High Low High High N/E 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX DEVELOPMENTS      
[SEVERAL] Any that have significant social issues N/E N/E Low? N/E N/E 
PDI = power distance; IDV = individualism; MAS = masculinity; UAI = uncertainty avoidance. 
* N/E: Not evaluated 
** Optimum percentage of team members who obtained their most recent degree in a different country; diversity 
vs. performance produced an inverted ‘U’ shape. 
Table 3-1: Summary of study results – work team creativity and innovation 
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viii) Conclusions – teams involved in creativity and innovation 
The results were summarised in Table 3-1.  Note that this table attempted to cover a range of 
types of creativity, from blue-skies research (top of the table) to product implementation (at 
the bottom of the table).  As there were no ‘hard and fast’ definitions of what was meant by 
innovation, nor are all forms of product initiation likely to require the same levels of 
innovation, it was unsurprising that there were some contradictory results.  However, despite 
these contradictory results, there were some clear trends in terms of culture trait values vs. 
levels of creativity.  From a synthesis and evaluation of the literature on creativity and 
innovation, taking into account the ‘majority vote’ from Table 3-1, it appeared that: 
• High creativity – research and early innovation (original thinking):  These 
benefited from high individualism, low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance (but 
this may not have had a large effect) and low-to-medium diversity (optimum of under 
30% non-nationals). 
The results with regard to masculinity were extremely inconsistent, with optimal 
values varying from low to high; however, evaluations such as that of D’Iribane (and 
Hofstede’s supporting comments) suggested that low masculinity resulted in group-
think that prevented beneficial conflict and exploration of options.  Overall, a medium-
high masculinity (optimum score of approximately 70) appeared to be the optimum, 
avoiding both group-think and excessive conflict. 
• Medium creativity/innovation:  The results appeared to show benefit from medium/-
high individualism, low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance (again, this 
probably has only a limited effect); no results with regard to diversity.  Masculinity 
appeared to have little effect on performance. 
• Low creativity process and product improvement (implementation):  These 
appeared to benefit from low individualism, high power distance, high masculinity and 
high uncertainty avoidance.  No results were available for diversity, although it 
appeared unlikely that the wider breadth of knowledge and experience that diversity 
could bring would counteract for the loss in output due to reduced communication.   
• Projects associated with complex social issues:  Based on the many qualitative 
analyses of the high failure rates of large, complex projects, the greatest single cause 
of failure appeared to be communication and understanding.  It appeared likely that 
low masculinity project teams would perform significantly better in terms of communi-
cation, compromise-seeking and working together than high masculinity teams. 
Note that there appeared to be interactions between cultural traits, for example:  
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• Low masculinity might counteract the positive effects of high-individualism/low-
uncertainty avoidance (willingness to disagree, to think differently) when in a situation 
that demanded creative thinking. 
• Low individualism might counteract the negative effects of high masculinity 
(aggressive competitiveness) when in the low-innovation stage of product 
implementation. 
These interactions could add to the complexity of forecasting performance on the basis of 
culture. 
To summarise the above:  It appeared that, as the requirements placed on a team shifted 
from original thinking, high creativity activities to low innovation, routine activities (e.g. minor 
product or process improvements), the optimum team cultural traits shifted from high 
individualism, low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance to low individualism (high 
collectivism), high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance. 
With regard to masculinity, the picture was less clear than with the other cultural dimensions. 
Low masculinity appeared to impede the expression of original, novel ideas, and high 
masculinity appeared to benefit the performance of relatively routine team requirements.  In 
the case of projects with complex social issues, qualitative evidence suggested that reduced 
masculinity enhanced the likelihood of success. 
 
Figure 3-2: Estimate of optimum culture values for innovation teams from the literature review 
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Figure 3-2 presents an initial estimate of the optimum culture scores based on the literature 
review of innovation teams.  The reviewed studies of higher creativity situations, presented 
some contradictory results, in particular with regard to masculinity (MAS). 
Finally, the lack of a widely-accepted framework for categorising creativity-related activities 
see next subsection) has made the task of this part of the literature review more difficult. 
ix) Concerns associated with the validity of published study results 
Lack of a practicable research/creativity/innovation framework 
As stated earlier, the author found it difficult to place the various studies (and their results) in 
the spectrum of creative/innovative activities, as there was wide variation in the studies’ 
usage of creativity/innovation-linked terms.  Many innovation frameworks have been 
proposed, but these were typically too limited in scope or too complex.  A framework was 
needed that enabled the positioning of innovation-related activities, rather than the planning 
and execution of such activities.  Taking into account the eastern and western viewpoints 
introduced in the discussion at the beginning of this subsection on creativity and innovation 
(3.3.1(a)), three potentially independent activities or processes could be identified – 
searching for truth, creativity/lateral thinking/invention, and adaptation to needs/markets; 
these or similar groupings could form the basis of a three (or more) dimension framework, 
such as the example illustrated in Figure 3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3:  A potential 3-D framework 
Each of the above three activities could require significantly different skillsets and, as such, 
would probably be optimised in different cultures; however none, in isolation, would benefit 
society.  
The placing of projects and project studies in a multidimensional framework such as that of 
Placing projects in 
a 3-D creativity-
innovation space
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Figure 3-3 would enable improvements in the generalisation of study results, and a conseq-
uent better understanding of the effects of culture on various types and levels of creativity.  
However, note that each of these dimensions could be subject to more detailed structuring. 
Use of patents as a measure of innovation output 
Patenting rates were utilised in many published innovation-related studies as a measure of 
innovation output.  Where patent quality was taken into account, e.g. in terms of citations and 
income generated, patents may have represented a reasonable measure of innovation.  
However, the number of patents has been increasing dramatically over recent years, 
particularly in the Far East – in 2012, Asian countries filed 56% of all patents and 70% of all 
industrial designs.  A large proportion of patents refer to minor design features that serve to 
block rivals from competing, for example ‘icons with rounded corners’ and ‘mobile phone 
responses to finger-tapping on a touch sensitive screen’.  The key implication of the above 
changes is that raw patent data for recent years has been showing a decreasing correlation 
with innovation levels; a recent study by Efrat (2014) revealed a negative correlation between 
innovation and individualism based on raw patents (the opposite of most previous study 
results). 
How culture affects creativity and innovation behaviours 
The above two concerns would have reduced the accuracy of results to some extent.  
However, in some cases, results for apparently similar levels of innovation were the reverse 
of each other - for example, in the cases of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.  It is 
difficult to explain such opposing results merely as ‘inaccuracies’. 
b) Student groups 
Students could be considered to be representative of the sociotechnical system design team 
members of the future; also, the availability of multiple groups with similar targets in similar 
settings provided the equivalent of controlled laboratory experiments.  Although many 
academic publications on student groups were retrieved, very few quantitative analyses of 
the effects of culture on group performances were found, as most studies examined other 
variables than performance, for example self-efficacy and satisfaction; these have been 
found to be poor predictors of performance, in particular creative performance (Paletz, Peng, 
Erez, & Maslach, 2003).  In other cases, studies have split student groups into two 
categories – homogenous and culturally-diverse, e.g. Daily et al. (1997), Watson et al. 
(1993); such a split was too coarse to capture the nuances associated with the varying 
degrees and different aspects of cultural diversity.  Published studies of student group 
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performance are examined in the following paragraphs. 
D.C. Thomas (1999) studied 24 undergraduate student groups, each of which was tasked to 
evaluate five business case studies. He reported that culturally homogeneous groups 
produced better quality solutions for all five case studies than did culturally heterogeneous 
groups; no improvement in the relative performances of the heterogeneous occurred over the 
period of the study.  Cultural distance was used as a measure of diversity , but was only 
measured in terms of collectivism/individualism, based on an eight-item scale developed by 
Maznevski et al. (1997). 
Dahlin et al. (2005) studied 19 MBA student teams, each of which was tasked to carry out 
four case study analyses.  They reported that national diversity had a ‘U’ shaped relationship 
with range of information use, but an inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship with depth and integ-
ration of information use.  Range of information had ramifications for the size of the potential 
solution space, i.e. for the level of creativity of a group; depth and integration probably had 
greater ramifications for detailed design and implementation.  Blau’s index (Blau, 1977), 
which was based on the relative proportions of different nationalities rather than the cultural 
difference between them12, was used to calculate both educational and national diversity. 
Goncalo & Staw’s (2006) study of the effects of individualism on the creativity of undergrad-
uate student groups involved priming them to act individualistically or collectivistically, then 
instructing them to act creatively or practically.  Individualistic groups, when instructed to be 
creative, were more creative than collectivistic (low-IDV) groups in both the number of ideas 
generated and the creative quality of the ideas selected. 
Wodehouse et al. (2011) examined the effects of average national culture scores on the 
concept design performance (concept generation and selection) of culturally-diverse student 
groups.  For idea generation, individualism (positive) was the strongest factor, followed by 
uncertainty avoidance (negative), then power distance (negative).  For idea selection (from 
the previously-generated idea set), individualism (positive) was again the strongest factor, 
followed by power distance (negative), then uncertainty avoidance (negative).  Masculinity 
appeared to have little effect on the results.  Surprisingly, the authors did not take the 
opportunity to examine the effects of different levels of cultural diversity in the groups. 
The above student group results are summarised in Table 3-2; it appeared that the most 
                                            
12 As a result, Blau’s index is insensitive to actual cultural differences within and between teams.  A 
team consisting of three very similar nationalities (e.g. German, Austrian and Swiss-German 
members) would have the same Blau’s index score as a team consisting of three very different 
nationalities (e.g. Japanese, Serbian and Costa Rican members). 
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creative student groups were high in individualism, low in power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance.  Masculinity appeared to have little effect, and the results for cultural diversity 
were inconclusive. 
Researchers Group and task types 
Optimum cultural dimension scores 
(low, moderate, high, or [optimum 
value]) 
PDI IDV MAS UAI Diversity 
Thomas (1999) Undergraduate student groups, business 
case studies. N/E* N/E N/E N/E 0 
Dahlin et al. (2005) 
 
MBA student groups, business case studies 
– range of info used. N/E N/E N/E N/E 
Low or                                           
high** (‘U’) 
MBA student groups, business case studies 
– depth & integration of information. N/E N/E N/E N/E Mod*** (‘∩’) 
Goncalo & Staw 
(2006) 
Undergraduate student groups, creativity of 
solutions. N/E High N/E N/E N/E 
Wodehouse et al. 
(2011) 
(small sample) 
Student groups, design idea generation Low High Little effect Low N/E 
Student groups, design idea selection Low High Little effect Low N/E 
* N/E: Not evaluated. 
** U-shaped – low and high diversity teams perform better than moderate diversity teams. 
*** Inverted U-shaped – moderately diverse teams perform better than low or high diversity teams. 
Table 3-2: Summary of study results – student groups 
Although the above evaluation of student creativity appeared to confirm the earlier results for 
creativity in academic and industrial teams, there were grounds for caution.  In most or all of 
the cases, collectivist (low individualist) students were at a disadvantage in that they were 
typically situated in a foreign environment; this could have had a negative effect on their 
group performances.  It would therefore be informative to be able to compare the above 
results with those of diverse student groups that were performing in a collectivist 
environment. 
c) Culture, safety and sociotechnical system accidents 
National culture plays a significant role in accident rates (in particular in complex socio-
technical systems such as large transport aircraft, oil refineries and power stations).  There 
are, however, very few quantitative studies of the effects of culture on safety-critical socio-
technical systems other than aircraft, and some of these have been criticised due to the 
potential impacts of external factors that were not taken into account (Strauch, 2010). 
i) Accident rates in commercial aviation 
During the 1990s, an investigation by Boeing revealed a significant relationship between 
national cultures and accident rates of Western-built commercial passenger jet aircraft, even 
after taking account of differing fleets, ground facilities and training.  In particular, Weener’s 
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study of aircraft losses between 1952 and 1992 (E. F. Weener, 1993) linked national scores 
on several of Hofstede’s cultural factors to increases in accidents per million departures.  
Also during the 1990s, Merritt & Helmreich surveyed more than 17,000 airline staff, including 
8,000 pilots, from 23 countries (A. C. Merritt & Helmreich, 1995); the range of staff included 
captains, first officers, flight attendants, maintenance staff, managers and trainers.  Despite 
the large amount of common training across countries (including simulator flight training and 
crew resource management (CRM)), Merritt & Helmreich’s surveys of attitudes amongst the 
8,000 pilots showed close agreement with three of Hofstede’s original national culture results 
for IBM staff - individualism (vs. collectivism), power distance and uncertainty avoidance.  In 
terms of questions relating to their occupation, pilots across all sampled nations were in 
closer agreement than would be expected purely from the above cultural survey results13.  
Nevertheless, in specific areas, Merritt & Helmreich reported significant differences between 
cultural groups; examples of these are listed below:  
• Asian pilots preferred order and predictability, whereas most Anglo and North 
European pilots preferred flexibility and challenging tasks. 
• Anglo and North European pilots were the most willing to make their views known in 
the cockpit, whereas Moroccan, South American and most Asian pilots were the least 
likely to make their views known; this distinction is associated in part with power 
distance.  Unwillingness to draw the captain’s attention to errors or problems has 
been a significant factor in many commercial aviation accidents. 
• Asian and South American pilots were, in general, neutral or agreed that written 
procedures should be provided for all in-flight situations and that rules should be 
obeyed at all times; Anglo pilots strongly disagreed that written procedures should be 
provided for all in-flight situations and also disagreed that rules should be followed 
when the situation suggested otherwise.  
Crew resource management (CRM) training encompassed communication skills, team-
working, situational awareness, problem-solving and decision-making to ensure the optimum 
use of all resources, in particular when working under pressure or operating in unusual 
conditions.  Regular CRM training is now mandatory for commercial flying crew covered by 
most of the World’s regulatory bodies, and is also mandatory for an increasing proportion of 
military crew across the World.  Because of its USA/Northern European origins, CRM is 
culturally bound (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999) as it is based on the assumption of a 
low power distance, high individualism culture where junior members of the crew are willing 
                                            
13 This closer agreement reflected their shared professional (or occupational) culture. 
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to question or challenge the captain.  As a result, flight crews from collectivist, high power 
distance cultures, e.g. South Korea and China, have considerable barriers to overcome in 
order to develop the cultural cockpit environment in which subordinates are willing to 
challenge the captain when they recognize problems or errors.  Harris & Li (2008) 
commented on the much higher commercial aviation accident rates of Asia and Africa 
compared to the USA and Europe, in particular drawing the reader’s attention to the fact that 
in Asia and Africa, the most frequent circumstantial factor in accidents was a failure in crew 
resource management.  An earlier paper of theirs (Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008) described an 
analysis of Taiwanese aircraft accidents that utilised the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS); poor CRM was found to result in a 30-to-40-fold increase in 
decision-making errors, perceptual errors and violations of procedures. 
Jing et al. (2000; 2001) examined accident rate information for airlines around the World 
during the previous twenty years (see http://planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm).  They found that 
the most important cultural variable was authoritarianism, which was positively correlated to 
accident rate and appeared to account for over half the variance (in accident rates) between 
cultures.  From Jing et al.’s descriptions and definitions of authoritarianism, high authoritar-
ianism appeared to be a combination of high power distance and low individualism.  Jing et 
al. stated that authoritarianism was very high in mainland China, Taiwan and Korea; Chinese 
subordinates in the cockpit would typically agree without query to the captain’s demands, 
even if it meant deviating from the standard procedures.  Jing et al. commented that the 
Western designers of most aircraft and systems did not understand authoritarianism or the 
degree to which it distorted aircraft operations. 
Incident reporting programmes such as the American Aviation Safety Action Program 
(ASAP) (Gibbons, Von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2005), the British Confidential Human Factors 
Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) (CHIRP, n.d.) and the British Airways Safety 
Information System (BASIS) (Holtom, 1998), have made significant contributions to the 
reduction of serious aircraft accidents (in terms of losses per million flights), and to the 
improvement of training and standard operational procedures (SOPs). 
The assumption behind incident reporting programmes is that all humans make errors, 
usually unintentionally; therefore aircrew should be encouraged to report errors and incidents 
within a blame-free environment.  Following analysis of these errors and incidents, changes 
can be put in place to prevent them in the future, or to enable their detection and correction 
before a safety issue arises.   However, a significant blame and shame culture exists in many 
Asian organizations, which deters Asian pilots from revealing errors on their own part if there 
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is a perceived risk of being exposed.  In 1999, the Taiwanese government introduced the 
TACARE voluntary incident reporting programme in order to improve the country’s very poor 
airline flight safety record.  The level of incident reporting was low, therefore Lee & Weitzel 
(2003) conducted a study of the usage of TACARE and found that carriers would attempt to 
identify and punish flight crews responsible for (reported) incidents, rather than seek to 
establish and eliminate the root causes of incidents.  Lee & Weitzel also commented in their 
paper that there was a very high power distance between Taiwanese flight crew captains and 
first officers, a cultural factor value known to be strongly, positively correlated with flying 
incidents; this high power distance would also discourage lower ranking officers from 
reporting incidents associated with their captains’ behaviours.  A decade-later review of the 
utilisation of the TACARE system by maintenance personnel (Y.-F. Chen, Metscher, Smith, 
Ramsay, & Mason, 2014) revealed that fear of punishment and lack of feedback still 
discouraged personnel from submitting safety reports. 
It has become clear that Western-designed training, crew resource management and 
incident reporting systems do not fully meet the needs of non-individualist, high power 
distance cultures.   In addition, aircraft cockpit layouts and standard operating procedures 
are based on Western individualist cultural assumptions.  
ii) Accident rates in NATO air forces 
Soeters & Boer (2000) conducted a comparative study of fourteen NATO air forces using 
data based on the years 1988 to 1995.  These air forces used similar or identical aircraft, 
underwent similar training, had common NATO-designed operating procedures and 
regulations, were involved in the exchange of personnel between NATO air forces and took 
part in combined exercises with other NATO countries.  The range of NATO aircraft includes 
single-seat tactical fighters and tactical ground attack aircraft (typically operating in pairs of 
groups of four), two-seat trainers and strategic penetration aircraft and large multiple-crewed 
aircraft; however, all work in a larger team environment (i.e. including command & control).  
Despite the commonality of training, operating procedures and aircraft, strong positive, statis-
tically-validated correlations were found between low individualism, high power distance and 
high uncertainty avoidance scores, and increased accident rates.  It is important to note that 
the NATO standards, regulations, operating procedures, etc., are based on the US/British 
model; this model has built-in assumptions with regard to aircrew cultures, i.e. that they have 
an Anglo culture (which scores high in individualism, low in power distance and low in 
uncertainty avoidance).  
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iii) Automation of sociotechnical systems 
Over recent decades, sociotechnical systems have become increasingly automated, and it is 
therefore worth examining automation-related issues in a separate subsection; a more 
detailed examination can be found in Hodgson, Siemieniuch & Hubbard (2013).  These 
issues go beyond the cultures of specific groups or nationalities, although they are affected 
by certain cultural traits.  It is not feasible to predict all modes of failure in highly automated 
sociotechnical systems; therefore, given the severe consequences of failure, it has been 
necessary to back up these automation systems with humans.  However, this automation 
has brought changes to the activities, workloads, situation awareness and skill levels of 
human operators or crew.  The issues arising from these changes are considered below, with 
particular reference to the aviation environment. 
Automation systems, including flight deck automation, changed the role of the operator from 
that of active, in-the-loop ‘doer’ to that of passive, out-of-the-loop monitor.  Humans proved to 
be poor system monitors of high-reliability systems (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993), 
and they reacted more slowly to deviations than when inside the control loop (Kaber & 
Endsley, 1997).  Crews of highly automated aircraft typically had reduced situation aware-
ness not only with regard to the current ‘flying state’ of the aircraft but also, critically, with 
regard to the detailed mode of the automation system, its constraints and its likely future 
behaviour (Sarter & Woods, 1995a).  
In 1996, a U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) report (Federal Aviation Administration 
Human Factors Team, 1996) stated that systemic vulnerabilities in flight path management 
systems adversely affected crews’ situation awareness and management of automation.  
The level and complexity of flight automation has increased significantly since 1996, and 
even highly-experienced crews are experiencing increasing difficulties with automation 
(Sarter, Mumaw, & Wickens, 2007).  An updated FAA report on flight path management 
systems (FAA, 2013) found that systemic vulnerabilities remained in the design, user training 
and operation of modern flight path management systems; excessive complexity and pilot 
skill degradation had resulted in many incidents and accidents.  Recent examples of such 
incidents and accidents included Hamburg (BFU, 2010), Learmouth (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, 2011) and Schipol (Dutch Safety Board, 2010).  Evidence of flight crew loss 
of skills associated with automation (and automation policy) has been widely reported 
(Ebbatson, Harris, Huddlestone, & Sears, 2010; Ebbatson, 2009; Gillen, 2010; Wood, 2004; 
Young, Fanjoy, & Suckow, 2006).  A recent survey (Zimmermann, Paries, & Amalberti, 2011) 
revealed that commercial pilots and air traffic controllers believed that flight safety was 
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decreasing.  The uncontained engine failure on a Qantas Airbus A380 in 2008 (Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, 2010) and the successful ditching of an Airbus A300 on the River 
Hudson after engine failure in 2008 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010) were 
demonstrations of very high manual skill levels that few of the latest generation of pilots 
possess.  
Researchers have highlighted the paucity and low quality of interaction between crews and 
automation systems (Norman, 1990), the need for context-aware systems that emulate CRM 
principles (Geiselman, Johnson, Buck, & Patrick, 2013) and the need for multisensory feed-
back to crews (Sarter, 2000).  To-date, the automation element of most sociotechnical 
systems has acted as a poorly trained, incommunicative member of the system’s crew – thus 
defeating the purpose of crew resource management (CRM) training.  To replace the loss of 
shared situation awareness resulting from automation, researchers argue that the automated 
system must become to an adequate degree part of the crew (Christoffersen & Woods, 
2002), (G. Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, Hoffman, & Feltovich, 2004).  
Sherman et al. (1997) surveyed the attitudes of a sample of 5,879 airline pilots from 12 
nations towards flight deck automation.  They reported that the influence of national culture 
on the pilots’ agreement (or otherwise) to 15 automation-related questions was far greater 
than that of organizational culture or pilot experience14.  Cultural differences in attitudes to 
automation were important because they affected crew utilisation of automation and their 
levels of trust, manual skills and situation awareness. 
A summary of sociotechnical system automation safety issues:  To-date, increased 
automation of sociotechnical systems, in particular aircraft automation, has resulted in 
changes to primary crew functions from ‘doing’ to ‘monitoring’, reductions in crew situation 
awareness and downgrading of crew ‘hands-on’ skills.  As a result of these changes, when 
failures of automation systems occur, manual recovery is compromised. Developments in 
automation, combined with airline crew flight training policies, are resulting in an increasing 
gap between actual and required crew capability and situation awareness.  In terms of 
Reason’s ‘Safety Space’ model (Reason, 2008), flight automation systems are moving 
rapidly in the direction of increasing vulnerability; similar issues can be found in other 
complex sociotechnical systems, for example nuclear power stations and refineries.  
                                            
14 The author of this thesis carried out a further analysis of Sherman’s results (see Chapter 5 for more 
details) in order to gain further insights, for example ‘More automation is better’ scores were positively 
correlated with national power distance scores, and ‘I prefer automation’ scores were positively 
correlated with national PDI and UAI scores. 
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iv) Accident rates in industry 
Many (but not all) industrial accidents have been associated with team activities.  Infortunio’s 
(2003) study showed that industrial fatal accident rates were correlated with high UAI scores 
and high PDI/IDV ratios but not with MAS scores. Note that Infortunio (on page 115) warned 
that other factors, including country wealth levels, could moderate the results of his study; 
see Subsection III.B.4 of his thesis for further comments on this. 
v) Road traffic accidents 
Although traffic accidents are not typically the result of team activities, they are worth 
studying because the cultural factors associated with road accidents also play a part in other 
forms of accident and failure.  Ozkan & Lajunen’s (2007) study of traffic accident data from 
46 countries identified gross national product (GNP) per capita (negatively related), 
neuroticism and uncertainty avoidance (both positively related) as being significantly 
correlated with accident rates.  Masculinity (positive) and individualism (negative) were 
identified as being correlated to a lesser degree. 
vi) Reaction times to anomalies 
G.A. Klein et al. (1999) stated that personnel with low uncertainty avoidance scores mentally 
‘reframed’ with less information than did personnel with high uncertainty avoidance scores, 
i.e. they responded quicker to anomalies.  In the context of a complex sociotechnical system, 
this could provide valuable additional time in which to respond to a deteriorating situation, 
though it could also lead to false alarms.  
vii) Summary – safety-critical sociotechnical teams 
The results of the review of the effects of national culture on the safety of sociotechnical 
systems are presented in Table 3-3; these include studies of reactions to anomalies.  High 
accident rates appear to be associated with a particular pattern of cultural dimension scores - 
low individualism, high uncertainty avoidance and, in most cases, high power distance 
scores.  In the case of uncertainty avoidance, performance in emergency situations is also 
typically hampered by inadequate practical training and a reluctance to react promptly.  A 
high masculinity score might have been expected to increase the rate of accidents caused by 
competitiveness and bravado, but there is little evidence of this from the statistics, other than 
in (non-team) road accidents.  
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Researchers 
 
Sociotechnical system type 
or reactions to threats and 
anomalies 
Optimum cultural dimension 
scores* (low, high, or 
[optimum value]) 
IDV PDI MAS UAI Diver-
sity 
Jing et al. (2001) Commercial transport aircraft High Low N/E** N/E N/E 
Soeters & Boer 2000) Military aircraft High Low Little 
effect 
Low N/E 
G. A. Klein et al. (1999) Thresholds for quick reactions to 
anomalies 
N/E N/E N/E Low N/E 
Vincent & Dubinsky Maladaptive coping with threats N/E N/E N/E Low N/E 
* Optimum scores: These refer to busy or abnormal situations where the risk to safety is greatest. 
**N/E: Not evaluated. 
Table 3-3: Summary of study results – safety-critical sociotechnical systems 
Finally, a caveat:  Wealth (per-capita GDP) is closely correlated with high IDV; therefore it is 
important to account for wealth before ascribing correlations to cultural traits or scores. 
d) Professional sports teams 
Sport provided an opportunity to study the effects of culture and diversity in depth due to the 
detailed records of multiple projects (i.e. games) for which player details and outcomes were 
available; indeed Kahn (2000) described professional sport as a ‘labour market laboratory’ 
because the life history of every worker (and supervisor) was available (… along with the 
team performance data).  In addition, there were many levels of cultural diversity 
(heterogeneity) across teams in most professional leagues. 
Although many studies have taken place on sports performance and team diversity, very few 
studies have examined the effects of team member national culture on performance. 
i) Football 
Haas & Nüesch collected data on the performance of the (German) Bundesliga from 1999/00 
until 2005/06 (Haas & Nüesch, 2012) and found that increased national diversity resulted in 
reduced team performance.  Haas & Nüesch utilised the Shannon diversity index as the 
basis for calculating diversity15.  On the basis of the researchers’ choice of diversity index, 
the author considers the results to be of limited value.  Note: The author requested access to 
the raw data on which the conclusions were based, but this was not forthcoming. 
In order to further assess the results obtained by Haas & Nüesch (in the absence of further 
data from them), the author obtained aggregate Bundesliga player nationality data for the 
                                            
15 As was the case with Blau’s index (see earlier footnote), the Shannon diversity index was based in 
this case on the number or proportion of different nationalities and was, as a result, insensitive to 
actual cultural differences within and between teams. 
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1999/00 to 2005/06 seasons from a football website (see 
http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/en/2-bundesliga/gastarbeiter/wettbewerb_L2_1999.html and 
linked web pages).  Based on this data, an analysis of the default national cultural dimension 
scores of Bundesliga players was carried out, which is summarised in Table 3-4. 
 
Table 3-4:  Average cultural dimension scores of non-German Bundesliga players 
As can be seen from Table 3-4, over the seven years of Haas & Nüesch’s survey the 
weighted average non-German player individualism (IDV) score was 16 points less than that 
of the Germans, the average power distance (PDI) score was 32 points greater and the 
average masculinity (MAS) score was 20 points less; however, the average non-German 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI) score was only 1.5 points (~1.5%) more than the national 
German uncertainty avoidance score.  It would therefore be reasonable to conclude that, on 
average, high German team national diversity would result in significant differences in team 
individualism, power distance and masculinity scores (but not in uncertainty avoidance 
scores), compared to teams consisting only of German nationals.  The German players’, 
managers’ and coaches’ distrust of foreigners (or ‘strangers’), implied by their higher than 
average uncertainty avoidance scores (G H Hofstede 2001, Ch. 4), would have played a part 
in reducing the effectiveness of integrating non-nationals into Bundesliga teams compared 
to, for example, the case with English Premiership teams.  
Brandes et al. (2009) analysed the effects of national diversity on the performance of 
German Bundesliga teams over the period 2001/02 to 2005/06, as measured by their end-of-
season position in the league.  Despite finding skill differences between nationalities, the 
results of the analysis indicated that these skill differences (and the associated national 
diversities) did not appear to influence team performances over a season.  Brandes et al.’s 
measure of national diversity was similar to that of Haas & Nüesch in that it was based on 
IDV PDI MAS UAI
1999/00 39.8 52.9 66.6 43.7 66.6
2000/01 38.1 49.7 67.4 46.5 66.9
2001/02 38.2 51.3 67.0 46.6 66.5
2002/03 36.9 46.0 69.3 44.9 66.2
2003/04 40.9 47.9 68.7 47.3 69.6
2004/05 40.5 54.8 64.8 47.3 65.7
2005/06 41.6 52.0 65.0 44.5 64.0
50.7 67.0 45.8 66.5
67 35 66 65
-16.3 32.0 -20.2 1.5
German culture scores:
Differences:
Mean weighted cultural dimension scores 
for non-German nationalsSeason
Fraction non-
German (%)
Average non-German culture 
scores over 7 yrs:
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the number of different nationalities and, therefore, did not reflect the cultural distance 
between team individuals.  Brandes et al. determined players’ skillsets from 22 factors (e.g. 
goals scored, assists, tackle success rate, clearances), and found that there were differences 
between nationalities.  One of the problems with these 22 factors was that they were not 
equally applicable to the various player roles, for example, ‘clearances’ were more important 
in the defender role than in the striker role.  Therefore, the associations between these 
factors and team performances were likely to be unclear. 
ii) Hockey teams 
Phillips & Phillips (2011) tested Blau’s paradox of heterogeneity (Blau, 1977) on the USA 
NHL hockey teams over the ten year period from 1988 to 1998.  They confirmed their 
hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between heterogeneity and (winning) performance, i.e. 
low and high heterogeneity teams were found to win more games than moderate heterogen-
eity teams, after taking account of control variables. 
iii) Summary – sports teams 
There were very few quantitative studies on sport, and those that were found had typically 
concentrated on the effects of diversity, and had utilised measures of diversity that took into 
account only the number of different nationalities in a team, rather than the actual cultural 
differences between players (and teams); the results were therefore not very informative.  In 
addition, their results were to some extent contradictory, as can be seen from Table 3-5. 
 
Researchers 
 
Sport and league 
Optimum cultural dimension 
scores (low, high, or 
[optimum value]) 
IDV PDI MAS UAI Diver-
sity 
Haas & Nüesch (2011) Football (German Bundesliga) N/E N/E N/E N/E 0 
Brandes et al. (2009) Football (German Bundesliga) N/E N/E N/E N/E No 
effect 
Phillips & Phillips (2011) Hockey (United States NFL) N/E N/E N/E N/E U* 
N/E: Not evaluated. 
* U-shaped – low diversity and high diversity teams perform better than moderate diversity teams. 
Table 3-5: Summary of study results – team sport 
e) Further issues of relevance to this review 
i) The effects of per-capita income on outcomes 
Per-capita income had a strong negative correlation with accident rates.  For example, two 
research studies demonstrated significant correlations between national power distance 
scores and aircraft accident rates (Ramsden, 1985; E. F. Weener & Russell, 1994); 
Hofstede’s re-analysis of the data (Hofstede 2001, p.115) found per-capita GNP to be the 
dominant variable, rather than power distance.  Similarly, Helmreich and Merritt (2001) drew 
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readers’ attention to the potential effects on accident rates of factors such as facility quality 
and government regulation (pp.104-5). 
ii) Studies that utilised multiple cultural frameworks 
Several published studies on national culture appeared to ‘mix-and-match’ cultural 
dimensions from two or more cultural frameworks, for example that of Hasan & Ditsa (1999).  
Because the introduction of non-orthogonal (i.e. overlapping) dimensions would tend to 
reduce the strengths of relationships between cultural dimensions and outcomes, or even 
reverse them, such studies were for the most part discarded. 
3.3.2 Evidence of the effects of culture on intrateam aspects of 
performance 
This section presents an overview from the literature of the intrateam effects of culture on 
human performance in various team-related situations.  The cultural dimensions referred to 
in the section are primarily the original four of Hofstede’s cultural framework.   
a) Power distance 
In high power distance societies, authority was concentrated in centralised decision-making 
structures, there were deep organisational hierarchies, information flow was constrained by 
these hierarchies (Hofstede 2001, Ch.3) , and there was a lack of informal ’across-the-
hierarchy’ (horizontal) communications (Khatri, 2009).   
Khare (1999) found that that communications between superiors and subordinates in India (a 
high power distance country) were primarily via formal channels.  Kim (1999) found that 
communication in high power distance South Korea was largely top-down, flowing through 
the formal chain of command, with little voluntary feedback on the part of subordinates; 
upwards communication tended to occur primarily as responses to superiors in formal 
settings or to be in the form of indirect, deferential, mitigated speech.  Similarly, Offerman & 
Hellmann (1997) noted that most communication in high power distance settings was in the 
form of commands, i.e. flowing downwards through the formal hierarchy, and that there was 
little delegation of authority.  Indeed, consultation of subordinates in high power distance 
organisations was likely to be construed as a sign of incompetence on the part of the 
superior (Francesco & Chen, 2000).  Subordinates in high power distance organisations 
were typically unwilling to participate in decisions and managers were inundated with routine 
decisions (Khatri, 2009) and likely to suffer role overload (M. F. Peterson et al., 1995).  The 
senior person in a team or group was expected to possess all the knowledge relevant to his 
or her position, even though this was clearly not the case in situations where significant 
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specialisation occurred.  As a result, levels of subordinate-initiated communication were low 
(Khatri, 2009), decisions were made autocratically (Terzi, 2011) and implemented more 
quickly than in a typical low power distance organisation due to lack of consultation (Graf, 
Hemmasi, Lust, & Liang, 1990); however, such decisions were likely to be suboptimal 
(Khatri, 2009), and employees typically dared not point out errors or mistakes. 
In low power distance societies, employees expressed a preference for consultation, 
communication typically flowed freely up and down the formal hierarchy and authority for 
most decisions was typically delegated to those with the relevant knowledge (Hofstede 2001, 
Ch.3).  Indeed, attempts to implement decisions without consultation in low power distance 
workplaces could potentially result in employee resistance (Brockner, 2001).  Xie et al. 
(2009) examined the effects of culture on communication effectiveness, finding that low 
power distance participants were more effective at communication with interaction (as in a 
work situation) than were high power distance participants.  However, there was typically 
more role ambiguity in low power distance organisations (M. F. Peterson et al., 1995), which 
could lead to higher job stress. 
Helmreich and Merritt’s five-year survey of commercial airline staff from 23 countries 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 2001) revealed that low power distance crew members were willing to 
make their views known to their captains, whereas high power distance crew members found 
it much more difficult to raise issues with their captains, even when these were safety-related 
issues.  Asian and South American crews were low in individualism, and this discouraged 
them further from drawing their captain’s attention to errors, as there was also the major 
issue of loss of face to contend with.  
High power distance once offered stability to communities, as every member of society knew 
his or her position; however, in advanced societies it discouraged some of the most able 
people from contributing fully to their organisations, because their potentially useful ideas 
might never be aired.  As a result, decisions tended to be suboptimal, due to the reduced 
range of options under consideration, and might be seriously flawed due to the unwillingness 
of subordinates to point out errors.  High power distance also discouraged spontaneous 
communication between subordinates and leaders; in time-critical situations, for example in 
the case of sociotechnical system emergencies, resulting in reduced shared situation 
awareness.  
To summarise the above:  In high power distance societies and organisations, manage-
ment and decision-making tended to be strongly centralised with little delegation of authority 
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or discussion with subordinates – this could result in suboptimal decisions, quickly taken; 
communication was primarily down the hierarchy, with little cross- or upwards communication 
(of facts or opinions) by subordinates; shared understandings or shared situation awareness 
would typically be low because of the resulting lack of interaction.  In low power distance 
societies and organisations, management and decision-making tended to be much more 
consensus-based, with delegation of authority to the most capable person, and decisions 
would be discussed with subordinates; communication typically flowed up and down the 
hierarchy, promoting continuous or frequent interactions and improved shared under-
standings or shared situation awareness. 
b) Individualism 
Members of high individualism societies considered ‘speaking one’s mind’ as reflecting 
honesty, whereas members of low individualism (i.e. collectivist) societies considered that 
the maintenance of harmony and the avoidance of direct confrontation should always take 
precedence (Hofstede 2001, Ch.5, p,236).  As a result, team members from high individ-
ualism societies typically communicated in a direct, low context manner, where the intended 
meaning was in the message, whereas team members from low individualism (high collec-
tivism) societies typically communicated in an indirect, high context manner, where only a 
small part of the meaning was in the message itself, the remainder was inferred from 
contextual references and pre-existing knowledge (Ting-Toomey, 1988).  Although high 
context indirect communication ensured the maintenance of harmony and reduced the risk of 
loss of face, it had negative consequences, in particular for urgent safety-critical communi-
cations, as it could lead to reduced shared situation awareness at critical times. For example, 
a low individualism subordinate, on detecting an error on the part of his or her superior, could 
not typically point this out, but had to attempt to draw the superior’s attention to the error in 
such a way that the superior discovered it for himself or herself.  This error discovery process 
could take a considerable period of time, and could involve the attention of several members 
of the team (e.g. aircrew, nuclear power station operators) at a critical time; an aircrew might 
only resort to direct communication with their captain when seconds away from a fatal crash; 
evidence for this was found in flight recorder voice recordings, for example National Trans-
portation Safety Board (2000).  One potential explanation for such behaviour came in the 
form of theories about chronically-accessible emotion-related schemas that were based on 
cultural norms (Weber & Morris, 2010)16; frequent activation of such schemas could lead to 
them taking precedence over important action schemas that had been acquired through 
                                            
16 The habitual activation of any construct in one’s everyday environment leads to chronic accessibility 
(Bargh, 1984; Higgins, 1996). 
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training and practice.  This was probably the case with face maintenance schemas 
associated with members of many Far-Eastern societies. 
A further effect of the need to maintain harmony in low individualism societies was that a 
need for consensus discouraged individuals from ‘going against the flow’, for example to 
suggest ideas that differed significantly from those that the majority were pursuing.  This 
consensus had an effect on such societies’ approaches to innovation, resulting in a focus on 
market-orientated incremental developments and improvements, rather than on novel ideas 
and products; in countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, such a focus was highly 
successful, and has proved difficult to replicate in the West.  Erez & Nouri (2010) identified 
the differences between the innovation approaches and goals of Eastern (collectivist) 
societies and Western (individualist) societies in terms of creativity-as-useful/appropriate vs. 
creativity-as-novel.  The low-individualist consensus that led to reduced novelty in ideas 
proved beneficial when it came to implementing an agreed course of action, as all members 
typically worked hard to achieve the associated plans. 
Many scholars have implied that trust is higher in collectivist countries than in individualist 
countries, because of the greater importance that collectivists place on interpersonal relation-
ships (C. C. Chen, Chen, & Meindl, 1998; Etzioni, 1996).  However, this has not appeared to 
be the case in recent surveys. Realo & Allik (2009) found that trust was higher in individualist 
societies when measured in terms of social capital.  Huff & Kelly (2003) investigated trust of 
in-groups and out-groups exhibited by American individuals and by individuals of six Asian 
countries, and found that USA individualists exhibited higher trust of both in-group and out-
group individuals and organisations than did Asian collectivists.  The results of an earlier 
cross-national survey of Japanese and American respondents by Yamagashi & Yamagashi 
(1994) indicated that American respondents were more trusting of people in general than 
were the Japanese.  The relationships between individualism and trust were complicated by 
the fact that another cultural dimension, uncertainty avoidance, also affected the propensity 
to trust. 
To summarise the above:  Low individualism (or high collectivism) reduced the speed and 
clarity of communications in teams, and also tended to reduce creativity in teams due to the 
drive for harmony and the need to avoid conflict.  However, the harmony and commitment 
that low individualism engendered enabled teams to perform very effectively at lower 
creativity tasks.  Low individualism also reduced shared situation awareness in organised 
action teams due to issues of face maintenance. It was not clear as to the role that trust 
played in team performances, but it appeared that trust in others (not the same as trust in 
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others’ abilities) was higher amongst high individualism individuals than amongst low 
individualism individuals. 
c) Masculinity 
Hofstede (2001, Ch.6, p.318)  described low masculinity employees as ‘working in order to 
live’, valuing working conditions and social relationships more than performance, under-
selling themselves, being unwilling to relocate their families to enhance their careers and 
preferring the achievement of quality of working life.  He described high masculinity 
employees (in particular, managers) as ‘living in order to work’, valuing interesting work, 
performance and pay more than working conditions and social relationships, overselling 
themselves, being competitive and willing to relocate their families in order to enhance their 
careers. 
Low masculinity (high femininity) appears to produce some of the behaviours of low individ-
ualism, in particular compromise-seeking activities; such behaviours are beneficial to team-
working, but suppress the generation and discussion of contentious issues or novel ideas.  
Medium-to-high masculinity appears to encourage the generation and presentation of novel 
ideas in a team situation.   As stated by Hofstede, one of the attributes of a high masculinity 
society is a high level of competition.  It was therefore surprising that little evidence was 
found that high masculinity contributed to industrial or aircraft accident rates.  It was also 
surprising to find, from a study of medical communication across ten European countries 
(Meeuwesen, van den Brink-Muinen, & Hofstede, 2009) that general practitioners in high 
masculinity countries devoted more of their time to psychosocial issues (responding to the 
emotional issues of patients) and were more satisfied with their work than was the case with 
practitioners in low masculinity countries.  In their three-decade multi-level review of the 
application of Hofstede’s cultural framework, Taras, Kirkman & Steel (2010) examined the 
relationships between Hofstede’s original four dimensions and a wide range of organisat-
ionally relevant outcomes.  They found that masculinity was strongly correlated with a 
preference for a compromising approach to conflict management, rather than an avoiding or 
confrontational approach, or cooperation with opponents. 
Helmreich & Merritt’s survey of more than 15,000 civil aircraft crew (2001, p.249) found that, 
although the crew power distance, individualism and (to a slightly lesser extent) uncertainty 
avoidance scores were reasonably correlated with Hofstede’s original IBM country scores, 
their masculinity scores were not significantly correlated with Hofstede’s original scores.  
Soeters (1997) utilised Hofstede’s Value Surveys Module to carry out a survey of student-
officers at thirteen European military academies.  Surprisingly, the masculinity scores were 
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all lower, in most cases much lower, than the standard scores for the student officers’ civilian 
compatriots, and were in almost a random ranking compared to the standard Hofstede 
scores.  There may be certain exceptional issues in play, for example a particularly high level 
of self-selection for both civil aviation pilots and military officers, but there may be more 
fundamental questions about the nature of this masculinity dimension. 
To summarise the above:  Masculinity appeared to play a part in generating (or at least 
ensuring the presentation of) novel ideas in high creativity teams due to the associated 
competitiveness and willingness to engage in conflict behaviour (this would also ensure rapid 
communication), but high masculinity could lead to excessive intra-team conflict.  However, 
there were conflicting results from surveys that utilised default national culture scores, and 
cultural value surveys of civil aircraft crew and military officers revealed that actual scores for 
this dimension tended to conform less to default national scores than was the case with other 
dimensions. 
d) Uncertainty avoidance 
Compared to members of high uncertainty-avoidance societies, members of low uncertainty-
avoidance societies were lower stressed, less anxious, more open to change and innovation, 
curious about, rather than frightened of, what was different, and were more tolerant of 
diversity, (Hofstede 2001, Ch.4, p.161).  High uncertainty avoidance societies coped with the 
many things beyond human control by reducing apparent uncertainties, e.g. by introducing 
many laws and rules and by adherence to clearly-defined procedures, rituals, etc.  
Offerman & Hellman’s (1997) survey of the attitudes of mid-level managers of a multinational 
organisation from 39 countries revealed that high uncertainty avoidance was significantly 
associated with managers maintaining control, refusing to delegate and lacking 
approachability. 
Joy & Kolb (2009) carried out a research investigation into the effects of cultural dimension 
scores on preferred learning styles.  They reported that students and teachers in high 
uncertainty avoidance societies preferred abstract conceptualization and reflective observa-
tion, whereas those in low uncertainty avoidance societies were comfortable with concrete 
experience and active experimentation, e.g. training exercises with realistic role play.  
Effective mental schemas for dealing with situations such as accidents and emergencies 
could only be developed via realistic role play, so this reluctance had implications for the 
safety of complex sociotechnical systems.  Burke et al. (2008) examined data from 68 
organizations from 14 nations in order to assess the effectiveness of training in reducing 
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accidents and injuries; they found that workers from high uncertainty avoiding nations were 
less well engaged with safety training, that their training was less effective in reducing 
accidents and injuries and that they responded to critical situations in a rigid manner.  Burke 
et al.’s results support those of Joy & Kolb. 
High uncertainty-avoiding Asian and South-American pilots in Helmreich & Merritt’s survey of 
commercial airline staff (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001, p.84) were either neutral to or agreed 
with the statement that written procedures should be provided for all in-flight situations and 
that rules should be obeyed at all times, whereas low uncertainty-avoiding Anglo pilots 
strongly disagreed with this statement.  This tendency of personnel from high uncertainty-
avoiding societies to follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) more closely than 
personnel from low uncertainty-avoiding societies when running complex sociotechnical 
systems (such as airliners) could reduce the likelihood of errors – a significant benefit in 
normal operating situations, in maintenance activities and in routine manufacturing situations.  
However, such personnel would typically persist in following these SOPs (or organisational 
rules) when they were no longer relevant to the situation (Beckmann, Menkhoff, & Suto, 
2008; Helmreich & Merritt, 2001).  Vincent and Dubinsky (2004) examined the response-to-
threat reactions of students from USA (low-to-medium uncertainty avoidance) and France 
(high uncertainty avoidance) when faced with threat situations; they reported that the French 
students exhibited more maladaptive coping than did the USA students.   
G. Klein et al. (1999) stated that tolerance for uncertainty (the inverse of uncertainty 
avoidance) influenced the threshold for initial reaction to an anomaly; this was because 
problem detection took place when the observer mentally reframed his/her understanding of 
a situation; see G. A. Klein et al. (2005) for a more detailed discussion of problem detection.  
Personnel with low uncertainty avoidance scores (high tolerance for uncertainty) changed to 
a new initial understanding (i.e. reframed) with less information than did personnel with high 
uncertainty avoidance scores; although this lower information threshold could lead to more 
false alarms, it alerted an individual to anomalies at an earlier stage.  The differences in 
capability or willingness to deal with uncertainty and unexpected change extended beyond 
the environment of fast-reaction organised action teams and crews.  
Barr & Glynn (2004) administered a survey to 276 participants on graduate or executive 
management courses (47% U.S. citizens, the remainder from Europe and the Far East).  The 
aim of the survey was to assess the participants’ responses to threats and opportunities 
associated with strategic issues. They were particularly interested in participants’ 
associations between indicators of controllability and threats or opportunities.  Their results 
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indicated that participants from high uncertainty avoiding cultures more strongly associated 
lack of controllability attributes with threats than did those from low uncertainty avoiding 
cultures.  Much weaker associations were found based on the power distance, individualism 
and masculinity cultural dimensions.  These results have implications for the performance of 
high innovation teams where, due to the presence of ‘unknowns’, controllability is reduced.  
Indeed, Cozzi & Giordani’s (2011) analysis of the effects of ambiguity aversion on countries’ 
R&D performances (referred to earlier in this thesis) showed that high UAI personnel and 
organisations were less effective at R&D, with its potential outcome uncertainties and 
ambiguities. 
To summarize the above: High uncertainty avoiding cultures preferred order and routine, in 
teaching, training, employment and life in general.  They were poor at dealing with 
uncertainty and disliked to ‘venture into the unknown’, and this had a negative effect on their 
creativity.  Personnel with high uncertainty avoidance scores tended not to delegate, lacked 
approachability (affecting communications).  They followed SOPs more closely than 
personnel with low scores, which was beneficial to sociotechnical system safety under 
normal operating conditions.  However, high uncertainty avoidance scores tended to hamper 
decision-making in response to rare emergencies because of reduced situation awareness 
(due to a lack of realistic training), delayed problem detection and reaction (due to an 
unwillingness to mentally reframe) and an unwillingness to abandon inappropriate SOPs. 
e) Cultural diversity 
Researchers have long claimed that the multiple perspectives of cultural diversity provided 
the potential for higher team creative performance, as suggested by Cox & Blake’s ‘value-in-
diversity’ hypothesis, and could also reduce ‘groupthink’ (Cox & Blake 1991).  Nemeth (1986) 
found that the level of critical analysis relating to decisions amongst alternatives was higher 
in groups that included minority views than in groups that did not, resulting in improved 
decision processes.  McLeod et al. (1996) found that ethnically diverse groups produced 
better quality ideas on brainstorming tasks than did ethnically homogeneous groups.   
In contrast to the above, Thomas (1999) found that homogenous teams outperformed 
multicultural teams in a range of tasks, and Wolf (2002) reported on the unexpected 
problems that managers had faced with multicultural teams.  Hambrick (1998) reported that 
the performance outcomes of multicultural teams had generally been discouraging, 
particularly in situations that involved coordinative tasks; the promising areas for multicultural 
teams appeared to be in creative tasks, where heterogeneity in values and cognition could 
be beneficial.  Vodosek ( 2007) investigated the mediation roles of intra-group relationship, 
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process and task conflict on the relationships between cultural diversity and science research 
group outcomes; he found that cultural diversity was positively associated with all three forms 
of conflict, which were in turn associated with unfavourable group outputs.   
Niebuhr (2010) carried out a regression analysis of innovation performance in the various 
German regions; this indicated that diverse cultural backgrounds in the workforce might 
enhance research & development performance.  Kochan et al. (2003) investigated the effects 
of race and gender diversity on performance, but found few direct positive or negative 
effects.  Earley & Mosakowski ( 2000) investigated the performance of five teams whose 
members had a wide diversity in nationalities, but had similar educational and work back-
grounds; they found that there were greater communication and conflict problems in 
moderately heterogeneous teams than in highly heterogeneous teams; they explained their 
results in terms of Lau & Murnighan’s (1998) faultline concept.  However, Earley & 
Mosakowski based their measure of heterogeneity or diversity on the proportions of different 
nationalities (e.g. as in Shannon’s or Blau’s index), rather than on the degree of cultural 
distance between team members.  Elron (1997) examined the effects of cultural diversity on 
the performance of top management teams (TMTs) at 121 subsidiaries of multinational 
companies.  He assigned Hofstede’s default country scores to team members, and 
calculated team cultural diversities based on statistical measures of mean and variance.  
Elron found a positive relationship between cultural diversity and TMT performance; in 
particular, he found that only diversity in individualism and masculinity were significant for 
team performance, whereas diversity in uncertainty avoidance was a significant factor for 
intra-team disagreements. 
Horwitz & Horwitz (2007) carried out a meta-analysis based on a set of 78 correlations 
obtained from 35 journal articles on teams; they considered both task-related diversity 
(functional expertise, education and organisational tenure) and bio-demographic diversity 
(age, gender and race/ethnicity).  They found a positive impact for task-related diversity, but 
none for bio-demographic diversity (of which race/ethnicity could be associated to culture).  
Stahl et al. (2007) carried out a meta-analysis of 80 empirical studies of multicultural teams; 
they concluded that cultural diversity caused process losses due to reduced communication, 
reduced social interaction and increased conflict, but that these losses could be partially 
offset by increased creativity.  They later carried out a further meta-analysis of 108 empirical 
studies (Stahl et al. 2010); they concluded that cultural diversity led to process losses 
through increased task conflict and reduced social integration (in particular, for co-located 
teams), but led to process gains due to increased creativity and satisfaction; no clear 
relationship between cultural diversity and overall performance could be demonstrated. 
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Note that almost all the above-considered teams were ‘conventional’ teams, e.g. 
management teams, R&D teams or design teams, where minor delays and temporary 
misunderstandings due to cultural differences would not (in themselves) have a major effect 
on team performances.  In the case of organised action teams, e.g. aircraft crews, 
firefighters, military teams, oil platform crews and surgical teams, emergency response time 
requirements would be much shorter, and communication accuracy and speed would be of 
paramount importance.  The communication delays and losses that are inherent to multi-
cultural teams, e.g. due to native language differences, differing forms of speech (direct, 
context-independent vs. indirect, context-dependent), differing ‘face’ issues, etc., could be 
disastrous in periods of high cognitive load.  Orasanu et al. (1997) examined incident reports 
from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in order to ascertain the relationships 
between communication and flight safety; they found three main categories that led to error – 
poor transmission (due to inadequate language skills), ambiguous context, and inadequate 
understanding (the latter two largely because of cultural differences); although the misunder-
standings  that arise from faulty communications can occur between team members of the 
same culture, Orasanu et al. stated that they were much more likely between team members 
of differing cultures.  In contrast to the above, Merritt & Ratwatte (1997) suggested that multi-
culturality in crews might result in less complacency, adherence to best crew resource 
management practices and greater precision in their communications. 
Note that the most commonly used measures of cultural diversity appeared to be based on 
the proportions of different nationalities in the teams (e.g. as in Blau’s Index or the Shannon 
Index) rather than being based on the cultural differences between these nationalities.  As a 
result, studies of multicultural teams (discussed elsewhere in this thesis) could be expected 
to contribute to widely varying results that would potentially mask any underlying relation-
ships.  
To summarise the above:  The literature was to some extent contradictory, but the 
performance results were predominantly negative, compared to homogeneous teams.  
However, for teams working in non-time-critical situations, a degree of cultural diversity could 
enable the wider range of experience, knowledge and views that are properties of multi-
cultural teams, to contribute to improved decision options and greater team creativity.  For 
example, in a high technology research environment (e.g. cosmology, particle physics or 
mathematics), a powerful professional culture, complete with its own symbolism and 
language, would form the basis of effective communication and common understandings, 
irrespective of the national cultures of individual team members.  However, for organised 
action teams, the communication losses associated with multicultural team members could 
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reduce the teams’ abilities to handle exceptions and emergencies. 
3.3.3 Summarising evidence of the effects of culture on both external 
and intra-team aspects of team performance 
In this subsection, the areas of external team and intra-team performance affected by team 
member cultures are summarised based on Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.  These are 
grouped under five headings.  Note that these are tendencies only - individuals from the 
same cultural group can display opposite cultural tendencies.  
a) Management and decision-making 
Culture (as measured via the power distance, individualism and uncertainty avoidance 
scores) has a major effect on subordinate/superior relationships.  Some tasks and missions 
are best served by high power distance, authoritarian, strongly centralised management, for 
example highly automated factory systems or missions involving large military manoeuvres; 
others, for example complex decisions requiring wide or deep knowledge are typically best 
served by the consensus-based decentralised, delegating management  that tends to be a 
feature of low power distance, low uncertainty-avoiding cultures.  In some environments 
performance is best served by the rigid adherence to rules or standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) that tend to be a feature of high uncertainty-avoiding cultures, e.g. in many 
production and maintenance environments; in other environments, the ability to recognise 
when to abandon rules or SOPs may ‘save the day’, for example, when an aircraft is no 
longer operating within its normal flight envelope.  Where it is important to recognise and 
correct errors (particularly if time is a factor), the improved team communication of low power 
distance, low uncertainty avoiding cultures, and the context-free communication of high 
individualism cultures combine to provide prompt accurate responses.  
b) Creativity and innovation 
Some team goals require an ability to produce (and present) a large number of ideas, go 
against the consensus and engage in a degree of conflict; others require an ability to take 
new ideas forward towards usable concepts; yet others require an ability to implement 
existing technologies into products and processes; in this latter situation, disciplined concen-
tration on the task in hand is better than constantly exploring new ideas.  Culture, via 
pressure to conform, willingness to speak out and attitudes to uncertainty, has a 
considerable effect on creativeness. 
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c) Interaction (communication and co-ordination within the team) 
Some team situations require rapid, accurate communication and continuous co-ordination, 
best achieved with low power distance, high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance; 
other team situations require complex but non-time-critical communication, where cultural 
factors are less critical, although high power distance will still impede contributions from 
subordinates.  Cultures, due to face issues (in the case of low individualism) and status 
issues (in the case of high power distance), vary widely in the degree to which rapid, direct, 
factual communication can occur.  Cultural diversity impedes accurate communication, due 
to differences in default assumptions and language. 
d) Handling uncertainty and dealing with failures 
Some environments and team goals result in highly predictable activities and/or outcomes; 
other environments result in highly unpredictable activities and/or outcomes that must be 
accommodated by the team or crew.  Cultures (in particular, as measured by their 
uncertainty avoidance scores) vary greatly in their capabilities to deal with uncertainty. 
e) Situation awareness 
Some team situations require an ability to reframe and react early based on anomalous cues, 
others are best served by a preference to stick to standard procedures until there is no 
alternative but to change.  Culture, in particular uncertainty avoidance, heavily influences the 
communication, training and reframing activities that are required for effective situation 
awareness.  Power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and cultural diversity affect 
the communications that are vital part of transforming individual situation awareness into joint 
or shared situation awareness. 
Summarising the evidence from 3.3.1(c) and from 3.3.2, Figure 3-4 captures the key relation-
ships between culture and sociotechnical team performance (e.g. aircrews, oil platform 
operators) when under stress, e.g. due to emergencies or system failure.  
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Figure 3-4:  Relationships between culture dimension scores and sociotechnical team 
performance under stress 
Despite the large amount of evidence that is available on the effects of culture on team 
performance, it is worth remembering Hofstede’s cautions to his readers.  Hofstede (1993), 
p.89, stated that culture was a construct, i.e. that it was not directly accessible to 
observation, but could only be inferred from verbal statements and other behaviours; it 
should only have been used where it proved to be useful, and should have been bypassed 
where behaviours could have been predicted without it.  He went on to remind the reader 
that his cultural dimensions were also constructs that could be used as tools that might, or 
might not, clarify a situation. 
3.4 Tools that are available to evaluate ‘other culture’ teams and 
multicultural teams 
The primary objective of this part of the literature review was to identify any existing 
frameworks, tools etc., as a potential basis for the adaptation or development of a culture-
based team performance prediction tool, and to identify what gaps were present.  A key 
requirement was that any method or tool should not depend on knowledge about individuals 
in post (e.g. actual team members) as, in most cases where the tool would be used, such 
information would not be available; only team member national culture, organisation or 
organisation type and, potentially, team member training or educational level would be 
available in most cases.  
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In the case that the literature review revealed researchers that had devised a significantly 
different approach (from that shown in Figure 3-5) to the prediction or assessment of team 
performance of specific tasks or roles based on their cultural traits, then such an approach 
would, of course, be examined in detail. 
Expanded descriptions of the material in this section can be found in Appendix 1E. 
3.4.1 Methods, models and tools for the prediction of team performance 
or allocation of tasks based on national culture 
The purpose of this section was to review methods, models and tools that could predict (or 
could be adapted in whole or part to predict) team performances at key tasks based primarily 
on national culture.  Such tools would carry out most or all of the functions illustrated in 
Figure 3-5.  Due to the sparsity of material on national culture, the review was extended to 
include organisational culture and safety culture-based models and tools. 
 
Figure 3-5:   A generic flow diagram of a potential method or tool for predicting team 
performance based on culture 
Note that the flow diagram of Figure 3-5 represented a first attempt to identify, at a generic 
level, the information and processes that might be required to achieve some measure of 
culture-based team performance prediction (whether qualitative or quantitative); this was not 
intended to preclude an alternative approach. 
a) National culture models and tools 
Only one academic peer-reviewed publication was found on national culture-based methods, 
Determine (some 
measure of) individual 
and team cultural traits
Determine capability or 
behaviour requirements* 
for key tasks
Determine (some 
measure of) alignment 
between cultural traits 
and capability or 
behaviour requirementsActual or proposed team 
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education levels Predicted team 
fit or team 
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* This refers to capabilities or 
behaviours that are associated with 
(and affected by) culture, rather than 
those associated with technical skills.
Note: This diagram is intentionally 
unspecific, as it is not clear at this stage 
what frameworks, methods or tools are 
available to utilise or whether, indeed, an 
alternative approach might be found.
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models or tools for the prediction of team performance or the allocation of tasks.  This 
publication, by Sivakumar & Nakata (2003), split the product development process into two 
stages (initiation and implementation) as recommended by Johne (1984).  Overall, the 
Sivakumar & Nakata model was too limited (new product development only), only produced a 
set of values for an ‘optimum culture’, and relied on a set of culture ‘slope coefficients’ that 
were not clearly justified in the paper.  An examination of citations of this and one of their 
earlier papers on a similar topic (Nakata & Sivakumar, 1996) failed to identify any ‘culture 
tool’ related publications.  Earley &Gibson’s (2002) qualitative, two-level model of multicul-
tural teams incorporated six factors at the level of the individual team member and five 
factors at the group level; this model could not as such be applied to a real team, and only 
provided some very general guidance linking factors to performance effects (e.g. competi-
tiveness can lead to fragmentation).  
Due to the dearth of academic publications of relevance to national culture-based tools, the 
search was widened to include non-academic sources, and to review organisational culture 
and safety culture tools.  An examination of non-academic sources of culture tools, in 
particular, commercial web sites and business management books, revealed three ‘national 
culture’ tools.  The first, ‘The CULTURE Tool’ by Catholic Health was a very simple paper-
based checklist; it appeared to be targeted primarily at U.S. health workers travelling abroad.   
The second national culture tool (‘The Culture Compass Survey’ - see http://geert-
hofstede.com/cultural-survey.html) was provided by Hofstede17 and the consultancy 
company itim international.  This tool enabled the user to select his/her home country, 
country of interest and proposed role, then take a survey of cultural preferences.  Following 
this, cultural differences compared to home country and country of interest default national 
cultures were revealed and potential pitfalls and problems were highlighted.  This tool 
appeared to carry out, to some degree, several of the activities presented in Figure 3-4; it 
produced a cultural profile (for an individual, not a team), and took limited account of the 
individual’s role (rather than tasks).  The tool was aimed at the determination of the degree of 
fit of an individual ‘outsider’ to another culture, rather than the degree of fit of a team’s culture 
to a task set or mission.  Interestingly, Hofstede has in the past repeatedly warned about the 
ecological fallacy arising from assigning cultural scores (or cultural preferences) to an 
individual (Hofstede 2001, p.16).  Note that the Culture Compass Survey was released at a 
late stage of the work described in this thesis.  
The third national culture tool, by DFA Intercultural Global Solutions, (‘CultureCompass’ - see 
                                            
17 Hofstede’s academic contributions will be discussed later in this thesis. 
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http://dfaculturecompass.com/) was similar to the Hofstede-based Culture Compass Survey 
(above), it asked the user to select a role, to take a survey consisting of ten questions (each 
with a sliding scale between two extremes), and then to enter his/her nationality.  The tool 
then displayed the differences between the user and the national average, and reproduced 
standard material on the particular dimensions.  
b) Organisational culture models and tools 
A number of the more interesting organisational culture instruments described in the 
academic literature were assessed, for example, the Organizational Culture Inventory 
(Cooke & Szumal, 1993), Competing Values Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  
Typically, following the utilisation of checklists, questionnaires, interviews, discussion groups 
or a combination of these, the organisation’s current or proposed culture was allocated into 
one of several types (via a taxonomic or dimensional scheme); these types were clearly 
related to or affected by national culture, but very little reference was made as to the 
potential relationships to, and effects of, national culture.  None of these organisational 
culture tools contained elements that could be adapted to a national-culture-based tool; in 
particular, these tools did not enable the consideration of relationships between cultural 
elements and task performance requirements.  The majority of non-academic sources 
presented commercial variants on organisational culture tools, for example ‘lean culture’ 
tools, ‘cultural transformation’ tools, ‘culture alignment’ tools and ‘customer culture’ tools.  
Few of the publications and commercial tools on organisational culture acknowledged the 
heavy influence of national culture; as a result, they would have little relevance outside 
western cultures.  In addition, the organisational culture tools appeared not to consider task-
related requirements of organisations, rather a target corporate culture that was thought to 
be conducive from specific viewpoints (e.g. ‘the customer’). 
c) Safety culture models and tools 
The safety culture models and tools had many similarities to those of organisational culture, 
again employing checklists, questionnaires, interviews, discussion group, etc.  However, 
none of the safety-related dimensions, nor any task-related aspects, appeared to offer any 
contribution to the culture tool requirements of the author’s research. As was the case with 
organisational culture, none of the safety culture tools could be adapted to a national-culture-
based tool, nor did these tools enable the consideration of relationships between cultural 
elements and the task performance requirements associated with the teams’ purposes. 
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d) Summary on culture tools 
To summarise this section, no national culture-based models or tools were found that could 
enable the prediction of the performance of a proposed or current team in a range of 
team/task situations.  No national, organizational or safety culture tools were found that could 
be adapted effectively to meet the requirements of the research described in this thesis.  The 
tool that came nearest to meeting the requirements was that of Hofstede and itim inter-
national.  There appeared to be a significant gap, in both academia and commerce/industry, 
in the provision of tools or guidance for culture-based team selection, adaptation and 
performance prediction for critical tasks. 
3.4.2 Cultural frameworks 
In the absence of national culture-based models, methods and tools for the estimation or 
prediction of team performance, the purpose of this section was to ascertain the availability 
and capabilities of frameworks, models, methods or tools for the capture of national cultural 
traits of individuals and/or teams.  These could form the basis of, or at least provide guidance 
in the construction of, the ‘cultural side’ of a performance prediction model and tool (see 
Figure 3-5).  Note that Figure 3-5 represented a first attempt to identify, at a generic level, the 
information and processes that might be required to achieve some measure of culture-based 
team performance prediction (whether qualitative or quantitative); this was not intended to 
preclude an alternative approach.  As no practicable culture-based team performance 
prediction methodologies or tools were found, the flow diagram could provide a basis for 
reviewing the literature for potential components of such a method or tool. 
Over the last half century, researchers in human culture have developed a variety of quanti-
tative instruments for the measurement of culture.  Typically, these instruments or frame-
works encapsulated sets of cultural factors, attributes, orientations or dimensions that were 
presented as a binary or ternary choice between qualitative alternatives, or in terms of a 
quantitative scale between two extremes, and appeared to capture meaningful differences 
between people of different nationalities.  Although there was no universally-agreed set of 
cultural dimensions, certain dimensions (and minor variations on them) appeared in several 
of the cultural frameworks, and have been found to be statistically robust.   
A review of cultural frameworks has been carried out by the student, for which the initially-
identified authors were Hofstede, House et al., Triandis and Schwartz.  Academic books 
detailing many of these frameworks represented a useful starting point; these initially-
perused academic books included “Culture’s Consequences” (G H Hofstede, 1980), 
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“Cultures and Organizations” (Geert Hofstede, 1991), “Culture, Leadership and 
Organizations” (House et al., 2004), “Culture and Social Behavior” (Triandis, 1993), “Beyond 
Individualism/Collectivism” (S H Schwartz, 1994) and “Multinational Work Teams: A New 
Perspective” (Earley & Gibson, 2002).  Academic papers by these authors, and reviews by 
other authors of their work, were then retrieved and examined before expanding the review 
via forward- and backward-citations.  Following reading and commenting on these further 
papers, sets of keywords and phrases were identified, and utilised via the databases/search 
engines described in Subsection 3.2.2.   
There are now too many culture-measurement instruments (or frameworks) for all to be 
detailed in this thesis, for example, a recent review paper (Taras, Rowney, & Steel, 2009) 
identified 121 such instruments.  Therefore, this review was limited to the higher impact 
cultural frameworks, as only these could offer the range of study results that would enable 
the researcher to extract useful, predictive relationships between culture and performance. 
In providing a form of ‘cultural location’ (see top box of Figure 3-5), the above frameworks 
could, if combined with task/skill frameworks, provide the basis for a culture-based team 
performance prediction methodology.  Note that most of the descriptions of cultural 
dimensions in this section are, of necessity, limited; the references provide access to detailed 
definitions and explanations. 
a) National or ethnic culture frameworks 
National (or ethnic) culture typically reflects the most profound aspects of culture (compared 
to occupational, organisational, etc.), as it is inculcated in individuals from a very age.  This 
section describes the higher impact frameworks. 
Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck’s value orientations method (VOM) (Hills, 2002; Kluckhohn & 
Strodtbeck, 1961) has been utilised to identify cultural differences between groups; it 
encapsulated the work of the Harvard Values Project that took place during the 1940s and 
1950s (Bahr, 2006).  The method was based on five concerns or cultural orientations, each 
with three descriptive values or responses – human nature (good, mixed, evil), man-nature 
relationship (dominant, in harmony, subordinate), time sense (past, present, future), activity 
(doing, becoming, being) and social relations (individual, collateral, hierarchical).  The 
associated VOM assessment survey tool enabled members of communities to rank the 
responses for each of the above concerns, thus describing their own cultures as they saw 
them.  Unsurprisingly, people of different cultures chose different responses. 
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The VOM was successfully applied in a range of cross-cultural situations including higher 
education, healthcare and conflict resolution in public resource management (Gallagher, 
2001b), and could be used to train people to be aware of cultural differences. 
Triandis’ cultural framework (Triandis 1995; 1996) was composed of five cultural 
syndromes (or dimensions) – cultural complexity, cultural tightness, individualism, horizontal 
collectivism and vertical collectivism, each with two descriptive values (the equivalent of low 
and high) to choose from, i.e. a total of 32 (25) cultural categories.  Whereas many cultural 
frameworks treated individualism/collectivism as expressing the extremes of a single 
dimension, Triandis treated individualism and collectivism as three separate syndromes, 
including two types of collectivism – horizontal (‘interdependence and oneness’) and vertical 
(‘serving the group’).  
Hofstede’s cultural framework (1984) emerged out of a series of research investigations 
into culture at IBM sites in forty countries, between 1967 and 1973.  Based on statistical 
analyses of responses to a large set of questions, four largely independent cultural 
dimensions were originally identified – power distance, individualism, masculinity and 
uncertainty avoidance; national scores were derived for these and normalised to a range 
between 0 and 100.  More detailed descriptions of these dimensions can be found in 
Hofstede (2001), chapters 3 to 6.  Since Hofstede’s original analyses, many further countries 
have been evaluated and, at the start of this research, scores were available for 76 countries 
and regions (representing a large proportion of the World’s population).  Two more dimen-
sions, long term orientation (Hofstede 2001, Ch.7) and indulgence vs. restraint (Hofstede & 
Minkov 2010, Ch.8); however, at the time the author began his research, relatively few 
country values were available for  long term orientation and no indulgence vs. restraint 
scores were available. 
Trompenaars’ cultural framework (F. Trompenaars, Hampden-Turner, & C., 1997) was 
based on his consultancy experiences.  He concluded from these that cultures are distin-
guished from each other by the ways that their members solve three fundamental problems - 
their relationships with other people, with (or to) time, and with nature.  He collected data 
from his international business clients and their employees.  In particular, Trompenaars 
wished to know how these people resolved dilemmas.  He developed seven cultural 
dimensions that appeared to explain most of the variations in behaviour that he had 
observed via the questionnaires (Fons Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997).  These 
dimensions were universalism vs. particularism, individualism vs. communitarianism, 
specificity vs. diffusion, affectivity vs. neutrality, achieved status vs. ascribed status, inner 
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direction vs. outer direction and sequential time vs. asynchronous time. 
The GLOBE cultural framework was based on one of the largest recent studies of national 
culture (House et al., 2004); it examined the attitudes and beliefs of more than 17,000 
managers from 950 organisations in 62 countries.  The study was primarily focused on 
cultural influences on organisational leadership.  Based on detailed analyses of 
questionnaire results, the GLOBE researchers classified societies into ten regional clusters - 
Anglo, Latin Europe, Nordic Europe, Germanic Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia and Confucian Asia.  The GLOBE study 
identified nine cultural dimensions.  Of these, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, 
institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism and power distance originated from Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions.  Future orientation was based on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s time 
sense orientation (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) and was also related in concept to 
Hofstede’s long-term orientation cultural dimension.  Humane orientation was based on 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s human nature orientation, Putnam’s civil society work  and 
McClelland’s affiliative motive work.  
Schwartz’s culture-level value scale (or cultural values framework) was based on data 
collected and analysed data from 49 nations (Shalom H Schwartz, 1999, 2006).  He 
identified seven ‘cultural level value types’, which could be structured or condensed as 
‘cultural orientations’ along three polar dimensions, mastery vs. harmony, embeddedness vs. 
autonomy and hierarchy vs. egalitarianism. 
A summary of national culture frameworks:  The most commonly referenced culture 
frameworks (described earlier) have been compared to each other via a table, enabling the 
reader to observe the differing ‘cultural coverage’ of the various researchers’ offerings.  The 
six vertical columns of Table 3-6 represent the cultural dimensions, orientations or 
syndromes of the six cultural frameworks that are being compared.  The table rows associate 
dimensions that are similar, based on the descriptions of their authors.  It can be seen from 
the table that, for these six publicised and widely used cultural frameworks, individualism vs. 
collectivism (or its near equivalent) is the only cultural dimension common to all.  Power 
distance (or its near equivalent) appears in four of the six frameworks.  Uncertainty 
avoidance and man-nature relationships (or their near equivalents), appear in three of the 
frameworks.  
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Researcher/research team/model/method cultural dimensions 
Kluckhohn & 
Strodtbeck’s 
VOM 
Hofstede’s 
original cultural 
dimensions 
Triandis’ 
cultural 
syndromes 
Trompenaar’s cultural 
dimensions 
The GLOBE 
Study cultural 
dimensions 
Schwartz’s 
cultural 
orientations 
Social 
relations 
Individualism vs. 
collectivism (IDV) 
Individualism Individualism vs. 
communitarianism 
Institutional 
collectivism 
Embeddedness 
vs. autonomy 
Horizontal 
collectivism 
Universalism vs. 
particularism 
In-group 
collectivism 
 
Vertical 
collectivism 
 Assertiveness  
Specificity vs. diffusion Performance 
orientation 
 
 Power distance 
(PDI) 
 Achieved status vs. 
ascribed status 
Power distance Hierarchy vs. 
egalitarianism 
 Masculinity vs. 
femininity (MAS) 
  Gender 
egalitarianism 
 
Assertiveness  
 Uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) 
Cultural 
tightness 
 Uncertainty 
avoidance 
 
Time sense Long term 
orientation (LTO) 
  Future orientation  
Man-nature 
relationship 
  Inner direction vs. outer 
direction 
 Mastery vs. 
harmony 
   Sequential time vs. 
synchronous time 
  
   Affectivity vs. neutrality   
Activity (being 
or doing) 
   Humane 
orientation 
 
Human nature      
  Cultural 
complexity 
   
Note that dimensions in italics indicate at best an approximate fit. 
Table 3-6:  A comparison of national cultural dimensions, orientations and syndromes 
The frameworks of Hofstede and the GLOBE appear to achieve the greatest commonality 
across all cultural dimensions. 
b) Organisational culture frameworks 
A brief review was carried out of organisational culture tools in Section 3.3.1, but this was 
with a view to extracting useful features for application in the national culture tool.  The 
reason for this review was to determine whether it was possible, or reasonable, to adjust 
default national culture values to take account of organisational differences (where known).  
Ideally, it should be possible to allocate certain default organisational culture properties to 
certain sectors of activity, e.g. to aircraft transport, refining, power generation, medical 
facilities.  These could then have been used to adjust national culture values.   
The Competing Values Framework (CVF) emerged out of research work by Cameron and 
Quinn  (Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, 1983).   The CVF utilised two 
dimensions - focused vs. flexible (differentiating between stability, order and control on the 
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one hand, and flexibility, discretion and dynamism on the other) and internal vs. external 
(differentiating between an internally orientated focus on unity, integration and collaboration 
on the one hand, and a focus on competition, rivalry and differentiation on the other).  The 
associated organization culture assessment instrument (OCAI) covered six categories of 
organisation-related statements.  By allocating a total of 100 points across the four 
statements in each category (a total of 600 points), a set of scores emerged that located the 
organisation within the four CVF quadrants.  This allocation exercise was typically carried out 
for the ‘as-is’ organisation, and again for the ‘would like to be’ organisation.  The two 
orthogonal dimensions produced four quadrants; companies falling into these four quadrants 
were identified as hierarchy (focus/internal), market (focus/external), clan (flexible/internal) 
and adhocracy (flexible/external). 
Deal & Kennedy’s organisational culture framework (1988) utilised two cultural 
dimensions - rapidity of feedback and reward (the speed with which companies learned 
whether their actions and strategies have been successful), and degree of risk or uncertainty 
(the amount of risk (or uncertainty) associated with the organisation’s key activities).  These 
two dimensions produced four quadrants of culture (as with the earlier-presented CVF); 
companies falling into these four quadrants were identified as possessing process culture 
(slow/low-risk), bet-the-company culture (slow/high-risk), work-hard-play-hard culture 
(rapid/low-risk) and tough-guy-macho culture (rapid/high-risk).  Each of these company 
cultures fitted a particular type of business.  For example, the ‘tough-guy’, macho culture 
(high risk, rapid feedback) was associated with high-stress organizations that focused 
primarily on the present, facing constant risk of failing to achieve targets and losing rewards, 
for example sports and hospital surgery.  By way of contrast, the process culture (slow 
feedback/reward, low risk) was typically a slow plodding bureaucracy intent on maintaining 
the status quo (past=present=future). 
Harrison’s organisational culture framework:  Harrison (1972) argued that there were six 
‘interests’ associated with organisations, which formed the basis of ideological tension and 
struggle.  He proposed four organisational ideologies that emerged out of these – power 
orientation, role orientation, task orientation and person orientation.  Looking to national 
culture dimensions, Harrison’s power orientation could (from its description) be associated 
with high power distance, his role orientation could be associated with high uncertainty 
avoidance, and the other two with aspects of high masculinity and high individualism. 
However, in the absence of associations between the above orientations and particular 
sectors, it was not feasible for it to be adopted for the research work described in this thesis. 
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Hofstede’s six dimensional model of organisational culture (Hofstede et al. 1990) was 
based on studies of organizational cultures in twenty units of ten companies in Denmark and 
the Netherlands.  Following a detailed analysis of the results Hofstede et al. developed a 
model of organizational cultures consisting of six dimensions – process vs. results, employee 
vs. job orientation, parochial vs. professional, open vs. closed, loose vs. tight and normative 
vs. pragmatic.  Unfortunately, no evidence of the application of this framework was found, 
and Hofstede made no attempt to link it to his national culture framework. 
Schein’s organisational culture framework (1996a; 1996b) consisted of six dimensions - 
relationship to the environment, nature of human activity within the organisation, nature of 
time within the organisation, reality and truth in the organisation, the nature of people, 
distribution of power and affiliation.  The descriptions of these dimensions appeared to 
suggest associations with a number of cultural dimensions in several national culture frame-
works.  As with the other frameworks, there were insufficient applications, and no relationship 
between the above dimensions and specific industrial sectors, so it could not be adopted for 
the research work described in this thesis. 
A summary of organisational culture frameworks: The most commonly referenced 
organisational culture frameworks (described earlier) are compared to each other via a table, 
enabling the reader to observe the differing ‘organisational cultural coverage’ of the various 
researchers’ offerings.  The five vertical columns of Table 3-7 represent the cultural 
dimensions, orientations or syndromes of the five organisational culture frameworks that are 
being compared.  The table rows associate dimensions that are similar, from the five frame-
works. 
Organizational cultural framework 
Competing 
values 
(organisational 
culture) 
framework 
Deal and Kennedy’s 
organisational culture 
framework 
Harrison’s 
organisational 
culture 
framework 
Hofstede’s 
organisational culture 
framework 
Hofstede/-
Mintzberg’s 
organisation 
configurations 
Focused vs. 
flexible 
  Loose vs. tight Uncertainty 
avoidance? 
Role vs. task 
 
Normative vs. pragmatic 
Internal vs. 
external 
 Process vs. results 
 Rapidity of feedback    
 Degree of risk or uncertainty    
  Person vs. 
power 
Employee vs. job-oriented Power distance? 
   Parochial vs. professional  
   Open vs. closed  
Note that dimensions in italics indicate at best an approximate fit. 
Table 3-7:  A comparison of organisational cultural dimensions, orientations and syndromes  
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It can be seen from Table 3-7 that, for this sample of organisational culture frameworks, 
there was little common ground across them in terms of cultural dimensions.  No dimensions 
emerged as ‘clear winners’, and none provided guidance as to the likely ‘default’ dimension 
scores or values for given organisation types.  Also, none of the frameworks provided a basis 
for an association of organisational culture traits with sectors and, other than the competing 
values framework, they had not been widely applied.  On the basis of the above survey, it 
appeared that organisational culture could not be used as a contributory input to the work of 
this thesis. 
c) Occupational culture frameworks  
There have been few studies of occupational (or professional) culture, compared to 
organisational culture.  The majority of studies appeared to be comparisons between 
professions, or comparisons between the culture dimension scores of professionals and the 
national cultural dimension scores of their compatriots.  It was, however, clear that there was 
a significant degree of self-selection in many professions – different personality types chose 
to be accountants, teachers, doctors, etc.; this was likely to be reflected to some degree in 
their quantitative culture scores. 
The only study that appeared to offer a replicable, quantitative approach was one by Bosland 
(G H Hofstede 2001, pp.493-494; Bosland 1985).  This adjusted Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension scores based on years in full time education.  As most professions demand long 
periods in education, this provided a valid means of adjusting national culture scores 
indirectly for professions, although it did not capture the differences between ‘conservative’ 
(e.g. accountancy) and ‘outgoing’ (e.g. sales) professions that both required degree-level 
qualifications.   
A summary:  Bosland’s adjustment of the four dimension scores of Hofstede’s original 
national cultural framework was the only quantitative approach found that was related (via                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
years of full-time-equivalent education) to professional culture.   
3.4.3 Measures of team cultural diversity 
For the purposes of the work described in this thesis, a measure of cultural diversity of team 
members was required that provided a quantitative value reflecting the mean cultural 
differences between team members.  It was important that any measure utilised by the 
researcher would take account, not only of the number of different cultures (e.g. national 
cultures) in a team, but also the degree of difference between each of those cultures.  In 
addition, it was important that such a measure would enable users of a tool incorporating the 
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measure to identify the diversity associated with each team member. 
A review of the literature revealed three main approaches to the determination of diversity, 
examples of which are briefly discussed below. 
The Blau Index of racial and ethnic diversity (Blau, 1977) , the Herfindhal-Hirschmann 
Index (HHI) (Rhoades, 1993), the Shannon (or Shannon-Wiener) Diversity Index (SDI) 
and Simpson’s Index (Simpson’s D) were based on the number of different types (e.g. plant 
species, nationalities) and their relative weightings, not the degree of difference (diversity) 
between types.  
Greenberg’s Diversity Index (also known as the linguistic diversity index, LDI) was primarily 
utilised to measure the diversity of a country’s languages.  In his paper on the measurement 
of linguistic diversity (Greenberg, 1956), Greenberg described a simple index based on the 
probability of two speakers from the selected population speaking the same language, 
GDI(A), and also described an alternative that included a weighting for each language pair 
based on their linguistic similarities, GDI(B).  He then described an approach that takes 
account of multilingual speakers.  The weighted monolingual index was defined as:  
GDI(B) = 1 - ∑m,n (mn) (rMN) 
where m, n were the proportions of speakers of languages M and N in the population, 
and rMN was a measure of the resemblance between languages M and N. 
The Greenberg monolingual weighted index (type B) took account of the level of disparity 
between object types (species, languages, etc.).  It was therefore able to distinguish between 
teams with members of different but similar cultures from those of very different cultures.   
The Stirling Index (Stirling, 1999; Stirling, 2007) took account of the level of disparity 
between object types (different species, languages, cultures/countries, etc.) by assuming that 
they were located in Euclidean space, and the distance between any two object types 
represented their mutual disparity.  The Stirling index was defined as: 
SI =  ∑i,j dij pi pj 
for  i,j = 1 to the number of species (or team member countries), 
 dij = distance (disparity) between species (or country) ‘i’ and ‘j’ 
and pi = the proportion of the population belonging to species or country ‘i’. 
The Stirling index took account of the level of disparity between object types (species, 
languages, etc.).  
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The standard statistical measures of mean and variance, as used by Elron (1997) could 
be utilised to derive a value for team cultural diversity.  Elron calculated the mean and 
standard deviation of team members based on Hofstede’s default national culture scores for 
team members, the standard deviation providing a measure of team cultural diversity. 
To summarise the above:  There appeared to be three main approaches to the derivation 
of diversity within a team or population.  The most common approach took account of the 
number of different members based on some nominal value (e.g. gender, profession or 
nationality); although this was accurate for binary differences such as gender, it was unsatis-
factory as a measure of diversity because cultures could be very similar (e.g. Germany, 
Czech Republic) or very different (e.g. Guatemala, Australia).  The second approach utilised 
a measure of distance or separation in Euclidean space between members (e.g. based on 
their national culture scores, education and/or ages).  However, to combine (in our case) the 
cultural separation along several axes into a single (Euclidean) distance was to imply that 
each factor or dimension had a similar effect to each other in every circumstance.  The third, 
statistical approach to the derivation of team or population diversity placed an overemphasis 
on outliers. 
3.4.4 Team and task classifications 
For the purposes of the work described in this thesis, it was necessary to be able to describe 
teams and/or their tasks in terms of the behavioural capabilities required for successful 
performance.  Such behavioural capabilities (for want of a better term) could then be 
associated with team member cultural scores to form the basis of an assessment 
methodology and tool.  The following five culture-modified areas of behaviour/behavioural 
requirements were identified in Subsection 3.3.3: Management and decision-making, 
creativity and innovation, interaction (communication and co-ordination), uncertainty handing 
and achieving shared situation awareness.  It was therefore important to examine the 
literature in order to evaluate team and task typologies (taxonomies, classifications) in terms 
of their abilities to represent the above culture-related requirements. 
There have been many detailed reviews of the literature on team theory, in particular on 
team classifications, for example Guzzo & Dickson (1996), DeMatteo et al. (1998), Wildman 
et al. (2012) and Hollenbeck et al. (2012).  It appeared from an examination of these reviews 
that team classifications varied greatly depending on the ‘central’ team type (the classifier’s 
starting point) and on the purpose of the classification.  Some of the more interesting 
approaches to team/task classification (from the point of view of the author’s research) are 
briefly described below. 
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Cohen and Bailey (1997) carried out a review of research on teams and groups published 
between January 1990 and April 1996.  Their team classification was unsuitable for the 
approach in this thesis, as they appeared to place some types of organised action team in 
the same category as routine manufacturing teams.  However, they defined team 
performance along three dimensions – output quantity and quality, member attitudes, and 
behavioural outcomes.  The latter category was of interest, as it could contribute to a link 
between culture and some aspects of performance.  Marks, Mathieu and Zaccaro (2001) 
appeared to concentrate on the classification of industrial and commercial work teams but 
did not provide sufficient details on the task or behavioural aspects of teams to be useful to 
the work of this thesis; however, their ‘team maintenance’ processes could perhaps offer a 
basis for ‘layering’ the effects of culture onto team performance. 
Fernandez et al.’s emergency medicine team taxonomy (2008) utilised the input-process-
output (I-P-O) model that is widely used in industry and academia.  Inputs represented the 
team member characteristics (abilities, experience, etc.), processes represented the 
behaviours and collaborations required to achieve successful outputs in terms of task 
outcomes and team performances; the various sets of ‘task-work’ went through the I-P-O 
cycle, the output of one cycle being an input to the next.  The emergency medicine process 
model was proposed as having (in temporal sequence) a planning and preparation phase, 
action processes and reflection processes.   In particular, the taxonomy’s ‘action process’ 
phase and ‘support mechanisms’ might have been the locations for culture-affected 
tasks/behaviours, but insufficient details were available to consider it further.  Steiner (1972) 
recognised that the task was one of the key factors in team or group performance.  He split 
unitary (indivisible) tasks into disjunctive, conjunctive, additive and discretionary tasks, and 
divisible tasks into self-matching, (pre-)specified and organisationally (externally) allocated 
tasks; however, the basis of his classification was to enable the optimum allocation of team 
members on the basis of their technical or experience-based proficiencies, and it would be 
difficult to associate such tasks with the effects of culture. 
McGrath’s circumplex (McGrath 1984, Ch. 5) integrated the work of Hackman & Morris 
(1975), Shaw (1973), Davis and Laughlin, to produce his ‘task circumplex’ classification 
framework for group tasks.  This circumflex was represented as a circle with eight segments, 
each segment being one of eight mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive task 
categories - planning, creativity, intellective (have ‘correct’ answers), decision-making (have 
no ‘correct’ answers), cognitive conflict, mixed motive, competitive and performance/psycho-
motor tasks.  McGrath’s circumflex listed some of the areas where problems might occur in 
teams due to the effects of culture, for example in creativity tasks, cognitive conflict tasks, 
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mixed motive tasks and competitive tasks.   
Gluesing & Gibson (2003), Chapter 11:  Designing and Forming Global Teams, pp. 199-
226, claimed that the complexity that global teams, in particular, faced could be described 
along five dimensions – task, context, people, time and technology.  Task complexity 
appeared to be the most relevant for cultural issues, and could be described in terms of four 
elements - workflow interdependence (based on the degree of interaction required between 
team members), task environment (varying from a static, stable, predictable environment to 
one that was highly dynamic and unpredictable, causing disruptions and re-evaluations of 
activities), external coupling (which appeared to overlap task environment), and internal 
coupling (which appeared to overlap workflow interdependence).  Gluesing & Gibson’s 
approach was extremely complex, but it was perhaps only the communication ramifications 
of workflow interdependence and the uncertainty ramifications of task environment that had 
clear links to culture. 
Hollenbeck et al. (2012) reviewed the literature of team taxonomies and classifications, and 
demonstrated the weaknesses of taxonomies and other categorical systems when 
attempting to categorise concepts such as team types, which can be placed on a continuum.  
They proposed three dimensions as forming the basis for a wide range of team types - skill 
differentiation (the degree of knowledge or skill specialisation, which made it difficult to 
substitute team members), authority differentiation (the degree to which decision-making was 
concentrated, or distributed) and temporal stability (the degree to which team members had 
a shared history and expectations of a shared future).  This three-dimensional approach 
offered a limited degree of flexibility in categorising industrial and commercial work teams, 
but could not capture the key differences between teams that are related to culture, e.g. 
creativity or handling uncertainty.  Although the dimensions chosen by Hollenbeck et al. were 
not suitable for a culture-based team performance prediction methodology, the authors 
presented a very cogent case for a dimensional, rather than categorical (e.g. taxonomic) 
approach to team/task classification. 
To summarise the above: Most of the team/task classifications were concentrated on a 
very small range of teams, and did not include the factors that were mediated by culture.  
Steiner’s approach to task classification was valid for research and production-type teams, 
but was not very relevant to rapid-reaction (and similar) teams.  McGrath’s task circumplex 
contained several potentially useful task categories, Gluesing & Gibson’s dimensions of 
complexity covered too few of the factors that influence culture-related performance to be 
usable.  The multidimensional approaches of Hollenbeck et al. and Gluesing & Gibson 
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appeared to be the most flexible, but the chosen dimensions excluded most of the key team 
types of relevance to this author’s research, and also did not capture nuances of relevance to 
culture; however, the workflow interdependence and task environment of Gluesing and 
Gibson’s approach could (in theory) be adapted.  None of the team and task typologies 
identified in the literature covered the range of factors required for this research work.  
However, the reviews, in particular that of Hollenbeck et al., highlighted the severe limitations 
of any taxonomic approach – some concepts fit into rigid taxonomic hierarchies (e.g. flora 
and fauna), others do not (e.g. team and task types, games, word definitions).  Therefore, it 
was necessary to devise an alternative team/task typology, based on a non-taxonomic 
classification.  
3.5 Empirical evidence about the validity of national culture-based 
tools   
Due to the sparsity of national culture-based team performance prediction-based tools, this 
subsection also examined empirical evidence for the validity of national culture frameworks 
and role/task sets.  
3.5.1 Empirical evidence for the validity of methods, models and tools 
for the culture-based prediction of team performance 
As stated in Sub-section 3.4.1, only one academic peer-reviewed publication was found on 
methods, models or tools for the prediction of team performance or the allocation of tasks 
based on national culture. The two-stage models by Sivakumar & Nakata (2003) was too 
limited (new product development only), produced the culture scores for an optimum team 
only, i.e. provided no guidance for any proposed or actual team, and relied on a set of culture 
‘slope coefficients’ that were not clearly justified in the paper.  Furthermore, citations of this 
publication produced no evidence that the model/tool had been applied in an industrial 
product development environment, so it could not be validated.  The qualitative Earley and 
Gibson multicultural team model (Earley & Gibson, 2002) provided no more than general 
guidance to a team’s potential internal problems, and was criticised for its excessive 
complexity and redundancy, for example role processes were modelled at individual and 
group levels, and as integrative mechanisms (Troyer, 2002).  In practical terms, this model 
was little more than a checklist of factors to consider when evaluating a team of individuals of 
known personal and cultural traits, and did not offer any capability or basis for developing a 
predictive cultural tool that took account of team mission and location.  
As a very simple paper-based checklist, ‘The CULTURE Tool’ by Catholic Health was of no 
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significant interest to the research of the author of this thesis.  However, it did raise the 
question as to whether a qualitative culture-based performance prediction tool could be 
developed.  After a brief consideration of requirements, it became clear that such a tool 
would have to contain a huge amount of text and would not provide any capability for further 
analysis, unless there was a numeric basis behind the text.   
‘The Culture Compass Survey’ by Geert Hofstede and the consultancy company itim 
international appeared to carry out, to some degree, several of the activities presented in 
Figure 3-5; it produced a cultural profile (for an individual, not a team) and took account of 
the individual’s role (rather than tasks).  However, the tool was aimed at the determination of 
the degree of fit of an individual ‘outsider’ to another culture, rather than the degree of fit of a 
team’s culture to a task set.  In addition, it did not offer role/task choices of key importance to 
sociotechnical systems (e.g. associated with innovation teams or organised action crews).  
Nevertheless, the qualitative feedback comments of this tool (clearly based on quantitative 
differences between national cultural scores and the scores generated from the individual’s 
survey answers) represented a ‘user-friendly’ way of communicating potential problem areas.  
This tool did not encompass teams or detailed roles or tasks, nor did it consider the cultural 
fit with tasks or roles, instead it looked at the degree of difference between cultures, and their 
effects.  Although offering interesting insights about the generation and presentation of 
cultural information, it did not otherwise represent a means towards the aims of this author’s 
research.  
In comparison to The Culture Compass Survey tool, the CultureCompass tool accepted less 
information from the user, offered considerably less information in return and was not 
considered to be of further interest. 
3.5.2 Empirical evidence for the validity of cultural frameworks 
In this section, evidence is presented for the empirical validity and potential applicability (in 
the researcher’s work) of the national cultural frameworks described in Section 3.4.2.  
In addition to empirical validity, the author’s work places requirements on a cultural 
framework to provide default cultural traits (however described or enumerated) for all of the 
World’s major countries or areas, to discriminate adequately between national differences, to 
enable the linking of a range of team behaviours or task performances to cultural traits18, to 
have been validated by researchers and to have been utilised in a large number of studies. 
                                            
18 This ‘enablement’ might occur in terms of the extended descriptions and examples provided in 
relevant texts and/or the applications of the framework to cultural studies as described in publications. 
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a) The empirical validity of national or ethnic culture frameworks 
Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck’s five-dimension (or five syndrome) value orientations 
method (VOM) (Gallagher, 2001a; Hills, 2002; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) was intended 
primarily as a tool to enable (and train) people to understand their own and other cultures.  
The VOM’s three-value (trinary) syndromes lacked discrimination, did not provide default 
values for the majority of countries, and would have been difficult to link to behavioural traits 
that were relevant to task performance assessment.  Maznevski et al. (2002) applied the 
value orientations method (also known as the cultural orientations framework) to 1,600 
people in five countries, but this was one of comparatively few studies of reasonable size.  
Although the VOM served a valid purpose as a thought-provoking introduction to cultural 
differences, it was not suitable as the basis for a culture-based performance prediction tool. 
Triandis’ five-dimension (or five syndrome) cultural framework (Triandis 1995; 1996) 
lacked discrimination due to its two-value (binary) syndromes and, as was the case with the 
VOM (above), did not provide default values for the majority of countries.  In addition,  
Triandis (1993, p.177) stated that the tightness syndrome was related to the collectivism 
syndrome, i.e. that they were not independent of each other; this would lead to increased 
problems during any statistical analyses. 
Hofstede’s original cultural framework (1984) consisted of the four dimensions of power 
distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.  Summarised 
data including default culture scores for 76 countries and regions (representing a large 
proportion of the World’s population) were available at the start of the author’s research, 
whereas for the later-added ‘long-term orientation’ dimension, default values were only 
available for 23 countries; in addition, a number of criticisms had been made of the 
dimension (Fang, 2003; Jacob, 2005).  A sixth cultural dimension, ‘indulgence vs. restraint’, 
was added shortly after the author began his research, but a comprehensive set of default 
national scores was not available at the time. 
Hofstede’s original four-dimension framework has been verified many times and in many 
countries since its original publication for example in Russia (Naumov, 2000), the Gulf States 
(At-Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza, 1996), New Zealand (Brown, 2003); in addition, individual 
dimensions have been further evaluated and verified, for example uncertainty avoidance 
(Merkin, 2006; Minkov & Hofstede, 2014).  The framework has also had its antagonists 
based on claims of questionable underlying assumptions (McSweeney, 2002), that Hofstede 
might not have been actually measuring culture (Baskerville, 2003) and that the framework’s 
dimensions had limited distinctiveness and independence (Blodgett, Bakir, & Rose, 2008).  
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Hofstede answered such antagonists directly (G H Hofstede, 2002, 2003), typically 
elaborating on the misassumptions that these antagonists had made about his work.  Jones 
(2007) examined publications by scholarly antagonists and protagonists of Hofstede’s 
framework, and also examined published dialogues between Hofstede and his antagonists 
(see above references); Jones concluded that the weight of evidence supported the majority 
of Hofstede’s work, and that it remained the most valuable contribution on culture to-date for 
scholars and practitioners.  Based on the results of a study of cultural frameworks, 
Magnusson, Wilson, Zdravkovic, Zhou, & Westjohn (2008) concluded that cultural distance 
constructs based on Hofstede’s and Trompenaar’s frameworks19 had strong convergent 
validity, whereas those based on the Schwartz and GLOBE frameworks had much weaker 
validity. 
The most important validations of Hofstede’s framework were found in meta-studies of the 
framework’s application.  Smith & Bond (1998, Ch. 3) examined large scale studies 
published since Hofstede’s original version of ‘Culture’s Consequences’ (1984), and 
concluded that those studies had supported, rather than contradicted, Hofstede’s work.  
Kirkman et al. (2006) reviewed the use of Hofstede’s framework in 180 studies, agreed with 
Smith & Bond, but drew attention to limitations in the coverage of these studies (in part due 
to fragmentation and redundancy) and made recommendations for the improvement of 
researchers’ use of Hofstede’s framework. In a final example, Taras et al. (2010) utilised data 
from 598 studies to meta-analyse the relationships between Hofstede’s original four 
dimensions and a range of ‘organisationally relevant outcomes’.  They found that, at the 
individual level of analysis, the predictive power of Hofstede’s cultural values was lower than 
those of personality traits and demographics for outcomes such as job performance and 
absenteeism, but higher for outcomes such as organisational commitment, team-related 
attitudes and feedback-seeking; the latter were perhaps more strongly to the team-related 
aspects of this PhD study than were the former.  
To summarise: Hofstede’s cultural dimension scores possessed precision (in itself no 
guarantee of accuracy) and, at the start of this researcher’s work, national scores for 
Hofstede’s original four cultural dimensions were available for the majority of the World’s 
population.  In addition, compared to other cultural frameworks, Hofstede’s framework had 
been subject to much corroborative research and had been used in many culture surveys. 
The GLOBE nine dimension cultural framework appeared to adapt its dimensions from a 
several pre-existing frameworks, including Hofstede’s and Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck’s VOM.  
                                            
19 This is an important consideration for the research described in this thesis. 
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In view of some of the conflicting or indeterminate results in the literature for Hofstede’s 
masculinity dimension, the GLOBE’s splitting of Hofstede’s masculinity dimension into two – 
gender egalitarianism and assertiveness – was of particular interest. 
As in the case of Hofstede’s framework, data from the GLOBE studies were available to the 
author in summarised form.  The primary sources for this data were in the two main books of 
the project, i.e. House et al. (2004) and Chhokar et al. (2008).  Hofstede (2006) statistically 
analysed this GLOBE data and questioned the basis for deriving the nine GLOBE cultural 
dimensions, pointing out (amongst other things) that the data suggested the presence of the 
Hofstede masculinity/femininity dimension.  A further issue for this researcher was that, at 
the start of this PhD research, few independent researchers had published studies utilising 
the GLOBE dimensions compared to those utilising Hofstede’s framework. Later literature 
reviews by the author revealed a continuing paucity of studies that utilised the GLOBE 
cultural scores; the majority of published articles consisted of further papers by the GLOBE’s 
authors, critiques of the GLOBE framework, or comparisons of GLOBE with Hofstede’s 
framework and others, for example Graen (2006), Peterson & Castro (2006) – a critique that 
was answered by Hanges & Dickson (2006). 
Schwartz’s culture-level value scale (or cultural values framework) was condensed from 
seven ‘cultural level value types’ into three ‘cultural orientations’ or dimensions; Schwartz 
stated that he believed that these types and dimensions were non-independent of each 
other, which negated the effectiveness of using them as dimensions.  As is the case with the 
GLOBE framework and Trompenaars’ framework, there are relatively few published 
independent research studies that utilise Schwartz’s framework, compared to Hofstede’s. 
A summary of the validity of national culture frameworks:  As stated at the beginning of 
this section, there was a set of minimum requirements for any cultural dimension framework 
to be viable for the purposes of the research described in this thesis.  In particular, a national 
cultural framework would be required to: provide default cultural traits or scores (however 
described or enumerated) for all of the World’s major countries or areas, discriminate adeq-
uately between national differences, enable the linking of a range of team behaviours or task 
performances to cultural traits20, have been widely validated by researchers and have been 
utilised in a large number of studies.  The latter requirement is of particular importance, as 
these studies would be the sources of qualitative and/or quantitative data for this PhD study.  
                                            
20 This ‘enablement’ might occur in terms of the extended descriptions and examples provided in 
relevant texts and/or the applications of the framework to cultural studies as described in publications. 
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At the time that this literature review was originally carried out, the national culture framework 
with the most empirical validation was that of Hofstede’s.  Hofstede’s framework was also the 
one that was critiqued the most, and which appeared to have the most support amongst 
researchers.  However, there were issues with the framework, many of which applied also to 
other frameworks. The potential effects of such issues needed to be noted, as they could 
threaten the validity of subsequent work.   
d) The empirical validity of organisational culture frameworks 
It can be seen from Table 3-7 that, for the most commonly-cited organisational culture frame-
works, there was little common ground across them in terms of cultural dimensions.  No 
dimensions emerged as ‘clear winners’, nor was there common guidance as to the likely 
‘default’ dimension scores or values for given organisation types.  Also, none of the 
frameworks provided a basis for an association of organisational culture traits with sectors 
and, other than the competing values framework, they had not been widely applied.  It 
appeared that existing organisational culture frameworks could not be used as a contributory 
input to the work of this thesis. 
e) The empirical validity of occupational culture frameworks 
As stated in Subsection 3.4.2(c), the majority of studies of occupational culture appeared to 
be comparisons between the cultures or cultural dimension scores of different professions, 
for example, Helmreich and Merritt’s (2001) study of the cultural traits and attitudes of 
personnel in aviation and medicine.  It was clear that there was a degree of self-selection in 
many professions – different personality types chose to be accountants, teachers, doctors, 
etc.; this was likely to be reflected to some degree in their quantitative culture scores. 
The only study that appeared to offer a practicable, replicable, quantitative approach was 
one by Bosland (G H Hofstede 2001, pp.493-494; Bosland 1985).  This adjusted Hofstede’s 
national cultural dimension scores based on years in full time education.  As most 
professions demand long periods in education, this provided a valid means of adjusting 
national culture scores indirectly for professions, although it did not capture the differences 
between ‘conservative’ and ‘outgoing’ professions that both required degree-level qualifi-
cations.  Bosland’s tables were validated to some extent when they were used to adjust the 
culture scores of country elites that emerged from a study by Hoppe (1990).  Other studies 
have, in general terms, confirmed Bosland’s work.  For example, Bosland’s tables indicated 
an increase in individualism score with education; this was supported by Bangwayo-Skeete, 
Rahim & Zikhali’s (2011) analysis of the 2005 World Value Survey data; this analysis found 
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that individuals with higher education attached an increased importance to autonomy vs. 
conformity to traditional social norms, implying an attitudinal move towards increased 
individualism.  
A summary of the validity of occupational culture frameworks:  Bosland’s adjustment of 
the four dimension scores of Hofstede’s original national cultural framework was the only 
quantitative approach found that was related (via years of full time education) to professional 
culture.  As it adjusted Hofstede’s national culture scores, it would be simple to incorporate 
into a method or tool that utilised Hofstede’s national culture framework.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
3.5.3 Empirical evidence for the validity of measures of team cultural 
diversity 
More detailed descriptions of the diversity measures discussed in this section are provided in 
Subsection 3.4.3.  The majority of quantitative publications on multicultural teams appeared 
to use measures of diversity based on the proportions of different nationalities, rather than 
the degree of difference between those nationalities, for example measures such as the Blau 
Index, the Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index, the Shannon (or Shannon-Wiener) Diversity Index 
(SDI) and Simpson’s Index.  These nominal measures would produce the same diversity 
score for a four-member team consisting of British, Irish, Australian and New Zealander 
members as for a team consisting of Chinese, Iraqi, Canadian and Brazilian members.  
Clearly, such diversity measures are insensitive to the actual cultural differences between 
team members, and their utilisation has contributed to the inconclusive performance results 
that have emerged from meta-studies such those of Stahl et al. 
Measures of diversity such as Stirling’s index utilised quantitative measures of distance or 
diversity.  However, the assumption implicit in combining several cultural dimension scores 
into a single Euclidean distance was that all dimensions contributed similarly to each other in 
every circumstance; this was not a realistic assumption with regard to human culture.  
As stated in Subsection 3.4.3, Elron (1997) applied  the statistics-based measures of mean 
and variance to Hofstede’s cultural scores for team members in order to calculate team 
cultural diversity; however, although this approach took account of the default national 
cultural scores of team members, it placed a very high weighting on ‘outliers’ due to the use 
of variance; this may have exaggerated the cultural diversity of certain teams.  In addition, it 
was not clear as to how this approach could enable the diversity of each team member to be 
expressed individually – this would be important if it were required to ‘tailor’ a team to be 
more or less diverse. 
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To summarise the above:  The majority of diversity measures (e.g. Blau and Shannon 
indices) were related to the number (or proportion) of different species, ethnic groups, 
nationalities, etc., not to the amount of difference or diversity between them.  Diversity (or 
heterogeneity) indices such as those of Greenberg and Stirling indices took account of the 
Euclidean distances between groups or subgroups (e.g. ages, culture scores, years in post), 
assuming that it did not matter which element of diversity contributed the most; however, this 
does matter.  Diversity measures based on statistical measures of variance took into account 
the actual allocated culture scores of individual team or group members, but put excessive 
weight on outliers, due to the calculation of variance.  All of the diversity measures produced 
an aggregate team diversity value, but did not provide any diversity-related information about 
individual team members – such information would be necessary if a culture tool were 
required to provide guidance about team composition. 
3.5.4 Empirical evidence for the validity of team and task classifications 
for the proposed work 
As stated in Subsection 3.4.4, to achieve the aims of the research described in this thesis, it 
was necessary to be able to describe teams and/or their tasks in terms of the behavioural 
capabilities required for successful performance.  Such behavioural capabilities (for want of a 
better term) could then be associated with team member cultural scores to form the basis of 
an assessment methodology and tool. 
Examination of a range of team and task classifications (see Subsection 3.4.4) revealed no 
classification that covered an adequate breadth of team types, task types or behaviour 
requirements that could be moderated by culture.  
3.6 Summary of the review of the literature and state-of-the-art 
This chapter started with an introduction to the literature review method and literature 
sources that were utilised.  Section 3.3 presented evidence of the effects of national culture 
on team performances.  Section 3.4 presented information on culture-related tools and 
methods.  Subsection 3.4.1 highlighted the sparsity of culture-based performance prediction 
tools, indicating that there was a substantial gap in the literature.  In the absence of such 
tools, Section 3.4.2 presented details of culture frameworks, which allowed us to describe the 
cultures of teams and individuals, Section 3.4.3 addressed measures of cultural diversity that 
were required for a culture-based performance prediction tool and Section 3.4.4 addressed 
team/task behavioural and performance requirements. 
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Section 3.5 examined the empirical evidence for the validity of culture-related tools and 
methodologies, finding that only Hofstede’s tool met all the requirements of the researcher’s 
proposed research for discrimination, validity and the availability of published case studies 
and analyses. 
3.6.1 What was not helpful 
a) ‘Citation disconnect’ between disciplines 
Researchers have traditionally relied heavily on citation following in order to trace valuable 
veins of research.  However, the research publications of interest to the author were very 
widely dispersed across disciplines - more than a hundred different journals had been refer-
enced by the completion of the thesis; this count excluded conferences, reports and web-
based data sources.  Unsurprisingly, there appeared to be little connection in terms of cross-
citations between papers published in journals of different disciplines.  Also, publications 
tended to have either an extremely high number of citations or a very low number of (or zero) 
citations, according to World of Science and Scopus; neither of these alternatives was useful. 
b) Lack of a creativity/invention/innovation classification 
The examination in this review of the effects of culture on innovation-related activities was 
hampered by the lack of clarity amongst researchers as to the degree of creativity, invention, 
etc., that their study results were associating particular cultural traits with.  There was a need 
for a common creativity/innovation framework against which such activities could be 
measured, e.g. one similar to that proposed in Subsection 3.3.1(a) (ix), Figure 3-3.  To add 
further concerns over the accuracy of recent study results, the use of raw patent numbers as 
a measure of innovation output must now be called into question due to the increasingly 
trivial nature of patents that are created as ‘foot-soldiers in the commercial litigation wars’.  
The recent degradation of patents as genuine intellectual property has resulted in the 
reversal of apparent optimum culture scores – a few years ago, high individualism was 
associated, via patent output levels, with high innovation; a recently published study 
demonstrated the opposite result.  This reversal was reflected in the recent major increase of 
Far-Eastern patenting activities.  Whereas it was to be expected that other cultures would 
reduce the longstanding Anglo/European dominance over innovation, there was no evidence 
other than that of patent numbers that a watershed had been reached. 
c) Paucity of material relating safety culture to national culture 
A significant part of the research described in this review was concerned with the operational 
safety of sociotechnical systems, and the effects of national culture on this safety.  A large 
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majority of publications relating to safety and culture concerned the topics of safety culture 
and safety climate; disappointingly, very few of these publications made a connection 
between safety culture and national culture.  Most of those that did mention national culture, 
failed to identify clear links, for example from national culture, through organisational culture 
to safety culture/climate. 
3.6.2 Gaps identified 
a) Lack of culture-based performance prediction tools 
No culture-based team performance prediction tools were found in the literature.  The most 
similar method or tool to that proposed by the researcher was a commercial tool offered by 
Hofstede and the company itim that, following completion of a questionnaire, determined an 
individual’s cultural differences from his or her own country and that of a proposed country, 
and indicated (on the basis of a selection from a small number of general roles) the likely 
issues that might arise; however, this was neither adaptable to team (rather than individual) 
level, nor were the general roles adaptable to meaningful team tasks or behaviours. 
b) Lack of team/task/mission classification of relevance to national culture-
based tools 
No team/task/mission classification was found that could incorporate team member culture 
as a factor in performance. 
c) Lack of a creativity/invention/innovation classification 
As stated in Subsection 3.6.1(c) above no satisfactory classification system was found to 
enable the accurate placement of innovation-related activities to enable the comparison of 
published culture/innovation studies. 
3.7 Detailed problem statement based on the review of the 
literature and state-of-the-art 
The design of complex sociotechnical systems (e.g. oil refineries, power stations, airport 
systems, large transport aircraft), has been dominated by Western organisations; even in the 
case of non-Western designs, the ’blueprint’ is based on Western designs, due in part to the 
constraints imposed by international standards and the associated licencing requirements.  
As a result, Western cultural assumptions are built into such systems, which function less 
effectively when operated by non-Westerners.  There are limited quantitative ergonomic 
tables and tools to assist designers to take account of human physical and mental limitations 
(if they choose to use them); however, there are no such tables and tools to assist designers 
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to take account of user culture.  Whereas we are not yet at a stage where culture-sensitive 
methodologies could be developed directly to improve designs, a ‘cultural clash’ detection 
system might warn designers where there was a likelihood of mismatch. 
Multinational companies increasingly delegate R&D and product improvement projects to 
foreign subsidiaries, with mixed results to-date.  The location, selection or building of teams, 
as opposed to systems, for various functions (e.g. sociotechnical system design, problem-
solving, process improvement, product updating, blue-skies research) could be improved by 
matching culturally-related strengths to project requirements.   
Culture has been shown, in this literature review, to affect behaviour, communication, 
decision-making, creativity, training and other aspects of team performance, leading in many 
cases to reduced performance and safety.  However, current understandings of the effects of 
various cultural traits are variable.  The effects of power distance and individualism on team 
performance are better understood and more consistently reported in the literature than are 
the effects of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance; reports on the performance effects of 
various levels of cultural diversity in teams are extremely inconsistent and contradictory.  
There is a need for an improved understanding of these three team cultural traits. 
To summarise: There is no effective quantitative methodology or tool for taking account of 
culture when designing systems or selecting teams.  As a result, system and team 
performances are hampered, in some cases with fatal consequences.  It is important, there-
fore, to understand and capture relevant culture-related performance factors both for the 
improvement of the sociotechnical system design process, and for improved safety in the 
operation or crewing of such systems. 
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4 Research tools and proposed activities 
4.1 Introduction 
The key purposes of the research described in this thesis were to identify relationships 
between the observed performances of various team types (based on their tasks/missions) 
and the cultural backgrounds of their team members, and to develop models, methodologies 
and tools to aid in the selection of team members and the prediction of team performance-
limiting issues. 
In order to develop the above explanations, it was first necessary to select or define cultural 
frameworks, methodologies and classifications that would enable the representation (or 
description) of cultural traits, team and/or task types and to relate them to team performance 
levels.  The primary purposes of activities described in this chapter were therefore: 
• To select or define a framework for the representation of team member cultural traits 
(primarily based on national cultural traits) in quantitative terms, 
• To select or define a quantitative measure for team cultural diversity, and 
• To select or define an initial team/task/behavioural framework that enabled the 
relationships between team member cultural traits and team performance levels to be 
explored for various team/task situations.  
• To highlight simplifying assumptions related to the choices made in selecting and/or 
defining elements of proposed tools.  
• To detail the further research activities required to achieve the aims and objectives of 
the work.  
Section 4.2 describes the selection of a cultural framework, and the associated issues, 
caveats and assumptions.  Section 4.3 describes the development of a measure of cultural 
diversity, and the associated issues, caveats and assumptions.  Section 4.4 presents details 
of a practical team/task/mission framework consisting of five major factors, which is based on 
the studies of the literature review, in particular Section 3.3.  Section 4.5 details additional 
research activities (based in part on Section 3.6.2 of the literature review). 
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4.2 The selection of a cultural framework 
As was stated in Subsection 3.5.2, Hofstede’s original four-dimensional framework (G H 
Hofstede, 1980) had been shown in the literature to have the widest applicability and replica-
bility of all the cultural frameworks; in addition, there were more studies published that 
utilised Hofstede’s framework than any (or all) other frameworks.  Therefore, Hofstede’s 
original four-dimensional framework was chosen to form one of the pillars on which the 
remaining work of this thesis was based.  Note that, for reasons of lack of data and, in the 
case of long term orientation (LTO), adverse criticism (See Subsection 3.4.2), the two later-
added dimensions of Hofstede’s framework were not used. 
A decision was made that, where appropriate, Bosland’s education-related corrections 
(Bosland, 1985) would be applied as a proxy for the effects of professional or occupational 
culture.   
4.2.1 The four (original) cultural dimensions in more detail 
Tables 4-1 to 4-4 present descriptions representing the four cultural dimensions utilised in 
this thesis.  See Hofstede (2001), chapters 3 to 6, for his much more detailed descriptions, 
examples, explanations and statistical studies relating to these cultural dimensions.  Note 
that the descriptions in Tables 4-1 to 4-4 represent extreme locations on the cultural 
dimension scales, and that most societies are positioned more centrally. 
Low PDI High PDI 
Families and friends: Parents and children tend to 
treat each other as equals; children are expected to 
develop social competence at a relatively early age 
and to develop a sense of personal and civil 
morality. 
Education:  Teachers and students tend to treat 
each other as equals, and learning is seen as 
requiring a two-way process of communication. 
Employment: Managers and workers tend to work 
in decentralised organisational and decision-
making environments.  The real decisions are 
made by those with relevant expertise, rather than 
those with power in the hierarchy. 
Families and friends: Children are expected to be 
hard-working and obedient, and to respect their elders 
throughout life; they are not considered to be 
competent until they are adults. 
Education:  Teachers are the source of all knowledge 
and must be treated with respect in all situations; 
learning depends on the teacher’s wisdom, not the 
student’s initiative. 
Employment: Managers and workers tend to work in 
organisations with centralised organisational structures 
and decision-making; subordinates expect to be told 
what to do, and to have little say in decisions, 
irrespective of their expertise. 
Table 4-1:  Power distance (PDI) – expectations and behaviour 
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Low IDV High IDV 
Families and friends:  Extended families live together 
or in close proximity, strong ties are reinforced by 
frequent meetings; there is little privacy (but it is not 
desired); people think primarily in terms of ‘we’. Family 
or clan protection is provided in return for unquestion-
ing loyalty; the world is split into in-group and out-
group; the family choses friendships, marriage 
partners. 
It is essential to maintain harmony; to this end, direct 
confrontations must be avoided (the word ‘no’ is 
seldom used, and ‘yes’ does not necessarily mean 
yes).  Being caught breaking important rules leads to 
shame and loss of face for the perpetrator and his/her 
in-group; morality is primarily a group issue. 
Education:  Students are discouraged from showing 
individual initiative, and do not speak up in class (in 
part due to the risk of being shamed).  Students expect 
to be shown favouritism by in-group teachers.  The 
main purpose of education is ‘learning how to do.’ 
Employment:  Hiring and promotion of employees is 
influenced by their in-group associations.  Manage-
ment, discipline and rewards are best directed at the 
level of the group.  The need for harmony and consen-
sus leads to ‘groupthink’, and reduces the generation 
of novel ideas and the capability for radical innovation. 
Families and friends:  People only live with 
immediate family members, extended family ties 
are weak; family members expect to have a degree 
of privacy; people think primarily in terms of ‘I’; 
children are expected to seek independence; other 
people are seen as individuals, rather than as in- or 
out-group members; individuals chose their own 
friends, marriage partners. 
Honesty, directness and speaking factually are 
valued above harmony, (‘yes’ means yes and ‘no’ 
means no).  Breaking important rules leads to guilt 
and loss of self-respect for the perpetrator; morality 
is primarily a personal issue. 
Education:  Students are encouraged to show 
initiative, and are expected to speak up in class.  
Students expect teachers to be impartial in their 
treatment.  The main purpose of education is 
‘learning how to learn.’ 
Employment:  Hiring and promotion of employees 
should be based on appropriate skills and talent.  
Management, discipline and rewards are best 
directed at the level of the individual.  A willingness 
to go against the consensus enables the generation 
of novel ideas and improves the capability for 
creativity and radical innovation. 
Table 4-2:  Individualism (IDV) - expectations and behaviour 
No framework or schema was chosen to reflect organizational culture, as no consistent, 
widely-applied quantitative representation had been found during the literature review.  If 
support could be found from later surveys or pilot studies, the methodology or tool could 
have been developed further to allow modifications to team member or overall team culture 
scores based on their affiliations (e.g. to a large bureaucratic company or to a small contract 
design company). 
Low MAS High MAS 
Families and friends: Both parents have similar 
relationships with their children, who are encouraged 
to be modest, and not to express aggression. 
Education:  Socialisation is more important than 
educational achievement; students are expected to 
have limited concern for their own performance and 
to regard the average student as the performance 
benchmark. 
Employment:  Employees ‘work in order to live’, 
working conditions and social relationships at work 
are more important than performance.  Employees 
undersell themselves, are unwilling to relocate their 
families in order to pursue their careers and prefer to 
achieve quality of working life. 
Families and friends: Differentiated relationships - 
fathers deal with the physical world, mothers with the 
emotional world; girls cry and boys fight back; 
ambition is encouraged in both sexes. 
Education:  Educational performance is very 
important; students are expected to have significant 
concern for their own performance and to regard the 
high-performing student as the benchmark. 
Employment: Employees ‘live in order to work’, 
working conditions and social relationships at work 
are less important than interesting work, performance 
and pay.  Employees (in particular managers) are 
assertive, oversell themselves, are competitive and 
are willing to relocate their families in order to pursue 
their careers. 
Table 4-3:  Masculinity (MAS) - expectations and behaviour 
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Low UAI High UAI 
Families: Parents are more relaxed about rules, 
including those defining what is forbidden or dirty, 
and there are few ‘absolute truths’.  Children are 
encouraged to see the world as a friendly place, and 
are exposed to situations of uncertainty. 
Education:  Teachers are not expected to know 
everything, and students expect to contribute to 
discussions in loosely structured learning situations. 
Employment: Employees tend to change jobs 
frequently, and are happy to work for small 
organisations. Senior management is primarily 
focused at the strategic level; a pragmatic approach 
is taken to running the business and dealing with 
problems; faith is placed in generalists. 
Tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity makes it 
easier for innovators and inventors to flourish, but a 
limited faith in technological solutions may be a 
barrier to adoption. 
Families: Parents are inflexible about rules, including 
those that define what is forbidden or dirty; there is a 
strong belief in ‘absolute truths’, with little room for 
alternative views.  Children are told that the world is a 
hostile place, and are sheltered from the unknown.  
Education:  Teachers are expected to know every-
thing relating to their subject, and students expect a 
highly-structured learning situation. 
Employment: Employees seldom change jobs, and 
prefer to work for large organisations.  Senior 
management is involved at the operational level, and 
one of its key roles is to limit the level of uncertainty 
for subordinates; faith is placed in high specialisation. 
Lack of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity 
makes it difficult for innovators and inventors to 
flourish, but a greater faith in technological solutions 
helps widespread adoption, once accepted. 
Table 4-4:  Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) - expectations and behaviour 
Hofstede’s cultural framework was originally intended to provide scores in the range 0 to 100 
but, following the addition of further countries to the original set, some of these countries 
were found to have extreme cultural values for their populations; for example, Slovakia 
scored 104 for power distance and 110 for masculinity, Greece scored 112 for uncertainty 
avoidance21.  Nevertheless, treating these scores as representing a percentage (between 
minimum and maximum), in particular when considering cultural differences and diversity, 
was considered to be a reasonable approximation. 
4.2.2 Caveats with regard to the cultural framework 
Any cultural framework provides, at best, a shorthand representation of cultural traits - a 
limited set of quantitative cultural dimensions cannot explain every cultural difference 
between groups or nations.  Despite the significant support for Hofstede’s framework 
demonstrated in the literature review, it is no different to other frameworks in this respect.  
This subsection provides a number of examples to illustrate the limited sensitivities of cultural 
frameworks. 
Firstly, a comparison of British and Americans revealed many noticeable differences, for 
example see Table 4-5. 
                                            
21 Note that in 2013 or 2014 (too late for this author’s research), Hofstede made minor adjustments to 
his cultural dimensions so that, uncorrected for education, they again produced scores between 0 and 
100 for all countries; the updated sets of values could be downloaded as an .xls file from Hofstede’s 
website (http://geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix).  Accessibility last checked in July 2014.  
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United Kingdom United States 
General: 
Limited competitiveness, a dislike of the ‘hard sell” 
approach (e.g. in advertising). 
A tendency to undersell oneself. 
Indirect communication except where direct needed. 
Understatement in speech. 
A liking for satire and irony. 
Military: 
Minimum force (making do). 
Moderately detailed planning that defines commander’s 
intent and the logic behind the plans, leaving consid-
erable flexibility to those carrying out the plans. 
General: 
Extreme competitiveness, expectation of the ‘hard 
sell” approach (e.g. in advertising). 
A tendency to self-promotion. 
Direct communication. 
Overstatement in speech. 
A dislike of satire and irony. 
Military: 
Overwhelming force. 
Highly detailed planning of what and how, leaving 
little flexibility to those executing the plans. 
Table 4-5: Some differences between UK and USA cultures 
See Nevett (1992) for an analysis of American and British television advertising audience 
preferences; see Fox (2004) for a detailed analysis of the English (rather than British), in 
particular with regard to irony and understatement; see Rasmussen et al. (2008) for more 
details about differences between the UK and USA in military planning.  Despite the above 
(and other) cultural differences between the UK and the USA, the two countries appeared 
remarkably close across five of six cultural dimensions of the Hofstede framework, with an 
average of 5 points (effectively 5%) difference across the original four Hofstede dimensions; 
only in the later version of the long-term orientation dimension (LTO-WVS) was there a 
significant difference in the countries’ scores – the USA and UK scores were, respectively, 
25 and 5022.  Based on anecdotal evidence from the author’s experiences and those of 
colleagues, friends and relatives, the British appeared much closer in cultural terms to other 
Anglo countries than the USA – Australia, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Canada. 
A further inspection and comparison of country cultural scores revealed further surprising 
similarities and differences23 between the default cultural scores of certain countries, based 
on Hofstede’s results.  Table 4-6 presents the culture score differences of a selection of 
countries for each of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the average differences are based on 
the four original dimensions (as utilised in this thesis) and also on the six dimensions 
(including the two recent additions to the framework) .  
                                            
22 But note that Dumitrescu (2012) attributes the differences in rhetoric between the UK and USA, in 
particular under- vs. overstatement, to their differing LTO-WVS scores. 
23 At the time of writing this thesis, one could visit the website http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html 
and select two countries in order to compare their ‘Hofstede framework’ cultural scores. 
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Countries to be compared Culture score differences Av. differences 
Country 1 Country 2 PDI IDV MAS UAI PRA IND 4 dims 6 dims 
Austria 
Japan 43 9 16 22 28 21 23 23 
Portugal 52 28 48 29 32 30 39 37 
Germany 
Japan 19 21 29 27 5 2 24 17 
Denmark 17 7 50 42 48 30 29 32 
France 
Thailand 4 51 9 22 31 3 22 20 
United Kingdom 33 18 23 51 12 21 31 26 
Brazil 
Taiwan 11 21 4 7 49 10 11 17 
Venezuela 12 26 24 0 28 41 16 22 
Table 4-6:  Differences between culture scores of selected countries based on the default 
values of Hofstede’s framework24 
From this table, we can observe the following:  
• Austria appeared to be culturally far closer to Japan than to Portugal. 
• Germany appeared to be culturally closer to Japan than to its immediate neighbour, 
Denmark. 
• France appeared to be significantly culturally closer to Thailand than to its immediate 
neighbour, the United Kingdom – despite having shared a considerable part of its 
language and history with that neighbour over the last millennium.  
• Brazil appeared to be culturally closer to Taiwan than to its immediate neighbour, 
Venezuela. 
We have to bear in mind, with the above results, that some dimensions may play a larger 
role than others in defining the ‘look and feel’ of societies; individualism is probably the most 
important in determining the basic ways that individuals within society interact; however, 
‘lesser’ dimensions such as uncertainty avoidance have critical roles to play in specific 
situations.  Also, the above examples represented unusual cases; by way of contrast, an 
examination of members of the Germanic cluster (including Germany, Austria, Czech 
Republic and German-Switzerland) revealed a very close set of scores, as did an 
examination of members of the Anglo cluster, and of Taiwan and South Korea. 
Hofstede and other culture researchers repeatedly warned researchers of the ecological 
fallacy, i.e. the fallacy that inferences could be made about individuals based on aggregate 
data collected at the group level (Hofstede 2001, p.16), (Brewer & Venaik, 2012); Hofstede 
emphasised that his cultural framework applied only at the level of social systems, not 
individuals.  Individuals could vary widely in their cultural dimension scores, for example an 
individual Indian pilot (high PDI nation) might have a lower PDI score than an individual US 
                                            
24 To a close approximation, these score differences may be regarded as percentages, i.e. with a 
maximum potential difference of 100%. 
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pilot (low PDI nation).  However, a key aspect of the research described in this thesis related 
to the prediction of the mismatch between the operators of sociotechnical systems and the 
requirements of those sociotechnical systems.  In many cases, the only knowledge available 
about operators was their likely nationalities and (perhaps) educational levels, therefore it 
was necessary to work with these (default) national-culture-level scores and determine, from 
the performance of culture tools that were built, whether national culture actually provided a 
useful basis (in the absence of other measures) for the prediction of performance constraints 
or benefits.  Clearly, if a system were to be designed to for users or operators in a particular 
country, then taking account of those operators’ national cultural traits, rather than the 
cultural traits of the country where the system was designed, would produce a better (if less 
than perfect) accommodation. 
Returning to Hofstede’s ecological fallacy:  Whereas individuals within a culture might vary 
significantly in terms of their own preferences (as would be reflected in their ‘personal’ culture 
dimension scores), the author suggests that these same individuals would vary far less in 
terms of their expectations of the behaviour of others; they would also vary less in their own 
behaviours when in social situations within their own cultures because cultures impose a 
behavioural straitjacket, due in part to the strong conformity bias that humans experience 
with regard to social norms.  This straitjacket is particularly strong in low-IDV, high-PDI and 
high-UAI cultures, where non-conformance is heavily discouraged.  In support of the author’s 
view, Gudykunst (1997) stated that, although each member of a culture had a unique view of 
that culture, the theories that members of that culture shared overlapped sufficiently so that 
they could co-ordinate their behaviours in everyday life.  In addition, researchers have 
challenged Hofstede’s concerns about the ecological fallacy; Fischer & Poortinga (2012), 
also Huang & Van de Vliert (2003) investigated individual-level  and culture-level value 
structures, and found strong similarities that negated the justification for separate structures.  
Steel & Ones (Steel & Ones, 2002) attributed stronger predictive powers at the national level 
to the reduction of measurement error on aggregated data, rather than the ecological fallacy. 
The author of this thesis collected a range of anecdotal information in order to investigate the 
ecological fallacy and other issues, see Chapter 5 for further details.  
4.2.3 Simplifying assumptions made with regard to the cultural 
framework 
Following on from the caveats presented in Subsection 4.2.2, it is useful at this stage to 
discuss the assumptions associated with the adoption of Hofstede’s dimensional framework 
and Bosland’s educational adjustments as key elements of the model and tool.  These are 
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presented below: 
(a) The representational accuracy of a simple four-dimensional cultural 
framework:  Four integer numbers between 0 and 100 (approximately) clearly 
cannot capture the nuances of human culture.  However, within the constraints of 
the team environment, the researcher assumed that the scores captured 
sufficiently the behavioural tendencies of team members that useful general 
predictions of some aspects of team performance could be made. 
(b) The ecological fallacy and individual variance within cultures:  Hofstede’s 
cultural scores were analysed at the societal level, and Hofstede has repeatedly 
warned of the fallacy of using them at the level of the individual.  However, the 
researcher assumed that, within the constraints of the team environment, 
individuals faced strong pressures to conform to the perceived cultural expec-
tations of their colleagues; they would therefore behave in ways that were typical 
of their cultures. 
(c) The accuracy of Bosland’s educational adjustments:  Education and 
occupation have significant effects on culture-based attitudes and, thereby, on 
potential behaviours.  Although only Hofstede and his colleagues directly 
endorsed Bosland’s education-related adjustments, there appeared to be support 
in the literature for cultural changes in the direction of Bosland’s adjustments 
(increasing education was associated with more individualistic, less uncertainty 
avoiding attitudes), see Subsection 3.5.2.  Although Bosland’s educational 
adjustments failed to capture cultural differences across professions (e.g. 
accounting vs. acting), they were expected to improve the accuracy of the 
Hofstede values. 
4.3 Selection or derivation of a measure for team cultural diversity 
Currently utilised measures of diversity were examined in Section 3.4.3 of the literature 
review.  None of these measures met the requirements associated with the culture methods 
and tools proposed in this thesis; therefore an alternative measure has been proposed in 
Subsection 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Requirements for a quantitative measure of cultural diversity 
A measure of cultural diversity was required that met the following criteria:  
1. It provided a measure of the mean cultural distance of team members from each 
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other, as a measure of overall team diversity, 
2. It used readily available data, in this case the cultural scores of individuals, (either as 
default country scores or as manually-entered scores), 
3. It enabled the retention and modification of culture scores for each individual team 
member; this allowed experimentation, and also allowed the entry of both default 
(country-average) scores and actual individual scores, e.g. those obtained via 
questionnaire25, 
4. It enabled the identification of individual team members that contributed most to the 
team’s cultural diversity,  
5. It provided diversity values separately for each cultural dimension, 
6. It could be implemented on a spread sheet without the use of macros26. 
7. The measure of cultural diversity would be understandable to users as well as to 
researchers. 
4.3.2 Derivation of an expression for cultural diversity based on cultural 
distance 
Based on the requirements listed in Section 4.3.1, a measure of cultural diversity was 
proposed that utilised the separation between team members in cultural space.  Figure 4-1 
illustrates the location of each member of an imaginary team in three-dimensional culture 
space consisting of power distance, individualism and uncertainty avoidance; in the research 
described in this thesis, team members will be placed in four-dimensional space (with the 
addition of the dimension of masculinity). 
In Figure 4-1, the distances from one of the members of the team to the other five members 
are represented by arrows; if we calculate the average length for these arrows, we have a 
measure of the individual’s cultural separation from the rest of the team.  We can repeat the 
above calculation for all team members and take an average; we then have a measure of 
team cultural diversity based on team members’ cultural distances from each other.  
In practice, in order to maintain cultural diversity values for each of the four cultural 
dimensions, the cultural separation calculations for each team member and for the team are 
                                            
25 The author considered, from his past experiences, that there were seldom more twenty members in 
a meaningfully interacting team.  Therefore, it was practicable to consider each team member 
individually in the calculation without incurring significant overheads. 
26 The issue of using spread sheets without macros was important if the tool were to be introduced to 
industrial companies, as many organisations placed major restrictions on their computer systems’ 
functionalities due to security concerns. 
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actually carried out separately for each dimension. The cultural diversity measure derived in 
this section has been utilised in the various studies described later in this thesis. 
 
Figure 4-1:  Cultural distance or separation 
The expression for cultural diversity was required primarily for the purpose of determining the 
mean cultural distance between each team member and his or her teammates.  For a single 
cultural dimension, given a set of team member scores along this dimension, the average 
cultural distance of any team member ‘i’ (Cdi) from other team members can be calculated by 
adding the culture score differences along each cultural dimension and dividing by the 
number of other team members27, i.e.:  
Cdix = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑁𝑗=1 (𝑁 − 1)⁄  
Where: 
Dix, Djx = Scores for cultural dimension ‘x’ for team members ‘i’ and ‘j’ 
N = Total number of team members (including member ‘i’) 
For example, if we have five team members with individualism scores of 30, 40, 50, 60 and 
70, then the team members’ average cultural distances (in terms of individualism) from their 
teammates are:  
Mbr1: (ABS(30-30)+ABS(30-40)+ABS(30-50)+ABS(30-60)+ABS(30-70))/(5-1) = 100/4 = 25 
                                            
27 Clearly, one’s cultural distance from oneself is zero, hence the term (N-1) in the denominator of the 
above expression; also, a team of one is not a team. 
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Mbr2: (ABS(40-30)+ABS(40-40)+ABS(40-50)+ABS(40-60)+ABS(40-70))/(5-1) = 100/4 = 17.5 
Mbr3: (ABS(50-30)+ABS(50-40)+ABS(50-50)+ABS(50-60)+ABS(50-70))/(5-1) = 100/4 = 15 
Mbr5: (ABS(60-30)+ABS(60-40)+ABS(60-50)+ABS(60-60)+ABS(60-70))/(5-1) = 100/4 = 17.5 
Mbr5: (ABS(70-30)+ABS(70-40)+ABS(70-50)+ABS(70-60)+ABS(70-70))/(5-1) = 100/4 = 25 
If we take the average of the team members’ average cultural distances (from other team 
members), we have a useful measure of team cultural diversity (Cdteam) in terms of cultural 
separation for the particular cultural dimension ‘x’, i.e.:  
Cdteamx = ∑ ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑖=1 �𝑁 × (𝑁 − 1)��  
For the earlier five-member team example, the average overall cultural distance for 
individualism, (or team individualism diversity) is (25+17.5+15+17.5+25)/5 = 100/5 = 20. 
An overall value for team cultural diversity across all four dimensions (or overall team 
member average cultural distance) can be obtained by applying the above equation to each 
cultural dimension and either averaging the values or, if appropriate, weighting the cultural 
dimensions on some measure of importance, which could vary depending on the type of 
team. 
Table 4-7 illustrates an example (implemented in Microsoft Excel) that applies the proposed 
diversity expression to an imaginary multicultural team consisting of eight members.  For 
each of the eight team members, the calculation utilises a look-up table to retrieve that team 
member’s four cultural dimension scores (based on nationality), and adjusts these scores 
based on Bosland’s education corrections.  Note that, though the team is imaginary, the 
cultural dimension scores and cultural diversity scores in Table 4-7 are accurate for that mix 
of nationalities. 
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M
em
ber 
num
ber 
Nationality 
Full tim
e 
educ'n 
(yrs) 
CULTURE SCORES 
(corr'd for years in  full 
time education) 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
PDI IDV MAS UAI PDI IDV MAS UAI Mean diversity 
1 Brazil 16 55 58 37 62 16 33 12 29 22 
2 France 16 55 91 31 72 16 30 17 37 25 
3 Great Britain 16 25 109 54 21 24 37 10 23 23 
4 China 16 65 40 54 16 23 43 10 27 26 
5 India 16 63 68 44 26 20 30 10 21 20 
6 Australia 15 35 103 56 42 18 34 11 21 21 
7 Great Britain 16 25 109 54 21 24 37 10 23 23 
8 Pakistan 16 43 34 38 56 16 49 11 25 25 
Team scores-> 46 77 46 40 20 37 11 26 23 
Table 4-7:  Example data and results based on the proposed diversity expression 
As is the case with all measures of diversity based on separation distances or differences in 
scores, the theoretical maximum team cultural diversity score that the diversity equation can 
generate depends on the number of team members.  For the equation developed in this sub-
section, based on the assumption of cultural dimension scores occupying a range of 0 to 100 
(as was the case with Hofstede’s original set of countries), the theoretical maximum value 
that overall team diversity can take along any cultural dimension ranges from 100% (of the 
range of values) for a two-person team to 50% for a very large team, see Table 4-8 for 
maximum diversity values associated with typical team sizes. 
Where individual member scores can take values between 0 and 100, the maximum 
theoretical diversity (Dmax) of a team of size ‘N’ is:  
Dmax =(𝐼𝑁𝐼 �𝑁2� ∗ (𝑁 − 𝐼𝑁𝐼 �𝑁2�) ∗ 2 ∗ 100/𝑁(𝑁 − 1)  
Where  𝐼𝑁𝐼 �𝑁
2
� returns the integer part of �𝑁
2
� 
Number of team 
members 
Maximum team 
diversity score 
Number of team 
members 
Maximum team 
diversity score 
2 100.00 7 57.14 
3 66.67 8 57.14 
4 66.67 9 55.56 
5 60.00 10 55.56 
6 60.00 11 54.55 
The maximum diversity score approaches 50 for very large teams. 
For the purposes of the diversity calculations associated with this table, it has been assumed 
that minimum and maximum cultural scores are 0 and 100 respectively (a small approximation). 
Table 4-8:  The effect of team size on maximum diversity scores 
Maximum team diversity values are not an artefact of the diversity equations, but reflect the 
fact that, for a team of three or more members, those members cannot all be separated by 
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maximal cultural distances from each other – all team members are located in the same finite 
‘cultural space’. 
4.3.3 Caveats with regard to the expression for cultural diversity 
An overall team cultural diversity score represents a simplification of the detailed member 
diversities and does not capture the detailed pattern of diversity in the team.  The very act of 
calculating a linear average for member diversities and overall team diversity implies an 
assumption of a linear relationship between the value of any diversity and the effects of that 
diversity.  It is suggested in the literature that innovation can benefit from a moderate amount 
of team cultural diversity, e.g. a score of 15 (in terms of the cultural diversity scales proposed 
by this researcher).  However, this diversity could arise in (say) a six member team via 
cultural diversities of 10, 15, 20, 17, 15 & 13, or diversities of 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 & 60; the 
contribution of diversity to innovation is likely to be quite different in each of the two cases.  It 
is likely that ‘moderation in cultural diversity’ applies at both the team level and the individual 
team member level, in which case the latter example does not representation ‘moderation’. 
There are issues associated with particular patterns of team cultural diversity; for example, 
fragmentation of a team into two or more subgroups can occur if members form distinct 
cultural ‘blocks’ (Cheng, Chua, Morris, & Lee, 2012; Dulaimi & Hariz, 2011), as shown in 
Figure 4-2.  Lau & Murnighan (1998) explore this issue further with their ‘fault lines’, where 
several sources of diversity (e.g. national culture, gender and functional background) can 
combine to cause fragmentation and conflict. 
 
Figure 4-2:  Fragmentation into subgroups 
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 102 
 
The proposed measure of cultural diversity would provide detailed intermediate information 
about the location of each team member in cultural space.  This, in turn, would allow the 
development of further analyses at a later stage (if required) to determine whether 
fragmentation into subgroups represents a significant risk for a team.  
4.3.4 Simplifying assumptions with regard to the measure of cultural 
diversity 
Taking account of the detailed descriptions and examples presented in Subsection 4.3.3, it is 
useful at this stage to discuss the assumptions associated with the adoption of the measure 
of cultural diversity as an element of the model and tool.  These are presented below: 
(a) Linearity of diversity effects (see examples in Subsection 4.3.3): The diversity 
values for each individual team member, and the mean diversity value for each 
dimension, were calculated as linear averages.  This implied an assumption of the 
linearity of the effects of cultural distance, i.e. a doubling of cultural distance between 
two members was assumed to bring twice as much in terms of diversity problems and 
benefits.   In situations where moderate levels of cultural diversity were beneficial, 
then the diversity expression would be less accurate in terms of its predictions if team 
member diversities were unevenly distributed, see the example described in Sub-
section 4.3.3.  The author has ignored this potential source of error, other than 
incorporating a warning in the tool when a single individual’s diversity is substantially 
greater than those of other team members. 
(b) Limited interactions between culture and diversity:  It was probable that team 
members from high uncertainty avoiding cultures, with their heightened suspicions of 
foreigners (Geert H. Hofstede, 2001, p.160, exhibit 4.4), would cope with cultural 
diversity less effectively than would those from low uncertainty avoiding cultures.  
This implied that the effects of team diversity were not independent of team average 
cultural values.  The author has ignored this potential source of error, and has 
assumed, for the purpose of tool-building, that such culture/diversity interactions had 
a limited effect compared to those of the average cultural scores and cultural diversity 
scores. 
4.4 Defining teams and tasks from the viewpoint of culture 
The team and task classifications identified in the literature review were unsuitable for the 
purpose of identifying the effects of culture on team task performance.  In particular, these 
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team taxonomies were typically applicable to a narrow range of teams, and the task 
taxonomies did not capture aspects of tasks that were affected by team member cultural 
traits.  Methods of representing team/task combinations had to be developed that were 
appropriate for the purpose of predicting the effects of culture on performance.   
Taxonomic approaches to team classification are very limited in what they can cover 
(Bacharach, 1989; Hollenbeck et al., 2012); their default assumption (of non-overlapping 
categories) forces users to assign teams semi-arbitrarily.  Even if our teams had five key 
features that could each take only four values, this would potentially generate more than a 
thousand slots in the taxonomy if we needed to differentiate between each team type.  In 
reality, team types have overlapping properties, and can often be assigned to several 
categories.  In our case, we need to distinguish between teams, not only on the basis of their 
tasks or missions, but also on the basis of the effects of team member cultures on team 
performance of those tasks or missions.   
4.4.1 A practical team/task framework 
The set of five key ‘culture-relevant’ factors, identified in Section 3.3.3, have been ‘fleshed 
out’ into a number of sub-factors (based on the information contained in Sub-sections 3.3.1 
to 3.3.3).  These factors and their sub-factors are described and summarised below: 
i)   Management and decision-making 
Culture (as measured via the power distance, individualism and uncertainty avoidance 
scores) has a major effect on subordinate/superior relationships. 
Delegation of management authority:  High power distance and high uncertainty 
avoidance cultures both encouraged strong, centralised, directive, non-consultative forms of 
management and decision-making, whereas low power distance and low uncertainty 
avoidance cultures encouraged more consensus-based, delegation-based forms of 
management and decision-making.  Some tasks and missions were best served by authori-
tarian, strongly centralised management, for example highly automated factory systems or 
missions involving large military manoeuvres; others, for example complex decisions 
requiring wide or deep knowledge were typically best served by the consensus-based 
decentralised, delegating management. 
Decision-making under uncertainty:  Managers from high uncertainty-avoiding cultures 
were slow to ‘reframe’ and tended to have difficulty with decision-making under uncertainty, 
resulting in delays and non-optimal choices that were made in an attempt to reduce 
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uncertainty.  Managers from high power distance cultures typically failed to exploit their 
subordinates’ knowledge, and often made decisions swiftly, based on inadequate 
information.  In some environments performance was best served by the rigid adherence to 
rules or standard operating procedures (SOPs) that tended to be a feature of high 
uncertainty-avoiding cultures, e.g. in many production and maintenance environments; in 
other environments, the ability to recognise when to abandon rules or SOPs could ‘save the 
day’, for example, when an aircraft was no longer operating within its normal flight envelope. 
Following standard operating instructions (SOPs) (vs. not following them when 
appropriate):  Members of high uncertainty avoidance teams would tend to adhere at all 
times to SOPs, thus reducing errors under normal conditions; however, they would continue 
to follow SOPs that were no longer applicable due to their tardiness in ‘reframing’.  Members 
of high power distance teams would not challenge their superiors when they failed to follow 
SOPs.  Members of low individualist teams would not directly challenge their superiors when 
they failed to follow SOPs, but would attempt, indirectly, to bring their attention to this failure.  
Members of high individualist teams were willing to challenge their superiors when they 
deviated from SOPs.  Note that cultural dimension scores interact and can produce 
conflicting constraints on team members. 
Recognising and correcting mistakes:  Members of high power distance cultures would 
typically be unwilling to correct their superiors (e.g. team leaders) when they had made a 
mistake.  Members of low individualism cultures would not correct others (in particular, 
leaders) because this would result in a loss of face; instead, they would try, indirectly, to draw 
the other person’s attention to the error so that he/she could discover and correct it.  
Members of high uncertainty-avoidance teams tended to take more time than others to 
recognise mistakes or incorrect assumptions; in addition, their leaders or managers tended 
to discourage feedback from their subordinates.  Where it was important to recognise and 
correct errors (particularly if time is a factor), the improved team communication of low power 
distance, low uncertainty avoiding cultures, and the context-free communication of high 
individualism cultures combined to provide prompt, accurate feedback.  
Summarising the above sub-factors: 
• Centralisation of authority and non-consultative decision-making vs. delegation of 
authority and consultative decision-making. 
• Decision-making under uncertainty. 
• Following standard operational procedures (SOPs) at all times vs. not following SOPs 
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when circumstances demand. 
• Recognising and correcting errors. 
ii)  Creativity and innovation 
Culture, via pressure to conform, willingness to speak out and attitudes to uncertainty, has a 
considerable effect on creativeness.  Some team goals require an ability to produce (and 
present) a large number of ideas, go against the consensus and engage in a degree of 
conflict; others require an ability to take new ideas forward towards usable concepts; yet 
others require an ability to implement existing technologies into products and processes; in 
this latter situation, disciplined concentration on the task in hand is better than constantly 
exploring new ideas.  
Developing new ideas and concepts:  High power distance team members would be less 
likely than low power distance team members to volunteer ideas; high uncertainty avoidance 
team members would feel uncomfortable with novel ideas (‘outside their comfort zone’).  Low 
individualism and low masculinity team members would tend to seek consensus rather than 
novelty.  A degree of cultural diversity offers a wider range of ideas, if they can be ‘teased 
out’, e.g. by brain storming.  
Developing, improving more conventional ideas, products, processes:  In the case of 
less creative work, well-controlled, ordered organisations and processes appear to be more 
effective.  In this case, high power distance, low individualist, high uncertainty avoiding and 
medium-high masculinity cultures appear to be most effective.  In between low and high 
creativity, it appears that the cultural dimension scores are similarly intermediate.  In the case 
of low-creativity teamwork, it is unlikely that the disruption caused by cultural diversity is of 
any benefit. 
Going against the consensus:  High power distance team members would normally agree 
with their leaders, or would say nothing rather than to disagree.  High uncertainty-avoiding 
team members would not generally be encouraged to state differing opinions.  Low 
individualism team members would typically regard consensus as a prior requirement for 
good performance; low masculinity team members would similarly be driven by a need for 
consensus.  High individualism team members would feel much less constrained to go with 
the consensus, and high masculinity team members would tend ensure that their views were 
heard, even if this caused intra-team conflict; however, their scores in other dimensions 
would affect this willingness to go against the consensus (e.g. low individualist, high 
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masculinity team members in Japan direct their competitiveness externally to the team). 
Summarising the above sub-factors: 
• Developing new ideas and concepts through to minor product improvements and 
following procedures (e.g. in maintenance). 
• Going against the consensus. 
iii) Interaction (communication and co-ordination within the team) 
Cultures, due to face and status issues, vary widely in the degree to which rapid, direct, 
factual communication can occur.  Some team situations require rapid, accurate 
communication and continuous co-ordination; other team situations require complex but non-
time-critical communication. The required speed, complexity and accuracy of communication 
within a team depends on the tasks that the team must able to carry out.  In a ‘blue-skies’ 
research team, occasional interchange of complex information may be required between 
team members; under emergency conditions in the cockpit of an advanced transport aircraft, 
or in the control room of a nuclear reactor, rapid, accurate interchange of key information 
may be required. 
Saying what you mean, meaning what you say vs. conveying meaning diplomatically 
(typically indirectly): In certain circumstances, it is important that team members exchange 
information in a prompt, direct, accurate manner, for example in military manoeuvres or 
rapidly-developing situations, e.g. emergencies, which require immediate responses.  High 
power distance discourages subordinates from communicating (unless prompted by their 
superiors); low-individualism demands high-context communication and, as stated earlier, 
drawing a superior’s attention to a problem or error can only be done indirectly – taking time 
and attention away from any developing situation.  However, when negotiating with low-
individualist, high-power-distance or little-understood groups, it is best to proceed with 
caution and a minimum of commitment to any expression of views.  In this case, the low-
collectivist, high-power-distance team member may be most effective. 
Communicate rapidly and accurately with colleagues, superiors and subordinates 
when necessary vs. communicating about and discuss in-depth complex concepts in 
a considered manner:  In some forms of teamwork, e.g. in action teams (aircrews, facility 
operating crews), rapid, accurate communication is required at key times.  Conversely, in 
some other forms of teamwork, for example project planning or research & development, 
team members come together to discuss problems on an ad-hoc or regular basis; although 
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there may be pressure to achieve specific goals, there is typically time for detailed 
discussions and deliberations. 
Interacting with other team members on a frequent or continuous basis vs. interacting 
with other team members mainly (or only) at key decision points:  When carrying out 
highly integrated or co-ordinated tasks, continuous interaction may be necessary, for 
example as part of an assembly or test task, or during a complex manoeuvre such as 
docking a ship, co-ordinating the landing of aircraft on a carrier or when handling an 
emergency.  Conversely, in some forms of teamwork, team members work individually for 
long periods, coming together to discuss progress and key stages, etc., for example in much 
of research and development work. 
Sharing information with other team members whenever possible vs. only sharing 
information on a need-to-know basis:  Keeping others in the team informed of any actions 
or status changes helps maintain a shared understanding of the situation or stage of 
development in an ongoing project.  Such information sharing is easier in a low power 
distance, high individualism, low uncertainty avoiding culture.  Conversely, in situations 
where secrecy (or confidentiality) is important, it may be necessary to limit information-
sharing.  In such cases, the suspiciousness of high-uncertainty-avoiding team members may 
be an asset.  Also, high-power distance, in discouraging informal information exchange, may 
be beneficial. 
Summarising the above sub-factors: 
• Say what you mean, mean what you say vs. convey meaning indirectly, 
diplomatically. 
• Communicate rapidly and accurately with colleagues, superiors and subordinates vs. 
communicate and discuss in-depth a range of complex topics in a considered 
manner. 
• Interact with other team members on a frequent or continuous basis vs. interact with 
other team members mainly (or only) at key decision points.  
• Share information at all times vs. share information only on a need to know basis. 
iv) Handling uncertainty and dealing with failures 
Some environments and team goals result in highly predictable activities and/or outcomes; 
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other environments result in highly unpredictable activities and/or outcomes that must be 
accommodated by the team or crew.  Cultures (in particular, as measured by their 
uncertainty avoidance scores) vary greatly in their capabilities to deal with uncertainty.  
Highly-predictable activities and outcomes vs. highly unpredictable activities and 
outcomes: In situations of relatively low uncertainty, for example planned maintenance of 
sociotechnical systems and the activities of many team games, the inflexibility of high power 
distance, the commitment to rules and caution of high uncertainty avoidance and the 
subservience to the group of low individualism may offer benefits.  In the opposite case, 
where both activities and outcomes may be unpredictable, then the flexibility of low power 
distance, low uncertainty avoidance and high individualism may offer benefits. 
Errors and failures must be dealt with quickly vs. errors and failures require careful 
consideration prior to action:  In situations where errors cause rapid deterioration in the 
situation, they must be recognised and dealt with promptly.  High uncertainty avoidance 
reduces the speed with which errors are detected, high power distance reduces the 
willingness of team/crew members to inform their superiors or leaders, and low individualism 
prevents subordinates from informing their superiors directly due to loss of face issues.  Low 
uncertainty avoidance, low power distance and high individualism contribute to rapid 
detection of errors and failures (willingness to reframe) and the informing of superiors 
promptly, in a direct clear manner.  In situations where there is time for extended 
consideration, the effects of culture on performance are less severe than when fast action is 
required.  However, high power distance tends to reduce the range of solutions under 
consideration (due in part to lack of consultation), and high uncertainty avoidance tends to 
limit potential solutions to those that are well-understood. 
Summarising the above sub-factors: 
• Highly-predictable activities and outcomes vs. highly UNpredictable activities and 
outcomes. 
• Handle highly predictable activities and outcomes except under rare circumstances 
when they become highly dangerous and unpredictable 
• Handle highly UNpredictable activities and outcomes 
• Handle errors and failures very quickly 
• Give careful consideration to errors and failures prior to action 
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v) Situation awareness 
Individual situation awareness:  This applies primarily to organised action teams, e.g. 
aircrews, power station operators.  High uncertainty avoidance tends to reduce individual 
situation awareness (due to both training issues and reluctance to mentally reframe). 
Shared situation awareness:  As above, this applies primarily to organised action teams.  
As stated above, high uncertainty avoidance tends to reduce individual situation awareness 
(due to both training issues and reluctance to mentally reframe) of all operators or crew 
members.  In addition, crew or operator communication difficulties hamper further shared 
situation awareness – high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance both discourage 
unprompted subordinate communication of information, and low individualism causes 
subordinates to refer indirectly to arising situational issues, often resulting in substantial 
delays in reactions and reduced shared situation awareness. 
Summarising the above sub-factors: 
• Maintain individual situation awareness at all times 
• Maintain shared situation awareness at all times 
4.4.2 An ideal team/task framework 
The cultural framework described and applied in the work of this thesis utilised four dimen-
sions (PDI, IDV, MAS and UAI) plus cultural diversity, thus enabling us to position team 
member cultures and team mean culture at locations in continuous culture space.  Rather 
than pursuing a taxonomic or factor approach to team/task classification, it would have 
greatly simplified matters if a small number of dimensions based on relevant independent 
factors could have been adopted as the basis for team/task classification, as recommended 
by Hollenbeck et al. (2012); this would have enabled us to position a team at a location in 
continuous team/task/mission space, rather than to ‘shoehorn’ it into an ill-fitting taxonomic 
slot.  
Figure 4-3 illustrates the idealised case, where a task/mission located in task/mission space 
could be mapped (by a process of transformation) into a ‘desirable’ location in culture space; 
for ease of illustration, only three axes are shown in the figure. 
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Figure 4-3:  Idealised process of mapping missions or tasks from task/mission space to culture 
space (due to representational difficulties, only three dimensions are shown for each ‘space’) 
Unfortunately, the five earlier-described task/mission factors could not directly be changed 
into dimensions because each factor was an umbrella for a set of sub-factors whose 
conglomerate set of weights could not be represented as a single point on a dimension 
scale.   
4.5 Proposed further research activities 
As stated in Chapter 2 (General problem statement and research methodology), the 
proposed research activities included the collection of detailed data from the research 
literature, the carrying out of a range of pilot studies, the detailed analysis of the resulting 
data, the development of performance prediction/culture discrepancy methodologies. 
The culmination of the research described in this thesis was to be the development of a 
culture tool to guide designers and team selectors.  However, due to the inconsistent and 
sometimes contradictory nature of culture study results reported in the literature, see Section 
3.7 (‘Detailed problem statement based on the review of the literature and state-of-the-art’), it 
was necessary also to consider several specific research questions before constructing the 
proposed culture models and tools. 
4.5.1 Specific research questions 
Much research work had been carried out on the effects of power distance and individualism 
on human perception, behaviour, decision-making and other aspects of performance, and 
there were clear trends reported in the literature, at least for certain types of team and task.  
However, the literature on masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and cultural diversity was much 
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less clear.  Therefore, the following three research questions were posed: 
1. Masculinity (MAS):  There were mixed results in the literature with regard to the 
effects of MAS on innovation, although low MAS appeared to be associated with 
compromise and groupthink.  In areas such as transport and industrial production, 
there appeared to be remarkably little association between MAS and accident rates; it 
would be logical to expect that high-MAS, highly-competitive operators and crew 
would take more risks than low-MAS highly socialising operators and crew.  Could the 
effects of MAS on team performance in various domains be clarified? 
2. Uncertainty avoidance (UAI):  High UAI appeared to have a negative effect on most 
team-related activities, except in the development of low innovation products and 
services.  Were there other areas where high UAI offered benefits?  
3. Cultural diversity:  Reports from the literature about the effects of cultural diversity 
on performance were inconsistent and, in many cases, contradictory.  Were there any 
cases where there were clear diversity-linked patterns of effects? 
4.5.2 Culture models and tools 
Based on findings from the literature review and further studies, it was necessary to draw up, 
at very least, approximate or general models of the relationships between the four cultural 
dimensions (plus cultural diversity) and the factors relating to task/mission performance.  
These, detailed in Chapter 5, would form the information or knowledge basis of the culture 
tools. 
The first tool (TCT1, Chapter 6) was intended as an initial exploration of approaches to 
cultural aspects of performance prediction; the later tools were intended to demonstrate 
increasingly practicable approaches to the assessment of cultural fit and performance 
prediction. 
4.6 Summary of research tools and proposed activities 
Hofstede’s four-dimension culture framework was selected as the cultural framework for the 
proposed research, along with Bosland’s educational adjustment factors (Bosland, 1985) 
where appropriate.  A measure of cultural diversity based on team member location in four-
dimensional culture space was developed.  A team task/mission classification based on five 
factors and their sub-factors was proposed, based on the literature review. 
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Prior to the development of the models and tool, a detailed data collection and analysis 
exercise was required, utilising material collected from the literature and the researcher’s 
own questionnaire results and pilot studies.  This exercise, detailed in Chapter 5, was 
intended to provide more details of relationships between cultural factors and the above-
proposed team/task performance factors. 
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5 Data collection and analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a set of studies, the purpose of which was to gather detailed 
information in order to identify or clarify culture-performance relationships for various team 
types.  These culture-performance relationships, combined with those found in the earlier 
literature review, were subsequently utilised in a set of team culture tools described in later 
chapters.  
Section 5.2 describes the collection (via interview and questionnaire) of anecdotal 
information and its analysis by the author of this thesis.  Section 5.3 presents the results of 
studies carried out by the author, either directly or (in some cases) based on data collected 
from external sources.  Section 5.4 provides partial answers to three research questions 
posed in Chapter 4.  Section 5.5 combines the results of the literature review and the 
analyses of Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 in order to derive culture/performance relationships for 
a set of team culture models and tools.  Section 5.6 provides a summary of the work of this 
chapter. 
The default assumption behind statistical analyses of data was that relationships between 
variables were linear.  This assumption appeared to be true in some cases, and appeared to 
be a good approximation over a limited range in other cases; however, it was not the case 
where an optimum value (or score) occurred in the middle of a range.  As examples of 
potential non-linear relationships, consider two of the cultural dimensions utilised in this 
report: 
• Masculinity and innovative or creative team projects:  Very high masculinity could 
result in excessive competition and reduced co-operation within a research team; low 
masculinity (high femininity) could result in excessive effort being devoted to the 
achievement of consensus, at the expense of novelty.  As stated in Chapter 3, Halkos 
& Tzeremes’ (2011) results implied an optimum masculinity score of perhaps 70 to 
80.  
• Power distance and complex projects requiring high co-ordination:  Very high 
power distance resulted in much-reduced delegation, potentially resulting in low 
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quality decision-making (based on status rather than knowledge) where subject 
matter experts are not encouraged to contribute and slow responses to problems 
(due to lack of feedback); however, very low power distance could lead to a loss of 
leadership and co-ordination. 
It was important, therefore, to consider non-linear (or bilinear) relationships where 
operational logic would indicate the likelihood of such relationships.  
Unless otherwise stated, the cultural dimensions referred to in this chapter were those that 
were identified in Hofstede’s original research, i.e. individualism (IDV), power distance (PDI), 
masculinity (MAS) and uncertainty avoidance (UAI). 
In order to determine team member culture scores, to apply Bosland’s educational correc-
tions (where appropriate), to calculate cultural diversity scores and to derive average team 
culture scores, many complex calculations were required.  Several tools were developed and 
incorporated into spread sheets for the purposes of carrying out these calculations. 
5.2 The collection of qualitative anecdotal information 
The author has worked, and continues to work, in a multicultural university environment.  
Through contacts via research meetings, research training courses, former colleagues and 
current friends in other departments and other universities and via sports contacts, the author 
has been able to gather a range of qualitative anecdotal information. In addition, he has 
utilised questionnaires to collect additional information. 
5.2.1 Informal interviews and personal conversations 
Note that, as the examples in this section are anecdotal, no claim is made to the effect that 
they are typical or representative.  The sources of most of the anecdotes below are the 
conversations that the author has had with other research staff, foreign students, lecturers, 
fellow footballers and others about their experiences on coming to Britain or travelling 
elsewhere.  In many cases, the anecdotes that I obtained were potentially traceable to their 
sources, and in other cases I was asked not to quote them; such anecdotes have not been 
listed in the selection below.  See Appendix 2 for more detailed versions of the 
conversations. 
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Examples of culturally-related feedback include the following28: 
• Rank and status:  Two high-PDI respondents (from different parts of the World) 
commented on the lack of respect accorded them by juniors of their own country 
when in this country. 
• Indirectness:  Despite their high IDV score (which would imply a direct mode of 
conversation), the British are typically very indirect in their commands and feedback.  
A direct-speaking Scandinavian commented on what he saw as this irritating aspect 
of dealing with the British; he also commented on the still-prevalent although 
declining occurrences of sexist remarks. 
• Face:  Several Chinese respondents commented on face and guanxi-related aspects 
of their culture (e.g. obtaining jobs, criticism). 
• A British pilot’s experiences:  The author carried out an unstructured interview with 
a pilot who had more than twenty years flying experience on flag carriers, budget 
airlines and private lease flying services.  As a regular pilot trainer, the pilot described 
one of his key tasks as attempting to minimise the ‘power slope’ in the cockpit as, for 
crews of many nationalities, the captain was a considerable distance above the first 
officer.  From the pilot’s description, it became clear that ‘power slope’ was the 
equivalent of power distance.  The pilot also described his concern about attitudes to 
standard operational procedures (SOPs), in particular the agitation of some non-UK 
co-pilots (including experienced ones) when told by him that he would deviate from 
SOPs in order to maintain a margin of safety, e.g. when landing at difficult airports in 
bad weather conditions.  
The pilot commented on the increasingly multinational nature of the industry, with 
some airlines employing more than seventy nationalities of flying crews.  One such 
airline used a set of ‘watertight’ SOPs in order to cope with crew national diversity; 
the pilot expressed concerns about this SOP-fixation and the safety issues that would 
arise when conditions deviated excessively from the norm, resulting in a loss of safety 
margin.  He commented that the Swissair MD-11 crash of 1998 might have been 
avoided if the pilots had immediately headed for the nearest airport instead of being 
preoccupied with following SOPs and going through detailed checklists.  I described 
the uncertainty avoidance dimension which, the pilot felt, explained some of the 
above differences he had found between various nationalities of pilot. 
                                            
28 Note that the cultural values (e.g. high-PDI) referred to the individuals’ default national culture 
scores for the Hofstede cultural framework.  
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The pilot went on to describe issues of face that came to the fore when he had to 
correct pilots of some nationalities, in particular when training or testing pilots; he also 
commented on the ‘gung-ho’ attitudes29 of US pilots, in particular.  We discussed this 
latter point further and it appeared to relate to masculinity; however, this attitude was 
apparently not common amongst other nationalities.  As the USA default masculinity 
score was lower than that of the UK and many other countries, this supported 
Merritt’s findings that Hofstede’s masculinity scores were not closely replicated 
amongst aircrew (A. C. Merritt, 2000).  The pilot also commented on differing 
preferences for automation, and the issue of loss of flying skills. 
To summarise this pilot’s experiences, it appeared that national culture played a 
significant role in civil aviation crewing, although the default masculinity scores 
appeared to be an unreliable indicator of attitudes and behaviour. 
5.2.2 Questionnaire responses 
The author designed a web-based culture questionnaire (taking advice from others as to its 
format and content) and distributed it via email to a range of students and employees and via 
Facebook to other contacts.   The questionnaire form is shown in Appendix 3.  Approximately 
75% of answers related to travellers to the UK, and 25% of the answers related to travellers 
from the UK (to elsewhere).   The most common issues and differences commented on in the 
questionnaire returns included the following: 
• Friendships:  One low-MAS and three low-IDV respondents commented on the 
disappointing shallowness of English friendships - the apparent initial friendliness did 
not develop into anything.  
• Formality and power distance (by other names):  Virtually all respondents from 
countries significantly higher in power distance (compared to the UK) noted this 
difference; in particular they commented on the reduced formality in meetings and the 
ease with which they could discuss matters with their team leader or supervisor. 
• Timing and preparation:  This was remarked on by several respondents.  In 
particular, the high-uncertainty-avoiding German respondents did not like the 
apparent lack of preparation and the lax time-keeping (including meeting overruns). 
The author also carried out an unstructured interview with a UK pilot with more than two 
decades of flying flagship airlines, budget airlines, private lease and pilot training and testing.  
                                            
29 As in over-competitiveness, overenthusiasm, lacking caution and not thinking through potential 
consequences. 
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His experiences accorded with three of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, but not with the 
fourth, masculinity. 
Although not all the comments received from conversations, interviews and questionnaire 
returns were directly related to culture, they seemed to confirm the author’s view (based on 
previous experience) that individuals’ culturally-defined expectations of behaviour were 
engrained to such a degree, almost irrespective of their personalities, that they felt shock 
and/or disappointment when these expectations were not met.  Such culturally-defined 
expectations about the behaviours of others (in particular the behaviours of others of the 
same nationality) almost certainly play a larger role in defining team member interactions 
than do minor differences in personality and upbringing.  This represents an ameliorating 
factor with regard to Hofstede’s ‘ecological fallacy’ warning. 
5.3 Data from the author’s studies 
The author has carried out a range of pilot studies on commercial and industrial work teams 
and student groups, and additional data has been collected from various sources (including 
websites detailing football fixtures and performances, footballer abilities, aircraft crash data, 
seafarer fatalities and research performance data).  The data has been processed and 
statistically analysed; summary results are presented in the following subsections, and more 
details can be found in Appendix 4.   
As well as contributing to the discovery or confirmation of general relationships, the pilot 
studies have enabled the relative contributions of the various cultural dimensions and cultural 
diversity dimensions to be determined; these have contributed to the culture-performance 
models that underlie the team culture tools described later. 
5.3.1 Industrial and commercial project and management teams 
A large number of researchers have investigated project and management team success 
and failure factors, e.g. Pinto & Mantel (1990), Cozijnsen et al. (2000), Belout & Gauvreau 
(2004) and Iamratanakul et al. (2007).  Their results have been extremely variable due in part 
to the wide disparity in measures of performance effectiveness, the large range of 
contributing factors (independent variables) taken into account and the wide range of project 
stages considered.  It was therefore with some trepidation that the author gathered data on 
project team performance via questionnaires and (where possible) accompanying interviews.  
The data was acquired from personnel who were, or had been, involved in technical project 
and/or management teams.  The results, in particular the interview feedback and 
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questionnaire comments sections, revealed some of the issues that plague researchers in 
this area; for example, a proven high performance team could find itself with an unattainable 
target due to external politics.  In general, however, it was usually clear from the question-
naire and interview comments as to how well teams performed on a professional and social 
level, irrespective of the achievement of the externally imposed team goals. 
Following further consideration, it was decided to retain the material on project and 
management teams for culture tool testing purposes rather than for influencing the task-
mission/desirable-culture relationships. 
5.3.2 Student project groups 
The primary data sources for the student group studies were the undergraduate student 
group projects carried out in Loughborough University’s School of Electronic, Electrical & 
Systems Engineering.  These student groups were effectively self-managed project teams. 
a) The student group studies 
Data was collected on the previous seven years of student group projects; students had 
been encouraged to comment in these past projects so that additional information on 
individual views of the groups and their performances were available.  The projects had been 
assessed in part on creativity and innovation. 
Table 5-1 presents a summary of the data analysis of student groups, detailed data can be 
found in Appendix 4A. The results of the statistical analysis indicated that the two main 
contributors to student group performance (as measured by overall project mark) were 
average individual student grade point average (GPA)30 and student group mean uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) score; together, they explained 74.5% of the variance in group performance.  
Student group project performance was positively correlated with average student GPA (as 
would be expected), negatively correlated with UAI score and positively correlated with UAI 
diversity score.  Other researchers have suggested that best student GPA score is more 
important than average student GPA score, e.g. (Swigger, Brazile, Harrington, Peng, & 
Alpaslan, 2005); this was tested but not supported by the statistical analysis.  
                                            
30 Based primarily on the students’ individual performances on coursework and examinations. 
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Prediction factors (of 
performance) in the student 
group model 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% confidence 
limits for B 
B Std error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Constant 42.619 12.045  3.538 .001 18.239 66.909 
Average student GPA* (%) 1.136 .101 .845 11.238 .000 .932 1.340 
UAI score -1.711 .414 -.658 -4.131 .000 -2.546 -.876 
UAI diversity score .536 .193 .441 2.778 .008 .147 .925 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.745 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 74.5% of the variance in 
performance of these student groups.  *GPA = grade point average (for the individual students). 
Table 5-1:  Student group data - summary of statistical analysis 
Based on data from Table 5-1, the relative effects of each cultural/ cultural diversity 
dimension (in the final model) on student performance are summarised in Table 5-2.  Note 
the use of unstandardised coefficients rather than standardised coefficients as the basis for 
calculation31. 
Cultural 
dimension 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Relative contributions of 
cultural dimensions 
UAI -1.711 -1.000 
UAI diversity .536 .313 
Table 5-2:  Relative contributions of cultural dimensions to student group performance 
b) Summary – student groups 
The largest contributory factor (for student groups tasked with innovative or creative projects) 
was average student grade point average; the major cultural factors were UAI, which was 
negatively correlated with group performance, and UAI diversity, which was positively 
correlated.  Other cultural factors were not statistically significant. 
5.3.3 University research groups 
Data from the UK’s 2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) website was downloaded 
and analysed by university department for physics & astronomy, and chemical engineering.  
However, some of the detailed data on the RAE website was removed (or made 
inaccessible) following initial access, preventing a full analysis.  For each department, the 
author had to assign nationalities to all individuals submitted to the RAE exercise; due to 
data protection requirements, nationality data was not available from these departments, and 
                                            
31 Note that unstandardised coefficients are used as the basis for calculating relative contributions of cultural 
dimensions to the dependent variables in all cases.  This is because all cultural dimensions have approximately 
the same actual range (of the order of 0 to 100) over the overall global population.  A particular sample may have 
very different ranges for PDI, IDV, MAS and UAI cultural scores (depending on the mix of countries represented); 
such a situation would result in very different standardised coefficient weightings compared to the unstandardised 
ones, which would not reflect the real world situation. 
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the author was obliged to search web sources in order to obtain confirmatory evidence. 
a) Physics and astronomy 
Details were obtained and processed for a total of twenty-six RAE2008 physics & astronomy 
submissions.  Following processing, they were analysed via the SPSS statistical package. 
Table 5-3 presents a summary of the data analysis for physics & astronomy; detailed data 
can be found in Appendix 4B.  Note that, in the statistical model of Table 5-8, an optimum 
MAS diversity score of ‘6’ had been derived from repeated tests of the model with various 
proposed optima; the negative sign for MAS diversity indicates that the score of ‘6’ 
represents a maximum, rather than a minimum, in terms of positive contribution to RAE2008 
score in the model.  
Prediction factors in final model 
(Physics & Astronomy) 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% confidence 
limit for B 
B Std error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
(Constant) 10.180 1.088  9.353 .000 7.923 12.437 
MAS score -.142 .020 -1.670 -6.977 .000 -.184 -.100 
MAS diversity score* -.114 .017 -1.632 -6.811 .000 -.149 -.079 
* MAS diversity was measured as the absolute distance from an optimum of diversity score of 6. 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.671 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 67.1% of the variance in this 
sample of the RAE2008 Physics & Astronomy results. 
Table 5-3:  University RAE2008 (physics & astronomy) – final regression model (with two 
independent variables) 
The results of the statistical analysis indicated that the two main contributors to Physics & 
Astronomy unit performance, as measured by their RAE2008 scores, were the masculinity 
(MAS) and MAS diversity scores; together, they explained 67.1% of the variance in research 
department performance; both were negatively correlated with RAE2008 score.  
Based on data from Table 5-3, the relative effects of each cultural/ cultural diversity 
dimension (in the final model) on university RAE2008 physics & astronomy performance are 
summarised in Table 5-4.  
Cultural dimension Unstandardised coefficients 
Relative contributions of 
cultural dimensions 
MAS score -.142 -1.000 
MAS diversity score -.114 -0.803 
Table 5-4:  Relative contributions of cultural dimensions to university RAE2008 (P&A) 
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b) Chemical engineering 
Details were obtained and processed for all nine RAE2008 chemical engineering 
submissions; it appears that many (other) chemical engineering departments have been 
entered in combination with other engineering departments.  Following processing, they were 
analysed via the SPSS statistical package.  
Given the small number of RAE2008 submissions, the number of predictor variables should 
be limited to one.  Table 5-5 presents a summary of the data analysis of for chemical 
engineering; detailed data can be found in Appendix 4C.  
Prediction factors in final 
model (Chemical 
Engineering) 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% confidence 
limit for B 
B Std error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
(Constant) 3.276 .148  22.186 .000 2.936 3.617 
MAS diversity score -.054 .014 -.810 -3.903 .005 -3.903 .005 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.613 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 61.3% of the variance in this 
sample of the RAE2008 Chemical Engineering results. 
Table 5-5:  University RAE2008 (chemical engineering) – final regression model 
The results of the statistical analysis indicated that the main contributor to chemical 
engineering facility performance, as measured by their RAE2008 scores, was the masculinity 
(MAS) diversity score; it explained 61.3% of the variance in research facility performance, 
and was negatively correlated with RAE2008 score.  
Based on data from Table 5-5, the relative effects of each cultural/ cultural diversity 
dimension (in the final model) on university RAE2008 chemical engineering performance are 
summarised in Table 5-6.  The table is produced for completeness – there is only one 
cultural dimension. 
Cultural dimension Unstandardised coefficients 
Relative contributions of 
cultural dimensions 
MAS diversity score -.054 -1.000 
Table 5-6:  Relative contributions of cultural dimensions to university RAE2008 (CE) 
c) Discussion and summary – RAE2008 results 
Only very limited inferences can be drawn, in part due to the nature of the RAE assessment32 
and in part due to the relatively small sample size, as is the case with chemical engineering 
                                            
32 Submissions are based on individuals, but the overall academic department or school RAE score is 
in part an aggregate of these scores, which may represent several research groups, each potentially 
with a different cultural profile. 
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The main topic of interest in the RAE2008 results related to cultural diversity.  Almost all the 
measures of cultural diversity that the author of this thesis has previously found in the 
literature represented ‘total’ or ‘combined’ diversity measures.  However, diversity along 
different cultural dimensions could have produced opposite effects on performance; this may 
explain why there was little consistency in the academic literature on diversity.  However, the 
above RAE2008 results suggested that MAS diversity could be a significant negative 
contributor to research performance, but that other forms of diversity were not.  When a 
combined measure of diversity was substituted, its contribution was insignificant. 
The sizes of the samples limited the number of independent variables that could justifiably be 
retained in the final model, and therefore limited the inferences that could be drawn from 
them.  MAS, in one model, and MAS diversity in the both models had a significant role 
(mainly negative) to play in performance as measured by the RAE2008 grade scores.  This 
was perhaps logical if we consider what could happen in discussions and meetings; without 
formal controls or strong leadership, consensus-seeking low-MAS researchers could be 
dominated by over-competitive high-MAS researchers. 
 It is also worth commenting that there appeared to be significant group size effects in both 
models.  Three size-related variables were tested in the early models, but √(group size) was 
found to contribute the most to the regression model.  It was logical that increased group size 
would tend to broaden experience and enable members to increase their individual 
knowledge and skills; however, as group sizes increased, groups would tend to become 
more bureaucratic, thus reducing the positive ‘group effect’.  The group size variables were 
removed from both of the final regression models as part of the ‘independent variable cull’. 
Turning to a different issue, academic research appeared to be ‘tagged’ onto one end of the’ 
innovation-improvement spectrum’ in the literature, yet the author found no evidence in that 
literature to support such a continuum.  As stated in Subsection 3.3.1(a)(x), three potentially 
independent activities or processes could be identified – searching for truth (much of 
academic blue-skies research), creativity/lateral thinking/invention, and adaptation to needs/-
markets; these or similar groupings could form the basis of a three (or more) dimension 
framework, as illustrated in Figure 3-3.  
5.3.4 Sports teams 
The author carried out a study of the 2010-2011 English Premier Football League season, 
during which twenty teams played a total of 380 matches.  Talent scores were obtained for 
all Premiership players based on the Castrol EDGE Rankings (Castrol, 2011), and were 
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updated at the halfway stage (beginning of 2011).  For each match, team talent scores were 
calculated based on player talent scores weighted by the proportion of the game that each 
player spent on the pitch; team mean culture dimension scores were similarly calculated 
based on weighted player nationality scores.  Team cultural diversity and team member 
average age were also calculated.  Talent, cultural and age differences between teams were 
calculated, and were statistically analysed via the SPSS package, both at the level of the 
game and at the level of the team over the season. 
The measure of performance chosen was shots-on-goal difference; shots-on-goal has been 
shown in the literature to be a more reliable measure of team performance than goals-
scored-difference or points, (Miklos-Thal & Ullrich, 2010; Reep & Benjamin, 1968), as goals 
scored and points are both significantly affected by inconsistent refereeing decisions.  
Several models were analysed, initially with a large number of prediction factors; factors with 
little statistical significance were eliminated.  The final football match model contained four 
prediction factors – team talent difference, home advantage, masculinity difference and 
uncertainty avoidance difference, see Table 5-7.  This model captured 41.3% of the variance 
in shots-on-goal-difference match performance over the season; detailed data can be found 
in Appendix 4D. 
Prediction factors in the 
final model (Premiership 
matches) 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% confidence 
limit for B 
B Std error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Constant -1.609 .205  -7.828 .000 -2.012 -1.205 
Home advantage 3.217 .291 .308 11.059 .000 2.646 3.788 
Team talent difference .140 .012 .376 11.402 .000 .116 .164 
Team MAS difference .099 .025 .157 3.968 .000 .050 .149 
Team UAI difference .134 .015 .368 8.973 .000 .105 .163 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.413 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 41.3% of the variance in the 
match-by-match shots-on-target results by Premiership teams during the 380-game season. 
Table 5-7:  English Football Premiership match performance (combined defence and attack) – 
regression model 
Prior to the final cull of prediction factors, the football match model also contained MAS 
diversity difference and UAI diversity difference (both positive), but their contributions were 
too low compared to the other variables and, therefore, were eliminated. 
Based on data from Table 5-7, the relative effects of each cultural/ cultural diversity 
dimension (in the final model) on English Premiership match performance are summarised in 
Table 5-8.  
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Cultural dimension Unstandardised coefficients 
Relative contributions of 
cultural dimensions 
Team MAS difference .099 .739 
Team UAI difference .134 1.000 
Table 5-8:  Relative contributions of cultural dimensions to English Premiership match 
performances 
The final football team model contained three prediction factors – team talent difference, 
home advantage and uncertainty avoidance difference, see Table 5-9; note that UAI diversity 
and MAS appeared in the football team model (both positive), but their contributions were too 
low for them to be retained.  This football team model captured 82.5% of the variance in 
shots-on-goal-difference performance over the season; detailed data can be found in 
Appendix 4E. 
Prediction factors in the 
final model (Premiership 
teams) 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% confidence 
limit for B 
B Std error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Constant -1.619 0.271  -5.967 0.000 -2.170 -1.069 
Home advantage 3.239 0.385 +0.567 8.414 0.000 .071 .175 
Team talent difference .123 0.026 +0.405 4.772 0.000 2.458 4.020 
Team UAI difference .107 0.025 +0.366 4.329 0.000 .057 .158 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.825 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 82.5% of the variance in the 
shots-on-target results by Premiership teams over the season. 
Table 5-9:  English Football Premiership team performance over the season (combined defence 
and attack) – regression model  
From the above models, it is clear that uncertainty avoidance (UAI) was positively associated 
with a team’s performance relative to its rivals.  Note that the model of Table 5-9 related to 
team performance over the season, not to individual match performances, where the 
variance due to random factors was much higher … a match-by-match prediction ability of 
82.5% (even for shots-on-target rather than goals) could earn the wielder of such knowledge 
a large income! 
Regular viewers of English Premiership matches will be aware of the high frequency with 
which defensive errors occurred – slow back passes that were intercepted by opposition 
players, defenders that were caught with the ball, etc.  It is therefore logical to hypothesise 
that a defensive player would benefit from a high UAI score, as such a player would attempt 
to reduce or accommodate uncertainty by maintaining greater margins of time and distance.  
Conversely, an attacking midfielder or striker might benefit from the creativity that comes with 
low UAI because this could impose increased uncertainty on the opposition defensive 
players.  In order to test the hypothesis ‘high UAI benefits defenders rather than attackers’, 
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further data processing was carried out to split each of the 380 team/game combinations into 
a defensive and attacking group of players33.  Perhaps due to the difficulties of identifying 
defensive midfielders from attacking midfield players, the analysis was inconclusive, and the 
benefits of high UAI appeared very similar for both defence and attack. 
Based on data from Table 5-9, the relative effects of each cultural/ cultural diversity 
dimension (in the final model) on English Premiership team performance over the season are 
summarised in Table 5-10.  
Cultural dimension Unstandardised coefficients 
Relative contributions of 
cultural dimensions 
Team UAI difference .107 1.000 
Table 5-10  Relative contributions of cultural dimensions to English Premiership team 
performances 
5.3.5 Organised action teams 
Organised action teams include a range of teams that have to react very quickly to 
circumstances, in particular ‘when things go wrong.’  They include high reliability sociotech-
nical system operators and crews, e.g. airline crews, ship crews, surgical teams, oil rig 
crews. 
a) Aircraft accidents 
Data covering the years 1970 to 2009 were collected from the aircraft crash data website 
Airsafe.com (Airsafe.com, n.d.) and were statistically analysed. 
The aircraft accident data were analysed taking into account national corruption via the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2011) and GDP-per-capita.  Note 
that during several trials, the per-capita income was ‘topped and tailed’ at various levels until 
optimum results were obtained, by limiting the maximum national GDP-per-capita to £17,000 
in the model; this reflected the fact that, above a ‘sufficing’ level of income, behaviour was 
not ‘proportional’ to income.  The results of the analysis are shown in Table 5-11 (accidents 
per million flights) and Table 5-12 (full aircraft loss equivalent, FLE, per million flights); 
detailed statistical data can be found in Appendices 3F and 3G.  Corruption was removed 
from both analyses, as it was not significant when GDP-per-capita (‘topped’ at £17,000) was 
included. 
                                            
33 Note that this split into defence and attack was to some extent arbitrary as, in a majority of the 
games, insufficient dedicated defenders were present; in such cases, one or more midfielders played 
in a defensive role, but it was not clear from the available data as to which midfielders were defending; 
it was therefore likely that the accuracy of the defence/attack split was limited. 
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Prediction factors in final 
model (aircraft accidents 
per million flights) 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients t Significance 
95.0% confid. 
limit for B 
B Std. error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
(Constant) 6.390 .316  20.241 .000 5.771 7.009 
PDI score .009 .003 .067 2.740 .006 .003 .016 
IDV score -.016 .002 -.215 -7.587 .000 -.021 -.012 
MAS score -.013 .002 -.100 -6.490 .000 -.017 -.009 
UAI score .011 .002 .105 5.168 .000 .007 .015 
Per-capita income (£17k max) .000 .000 -.428 -20.707 .000 .000 .000 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.486 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 48.6% of the variance in aircraft 
accident rates. 
Table 5-11:  Airline accidents per million flights - key statistical factors in regression model 
The statistical model for accidents per million flights predicted 48.6% of the variance in crash 
rates, and the statistical model for full (hull) loss equivalent (FLE) per million flights predicted 
44.4% of the variance in crash rates.  Note that in lower per-capita income countries, 
inadequate ground facilities, poor quality maintenance, limited skills and commitment of 
airport staff and other non-flying-related factors all contributed to higher flight accident rates; 
therefore flying crew culture could only provide a partial explanation. 
Prediction factors in final 
model (full aircraft loss 
equivalent, FLE, per million 
flights) 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients t Significance 
95.0% confid. 
limit for B 
B Std. error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
(Constant) 4.128 .234  17.646 .000 3.669 4.587 
PDI score .007 .003 .071 2.801 .005 .002 .012 
IDV score -.010 .002 -.192 -6.509 .000 -.014 -.007 
MAS score -.006 .001 -.069 -4.349 .000 -.009 -.004 
UAI score .009 .002 .115 5.450 .000 .006 .012 
Per-capita income (£17k max) .000 .000 -.416 -19.335 .000 .000 .000 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.444 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 44.4% of the variance in full 
aircraft loss equivalent rates. 
Table 5-12:  Airline full loss equivalent per million flights - key statistical factors in regression 
model 
For both statistical models (accidents per million flights and full loss equivalent per million 
flights), the most significant factor was per-capita income, and the most significant cultural 
dimension (even after taking account of its relationship with per-capita income) was IDV.  
The optimum (low crash rate) cultural configuration appears to be, from both models, high 
IDV, low PDI, high MAS and low UAI. 
As we would expect, accident rate is greater than FLE rate, as not all accidents cause a full 
loss of aircraft, passengers and crew; this fact is shown in the above models via the lower 
value unstandardized coefficients for the FLE rate.  Based on data from Tables 5-11 and 5-
12, the relative effects of each cultural dimension (in the final model) on accident and FLE 
rates are summarised in the Table 5-13. 
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Cultural 
dimension 
Accident rate FLE rate Relative contributions 
of cultural dimensions Unstand-
ardised Std. 
Unstand-
ardised Std. 
PDI .0095 .576 .0070 .667 .622 
IDV -.0165 -1.000 -.0105 -1.000 -1.000 
MAS -.0130 -.788 -.0065 -.619 -.704 
UAI .0110 .667 .0090 .857 .762 
Table 5-13:  Relative contributions of cultural dimensions to aircraft accident/FLE rates 
b) Maritime accidents 
Data covering the years 1995 to 2004 were extracted from the International Association of 
Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) Risk Assessment Data Directory (OGP, 2010b) and were 
statistically analysed. 
The maritime seafarer fatality data were analysed taking into account national corruption via 
the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2011), GDP-per-capita and 
national culture scores.  The results of the analysis are shown in Table 5-14; detailed data 
can be found in Appendix 4H.  
Prediction factors in final 
model (maritime seafarer 
fatality rates per 100k 
seafarer-years) 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients t Significance 
95.0% confid. 
limit for B 
B Std. error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
(Constant) 96.118 28.959  3.319 0.007 32.379 159.857 
IDV score -1.275 .368 -.677 -3.470 0.005 -2.084 -.466 
UAI score .503 .267 .367 1.880 0.057* -.086 1.092 
An adjusted R-squared value of 0.505 was obtained, i.e. the model explained 50.5% of the variance in maritime 
seafarer fatality rates.  *Slightly above the 5% level. 
Table 5-14:  Maritime seafarer fatality rates - key statistical factors in regression model 
As was the case with the aircraft data, corruption was removed from the analysis as it was 
not significant when GDP-per-capita was included; however, GDP-per-capita itself was of 
much lower significance in this (maritime) model than in the earlier aircraft model, and was 
removed from the final statistical model.  This (final) model predicted 50.5% of the variance 
in fatality rates; the most significant factor was IDV, followed by UAI; the optimum (low fatality 
rate) cultural configuration appears, from the model, to be high IDV and low UAI.  Note that 
PDI was positively correlated to fatality rates, whereas MAS was negatively correlated, as in 
the above analysis of aircraft crash rates. However, both PDI and MAS had a relatively low 
effect on the model, and were removed from the final version. 
Based on data from Table 5-14, the relative effects of each cultural dimension (in the final 
model) on maritime seafarer rates are summarised in Table 5-15. 
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Cultural 
dimension 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Relative contributions 
of cultural dimensions 
IDV -1.275 -1.000 
UAI .503 .395 
Table 5-15:  Relative contributions of cultural dimensions to maritime seafarer fatality rates 
Comparing the results to the aircraft accident results, we can see beyond correlations to 
probable causations (or lack of them).  The less effective maintenance and training 
associated with lower per-capita GDP countries had a lesser effect on shipping fleets than on 
aircraft fleets – ships continued to float when engines stopped; high PDI, which reduced 
inputs from junior members of the crew, was again less problematical in ships than in aircraft 
due to the lower communication rates required on ships in typical emergencies. 
There were issues relating to the accuracy of publically-accessible information on seafarer 
fatality rates; Nielsen & Roberts (1999) reported that the Institute of London Underwriters 
(ILU) figures for seafarer casualties due to marine disasters varied from under-reporting by a 
factor of six (Japan, Chile) to over-reporting by a factor of three (Singapore), compared to 
those countries’ official maritime organisations.  This implied that many countries, in 
particular the ‘flag of convenience’ countries, did not have a vested interest in maintaining 
accurate fatality figures.  
c) Attitudes to automation 
Sherman et al.(1997) surveyed the attitudes toward flight automation of 5879 airline pilots 
from twelve nations; Sherman et al. produced fifteen automation-related statements and for 
each country and for each statement, calculated the percentage of pilots who agreed 
(Sherman et al. 1997, Table IV).  The author of this thesis carried out a further statistical 
analysis of Sherman et al.’s survey results against pilots’ default national cultural scores, 
which provided additional insights.  Table 5-16 presents summary results for the six 
statements that were statistically significant in the author’s analysis; see Appendix 4I for 
details of the analysis of all fifteen automation-related statements.  Note that Sherman et al. 
had access to the raw data for 5879 pilots, and therefore could produce analyses with much 
greater statistical confidence than was achieved here by the author. 
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Model 
Pred’n 
factors 
in final 
model 
Adj. R 
Square 
Unstandardised 
coeffs 
Stdsd 
coeffs t Signifi-cance 
95.0% conf. 
limit for B 
B Std. error Beta 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
A01: I am concerned that 
automation may cause me 
to lose flying skills 
(Constant) 
PDI 
UAI 
.519 
86.771 
-.279 
-.440 
11.964 
.130 
.164 
 
-.455 
-.568 
7.252 
-2.153 
-2.687 
.000 
.060 
.025 
59.706 
-.573 
-.810 
113.836 
.014 
-.069 
A02: There are modes and 
features of the FMC that I do 
not fully understand 
(Constant) 
UAI .592 
53.199 
-.305 
4.737 
.074 
 
-.793 
11.230 
-4.119 
.000 
.002 
42.644 
-.469 
63.754 
-.140 
A03: When workload 
increases, it’s better to avoid 
reprogramming the FMC 
(Constant) 
UAI .263 
70.961 
-.303 
8.761 
.137 
 
-.574 
8.100 
-2.219 
.000 
.051 
51.441 
-.608 
90.481 
.001 
A05: Under abnormal conds, 
I can rapidly access the info 
I need in the FMC 
(Constant) 
UAI .353 
58.193 
.400 
9.668 
.151 
 
.642 
6.019 
2.647 
.000 
.024 
36.650 
.063 
79.735 
.736 
A10: The effective crew 
member always uses the 
automation tools provided 
(Constant 
PDI 
MAS 
.784 
117.941 
.392 
-1.028 
17.622 
.101 
.262 
 
.565 
-.572 
6.693 
3.880 
-3.929 
.000 
.004 
.003 
78.077 
.163 
-1.620 
157.805 
.620 
-.436 
A15: I prefer flying 
automated aircraft 
(Constant) 
UAI .389 
45.815 
.577 
13.072 
.204 
 
.666 
3.505 
2.827 
.006 
.018 
16.688 
.122 
74.942 
1.032 
The adjusted R-squared values indicate the proportion of the variance explained by the cultural dimension scores 
in each case. 
Table 5-16:  Automation preference results (based on Sherman et al. (1997)) 
The strongest correlation appeared to be between national cultural scores and the statement 
“The effective crew member always uses the automation tools provided”; support for this 
statement was strongly negatively correlated with masculinity (MAS), and was positively 
correlated with PDI. Of the remaining statements, five were positively or negatively correlated 
with UAI and nine were not significantly correlated with national cultural scores.  From the 
results shown in Table 5-16, it appears that high-PDI pilots and high-UAI pilots are generally 
more positive about automation than are their lower-PDI and lower-UAI colleagues. The 
aforementioned results should be treated with caution as they are based on only twelve 
countries. 
d) Summary – organised action teams 
It appeared, from the above results, that fast-reaction-time organised action teams (e.g. 
flying crews) benefitted from low PDI, high IDV, high MAS and low UAI, whereas relatively 
low-reaction-time organised action teams (e.g. merchant vessel crews) benefitted primarily 
from high IDV and low UAI; PDI and MAS appeared to have a much lower affect when more 
time was available for decision-making.  Similarly, the effects of GDP-per capita on seafarer 
fatalities were reduced because ship breakdowns were much less likely to be fatal mid-
voyage than was the case with aircraft piloting errors and breakdowns.  With regard to 
automation – a key factor in the further development of sociotechnical systems – the results 
indicated that attitudes of high UAI and high PDI crew were strongly positive towards it, and 
to the maximisation of its application. 
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5.4 Answers to the earlier research questions 
Three research questions relating to masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and cultural diversity 
were posed in Sub-section 4.6.1; these are considered further in this section. 
5.4.1 The effects of masculinity (MAS) on team performance 
a) Analysis of the literature on MAS 
The evidence from the literature review (see Subsection 3.3) about the effects of MAS on 
team performance was generally inconsistent and, in most cases where found, had a small 
affect compared to other cultural dimensions. 
Creativity and innovation:  Low-level innovation projects appeared to benefit from high 
team MAS scores, whereas medium-level innovation projects appeared to benefit from 
low/medium team MAS scores; no consensus appeared for high level innovation or 
academic research and development.  In the case of very large projects, in particular those 
with complex social or political issues, it appeared from qualitative analyses that high team 
member masculinity scores would tend to contribute to project failure. 
b) The author’s studies on MAS 
Creativity and innovation:  High academic research team MAS scores were associated 
with reduced performance (as measured by the UK Research Assessment Exercise).  
However, as commented in Subsection 5.3.3, the way that the original RAE data had been 
collected (at the department or school level) meant that that the effects of culture on 
individual teams within departments was somewhat masked; also, the sample sizes (in terms 
of number of schools/departments) were small. 
Sociotechnical system operators or crews:  High operator or crew MAS scores were 
associated with reduced sociotechnical accident rates, but MAS was significantly less 
influential than individualism (an accident-reducing factor) and uncertainty avoidance (an 
accident-increasing factor).  However, in the case of attitudes towards automation, high-MAS 
aircraft crews were strongly opposed to the use of automation at all times. 
c) Summary of findings about masculinity (MAS) 
There was general agreement in the literature that a high MAS score was beneficial in 
project team activities requiring low creativity, e.g. minor product or process improvement, 
but elsewhere, the evidence was inconsistent.  A high team MAS score appeared 
disadvantageous in some situations where time was not a critical factor, e.g. in multicultural 
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research teams, perhaps because it discouraged some lower-MAS team members from 
contributing fully; note that low MAS scores could have had a similar effect, but for reasons 
associated with group-think.  However, where rapid decisions had to be made, for example in 
organised action teams, high MAS scores appeared to be associated with benefits – 
probably in terms of quicker responses to deteriorating situations.  
The relationship between MAS and creativity/inventiveness does not appear to be a simple 
linear one. 
5.4.2 The effects of uncertainty avoidance (UAI) on team performance 
a) Analysis of the literature on UAI 
Creativity and innovation:  A detailed analysis of reports in the research literature (see 
Subsection 3.3.1) indicated that a low team UAI score was beneficial to high-level innovation 
projects, and that a high UAI score was beneficial to low-level innovation projects.  Note that 
UAI did not appear to have a significant effect on academic research, as measured by the 
UK’s RAE2008 scores (see Subsection 5.3.3); this raises a question as to assumptions 
about the relationships between fundamental research and creativity, inventiveness and 
innovation.   
Sociotechnical system operators or crews:  A high crew UAI score was associated with 
reduced effectiveness of training, and also contributed to increased accident rates in high-
reliability sociotechnical systems. 
b) The author’s studies on UAI 
Student project groups:  Student group project performances were negatively affected by 
high student group UAI scores.   
Team sports:  UAI was found to have a significant effect on the performance of professional 
footballers in the English Premiership; high team UAI scores were associated with improved 
shots-on-target-difference performance.  Football is a game with simple rules and highly 
constrained and predictable scenarios; in such an environment, the emphasis (at least for 
defenders) should be on the avoidance of mistakes.  This emphasis on predictability and 
avoidance of mistakes is paralleled in maintenance organisations, in particular those that are 
responsible for sociotechnical systems. 
Sociotechnical system operators or crews:  High crew UAI was found to have a negative 
effect on sociotechnical system safety; it appeared to have an influence between half and 
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two-thirds that of individualism (IDV).  High crew UAI scores were also associated with 
positive attitudes toward automation, its usage and its capabilities – potentially leading to 
overconfidence and complacency. 
c) Summary of findings about UAI 
A high UAI score appeared to be beneficial wherever the emphasis was on following the 
rules and not taking excessive apparent risks – e.g. in repetitive or low-innovation work, in 
maintenance and in team games.  However, where there was a need to ‘reframe’, to 
reassess quickly, a high UAI score appeared to be disadvantageous; high UAI scores also 
reduced the effectiveness of training.  A high UAI score was also associated with very 
positive views of automation and its capabilities. 
5.4.3 The effects of cultural diversity on team performance 
a) Analysis of the literature on cultural diversity 
The original literature review (see Section 3.3) revealed a paucity of consistent results in the 
research literature.  This was considered to be due, in part, to the utilisation of inadequate 
measures of cultural diversity. 
Student groups:  Studies indicated cultural diversity to be a negative contributor to 
performance, or to be represented by a ‘U-shaped’ or ‘inverted-U-shaped’ distribution, 
depending on exactly what aspect of performance was measured.  
Innovation and creativity:  Academic research appeared to benefit from 20-25% non-
indigenous researchers or, alternatively, ‘low’ diversity. 
Sports teams:  Studies of the German Bundesliga performance indicated that team cultural 
diversity was either associated with reduced performance, or had no effect on performance; 
note that the German high UAI nationality score is likely to have a negative effect on the 
effectiveness of integrating other-culture players within teams34.  A study of cultural diversity 
in USA professional hockey teams revealed a ‘U-shaped’ relationship to team performance; 
low- and high-diversity teams outperformed medium-diversity teams.  
b) The author’s studies on cultural diversity 
In each of the author’s studies, the statistical analyses included separate evaluations of 
models that initially included the four individual cultural diversities (of PDI, IDV, MAS and 
                                            
34 High uncertainty avoidance is associated with suspiciousness of foreigners (Hofstede et al. 2010, 
Ch. 6) 
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UAI) and of models that initially included, instead, the mean cultural diversity (the average 
value of the four individual diversities).  In no case was this mean cultural diversity found to 
be significant. 
Student groups:  Diversity in uncertainty avoidance (UAI diversity) appeared to have a 
significant and positive effect on student group performance. 
Innovation and creativity:  Diversity in masculinity (MAS diversity) appeared to have a 
negative effect on academic research team performance (but see earlier-stated caveats).  
This would be logical in the sense that high-MAS researchers might tend to dominate 
discussions and meetings, thus discouraging low-MAS researchers from contributing their 
ideas. 
Team sports:  MAS diversity and UAI diversity were found to have a small effect on English 
Premiership team performance over the season, but were removed from the final statistical 
analysis. 
c) Summary of findings about cultural diversity 
Mean cultural diversity, taken across all cultural dimensions, appeared to have no net effect.  
However, diversity in individual cultural dimensions was found to play a part in the 
performance levels of student groups, academic research teams and, to a lesser extent, 
sports teams (football).  This implies that one should consider diversity along each cultural 
dimension independently. 
Note that measures of diversity such as Shannon’s index or Blau’s index were, as previously 
stated, fundamentally flawed when applied to multicultural teams. 
5.5 Establishment of quantitative culture-performance 
relationships from the data 
As stated earlier, the literature on culture/performance relationships, including the 
quantitative studies, was unclear and frequently contradictory; the author’s studies supported 
some studies in the literature, contradicted others and suggested further relationships.  
Taking all this into consideration, the author, therefore, had to make ‘best estimates’ of 
culture-performance relationships in various team situations.  These, in turn, formed the 
basis for the culture/performance associations incorporated in the methodologies and tools 
described in later chapters. 
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5.5.1 Optimum ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture dimension scores 
Neither the studies identified in the literature review, nor the author’s own studies, provided 
absolute values in terms of optimum quantitative culture scores for particular missions/tasks; 
much of the literature, e.g. G. K. Jones & Davis (2000), merely associated general culture 
dimension scores (e.g. ‘high PDI’) with particular scenarios (e.g. ‘low creativity teamwork’).  
In other cases (as in the author’s studies), a cultural dimension ‘slope’ was obtained.  This 
would enable the identification of a positive or negative relationship between a cultural 
dimension and a performance factor (e.g. that uncertainty avoidance (UAI) had a negative 
relationship with creativity); it would also enable the determination of the relative importance 
of each cultural dimension to the particular mission (e.g. MAS contributed 23% as much as 
IDV in the statistical analysis); see Table 5-23 for a summary of the relative effect strengths 
of the cultural dimensions for each of the author’s studies.  However, in order for a culture-
based performance prediction tool to be effective, it would be necessary to associate specific 
situations/missions/tasks with specific quantitative optimum culture scores, in order to 
produce some measure of sub-optimality for any proposed or actual team.  For example, 
what are the optimum PDI, IDV, MAS and UAI scores for a team operating a large ocean-
going ship?  In order to develop the above culture score/mission relationships it was 
necessary to make several assumptions and approximations.  These are discussed below 
and in the following subsections. 
First of all, a brief examination of the literature:  Harzing (1999) stated that, where theory was 
stated in ordinal terms (e.g. low/high, as above), a simple theoretical approach could be 
used, e.g. assigning ‘low’ a zero score, and ‘high’ a one hundred score; alternatively, 
empirical ‘ideal profiles’ could be generated, e.g. by using the mean scores generated from 
calibration samples, for example the mean scores of high performance organisations, as 
exemplified by Gresov (1989) and Venkatraman & Prescott (1990); deviations from such 
profiles could be calculated to produce ‘misfit’ scores.  In the case of the author’s work, there 
are two complicating factors; these are described further below: 
1. Hofstede’s cultural framework:  Hofstede’s original cultural scores (based on the 
data from IBM subsidiaries) were weighted to form a range between zero and one 
hundred.  However, later additions (e.g. Malaysia (PDI), Slovakia (MAS) and Greece 
(UAI)) extended the range of cultural scores beyond one hundred.  In addition, the 
work described in this thesis has utilised Bosland’s educational corrections, which 
have also extended the range beyond one hundred (e.g. the Anglo countries (IDV)) 
and below zero (e.g. Sweden (MAS)).  This complicates the issue of where to position 
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‘low’ scores and ‘high’ scores for each dimension.  See Tables 5-17 and 5-18 for 
examples of these range changes. 
2. The ramifications of extreme culture scores:  As is the case with all extremes (e.g. 
in political views or personality), there are potential dangers in the assumption that 
‘more of a good thing’ (or ‘less of a bad thing’) is better throughout the full range of 
potential values.  For example, extreme masculinity may lead to extreme intra-team 
conflict, and extreme uncertainty avoidance may lead to paralysis in decision-making. 
The author therefore examined the countries associated with extreme scores in order to 
evaluate their appropriateness, or otherwise.  For example, the countries with the highest 
uncertainty avoidance scores were Greece (112), Portugal (104), Guatemala (101) and 
Uruguay (100); these were not countries that were associated with highly effective low-
innovation capabilities.  Japan (92), South Korea (85) and Taiwan (69) were, however, 
associated with excellent low-innovation capabilities.  They were therefore chosen as the 
exemplars to represent optimum low-innovation uncertainty avoidance score; their average 
score, corrected for thirteen years full time education equivalence was selected.   
The above-described process is not clear-cut, and the author was obliged to make a number 
of subjective best estimates as to which countries to discount and whether to take a 
maximum (or minimum) or average of a group of countries.  Where a particularly high-
performing country was at an extreme end, then the author would choose that country’s 
culture score.  For example, in the case of low uncertainty avoidance, the high-performing 
Nordic group was immediately above Jamaica and Singapore (the lowest-scoring countries).  
A decision was taken to choose the Danish score, as Denmark was the highest performing 
Nordic country with regard to high originality (e.g. Nobel science awards), and had the lowest 
Nordic uncertainty avoidance score; the Nordic average uncertainty-avoidance score would 
also have been defensible.  
A case of particular difficulty was that of high masculinity, for which Japan had the highest 
score (of 95, uncorrected for education).  The aggressive competitiveness of Japan’s high 
masculinity appeared to be redirected out from the team or group to focus on competition 
with other groups and organisations; note that the individualism score for Japan is signifi-
cantly higher than those of two West European countries, Portugal and Greece, so an 
explanation based on collectivism does not appear to be satisfactory.  It was decided there-
fore to base the high masculinity scores on the average of the Germanic group (including 
Austria) which was the highest masculinity scoring group of ‘high performance’ countries. 
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Tables 5-17 and 5-18 provide information on the countries with the lowest and highest 
scoring cultural dimension scores, respectively; these also include Bosland’s corrections for  
thirteen and sixteen years full time education equivalent, where relevant, representing the 
most common levels of education amongst sociotechnical system designers and operators.  
A summary of the reasoning behind the adoption of particular low and high culture scores is 
also included in these tables. 
For more extensive details of country cultural dimension scores and distributions, the reader 
is recommended to examine Hofstede (2001), exhibits 4.2, 5.7, 6.8, 6.17, A5.1 and A5.3.  
The first four exhibits provide 2-dimensional maps of cultural dimension scores (UAI x PDI, 
IDV x UAI, IDV x MAS and UAI x MAS) for fifty countries and three regions; the latter two 
exhibits provide country cultural dimension scores and ranks.  
C
ultural 
dim
ension 
Lowest-scoring 
countries 
U
ncorrected 
range of  scores  
C
orrected 
scores (13 yrs 
FTE) 
C
orrected 
scores (16+yrs 
FTE) 
Comments  
R
ecom
m
ended 
‘low
’ score(s) 
PDI 
Austria (11), Israel (13), 
followed by the Nordics 
(18-33), Anglos (22-40) 
and other Germanics 
(34-35). 
11-40 30-57 3-29 
The cases for low PDI were primarily 
associated with high creativity, communi-
cation speed, decision-making and 
situation awareness (mainly FTE16). It 
was difficult to distinguish amongst this 
grp, so an average of 16 was proposed. 
16 
IDV 
Guatemala and other 
Central American 
countries (6-19), Paki-
stan (14), Taiwan TW 
(17), South Korea KR 
(18), West Africa (20), 
China (20), Thailand 
(20), Singapore (20). 
6-20 
 
(TW &  
KR 17-
18) 
6-20 
 
(TW & 
KR 17-
18) 
26-40 
 
(TW & 
KR 37-
38) 
The cases for low IDV were primarily 
associated with low-innovation develop-
ments & production (mainly FTE13yrs); 
also some aspects of diplomatic 
negotiation (FTE16yrs+). TW & KO were 
the key producers among these, 
suggesting a low-IDV of around 17 
(FTE13) and 37 (FTE16+). 
17 
(producers) 
 
37 
(negot-
iation/-
mgmt) 
MAS 
Sweden (5), other 
Nordic countries (8-26), 
Costa Rica (21), 
Yugoslavia (21), Chile 
(28). 
5-28 
 
(Nordics 
5-26) 
12-35 
-7to16 
 
(Nordics 
-7to14)  
It was not clear from the data as to where 
low-MAS was beneficial but, qualitatively, 
it appeared that complex projects with a 
social dimension (FTE16yrs) could benefit 
from low-MAS.  Taking the Nordic mean, 
a value of 4 was proposed. 
4 
UAI 
Singapore (8), Jamaica 
(13), Denmark (23), 
Sweden (29), China 
(30), UK (35), India 
(40).  
Other Nordics (29-59) & 
Anglos (35-51), not 
included in scores. 
8-40 10-42 
-6to26 
 
(Dnmrk 
9) 
Low UAI appeared to benefit creativity/ 
high-innovation, communication speed, 
decision-making and situation awareness 
(mainly FTE16yrs+).  There may be some 
issues with following SOPs as UAI 
decreases. It was therefore proposed that 
the lowest UAI score of the innovative 
Nordic countries be adopted, i.e. a value 
of 9, reflecting Denmark FTE16+. 
9 
Table 5-17:  Low scores utilised for cultural dimensions 
Based on the information in Table 5-17, the ‘low’ scores for Hofstede’s original four 
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dimensions were proposed as power distance (PDI) = 16, individualism (IDV) = 17 (13yrs 
FTE) & 37 (16yrs FTE+), masculinity (MAS) = 4, and uncertainty avoidance (UAI) = 9.  These 
recommended optimum scores were best estimates based limited information, and should 
not be taken to imply an accuracy to within +/-1 point (or +/-1%). 
C
ultural 
dim
ension 
Highest-scoring 
countries 
U
ncorrected 
range of  scores  
C
orrected 
scores (13 yrs 
FTE) 
C
orrected 
scores (16+yrs 
FTE) 
Comments 
 
R
ecom
m
ended 
‘high’ score(s) 
PDI 
Malaysia (104), Guat-
emala (95), Panama 
(95), Philippines (94), 
Mexico (81), Arab 
countries (80), … 
compared to S.Korea, 
KR (60), Taiwan TW 
(58), Japan JP (54) 
80-104 
 
JP, KR 
& TW: 
54-60 
93-115 
 
 
 
70-75 
65-87 
 
 
 
42-47 
High PDI appeared to be beneficial for 
low innovation tasks (mainly FTE13yrs).  
An examination of high PDI countries 
revealed that the most productive 
countries (Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea) had FTE13 PDI scores of 70-75. A 
high-PDI score of 73 was therefore 
proposed.    
73 
IDV 
Anglos (70, 79-91), 
Netherlands (80), Italy 
(76), Belgium (75), 
France (71), Nordics 
(63-74), Germanics (55-
68) 
55-91 
 
Anglos 
79-91 
55-91 
 
Anglos 
79-91 
75-111 
 
Anglos 
99-111 
High IDV appears to be beneficial for 
creativity/high innovation, for accurate 
communication and for rapid decision-
making (mainly FTE16+).  The highly 
innovative countries had high IDV scores; 
a high-IDV score of 105, the average of 
the Anglos was therefore proposed. 
105 
MAS 
Japan (95), Austria (79), 
Venezuela (73), Italy 
(70), Mexico (69), other 
Germanics (66-70), 
Anglos (52-68) 52-95 
50-102 
 
German
ics 73-
77 
40-83 
 
German
ics 54-
58 
High MAS appears to be beneficial for low 
innovation, routine tasks (mainly FTE13-
yrs), and for safety in the running of 
organised action teams (FTE13&16).  
However, Japan scores much higher than 
all other countries, and is not a replicable 
model for MAS; a high-MAS score of 75 
(FTE13) and 56 (FTE16) is therefore 
proposed, based on the Germanics. 
75 
(producrs) 
 
56 
(orgAction) 
UAI 
Greece (112), Portugal 
(104), Guatemala (101), 
Uruguay (100), Belgium 
(94), Salvador (94), 
Japan (92), … South 
Korea (85), … Taiwan 
(69). 
69-112 
71-114 
 
JP, KW 
& TW 
94, 87, 
71 
55-98 
High uncertainty avoidance appears to be 
beneficial when involved in low innovation 
tasks and routine situations that do not 
involve unforeseen events (e.g. following 
SOPs at all times).  A high-UAI score of 
84 is proposed, based on the average 
FTE13 scores of JP, KR and TW. 
84 
Table 5-18:  High scores utilised for cultural dimensions 
Based on the information in Table 5-18, the ‘high’ scores for Hofstede’s original four 
dimensions, were proposed as power distance (PDI) = 73 (13yrs FTE), individualism (IDV) = 
105 (16yrs+ FTE), masculinity (MAS) = 70 (13yrs FTE) & 56 (16yrs+ FTE), and uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) = 84.  As is the case with the ‘low’ scores, these recommended optimum 
scores were best estimates based on limited information, and should not be taken to imply 
an accuracy to within +/-1 point (or +/-1%). 
The ‘low’ and ‘high’ cultural dimension scores listed in Tables 5-17 and 5-18 were used in the 
 138 
 
models developed in later chapters. 
5.5.2 Relative weighting factors for cultural dimensions 
The author collected culture dimension predictive powers from published studies that were 
identified in the literature; these are presented in Table 5-19. 
Researchers/innovation 
type 
Best estimate  of 
study creativity/-
innovation type 
Cultural 
dimension 
Predictive 
powers of 
cult. dims 
Normalised 
contrib’n of 
cult. dims* 
Kaasa & Vadi (2010) – high-
tech patents (Eurostat & ESS 
DB) 
Innovation (high end) 
PDI 
IDV 
MAS 
-0.39 
0.22 
-0.41 
-0.736 
0.415 
-0.774 
UAI -0.53 -1.000 
Kaasa & Vadi (2010) – all 
patents (Eurostat & ESS DB) Innovation 
PDI 
IDV 
MAS 
UAI 
-0.50 
0.24 
-0.43 
-0.59 
-0.847 
0.407 
-0.729 
-1.000 
Kaasa & Vadi (2010) – biotech 
patents (Eurostat & ESS DB Biotech innovation 
PDI 
IDV 
MAS 
UAI 
-0.43 
-0.1 
-0.27 
-0.46 
0.935 
0.217 
-0.587 
-1.000 
Shane (1992) - inventiveness Inventiveness/-creativity 
PDI -0.38 -0.931 
IDV 0.408 1.000 
Rinne & Steel (2012) – GII 
composite innov’n output Innovation 
PDI 
IDV 
UAI 
-0.58 
0.66 
0.00 
-0.879 
1.000 
0.000 
Efrat (2014) – patents/popul’n 
– no discrimination (SEM) 
Innovation 
DO NOT USE 
PDI 
IDV 
MAS 
-0.07 
-0.14 
0.15 
-0.280 
-0.560 
-0.600 
UAI -0.25 -1.000 
Efrat (2014) – scientific & 
technical journal articles 
Searching for 
knowledge 
PDI 
IDV 
MAS 
UAI 
-0.61 
0.51 
-0.31 
-0.56 
-1.000 
0.8361 
-0.508 
-0.918 
Willems (2007) – patents 
(Euro – EPO, USA – USPTO), 
1999-2004 
Innovation 
PDI 
IDV 
MAS 
UAI 
-0.180 
0.315 
0.193 
-0.099 
-0.571 
1.000 
0.6127 
-0.314 
* The predictive powers of the various cultural dimensions were dependent on the various additional input 
factors taken into account in the publishing researcher’s study (e.g. GDP-per capita or R&D investment 
intensity); these differed from study to study.  Therefore it was necessary to normalise the cultural contribu-
tions; this was achieved by dividing the predictive power of each cultural dimension by the absolute value of 
the predictive power of the biggest cultural contributor. 
Table 5-19:  Cultural dimension relative weightings for creativity/innovation (from the literature) 
The author collected normalised cultural dimension score relative weightings from his pilot 
studies (see Tables 5-2, 5-4, 5-6, 5-8, 5-10, 5-13 and 5-14); these weightings are presented 
in Table 5-20. 
These normalised culture scores have been determined in order to provide an option to 
refine the weightings applied to the cultural dimensions in the models and tools described in 
the following three chapters. 
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Team type Cultural dimension 
Relative contributions 
of cultural dimensions 
Relative contributions 
corrected to reflect 
positive performance 
Student groups UAI -1.000 -1.000 UAI diversity 0.313 0.313 
RAE2008 (P&A) MAS -1.000 -1.000 MAS diversity -0.803 -0.803 
RAE2008 (CE) MAS diversity -1.000 -1.000 
English Premiership football 
(single match) 
MAS 0.739 0.739 
UAI 1.000 1.000 
English Premiership (team 
over season) UAI 1.000 1.000 
Aircraft accident/FLE rates 
PDI 0.622 -0.622 
IDV -1.000 1.000 
MAS -0.704 0.704 
UAI 0.762 -0.762 
Maritime accident rates IDV -1.000 1.000 UAI 0.395 -0.395 
Table 5-20:  Cultural dimension relative weightings (from the author's studies) 
5.6 Potential issues with Hofstede’s cultural framework 
Following pilot study work and analysis work utilising Hofstede’s cultural framework, it would 
be useful at this stage to consider further some aspects of the framework that could have 
affected the accuracy of results and, also, could reduce the effectiveness of the culture tools 
that are described in the following chapters.  
5.6.1 The incremental addition of cultural dimensions 
Following work by Michael Bond, a fifth dimension (long-term orientation) was added to 
Hofstede’s framework (Geert H. Hofstede, 2001) and, following Minkov’s detailed analysis of 
the World Values Survey, a sixth dimension (indulgence vs. restraint) was added and the fifth 
dimension was revised (Geert H. Hofstede et al., 2010).  As stated earlier in this thesis, due 
to the lack of comprehensive country scores when this research began, the latter two 
dimensions were not used.  However, there were issues associated with the addition of extra 
dimensions – it would have been highly unlikely that the extended framework represented 
the optimum separation between dimensions.  Ideally, the data for all existing dimensions in 
the framework should have been re-evaluated, and reallocated to a set of new dimensions 
(with no prior commitment to the number of dimensions); some of these might have been 
sufficiently similar to the old dimensions to retain their original names and essential 
characteristics, some might not.  Hofstede, in his forward to Minkov’s book (Minkov, 2011), 
commented that, if he were to start again, he would probably begin with the World Values 
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Survey35; this is precisely what Minkov did in order to produce his four-dimensional cultural 
framework, however his 2011 publication appeared too late to be utilised in this research.  
The author of this thesis, if starting two years later, might have chosen Minkov’s framework, 
rather than Hofstede’s36. 
5.6.2 The calculation of cultural dimension scores 
Hofstede normalised the culture scores he obtained from his originals samples so that the 
countries’ scores ranged from zero to one hundred, although this range changed with the 
addition of new countries to the samples.  However, as a consequence of this normalisation, 
the scores only reflected a country’s relative position amongst a group of countries, rather 
than reflecting (directly) any tendency to think or behave in a certain way.  This lack of 
absolute meaning caused the author of this thesis difficulties in making judgements of 
optimum ‘low’ and ‘high’ scores (see Subsection 5.5.1).  This point is discussed further at the 
end of the next chapter. 
5.7 Summary 
Relevant studies from the literature have been evaluated and, in combination with the 
author’s pilot studies, have enabled a number of general relationships between culture 
dimension scores and team performances in various situations to be identified.  In particular, 
quantitative scores have been assigned to the ‘low’ and ‘high’ cultural dimension scores 
identified in the literature review and in the author’s studies; these scores formed an 
essential part of the data basis of the team culture tools that are described in the following 
chapters. 
A contribution has been made to current understandings of masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance and cultural diversity.  
 
  
                                            
35 See Web page http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp for information on the World Value Survey 
(WVS) and for access to WVS data. 
36 But note that the author of this thesis has not yet found any significant studies that have utilised 
Minkov’s framework. 
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6 A first model and prototype team culture tool 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of a first model and team culture tool (the TCT1).  In 
this and subsequent chapters, the terms ‘mission’, ‘task’ and ‘task set’ are used inter-
changeably. 
The first prototype of the culture tool was intended to produce a direct score of culture-based 
team effectiveness.  The purpose of developing the first prototype was to gain an under-
standing of the limitations imposed by our current knowledge of the effects of culture, in 
particular when attempting to quantify these effects directly in terms of team performance.  It 
was therefore expected to represent a step too far, i.e. to be attempting to ‘do too much with 
the limited data available to us’.  It also provided a platform to test and assess a vital 
component of any culture tool – the team cultural profiler. 
6.2 The basis of the first model (TCT1) 
This section is intended to provide an overview of the model behind the first tool, in parti-
cular, the basis on which it generated a measure of team performance, and the assumptions 
that lay behind the approach. 
6.2.1 Overview of the first model 
The performance prediction model underlying the first team culture tool took the team cultural 
profile (generated by the team cultural profiler when the user entered the team member 
details) and applied it to three task/mission factors.  The team culture scores reduced the 
effectiveness of each of the team /mission factors to varying degrees based on how far these 
scores were away from their optimum scores for each  of the factors; the resultant factor 
effectiveness values were expressed as percentages.  The user entered the relative 
importance of the three task/mission factors as weights (e.g. 50, 100 and 115), and the 
performance prediction model used those weights to calculate an overall cultural-profile-
based efficiency for that team carrying out that task/mission.  Figure 6-1 provides an outline 
flow diagram of the model. 
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The three task/mission factors - creativity and innovation requirements, interaction (comm-
unication and co-ordination) requirements and requirements for handling uncertainty and 
dealing with failures and errors, were considered to cover a sufficiently wide range of team /-
task/mission types to enable an initial evaluation of the TCT1 model.  The omission of the 
other two factors - management & decision-making and situation awareness - from the model 
would reduce its predictive capability, but it was considered to be important to produce a 
simple first test-bed for the model and tool. 
 
Figure 6-1:  The underlying culture/mission model for the TCT1 
6.2.2 Underpinning assumptions of the first model 
The underpinning assumptions of the first performance prediction model were as follows: 
(a) Capturing the cultural traits of an actual or proposed team:  It was assumed that 
the cultural traits of an actual or proposed team could be adequately captured by 
utilising the default national scores of Hofstede’s original four cultural dimensions for 
each team member (and deriving the team cultural diversity based on these scores). 
(b) Capturing the actual or proposed team’s task/mission:  It was assumed that the 
tasks or mission of the team could be captured sufficiently for the purposes of this 
Team member 
cultures
DETERMINE
AVERAGES
DETERMINE
DIFFERENCES
Team culture 
score
Team cultural 
diversity score
Actual team cultural profile
Task/mission
Weight a standard set of mission/task factors 
to DESCRIBE THE MISSION
APPLY culture profile based efficiency 
factors to weighted task/mission factors
Predicted team 
performance
Weighted, efficiency-
moderated mission factors
Weighted task/mission factors
SUM weighted, efficiency-
moderated mission factors
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‘Aunt Sally’37 by weighting three ‘standard’ task/mission factors compared to each 
other. 
(c) Calculating the effects of the team’s cultural traits on the task/mission factors:  
For each of the task mission factors, it was assumed that the cultural traits of the 
team potentially reduced the performance of each task/mission factor from a 
theoretical ideal performance (depending how far away the cultural trait was from the 
ideal trait, as captured by the culture scores), and that a worst-case scenario (in 
terms of cultural traits) would result in very poor factor performance.  
The implications of the above assumptions and the degree to which they were found to be 
justified are discussed later in this chapter. 
6.3 A detailed description of the first model and team culture tool 
The first model was based on profiling the team in terms of national culture scores, and 
profiling the mission in terms of a subset of the factors identified in Subsection 3.3.3 and 
detailed in Subsection 4.4.1.  The task/mission factors chosen were: 
• Creativity or innovation requirements 
• Communication and co-ordination requirements 
• Level of uncertainty/unpredictability 
Irrespective of the mission, a particular team cultural profile would affect each of the three 
task/mission factors the same way, reducing the team’s performance (compared to ‘ideal’) of 
each of these factors by its own culture-based efficiency factor.  It was the relative weightings 
of the mission factors that would determine the overall effects of those culture-based 
efficiency factors in the final ‘performance as a team’ value. 
Figure 6-2 illustrates the actual TCT1 as implemented in the Microsoft Excel spread sheet 
program.  It can be seen from Figure 6-2, that the team cultural profile (derived from team 
member nationalities and years in full-time education, see Subsection 6.3.1), was used to 
derive estimates of internal communication capability and potential innovation capability.  
These factors were then combined with the task/mission profile weights (manually entered as 
estimates) and summed to produce an estimate of likely team performance of the given 
mission profile. 
                                            
37 ‘Aunt Sally’: A person or thing that is set up as a target for criticism.  High accuracy was not a 
requirement in this model, rather the ability to demonstrate a principle, its weaknesses and limitations. 
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Figure 6-2:  The Excel implementation of the first prototype culture tool (TCT1) 
A description of an early version of the TCT1 can be found in Hodgson et al. (2011).  
6.3.1 Profiling the team 
Because one of the key potential uses of the methodology and tool was to assess the 
goodness of fit between complex sociotechnical systems and their users, where we might 
know nothing about potential users other than their likely nationalities and education, the 
tool’s team profiler was designed to operate with default national culture scores.  
As stated in Chapter 4, Hofstede’s original four-dimensional cultural framework (Geert H. 
Hofstede, 1984) had been selected as the basis for determining team member culture 
scores, and a measure of cultural diversity had been developed based on the concept of 
cultural distance.  In order to profile the team, the user was required to enter, for each team 
member, nationality and number of years in full time education.  The tool then looked up the 
standard Hofstede culture scores for the relevant country, applied educational corrections, 
and entered them in the table.  The tool then calculated each individual’s average cultural 
distance from other team members, for each of the four dimensions, and also calculated the 
=
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team’s mean culture scores and cultural diversity scores for the four cultural dimensions.  
See Table 6-1 for an example team; this shows inputs in the form of team member 
nationalities and years of education (columns 2 and 3), and outputs in terms of culture and 
diversity scores (columns 4 to 12).  
Te
am
 
m
em
be
r n
o.
 
Nationality 
Fu
ll 
tim
e 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
(y
ea
rs
) 
CULTURE SCORES 
(corrected for years in 
full time education) 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY SCORES 
PDI IDV MAS UAI PDI IDV MAS UAI Mean diversity 
1 Germany 16 25 87 54 51 12 10 8 17 12 
2 France 16 55 91 31 72 22 8 21 24 19 
3 Great Britain 16 25 109 54 21 12 15 8 35 17 
4 Germany 16 25 87 54 51 12 10 8 17 12 
5 Italy 16 38 96 58 61 12 8 10 17 12 
6 France 16 55 91 31 72 22 8 21 24 19 
7 Great Britain 16 25 109 54 21 12 15 8 35 17 
8 Italy 16 38 96 58 61 12 8 10 17 12 
… ……………… … … … … … … … … … ………. 
14            
15            
 Team scores   36 96 49 51 15 10 12 23 15 
Table 6-1:  1st prototype team culture profiler output 
The team cultural profile automatically fed into the later calculations of the tool (see upper 
right-hand side of Figure 6-2), and the performance estimate was calculated based on this. 
6.3.2 Profiling the task/mission 
To profile the task/mission, the user simply entered estimates of the relative importance of 
the three mission profile factors.  In the spread sheet of Figure 6-2, the factor values have 
been entered as 100, 20 and 10, as the task is concerned primarily with innovation; note that, 
as it is the relative sizes of the estimates that matter, these could have been entered as 20, 4 
and 2. 
6.3.3 Interpreting the results 
The tool produced a direct estimate of the predicted performance level associated with the 
team cultural traits.  In the example of Figure 6-2, the culture-based performance was 
estimated to be 77% of the optimum (cultural) performance.  A limited amount of other infor-
mation was available in the other spread-sheet boxes; for example, on the basis of the 
culture scores, the interaction/communication capability was calculated to be 77% and the 
innovation/creativity capability was calculated to be 80%. 
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6.3.4 Basis of the predicted performance equations 
The six equations that produce the culture-moderated performance estimate of the TCT1 are 
explained individually in the following paragraphs.  The equations were taken from the Excel 
implementation of the 1st prototype culture team tool38, see Figure 6-2.  There were no 
absolute measures of performance in the literature, nor could any be gained from the 
studies, only estimates of relative effector strength.  Therefore, ‘amplifier’ variables were 
placed in the equations that contained culture scores; these enabled the culture effect 
strengths to be increased or decreased to reflect empirical results. 
a) Team internal communication capability (COMM) 
There was little to base this equation on other than the general literature including Hofstede 
and Helmreich & Merritt (Subsection 3.3 of the literature review).  The literature was in 
general agreement that the biggest effectors where PDI, IDV and CDIV, with MAS and UAI 
having a lesser effect.  For effective communication, optimum values for PDI, MAS, UAI and 
CDIV were low, whereas the optimum value for IDV was high.   Accordingly, PDI, IDV and 
CDIV have each been weighted 25%, MAS and UAI have each been weighted 12.5%.  
These weightings can only be regarded as approximate. 
PDI: Optimum value=16, weighted 25%. 
IDV: Optimum value=105, weighted 25%.  
MAS: Optimum value=4, weighted 12.5%. 
UAI: Optimum value=9, weighted 12.5%. 
CDIV: Optimum value=0, weighted 25%. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =
�100 − 𝐴1 ∗ 0.25 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑃𝐷𝐼 − 16)�  × 
�100 − 𝐴1 ∗ 0.25 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(105 − 𝐼𝐷𝐼)� × �100 − 𝐴1 ∗ 0.125 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐴𝐴 − 4)� ×(100 − 𝐴1 ∗ 0.125 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑈𝐴𝐼 − 9) × �100 − 𝐴1 ∗ 0.250 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(15 − 𝐶𝐷𝐼𝐼)�100000000  
Note the amplifier variable, A1, in the above equation; this has been set to ‘1’ (no effect) in 
the example illustrated in Figure 6-2, but could be used to ‘boost’ the effects of culture on 
performance. 
b) Team innovation/creativity (INNOV) 
The innovation/creativity efficiency equation utilised information from the normalised values 
                                            
38 Note that the denominators (or divisors) in the following equations were there simply to correct the 
results arising from multiplying percentages together; they ensured that the values of the expression 
remained between 0 and 100. 
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that were provided in Table 5-19 of Subsection 5.5.2.   
Researchers Dependent variable 
Dimension relative predictive powers 
PDI IDV MAS UAI 
Kaasa & Vadi 
(2010) Innovation -0.847 0.407 -0.729 -1.000 
Rinne & Steel 
(2012) Innovation -0.879 1.000 N/E 0 
Willems (2007) Innovation -0.571 1.000 0.613 -0.314 
Average (innovation) -0.767 0.802 -0.058 -0.438 
Renormalised 
(max=1) ∑ABS=2.574  -0.956 1.000 -0.072 -0.546 
Renormalised 
(∑ABS=1) ∑ABS=1.000  -0.371 0.389 -0.028 -0.212 
Table 6-2:  Relative culture dimension predictive powers for innovation 
As this subsection is about innovation (not invention or high creativity), only ‘innovation’ 
entries were selected from Table 5-19 (including only one of Kaasa & Vadi’s entries, as the 
datasets overlapped).  The equations also used the relevant culture dimension extreme 
values provided in Tables 5-17 and 5-18 of Subsection 5.5.2 as their optimum values, where 
relevant, for example IDVOPT-HIGH=105, UAIOPT-LOW = 9. 
PDI: Optimum value=16, weighted 37.1%. 
IDV: Optimum value=105, weighted 38.9%.  
MAS: Optimum value=4, weighted 2.8% (but see comment on MAS below). 
UAI: Optimum value=9, weighted 21.2%. 
CDIV: Optimum value=15, weighted 25% (the average of the above). 
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐼 =
�100 − 𝐴2 ∗ 0.371 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑃𝐷𝐼 − 16)�  × �100 − 𝐴2 ∗ 0.389 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(105 − 𝐼𝐷𝐼)� × (100 − 𝐴2 ∗ 0.028 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐴𝐴 − 4)) ×(100 − 𝐴2 ∗ 0.212 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑈𝐴𝐼 − 9)) × �100 − 𝐴2 ∗ 0.250 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(15 − 𝐶𝐷𝐼𝐼)�100000000  
Note the amplifier variable, A2, in the above equation; this has been set to ‘1’ (no effect) in 
the example illustrated in Figure 6-2. 
Comment on the weight used for MAS:  Although MAS appeared here to have an almost 
negligible effect, the two scores in Table 6-1 that provided the average were -0.729 and 
+0.613 (when normalised to a maximum of 1.000), i.e. in each case MAS contributed 
significantly to the respective predictive model, but in the opposite direction, thus almost 
cancelling out (the average of the two was -0.072).  It was suspected that, as suggested by 
G. Halkos & Tzeremes (2011), there was a maximum MAS innovation effectiveness at 
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around a score of 70, uncorrected for FTE, i.e. 58 when corrected for 16 years FTE.  If this 
were the case, then samples with low MAS averages would show a positive MAS predictor 
sign, and samples with high MAS averages would show a negative MAS predictor sign.  
Kaasa & Vadi (2010) did not provide a mean value for MAS in their publication, so the above 
supposition could not be tested. 
c) Team uncertainty moderator (UMOD) 
Handling uncertainty places a requirement on the team to ensure that members 
communicate adequately, and is adversely affected by high uncertainty avoidance.  The 
uncertainty moderator (UMOD) takes the product of the communication capability and the 
weighted difference between the actual and optimum UAI score, and factors them by the 
uncertainty weighting supplied by the user (weighting = score allocated to uncertainty 
(USCORE) divided by total allocated score (TSCORE)). 
𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐷 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 × �100 − 𝐴3 ∗ 0.500 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑈𝐴𝐼 − 9)� × 𝑈𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈
𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈 × 100  
Note the amplifier variable, A3, in the above equation; this has been set to ‘1’ (no effect) in 
the example illustrated in Figure 6-2. 
d) Team communication effect moderator (CMOD) 
The team communication effect moderator (CMOD) factors the communication moderator 
score by the communication weighting supplied by the user (weighting = score allocated to 
communication (CSCORE) divided by total allocated score (TSCORE)). 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈 𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈⁄  
e) Team innovation effect moderator (IMOD) 
The team innovation effect moderator (IMOD) factors the communication moderator score by 
the communication weighting supplied by the user (weighting = score allocated to 
communication (ISCORE) divided by total allocated score (TSCORE)). 
𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐷 = 𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐼 × 𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈 𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈⁄  
 
f) Performance as a team (PERF) 
The performance as a team equation simply sums the weighted inputs from the three 
moderators (unpredictability/uncertainty, communication and innovation).  
𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃 = 𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷 + 𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐷 
 149 
 
6.4 Evaluation of the first prototype tool (TCT1) 
The TCT1 was tested and analysed on a range of team and mission types (high innovation 
teams, low innovation teams and aircrew39), but was not made available to potential users 
outside the research team because it was clear that it had a number of limitations (see 
Section 6.5). 
A paper on the first prototype tool, and the associated culture research was presented at the 
IEEE System of Systems Conference in Albuquerque (A. Hodgson et al., 2011).  The 
presentation generated considerable interest, and useful discussions with researchers and 
industrialists took place.  Following a demonstration of the tool, a number of issues about the 
tool and general approach were raised, and were later taken into account when the second 
tool was developed. 
6.5 Limitations, successes and a re-evaluation of assumptions 
The model performed a useful function in highlighting strengths and weaknesses in the 
model’s approach. 
6.5.1 Limitations and successes of the tool 
It became clear, after testing the tool with a range of mission profiles, that there were several 
significant problems with the tool, for example: 
(a) Differentiating between tasks/missions:  The tool was unable to differentiate 
adequately between different tasks/missions.  Low or moderate innovation capability 
(and a willingness to pursue the mundane) can be more useful than high innovation 
capability in certain types of team projects, for example when carrying out some 
forms of process improvement.  However, the tool scoring process could not capture 
this adequately.  
(b) Relative vs. absolute weighting of cultural dimensions:  Subject to the sensitivity 
limitation stated above, the relative weightings of cultural dimensions in the equations 
could be justified, as they reflected study results from the literature (captured in 
Tables 5-19 and 6-1).  However, the absolute weightings40 (captured in the model 
                                            
39 These were specific team types, not specific teams, i.e. exemplars that were used to assess 
whether the tool could produce acceptable results. 
40 In this context, absolute weightings are those weightings applied directly to the task/mission perfor-
mance measure (e.g. every unit (or 1%) increase in power distance causes a 0.25% reduction in task/-
mission performance). 
 150 
 
and tool by ‘tuning’ the values of the amplifier variables A1, A2 and A3) could only be 
established by comparisons against the performance of real teams.  The author was 
following the pragmatist principle41, but in this case, the model was too insensitive for 
it to be practicable to match its outputs against real-world performances. 
(c) Providing user guidance:  It would be difficult to extend the methodology and tool to 
provide guidance for team improvement because only limited information is produced.  
For example, Figure 6-2 indicated a culture-based performance rating of 77%.  How 
could we improve this?  What were the key problem areas?  
(d) Increasing sensitivity leads to excessive complexity:  To include more task/-
mission profile factors in the tool, and to split these factors into sub-factors 
(necessary to capture the nuances of creativity, innovation, etc.), would result in a 
model of excessive complexity; it would be extremely difficult to maintain the resulting 
large set of equations, or to modify or to test the model and tool. 
(e) The cultural profiler:  This worked very effectively, and enabled the user to 
experiment efficiently and effectively with different combinations of team members.  
However, several researchers (including two researchers at the IEEE System of 
Systems Conference where the researcher presented a paper on the TCT1) 
commented on the limitations of being constrained to automatically-generated 
individual cultural profiles based on a single nationality for each team member.  
Therefore the process would be modified in the second culture tool to enable more 
flexibility. 
6.5.2 A re-examination of the original assumptions 
With regard to the assumptions behind the model, the following conclusions could be drawn: 
(a) Capturing the cultural traits of an actual or proposed team:  It was considered 
that this was the least problematical part of the model and tool and that, inasmuch as 
any quantitative modeller of default national culture can capture traits, the cultural 
profiler captured the traits adequately. 
(b) Capturing the actual or proposed team’s task/mission:  This demonstrated the 
need for a much more detailed task/mission profile in order for a realistic, adequately-
                                            
41 See Chapter 2 for a full statement of the pragmatist principle.  As Laudan (1978) states, the criteria 
for assessing the development of a theory should be based on its problem-solving effectiveness, 
rather than on its falsifiability. 
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discriminating tool performance. 
(c) Calculating the effects of the team’s cultural traits on the task/mission factors:  
Although this assumption (that a worst-case scenario cultural mismatch to mission 
would likely result in very poor performance) was probably true, the first team culture 
tool (TCT1) could not reliably demonstrate such an effect because the required data 
was not available, and the detailed relationships for such a model would be difficult to 
incorporate in a tool and would also be difficult to verify. 
6.5.3 Comments on the application of Hofstede’s cultural framework 
Some of the problems that arose in the modelling of the TCT1 may have been caused by the 
nature of the cultural dimensions, others by easily-made assumptions about the nature of the 
associated statistical distributions.  These are discussed below. 
(a) The ‘relative’, rather than ‘absolute’ nature of Hofstede’s dimension 
scores 
Hofstede’s calculations of culture scores for his original samples of countries included 
normalisations that brought the range of country default scores for each of the four 
dimensions to between zero and one hundred.  This had two effects; the first was 
that, as new countries were added, the range of scores was extended to below zero 
and above one hundred.  However, a more important effect was that the post-
normalisation culture scores did not provide a measure of the actual degree of power 
distance, masculinity, etc. that countries possessed, just the relative differences 
between countries compared to the overall range of country values.  For example, a 
difference of twenty between two countries implied a difference of one-fifth of the 
maximum difference between any two of the original countries in the survey – 
whatever that might be.  It would be possible (although unlikely) that a country with a 
power distance score of zero was only modestly different from one with a score of 
one hundred.   The lack of meaning associated with these scores made it difficult to 
develop absolute relationships between cultural values and their effects on 
communication, conflict, etc. 
Instead of the above ‘relative’ scale, it would have been more informative to have an 
international set of culture scores that represented the absolute scores from answers 
to cultural dimension-related questions.  A score of zero (for example, on power 
distance) would be ‘maximally low’ on the survey’s power distance questions, and a 
score of one hundred would be ‘maximally high’.  In such a framework, it would be 
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likely that the distribution of country scores would be much less than the theoretical 
zero to one hundred range, perhaps thirty to seventy for one dimension, fifteen to 
sixty for another, but those scores would tell us much more – within the limitations of 
the original questions – about the cultures of those countries and about human 
societies in general.  We might deduce that (say) human societies are much less 
variable along certain dimensions than along others. 
The difficulties that the author had in assigning maximum and minimum cultural 
dimension scores (Subsection 5.5.1) would have been eased if the default culture 
scores had been absolute rather than relative.  A score of one hundred for uncertainty 
avoidance would have implied a society that was terrified of everything that was less 
than familiar in its world, a society that rejected all innovations, etc., rather than just 
‘the most uncertainty-avoiding society’.  When building the equations for the TCT1 
(Subsection 6.3.4), the author was able to assign relative values to the effects of 
cultural dimensions on behaviours, but there was no clear basis for the assignment of 
absolute relationships between cultural dimension scores and behaviours. 
Note that the above discussion is not intended to imply that a change to’ absolute’ 
measures would be any form of panacea, merely that it would be clear what the score 
meant in terms of answering a certain group of questions that were considered to 
relate to a particular cultural trait. 
(b) Further issues with the masculinity culture dimension 
When developing the innovation equation in Subsection 6.3.4(b), there were large 
effector scores for masculinity (from the literature), but they were of opposite signs, 
as was illustrated in Table 3-1 of the literature review.  These scores cancelled out, 
resulting in little input to the innovation equation of the TCT1 on the part of cultural 
masculinity.   This may be due to a statistical error in the published pilot studies due 
to the shape of the masculinity/innovation curve42, as G. Halkos & Tzeremes (2011) 
suggested that masculinity’s beneficial effects on innovation might peak at a score of 
70 (uncorrected for FTE, i.e. 58 when corrected for 16 years FTE).  If this were the 
case, then samples with low MAS averages would show a positive MAS predictor 
sign, and samples with high MAS averages would show a negative MAS predictor 
sign.  One of the data set sources, Kaasa & Vadi (2010), did not provide a mean 
                                            
42 E.g. an incorrect assumption that there is a linear relationship between the masculinity score and its 
effects on innovation performance when the actual shape has a distinct maximum within the range of 
samples. 
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value for the MAS samples in their publication, so the above supposition could not be 
tested.  However, there appeared widely conflicting results in the literature with 
regard to the effects of masculinity, so there are perhaps deeper issues with this 
cultural dimension. 
However, another reason could be that the masculinity cultural trait only comes into 
play under certain circumstances or situations.  Both in the case of airline pilots (A. C. 
Merritt, 2000) and military officers under training (Soeters, 1997), the measured 
masculinity scores did not relate to the country scores of the pilots and officers.   
6.5.4 Conclusions 
Several conclusions were reached, in particular: 
(a) The basis of the performance measure was flawed:  There were three main 
problems with the model: 
a. Relative vs. absolute data and relationships:  At the time of this research, it 
was not possible to obtain data on absolute relationships between cultural 
traits (as represented by cultural dimension scores) and aspects of team 
performance.  A methodology based on the relative effects of culture was 
required for the second model and prototype. 
b. Insensitivity and complexity:  Even if the data had been available, the 
model was too insensitive to incremental differences between teams.  The full 
range of factors and their sub-factors would have to be utilised to improve the 
sensitivity; however, this would result in excessive model complexity. 
c. User information and guidance:  In its present form, the tool does not (and 
cannot) provide information to inform the user adequately or to guide him/her 
in team improvement. 
(b) The method of obtaining the team cultural profile had proved very easy and 
effective to use:  This proved efficient, effective and understandable in use; 
discussions with other researchers led to proposed improvements in its represen-
tational flexibility, to be incorporated in the next tool.  
6.6 Summary 
Evaluations of the first prototype team culture tool demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
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team cultural profiler, but highlighted issues with the representation of task/mission profiles, 
raised some issues with regard to the cultural framework, and with the method by which an 
estimate of potential team performance was obtained.  It was therefore decided to carry the 
cultural profiler (in improved form) across to the second model and prototype team culture 
tool, but to develop a different assessment methodology, based on transforming the 
mission/task profile into an ideal or desirable culture profile to form the basis for a 
comparison with the actual team culture.  
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7 A second model and prototype team culture tool 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the development and evaluation of the second model and team 
culture tool (TCT2).  Unlike the first culture tool (TCT1), this version of the team culture tool 
was not intended to predict the ‘absolute’ performances of individual teams; instead, it was 
intended to highlight where culture was likely to be a significant factor in underperformance 
or heightened risk by assessing the goodness of fit between team and mission. This ‘fit’ was 
based on the generation of discrepancies between the desirable team culture profile (based 
on the mission) and the actual team culture profile. 
To use the tool, the user described the team cultural profile, as in the TCT1, and described 
the team task or mission by weighting a set of factors and their sub-factors; these factors 
were affected by culture and contributed positively or negatively to the task or mission. 
7.2 The basis of the second model (TCT2) 
This section was intended to provide an overview of the model that underlies the second tool, 
in particular, the basis on which it generated a measure of fit between teams and their task/-
mission requirements, and the assumptions that lay behind the approach. 
7.2.1 Overview of the second model 
The logic of the second performance prediction model was based on profiling the team via its 
members’ national cultural traits43 (as was the first model), profiling the task/mission in terms 
of five task/mission factors and their sub-factors (which were associated with specific cultural 
traits), and deriving a set of cultural ‘discrepancies’ that formed the basis for the assessment 
of team fitness for the task/mission.  
The team cultural profile was created by entering team members’ nationalities and their 
education levels into the model; this then calculated team average cultural scores and 
diversity scores, based on Hofstede’s default national culture scores.  The task/mission 
profile was produced by weighting the set of five task/mission factors identified in Subsection 
                                            
43 These ‘traits’ were captured in shorthand form using Hofstede’s cultural framework. 
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3.3.3, and their sub-factors (detailed in Subsection 4.4.1).  These task/mission factors were:   
• Management and decision-making requirements 
• Creativity and innovation requirements 
• Interaction (communication and co-ordination) requirements 
• Requirements for handling uncertainty and dealing with failures and errors 
• Situational awareness requirements 
The task/mission profile, produced by the user by weighting the above factors and their sub-
factors, was mapped across to a desirable cultural profile based on the ‘low’ and ‘high’ 
scores derived in Subsection 5.5.1 and the effects of national culture described in the 
literature and captured in Section 3.3.  This desirable cultural profile was compared to the 
actual team cultural profile generated earlier by entering team member nationalities; 
discrepancies between the two were then derived.  These discrepancies formed the basis for 
the assessment of mission fit.    
Figure 7-1 describes the above profiling and comparing processes. 
 
Figure 7-1:  Flow diagram illustrating the model underlying the second team culture tool (TCT2) 
Team culture 
score
Team diversity 
score
Actual team cultural profile
Team member 
cultures
DETERMINE
AVERAGES
DETERMINE
DIFFERENCES
Task/mission
Weight a standard set of mission/task factors 
and sub-factors to DESCRIBE THE MISSION
TRANSFORM via factor/culture relationships
Desirable team 
culture score
Desirable team 
diversity score
Desirable team cultural profile
DETERMINE 
DIFFERENCES
Cultural profile 
discrepancies
Weighted mission factors
 157 
 
A key aspect of this approach was that it allowed the user to define the importance of the 
above five team factors and their sub-factors to the team task or mission, rather than 
allowing them directly to select a team task or mission.  This approach acknowledged that 
mission or task requirements could be changed by the utilisation of new processes and/or 
new technologies.  For example, the need for joint (or shared) situation awareness could be 
met, at least in part, by a future intelligent agent that proactively informed crews of sociotech-
nical systems (such as aircraft, oil rigs or power stations) of developing hazards. 
7.2.2 Underpinning assumptions of the second model 
The underpinning assumptions of the second performance prediction model were as follows: 
(a) Capturing the cultural traits of an actual or proposed team:  As with the first 
model, it was assumed that the cultural traits of an actual or proposed team could be 
adequately captured by utilising the default national scores of Hofstede’s original four 
cultural dimensions for each team member (and deriving the team cultural diversity 
based on these scores). 
(b) Capturing the desirable team cultural traits to achieve a task/mission:  It was 
assumed that the tasks or mission of the team could be captured sufficiently by 
weighting five ‘standard’ factors and their sub-factors; this required the following:  
(i) Capturing the culture-sensitive elements of team tasks or missions:  
It was assumed that a small number of behavioural factors and their sub-
factors could capture the elements of a range of team tasks or missions 
that were most affected by cultural traits. 
(ii) Relating culture-sensitive elements of tasks/missions to culture 
traits:  It was assumed that the cultural traits required for optimum 
performance of the factors/sub-factors of (i) above could be adequately 
identified and encapsulated in the model. 
(iii) Describing a particular task or mission in terms of the above factors:  
It was assumed that users had sufficient knowledge to be able to weight 
the above five factors and their sub-factors with enough accuracy to define 
adequately the team’s behavioural requirements for the task or mission. 
(c) Obtaining useful information from the discrepancies between desirable and 
actual cultural traits:  It was assumed that the cultural discrepancies between actual 
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and desirable cultural traits were meaningful, i.e. they informed the user of something 
useful about potential team performance and/or team problems.  
Note:  The terms ‘adequate’ and ‘adequately’ related to the effects of inaccuracy on the 
performance of the model and tool.  The adequacy issue was complicated by the fact that 
inaccuracies in various areas would potentially add together to reduce the overall effective-
ness of tool in use.  It was therefore difficult to judge the degree of adequacy of individual 
steps in the process; however, the overall performance could be adjudged from the tool’s 
effectiveness in the hands of users. 
The implications of the above assumptions and the degree to which they were found to be 
justified are discussed later in this chapter. 
7.3 A detailed description of the key elements of the second model 
and tool 
The two key elements of the model and tool were the team cultural profiler, and the 
task/mission profiler.  These are further described below. 
7.3.1 Team cultural profiler 
This was based on the cultural profiler described in Subsection 6.3.1, with the addition of two 
further options: 
(i) Hybrid (or dual) cultural nationality:  This facility was provided to enable better 
alignment for those team members who were bicultural, e.g. because they had emigrated 
from one cultural area to another.  On selecting this option, the user was expected to 
select not one, but two nationalities when filling in the particular team member’s details in 
the cultural profile table.  The relevant culture dimension scores for the two nationalities 
were then retrieved by the tool (from a table that listed Hofstede’s default culture scores 
by country), corrected for the team member’s years in full time education, the four pairs of 
scores (2 x PDI, 2 x IDV, etc.) were averaged, and these four averaged cultural 
dimension scores were used in all further calculations for that individual. 
(ii) Manual entry of cultural scores:  This facility was provided for those team members 
with individually assessed culture dimension scores, or those with clear deviations from 
the mean of their culture (e.g. an American pilot with a very high power distance).  On 
selecting this option, the user was expected to enter, manually, the team member’s 
scores for the four Hofstede cultural dimensions.  The user’s nationality was then ignored 
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by the tool, and the manually-entered cultural dimension scores were used directly in all 
further calculations for that individual.  
7.3.2 Team task/mission profiler 
The five-factor team/task profiler framework is described in detail in this subsection.  The key 
aim of this profiler was to enable the user to describe the task/mission profile of the team in 
terms of factors which were associated with particular cultural dimension scores or ranges.  
By selecting and weighting the five major factors and their sub-factors (i.e. by indicating how 
important they were to the team mission), the user enabled the generation of an associated 
set of ‘optimum’ or ‘desirable’ cultural dimension scores.  Note that, for different aspects of a 
particular mission (e.g. communications and following standard operational procedures), 
contradictory ‘desirable’ cultural dimension scores could be generated – this reflected the 
reality of multifaceted tasks and missions. 
The five factors were originally described in Subsection 3.3 and expanded in Subsection 
4.4.1.  The culture dimension scores of Tables 5-17 and 5-18 were used where appropriate 
to quantify the scores for the sub-factors of the five factors44.   
Figure 7-2 is based on the innovation-related findings of Subsection 3.3 of the literature 
review, in particular Figure 3.2 and the author’s pilot study findings, combined with the ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ cultural dimension scores as derived in Section 5.5.  This figure was used to obtain 
quantitative values for ‘in-between’ sub-factors of the creativity & innovation factor. 
Two of the relationships in Figure 7-2 were particularly difficult to assess.  Firstly, MAS, 
appeared to be strongly positive for low innovation, but not clear for high innovation (but see 
comment in previous chapter).  Secondly, the results for cultural diversity appeared to be 
inconclusive and frequently contradictory; however, a degree of cultural diversity appeared to 
be beneficial in the case of high innovation/creativity, but not in the case of low innovation.  
The value of ‘15’ on the right-hand scale of Figure 7-2 represented the approximate 
equivalent to 20-25% non-nationals, or equivalent to a Shannon Index score of 0.35, as 
suggested by Barjak (2006) and Barjak & Robinson (2008). 
 
                                            
44 In cases where no evidence was found for the effects of a particular cultural dimension on a sub-
factor, no score was allocated to that factor for that cultural dimension. 
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Figure 7-2:  Culture/innovation relationships deduced from the literature and pilot studies 
The detailed scores for the various sub-factors are shown below: 
i)   Management and decision-making: As stated in Chapter 4, some tasks and missions 
were best served by authoritarian, strongly centralised management, for example highly 
automated factory systems or missions involving large military manoeuvres; others, for 
example complex decisions requiring wide or deep knowledge were typically best served by 
the consensus-based decentralised, delegating management. 
• Delegation of management and decision-making authority: 
o Centralised, directive, non-consultative management:  PDI=high=73; 
UAI=high=84. 
o Consensus/delegation-based management:  PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; 
UAI=low=9. 
• Decision-making under uncertainty:  PDI=low=16; UAI=low=9. 
• Following standard operating instructions (SOPs): 
o Following SOPs at all times:  UAI=high=84. 
o Abandoning SOPs when appropriate:  UAI=low=9. 
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• Recognising and correcting mistakes:  PDI=low=16, IDV=high=105, UAI=low=9. 
ii)  Creativity and innovation:   
Culture, via pressure to conform, willingness to speak out and attitudes to uncertainty, has a 
considerable effect on creativeness.  Some team goals require an ability to produce (and 
present) a large number of ideas, go against the consensus and engage in a degree of 
conflict; others require an ability to take new ideas forward towards usable concepts; yet 
others require an ability to implement existing technologies into products and processes; in 
this latter situation, disciplined concentration on the task in hand is better than constantly 
exploring new ideas.  
• Developing new ideas and concepts: PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; 
MAS=notLow=35to75; UAI=low=9; Cdiv=moderate=15. 
• Designing/implementing new products and processes (see Figure 7-2, innovation 
score=66): PDI=18; IDV=102; MAS=55; UAI=12; Cdiv=3. 
• Incorporating ideas developed elsewhere into processes or products (see Figure 7-2, 
innovation score=33): PDI=35; IDV=80; MAS=55; UAI=38; Cdiv=0. 
• Improving, revising designs, processes, process flows, correcting due to failures in 
the field:  PDI=high=75; IDV=low=17; MAS=75; UAI=high=85; Cdiv=0. 
• Going against the consensus:  PDI=low=16: IDV=high=105: MAS=notLow=35to75. 
iii) Interaction (communication and co-ordination within the team) 
• Say what you mean, mean what you say:  PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; MAS= not 
applicable (N/A); UAI=low=9. 
• Convey meaning diplomatically (typically indirectly): PDI=high=73; IDV=low=17; 
MAS=N/A; UAI=N/A. 
• Communicate rapidly and accurately with colleagues, superiors and subordinates 
when necessary:  PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; MAS=notLow=35to75; UAI=9; Cdiv=0. 
• Communicate about and discuss in-depth complex concepts in a considered manner:  
PDI=low=16. 
• Interact with other team members on a frequent or continuous basis:  PDI=low=16; 
IDV=high=105; Cdiv=0. 
• Interact with other team members mainly (or only) at key decision points:  (Any 
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cultural scores.) 
• Share information with other team members whenever possible:  PDI=low=16; 
IDV=high=105; UAI=low=9; Cdiv=0.  
• Only share information on a need-to-know basis: (Any cultural scores) 
iv) Handling uncertainty and dealing with failures 
Some environments and team goals result in highly predictable activities and/or outcomes; 
other environments result in highly unpredictable activities and/or outcomes that must be 
accommodated by the team or crew.  Cultures (in particular, as measured by their 
uncertainty avoidance scores) vary greatly in their capabilities to deal with uncertainty.  
• Highly-predictable activities and outcomes:  PDI=high=73, IDV=low=17, 
MAS=notLow=35to75, UAI=high=84. 
• Highly UNpredictable activities and outcomes:  PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105, 
UAI=low=9. 
• Highly predictable activities and outcomes except under rare circumstances when 
they become highly dangerous and unpredictable:  PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; 
UAI=low=9; Cdiv=0. 
• Must handle errors and failures very quickly:  PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; 
MAS=notLow=35to75; UAI=low=9; Cdiv=0. 
• Should give careful consideration to errors and failures prior to action:  PDI=low=16; 
MAS=notLow=35to75, UAI=low=9. 
iv) Situation awareness 
Operator/crew situation awareness is affected by their willingness to indulge in realistic 
training, their abilities to respond to changing situations (i.e. to reframe) and, in the case of 
shared situation awareness, their willingness to communicate rapidly and accurately.  
Situation awareness applies primarily to organised action teams, e.g. aircrews, power station 
operators.  
• Must maintain individual situation awareness at all times: UAI=low=9. 
• Must maintain shared situation awareness at all times:  PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; 
MAS=notLow=35to75; UAI=low=9; Cdiv=0. 
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7.4 Description of the operation of the tool 
In order to assess the suitability of a team in cultural terms, it was necessary to: 
1. Profile the team in terms of its cultural traits or characteristics (user input). 
2. Profile the team mission (including relevant environmental aspects) and thereby 
generate a desirable cultural profile (user input). 
3. Compare the two profiles and thus assess the team’s suitability or mismatch in terms 
of discrepancies (tool calculation). 
The process of describing the mission was, in reality, a process of weighting the various 
task-related factors and their sub-factors according to their importance to the performance of 
the team. The only differences between any two team missions or tasks were the weightings 
assigned to the factors and sub-factors.  The reasons for incorporating weightings of both 
factors and their sub-factors were: 
• The two levels of weighting enabled users to discount, at a high level (i.e. factor 
level), those items that were not important; for example, for some tasks or missions, 
creativity would not be important, for others, dealing with uncertainty or situation 
awareness would not be important.   
• Users found it much easier to weight a small number of alternative sub-factors on a 
comparative basis, rather than the full set of sub-factors. 
The following subsections describe the activities and profiles in more detail; as the culture 
tool represented the implementation of the model, the descriptions are presented in terms of 
tool usage and processes. 
7.4.1 Profiling the team 
As stated earlier, the team cultural profiler was based on that used for the first prototype, with 
the additional options of hybrid nationality and manual entry of cultural dimension scores.  
The user was first expected to enter team member names or identities, then to select from a 
dropdown list, for each team member, the choice of input – single nationality, hybrid 
nationality or manual entry; if ‘manual entry’ was selected, then the user was expected to 
manually enter scores for the four Hofstede dimensions.  The user was then required to 
select the number of years in full time education for each team member (from a dropdown 
list); these factored the scores, based on Bosland’s corrections. A field was also provided to 
record the gender of each team member (M or F), but this was not utilised in the calculations 
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because insufficient data had been found to justify its use. 
The team cultural profiler subsequently carried out one of the following courses of action: 
• Single nationality:  Retrieve the four standard culture scores for the relevant country 
or countries45, apply educational corrections then enter them in the table. 
• Hybrid (dual) nationality:  Retrieve the four standard culture scores for both 
nationalities, calculate the mean value for each score, apply educational corrections, 
then enter them in the team culture profile table. 
• Manual entry: Take the (four) manually entered culture scores and enter them 
directly in the team culture profile table without any further corrections.  
Following entry of the above information, the team cultural profiler calculated each 
individual’s average cultural distance from other team members for each of the four 
dimensions based on the equation described in Subsection 4.3.2, see below: 
Cdix = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑁𝑗=1 (𝑁 − 1)⁄  
Where Dix, Djx = scores for cultural dimension ‘x’ for team members ‘i’ and ‘j, and N = 
total number of team members (including member ‘i’) 
The team cultural profiler also calculated team mean culture scores and mean cultural 
diversity scores for the four cultural dimensions. See Figure 7-3 for an example team, 
showing inputs in the form of team member nationalities and education, and outputs in terms 
of culture and diversity scores.  
                                            
45 Default country scores for the four cultural dimensions were stored in a separate table. 
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Figure 7-3: Example TCT2 cultural profiler output 
The example in Figure 7-3 clearly shows the difference between the team cultural profiler of 
the TCT2 and the earlier version of the team cultural profiler in Table 6-1.  Note the facility to 
enter a single nationality, two nationalities, or to manually enter the individuals’ actual culture 
scores, if known.  
7.4.2 Profiling the mission 
The task/mission profile in this version of the TCT2 was based on the five major factors and 
their task-related sub-factors that have been described in detail, along with the associated 
cultural dimension scores, in Subsection 7.3.2.  The team task/mission profiler required the 
user to:  
1. Select one or more strategic-level descriptions of the team:  This enabled the 
system to detect large errors in the user’s scoring of the factors46.  If the user’s actual 
or proposed team task/mission was a very close fit to one of the strategic-level 
descriptions, then the user could just select the strategic level description and ignore 
the five factors and their sub-factors in order to obtain a default desirable cultural 
profile. 
2. Weight the five major factors on the basis of their relative importance:  In the 
                                            
46 If the user weights factors and sub-factors such that the corresponding desirable culture scores are 
very different from those of the default strategic-level scores, then this is indicative of errors in the 
user’s input, and a warning will be shown. 
(1) Enter team members in table below (top-left table); a minimum of surname, nationality and years full time education are required.
1 1 Appleyard James Single nationality United Kingdom M 15 34 102 61 26 18 19 4 12 13
2 1 Chopra Madhu Single nationality India M 15 72 61 51 31 25 27 7 13 18
3 1 Field Susan Single nationality United Kingdom F 15 34 102 61 26 18 19 4 12 13
4 1 Jarre David Hybrid nationality United Kingdom France M 15 49 93 50 52 16 18 9 25 17
5 1 Jameson Susan Single nationality United Kingdom F 15 34 102 61 26 18 19 4 12 13
6 1 Lee Yan Hybrid nationality China * United Kingdom F 15 54 68 61 24 17 23 4 14 14
7 1 McDonald Anne Single nationality United Kingdom M 15 34 102 61 26 18 19 4 12 13
8 1 Malik Adil Single nationality India M 15 72 61 51 31 25 27 7 13 18
9 1 Posluszny Borys Single nationality Poland * M 15 64 73 59 84 20 21 4 54 25
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 <-No.of mbrs 50 85 57 36 19 21 5 19 16
Date: 25 March 2012 TEAM CULTURE PROFILE TABLE - enter team member details (in blue areas)
Mbr 
num
Family name 
or ID
Fore-
name
Choice (of input 
data)
Nationality 1 Nationality 2 (if 
applicable)
Gen-
der
UAIMASIDVPDI IDVPDIUAIMASIDVPDI MAS Mean 
diversity
UAI
(2) Go to TABLE 2 and follow the instructions at the top of the table                                                            >>-------->
Problem solving:  Early failure of medium family hatchback 
brake master cylinder (18 months after release)
CULTURE SCORES 
(only used with 
'M anually enter 
scores ' option)
CULTURE SCORES 
(corr'd for years in  
full time education)
CULTURAL DIVERSITYFull 
time 
educ'
n 
(yrs)
Team scores->
Team ID or description:
START HERE >> 
(INSTRUCTIONS) (3) If the overall discrepancy score is more than 15, then consider changing team membership (see 'TO IMPROVE THE TEAM', below).
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‘numeric’ version of the TCT2, the user could enter any set of weights, as the tool 
would recalculate the factor weights to fractional values; a second ‘textual’ version 
utilised dropdown lists from which users could select a range of options from 
‘unimportant’ to ‘extremely important’ (or the equivalent).  Either version delivered a 
relative weight for each factor. 
3. Weight the individual sub-factors for each factor:  This was carried out in a similar 
manner to weighting the major factors; the final weighting of each sub-factor was the 
product of the factor and sub-factor fractional weightings calculated from the user-
entered weights. 
Figure 7-4 illustrates an example task/mission with user-entered weights in the pale blue 
columns.  The TCT2 could deal with any combination of inputs, as it recalculated every factor 
and sub-factor as a proportion; however, for ease of input, the user was recommended first 
to enter the strategic purpose plus the five factor weights (on the right) first, starting by 
entering a value of 100 for the most important factor, then entering the other lesser weights.  
Following that, for each factor, the user was recommended to again enter a value of 100 for 
the most important sub-factor, followed by the weights for any other important sub-factors.  If 
any factor or sub-factor was unimportant, then it can be left blank. 
In the example of Figure 7-4, the relative weightings of the five factors were calculated as: 
Strategic purpose  = 25/(25+75+100+100+50)   = 7.1% 
Mgmt & decision-making  = 75/(25+75+100+100+50)   = 21.4% 
Creativity & innovation      = 100/(25+75+100+100+50) = 28.6% 
Interaction (comms, etc.)  = 100/(25+75+100+100+50) = 28.6%  
Handling uncertainty, etc. = 50/(25+75+100+100+50 )  = 14.3% 
Situational awareness      = 0/(25+75+100+100+50 )  = 0.0% 
Within Mgmt & decision-making, the relative weightings of the sub-factors were: 
Strong centralised mgmt.  = 100/(100+60+20) = 55.6% of its parent factor’s weighting 
Follow SOPs at all times   = 60/(100+60+20) = 33.3% of its parent factor’s weighting 
Listen and analyse …       = 20/(100+60+20) = 11.1% of its parent factor’s weighting 
The weighting of any sub-factors as a proportion of all five factors (plus strategic purpose) 
equalled sub-factor (%) weighting multiplied by its factor (%) weighting, for example: 
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Strong centralised mgmt.  = 21.4% x 55.6% = 11.9% of total weighting in the tool. 
  
Figure 7-4:  Example task/mission profiler user input (in the pale blue areas only) 
7.4.3 Mapping the task/mission profile into a cultural profile and deriving 
discrepancies 
Based on the cultural dimension scores listed in Subsection 7.3.2, each of the sub-factors of 
Production or service team (e.g. product assembly, maintenance, restaurant)
Problem solving team (e.g. follow ing a product failure in the f ield) 100
Product midlife upgrade team (low -medium innovation)
New  product or service development team (medium-high innovation)
Product of the future team (high innovation, medium-high creativity)
Long-term research team (high creativity)
Negotiation team (mergers & acquisition, peace treaties, etc.)
Organised action team, highly differentiated skills, occasional major risks (e.g. surgery)
Organised action team, little differentiated skills, occasional major risks (e.g. aircraft cockpit)
Strong, centralised, directive management/decision-making 100
Consensus/delegation-based management/decision-making
Decision-making under uncertainty
Follow ing orders and standard operational procedures (SOPs) at all times 60
Not follow ing SOPs w hen circumstances merit
Recognising mistakes and correcting them 20
Develop new  ideas, new  concepts
Design/implement new  products or processes
Incorporate ideas developed elsew here into processes or products
Improve or revise designs, processes, process f low , correct failures occurring in the f ield 100
Go against the consensus w hen necessary
Say w hat you mean, mean w hat you say
Convey meaning diplomatically (typically indirectly)
Communicate rapidly & accurately w ith colleagues, superiors & subordinates
Communicate about and discuss in-depth complex concepts
Interact w ith other team members on a frequent or continuous basis
Interact w ith other team members at key decision points 100
Share information w ith other team members w henever possible
Only share information on a need-to-know  basis
Highly predictable activities and outcomes
Mostly predictable activities and outcomes 100
Highly predictable, except under certain relatively rare conditions
Highly UNpredictable activities and outcomes
Errors & failures must be dealt w ith quickly
Errors and failures require careful consideration prior to action 50
Maintain individual situation aw areness at all times
Maintainshared situation aw areness at all times
No signif icant SA requirements (SA applies primarily to organised action teams)
Strategic 
purpose(s)
25
(R
elative im
portance (com
pared 
to other subfactors of this 
factor
Im
portance of contextual factor 
to team
 (100 m
ax)
Contextual 
factors Contextual subfactors
TASK/MISSION PROFILE TABLE (general purpose)
- describe your team task/mission (in blue areas)
Management & 
decision-
making
75
Interaction 
(communicatio
n & co-
ordination) 
w ithin the team
100
Handling 
uncertainty & 
dealing w ith 
failures
50
Situational 
awareness 
(SA)
Creativity & 
innovation 100
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the 2nd prototype (TCT2) had an associated ‘desirable culture score’ for each of the four 
cultural dimensions, four cultural diversity dimensions and mean diversity dimension47; these 
were stored in a ‘desirable culture score’ master table).  Therefore, for each sub-factor, nine 
discrepancy values (one for each of the above nine culture/cultural diversity dimensions), 
were calculated as the difference between the team’s culture/cultural diversity score and the 
score in the ‘desirable culture score’ master table.  These were factored by the sub-factor 
and factor weights (entered by the user in the task/mission profile table – see Subsection 
7.4.2, above), and the results appeared in the team cultural discrepancy table, see Figure 7-
5. 
 
Figure 7-5:  Team cultural discrepancy table 
Note the ‘traffic light’ warning system in Table 7-5.  From this, it can immediately be seen that 
the greatest problem areas were management & decision-making, where the main issue 
relates to the requirement for strong, directive management, and creativity and innovation, 
                                            
47 Note that, due to very limited data on the effects of cultural diversity, for most sub-factors, cultural 
diversity values were set to ‘NA’ (not applicable).  Where a reasonable estimate for overall diversity 
was available from the data, either the same value was also put in the individual diversities, or the 
value was only put into the mean diversity (with the individual diversities set to ‘NA’.  This was less 
than satisfactory, but it was hoped that, when diversity data became available at a later date, it could 
be entered into the TCT. 
Task/mission 
factors Task/mission subfactors
Production or service team (e.g. product assembly, maintenance, restaurant) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Problem solving team (e.g. follow ing a product failure in the f ield) 100 7.14 -20.46 39.83 NA -48.89 19.32 21.39 5.44 13.53 NA 24.1
Product midlife upgrade team (low -medium innovation) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
New  product or service development team (medium-high innovation) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Product of the future team (high innovation, medium-high creativity) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Long-term research team (high creativity) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Negotiation team (mergers & acquisition, peace treaties, etc.) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Organised action team, highly differentiated skills, occasional major risks (e.g. surgery) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Organised action team, little differentiated skills, occasional major risks (e.g. a/c cockpit) 0 7.14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Strong, centralised, directive management/decision-making 55.556 21.43 -13.03 NA NA -26.60 NA NA NA NA NA 19.8
Consensus/delegation-based management/decision-making 0 21.43 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Decision-making under uncertainty 0 21.43 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Follow ing orders and standard operational procedures (SOPs) at all times 33.333 21.43 NA NA NA -15.96 NA NA NA NA NA 16.0
Not follow ing SOPs w hen circumstances merit 0 21.43 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Recognising mistakes and correcting them 11.111 21.43 3.73 -2.24 NA 3.01 NA NA NA NA NA 3.0
Develop new  ideas, new  concepts 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Design/implement new  products or processes 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Incorporate ideas developed elsew here into processes or products 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Improve or revise designs, processes, process f low , correct failures occurring in the f ield 100 28.57 -25.46 67.83 -17.72 -48.89 NA NA NA NA 16.17 35.2
Go against the consensus w hen necessary 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Say w hat you mean, mean w hat you say 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Convey meaning diplomatically (typically indirectly) 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Communicate rapidly & accurately w ith colleagues, superiors & subordinates 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Communicate about and discuss in-depth complex concepts 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Interact w ith other team members on a frequent or continuous basis 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Interact w ith other team members at key decision points 100 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Share information w ith other team members w henever possible 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Only share information on a need-to-know  basis 0 28.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Highly predictable activities and outcomes 0 14.29 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Mostly predictable activities and outcomes 66.667 14.29 -0.31 16.56 4.85 -9.26 NA NA NA NA NA 7.7
Highly predictable, except under certain relatively rare conditions 0 14.29 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Highly UNpredictable activities and outcomes 0 14.29 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Errors & failures must be dealt w ith quickly 0 14.29 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Errors and failures require careful consideration prior to action 33.333 14.29 11.18 NA 2.43 9.04 NA NA NA NA NA 7.5
Maintain individual situation aw areness at all times 0 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
Maintainshared situation aw areness at all times 0 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
No signif icant SA requirements (SA applies primarily to organised action teams) 0 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0
-9.7 23.7 -4.5 -22.1 1.4 1.5 0.4 1.0 4.6
Overall 
discrepancy 
score->
22.3 100%
Creativity & innovation 35.2 28.57%
Individualism
 (IDV)
Pow
er distance (PDI)
Cultural dimension score 
discrepancies
O
verall team
 cultural diversity 
(O
Cdiv)
Uncertainty avoidance diversity 
(UAIdiv)
M
asculinity diversity (M
ASdiv)
Individualism
 diversity (IDVdiv)
Pow
er distance diversity (PDIdiv)
Cultural diversity score 
discrepancies
M
ean subfactor discrepancies (from
 ideal)
O
verall w
eighting of context to team
 (%
)
Strategic purpose(s)
TEAM CULTURAL DISCREPANCY TABLE (general 
purpose) … areas of weakness and strength
Relevance to team
 (allocate 100 points to 
each section)
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI)
M
asculinity (M
AS)
Situational awareness 
(SA)
Management & decision-
making
Interaction 
(communication & co-
ordination) within the team
Handling uncertainty & 
dealing with failures
Task/m
ission factor discrepancy scores
7.14%
Contextual factor w
eighting (%
)
38.8
0.00%
24.1
0.0
0.0
15.3
21.43%
28.57%
14.29%
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where the main issue related to the requirement to ‘improve or revise designs …’. 
7.4.4 Interpreting the results 
As stated above, a ‘traffic light’ system was implemented to highlight discrepant cultural 
scores:  
• Green:  OK - culture score is within acceptable range. 
• Amber:  Warning - moderate mismatch likely to lead to some reduction in 
performance; this may be acceptable for non-critical situations. 
• Red:  Danger - high mismatch likely to lead to significant reduction in performance 
The ‘traffic light’ colours formed the backgrounds of the various discrepancies (see Figure 7-
5), enabling users to identify key problem areas at a glance. 
Figure 7-6 summarises the set of tables and their relationships, and a more detailed process 
and data flow diagram for the second team culture tool (TCT2) is provided in Figure 7-7.   
An understanding of the operation of the TCT2 can be gained by following the sequence of 
events shown in Figure 7-7, and referring to Figures 7-3 to 7-6 for the individual tables and 
their contents. 
 170 
 
 
Figure 7-6:  The four key tables of the second team culture tool (TCT2) and their relationships 
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Figure 7-7:  Process and flow diagram for the second team culture tool (TCT2) 
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7.5 Validation and evaluation of the second prototype tool 
Initial testing was carried out on the second prototype tool (TCT2) before asking potential 
users to apply it.  
7.5.1 Initial testing and validation 
Incident and accident data on commercial aircraft were collected from the website 
http://aviation-safety.net and input to the TCT2, see Appendix 5 for more details of the data.  
Table 7-1 presents this aircraft incident data and the discrepancy scores generated by the 
TCT2, based on crew nationalities. 
Date & aircraft 
details Incident 
Fatalities & 
damage 
Crew 
performance 
Crew 
nation-
ality 
Degree 
of error/-
recovery 
Discr-
epancy 
scores* 
Jan 2009, McDon-
nell Douglas 
MD82 
Instrument failure, 
crew became lost 
No fatalities, no 
damage: 
Disorientated – 
loss of situation 
awareness 
Argentina Moderate 
error 
26.0 
Jan 2009, Boeing 
737 
Not warned of landg 
conditions, river at 
end of runway  
No fatalities, 
little damage 
Quick reaction 
with max thrust 
reversers 
USA Good 9.2 
Jan 2009,US 
Airways Airbus 
Total engine loss  
over NY, river 
landing 
No fatalities, a/c 
total loss 
Exemplary 
judgmt & flight 
skills 
USA Exemplary 9.2 
Jan 2009, Boeing 
757 
FMC misbehaviour, 
should have aborted 
No fatalities, 
minor 
Suboptimal 
decisions, poor 
communications 
Ghana Moderate 
error 
29.3 
 
Feb 2009, Airbus 
A321 
Poor landing conds, 
did not abort or use 
thrust reversers 
No fatalities, 
minor 
Poor decision 
making 
France Moderate 
error 
26.2 
Feb 2009, Boeing 
737 
Faulty altimeters, 
FMC reduced thrust 
9 fatalities, a/c 
total loss 
Lack of situation 
awareness 
Turkey High error 31.0 
March 2009, 
Airbus 340 
Tail strike during 
take-off, erroneous 
calculations 
0 fatalities, 
minor damage 
Failure to follow 
SOPs 
Arab 
world 
Moderate+ 
error 
29.0 
April 2009, BAe-
146 
Flew into terrain 
despite repeated 
instr. warnings 
All crew killed, 
a/c total loss 
Lack of SA, cptn 
ignored co-
pilot’s warnings 
Indonesia Extreme 
error 
29.2 
April 2009, Boeing 
767 
Firm landing nose 
damage 
No fatalities, 
structural 
damage 
Erroneous flight 
control 
Arab 
world 
Moderate 
error 
29.0 
Apr 2009, De 
Havilland DHC-8 
Aft fuselage 
grounded on landing 
No fatalities, 
minor damage 
Lack of situation 
awareness 
Canada Moderate 
error 
11.6 
Apr 2009, 
McDonnell-
Douglas MD-81 
Left wing tip struck 
runway on landing 
No fatalities, 
minor damage 
Poor flight 
control 
Japan Moderate+ 
error 
31.1 
May 2009, Airbus 
A320 
Tail strike after 
bounced landing 
No fatalities, 
minor damage 
Poor flight 
control 
USA Moderate 
error 
9.2 
May 2009, Boeing 
747 
Flaps retracted with-
out warning on T/O 
No fatalities, no 
damage 
Excellent judgmt 
& flight skills 
UK Excellent 6.6 
Table 7-1: Incident data for commercial passenger aircraft 
The results from this limited evaluation of the TCT2 have been plotted in the graph of Figure 
7-8.  As can be seen, there appears to be a positive relationship between discrepancy score 
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and flying performance/accident rate.  Note that all modern passenger jet incidents (from the 
first six months of data from the accident site) where the flying crew unambiguously 
contributed in a significant way to the outcome of the incident (positively or negatively) were 
selected.  Incident reports that provided insufficient details were omitted. 
 
Figure 7-8:  Validation of TCT2 via aircraft incident data 
It was not possible to obtain equivalent data to that obtained from aircraft incident reports for 
other sociotechnical system operations; in particular, it was not possible, in most cases, to 
ascertain crew or operator nationalities. 
7.5.2 User testing and evaluation of the tool 
After initial testing of the tool on a range of team and task/mission types, the tool was made 
available to a number of current and former team leaders, and to others involved with multi-
national and/or other-national teams.  Most, but not all, of these team leaders were British, 
and their teams had varying proportions of UK and non-UK members. 
These users were each asked to fill in a team culture tool questionnaire (see Appendix 6).    
Information on user and case numbers is summarised in Table 7-2.  User feedback on the 
tool (obtained from their questionnaire responses) is summarised in Table 7-3; note that 
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answers based on dropdown lists have been converted into average percentage scores48. 
Users Project management team cases 
Organised action 
team cases 
6 8 3 
Table 7-2:  User and case numbers 
a) Ease of use 
For most users, an initial explanation and demonstration of the TCT2 was given, and the 
users’ results were also later discussed with them.  Most users considered that it was fairly 
clear as to what the culture profiling aspect of the tool was doing, that it was easy to use and 
that it was clear as to where the results (in terms of discrepancies) came from.  However, 
there was less user enthusiasm for the task/mission profiling side, as most users had had 
difficulty with it (also see later sub-sections for further comments on this).  There were clear 
issues of face validity with the TCT2 task/mission profiler.  Several users felt that more case-
specific guidance on what to do about the results might have been helpful.  
User 
answers 
Team cultural profiler Team task/mission profiler Discrepancy results Useful? 
Easy, 
under-
standable 
to use 
Quick/-
efficient 
to use? 
Meaningful 
team profile 
results? 
Easy, clear to use 
Quick/-
efficient to 
use? 
Did the 
overall results 
make sense? 
Was the 
standard 
improvement 
advice helpful? 
Could a 
TCT2-type 
tool be 
useful? 
AL Fairly easy Fairly fast Yes Very difficult Slow To some extent To some extent To some extent 
AMJ Very easy Fairly fast Yes Somewhat difficult Slow Yes Yes Yes 
JB Fairly easy Fairly fast Yes Somewhat difficult Slow To some extent Yes Yes 
SN Fairly easy Very fast To some extent Somewhat difficult Slow Yes To some extent Yes 
PB Fairly easy Fairly fast To some extent Somewhat difficult Slow To some extent To some extent To some extent 
TW Fairly easy Fairly fast Yes Very difficult Very slow Yes To some extent To some extent 
No. of 
answer 
options 
5 5 3 5 5 3 3 3 
Average 
score (%) 73 73 72 23 27 67 61 67 
Table 7-3:  Summary of TCT2 user questionnaire answers 
b) Clarity and transparency 
One user reported that moderate differences in results occurred when different members of 
the same team filled in the task/mission profile; this was mainly due to the fact that describing 
a task/mission profile in terms of management/decision-making, communications, 
uncertainty, etc., was genuinely difficult.  However, from conversations with the user, it 
appeared that the differences in task/mission profile also reflected the differing cultural back-
                                            
48 The number of options in each drop-down list was used as the basis for converting answers into 
percentage scores on the basis of an equi-spaced division of the range of answers.  For three options, 
the answer options (from worst to best) were placed in the centres of 0-33.3%, 33.3-66.7% and 66.7-
100%, i.e. at 16.7%, 50.0% and 83.3%.  For five options, the answer options were placed at 10, 30, 
50, 70 and 90%. 
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ground of one of the team members who entered the data into the TCT2. 
c) Flexibility and adaptability 
One user commented that the task/mission profiling weighting process imposed constraints 
that prevented him from adequately describing his team. 
One user commented positively on the ability to select dual cultural nationality or to enter 
(directly), as he felt that some team members were ‘in-between’ or just different to others, 
e.g. in terms of power distance or uncertainty avoidance49. 
d) Errors and accuracy 
There was a spread of opinion from non-committal to enthusiastic, but most felt that the tool 
would be an adjunct to the team-picking process, rather than the basis of it, and that 
accuracy was not a particular issue.  However one user felt that it was easy to misinterpret 
the intention or meaning of the task/mission sub-factors and enter an erroneous task 
weighting. 
There were some issues with regard to the mapping methodology.  As the task profile was 
created by weighting a completely standard profile, the team profile always showed some 
degree of discrepancy with that standard profile, i.e. there could be no ideal cultural profile 
for any given task/mission; it was the weighting process that selectively reduced the 
discrepancies in unimportant areas.  However, this also probably reflected the fact that any 
task-set or mission requires different behaviours at different times, for example closely 
adhering to standard operational procedures then abandoning them in some types of 
emergency. 
e) Other user-raised points 
Political correctness and stereotyping:  A user raised the issue of political correctness 
with regard to the use of nationality-based culture scores.   
Clearly, the tool used a process of stereotyping as, in many cases, there would be no other 
information available.  However, it would be unreasonable to use the tool directly as a basis 
for the inclusion or exclusion of specific individuals because such individuals should be 
personally assessed by their managers, as colleagues, rather than being assessed as 
cultural stereotypes.  
                                            
49 He and another user expressed particular interest in the cultural framework, as they felt that it 
offered an explanation for some of the issues they had previously contended with.  
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Trying to obtain the optimum team values:  Several users entered a range of (hypo-
thetical) teams into the TCT2 in order to gain an understanding of how it worked.  One such 
user, in particular, complained that it was not possible to get an ideal (zero discrepancy) 
score, as there was always at least one sub-factor that would be showing discrepancies.  
Such residual discrepancies occurred because different aspects of tasks or missions are 
associated with different culture scores.  
Using the TCT2 as an adjunct to other tools:  Another user suggested that the tool would 
have to fit in with Belbin-type tools (R Meredith Belbin, 2004, 2010) in order to be accepted. 
The tool has already been used at Loughborough University as part of a wider systems 
engineering toolset. 
Variable behaviours by team members:  A user commented that he occasionally noticed 
changes in the behaviours of individual non-UK team members, depending on the 
composition of the rest of the team.  In particular, he noticed that a particular team member 
would contribute less when one or more other members of his nationality joined the team.  
He suggested that the TCT2 would not account for this. 
This change in behaviour may have been an example of conformity bias (firstly to the wider 
team culture, then to the team member’s own culture), and the TCT2 would not directly 
account for this. 
The task-culture link:  Several users commented about cultural aspects, but two users in 
particular made some particularly interesting comments. The first of these was a pilot, not the 
same pilot with whom this researcher had an unstructured interview (see Subsection 5.2.1), 
but a colleague of his; the pilot’s comments have been reproduced below: 
“The culture elements explained a great deal - we're very aware of the problems of 
culture in the industry but mainly concentrate on the power gradient. Discussions with 
crews on the effects of culture (maybe demonstrating with a tool like this) might be 
valuable - if politically fraught.  Some pilots seem to be internationalized so that their 
own culture is less obvious, but most seem to be at times like the stereotypes in this 
tool. I may be missing the point in some way but I have noticed that these cultural 
differences aren't there all the time. Sometimes I suddenly notice the guy is acting 
differently, he is agitated or not communicating anymore – it’s like he's switched some 
part of his culture on.” 
There were two parts of this comment that were of particular interest; the first was: 
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“Some pilots seem to be internationalized so that their own culture is less obvious.” 
This was perhaps just a reflection of the international jet-setting community (literally), where 
long, perhaps permanent absence from one’s home led to the development of a hybrid 
culture.  The second part was:  
“I may be missing the point in some way but I have noticed that these cultural 
differences aren't obvious all the time. Sometimes I suddenly notice the guy is acting 
differently, he is agitated or not communicating anymore – it’s like he's switched his 
culture on.” 
This was of particular interest because it implied the turning on and off of cultural traits.  It 
appeared that, when the situation (or context) changed, a ‘dormant’ or background cultural 
trait was ‘switched on’. 
The second of the two users was a project manager who worked with both academia and 
industry; his comments have been reproduced below: 
“I'm not convinced about the way the task profile works. For instance, I have to deal 
with industrial engineers and academics of several nationalities. The tasks or 
missions they carry out may be the same in many ways if they collaborate on a 
project, but their environments are different and the way they actually respond and 
carry out the work is different.  When one of my experienced academic colleagues 
works at the industrial partner's premises, his behaviour is different from when at 
university - and so is mine - I wear my industrial hat!” 
This seemed to support the second part of the earlier comment, i.e. that specific (pre-exis-
ting) cultural traits are switched on or ‘primed’ in particular situations or contexts (though they 
may be occupational or organisational cultural traits, rather than national cultural traits).  
The following paragraph was taken from the anecdotal information referred to in Section 5.2 
and detailed in Appendix 2: 
“Two high power distance research colleagues have commented to me (and to other 
British colleagues) that they found it offensive when people junior to themselves from 
the same region (typically research students who had spent several years in the UK) 
did not acknowledge their seniority when addressing them.” 
This was interesting in that these same colleagues did not find it similarly offensive when 
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people junior to themselves of other nationalities did not acknowledge their seniority.  It is 
tempting to conjecture that this is a similar contextual response as the above examples. 
The previous user comment (‘variable behaviour by team members) may also be a similar 
contextual response to those above. 
Feedback and brief discussions with two of the above people had indicated that they felt that 
the actual behaviours within their teams or crew (in particular, within multicultural teams) 
could vary significantly and that culture-related behaviours did not always surface.  One, in 
particular, felt that such behaviours were triggered by the context and cues (and perhaps by 
expectations) within the team and the environment, thus reducing the effectiveness of default 
culture-based prediction tools such as the TCT2. 
f) Comments on user feedback 
Evaluations of the second prototype team culture tool (TCT2) demonstrated the flexibility of 
the task/mission profiler in terms of its ability to represent many team types, but users found 
the TCT2 quite difficult to apply because, for any particular task, a significant number of sub-
factors would have little meaning or relevance, and could be confusing and open to misinter-
pretation.  In addition, because many of the task sub-factors (e.g. management, delegation 
and decision-making styles) related to team behaviour, these were very likely to be affected 
by tool user cultural traits.  Perhaps more importantly, users raised some critical points about 
the underlying assumptions (see previous subsection). 
The issue of residual discrepancies reported on by one user was worth considering further.  
‘Tolerance bands’ rather than point values for the optimum cultural dimension scores would 
much-reduce or eliminate the residual discrepancies reported by users who were experimen-
ting to obtain zero-discrepancy teams (see (e) above).  Given the limited accuracy of any 
culture tool, such tolerances (if not excessive) would be a useful trade-off. 
The user comments with regard to contextually-modified behaviours were an important factor 
to take into consideration.  An examination of the literature, for example Oyserman & Lee 
(2008) suggested that most of the research to-date on cultural priming has concentrated on 
individualism-collectivism, and there appeared to be little literature associated with priming 
other cultural dimensions. New research, based on simulating the neural network activities 
associated with priming automatic social behaviours (Schröder & Thagard, 2013), may 
improve understandings of the general underlying mechanisms of contextual priming, but 
there is also a need for direct studies of uncertainty avoidance priming, etc. 
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7.5.3 Re-examining the underpinning assumptions of the second model 
The underpinning assumptions of the second performance prediction model were originally 
stated in Subsection 7.2.2.  They are reconsidered in this subsection in order to evaluate 
a) Capturing the cultural traits of an actual or proposed team 
Within the limits of a simple dimension-based system, the cultural profiler based on 
Hofstede’s framework was effective. 
b) Capturing the desirable team cultural traits to achieve a task/mission 
It was assumed that the tasks or mission of the team could be captured sufficiently by 
weighting five ‘standard’ factors and their sub-factors; this required the following:  
(i) Capturing the culture-sensitive elements of team tasks or missions 
Comments: The set of behavioural factors and their sub-factors was not ideal, but 
the factors captured sufficient key culture-related details to produce results that ‘were 
in the right direction’. However, two users raised issues about the validity about this 
task-based approach (see following paragraphs). 
(ii) Relating culture-sensitive elements of tasks/missions to culture traits 
Comments: The literature review provided enough information, in conjunction with 
the culture score ranges derived in Subsection 5.5.1, that the author was able to 
identify and encapsulate in the model the cultural traits required for optimum 
performance of the sub-factors.  There remained question marks over some of the 
relationships (in particular, those associated with masculinity and cultural diversity), 
due to lack of data and contradictory published results.  
However, as stated in Subsection 7.5.2(e), above, two of the participating managers 
had questioned the link between culture and actual behaviours within their teams or 
crew (in particular, within multicultural teams).  Whereas such local-contextual effects 
would certainly reduce the direct effects of culture (or the reliability with which such 
effects appeared), cultural traits would still provide a baseline and, given certain 
mission-related contextual cues, should tend to trigger certain behaviours.  
(iii) Describing a particular task or in terms of the above factors 
Comments: Some users found this difficult, as the sub-factors were not necessarily 
those that they would normally use to describe a team.  Although it was very flexible, 
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that very flexibility may have added to confusion (due to lack of focus towards specific 
tasks/missions) and reduced its acceptability. 
c) Obtaining useful information from the discrepancies between desirable and 
actual cultural traits 
Comments: General explanations were provided in the tool and, in addition, context-
sensitive (or discrepancy-sensitive) messages were generated to help in the identification 
of problem areas.  The managers who were interested in culture picked up the meanings 
of the cultural dimensions quickly and appeared to understand the operation of the tool 
and its outputs (discrepancy figures and comment(s)). However, there was a lack of 
confidence on the part of the some users in the task/behavioural profile, and therefore in 
the usefulness of the information. 
7.6 Proposed changes to the tool 
The proposed changes were based in part on the user comments and on the re-examination 
of the assumptions.  Although the task-related factors could perhaps be made clearer, and 
improved supporting advice could be provided, the comments by two users, in particular 
regarding situations or contexts were of concern.  A direct focus on the mission context 
could, to some extent, sidestep this issue, and also alleviate the practical difficulties that 
users had with the TCT2. 
It was therefore decided that the third prototype would include changes from a task-oriented 
representation, to a dimension-based mission representation that attempted to capture the 
key context of that mission.  This would enable a user to define a mission by locating it in 
‘mission space’, relative to other missions.  In addition, taking into account both the earlier-
expressed users’ concerns and the limited accuracy of the cultural scores, the third prototype 
would incorporate upper and lower bounds to optimum culture dimension scores, rather than 
single ‘optimum’ or ‘desirable’ values. 
7.7 Summary of the second model and team culture tool 
The second model and tool confirmed the effectiveness and face validity of the team cultural 
profiler.  However, it also highlighted issues with the factor/sub-factor representation of 
task/mission profiles, both in terms of difficulties in use and underlying assumptions.  A 
substantially different approach was therefore needed for the task/mission profiler.  
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8 A third model and prototype culture tool 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of the third and final set of versions of the model 
and team culture tool (TCT3); these utilised a dimension-based approach for both the team 
cultural profile and mission profile.  
The aim of this third exercise was to create a prototype culture tool that did not rely on a 
task-based approach, and demonstrated the potential for application by engineers and 
managers, rather than by researchers who had particular knowledge of culture and its inter-
actions with team performance. 
As was the case with the TCT2, this version of the team culture tool was not intended to 
predict the ‘absolute’ performances of individual teams, but was intended to highlight where 
culture was likely to be a significant factor in underperformance or heightened risk.  Also, as 
was the case with the TCT2, the goodness of fit (between team and mission) was based on 
the generation of discrepancies between the desirable team culture profile (based on the 
mission) and the actual team profile.   
The main difference in the third methodology and tool was that the team mission was 
selected as a location in multidimensional mission space, rather than described via weighting 
a set of factors and their sub-factors. 
8.2 The basis of the third model (TCT3) 
This section was intended to provide an overview of the model that underlies the third tool, in 
particular, the basis on which it generated a measure of fit between teams and their mission 
requirements, and the assumptions that lay behind the approach. 
8.2.1 Overview of the third model 
The logic of the third performance prediction model was based on profiling the team via its 
members’ national cultural traits (as were the first and second models), profiling the mission 
by locating it within a set of mission dimensions (rather than via the five team behavioural 
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factors of the second model) in order to capture directly the key context of the mission50, and 
thereby directly deriving a set of cultural ‘discrepancies’ that represented the differences 
between the optimum cultural traits for the mission and the actual cultural traits of the team.  
These discrepancies formed the basis of team fitness for the mission.  
The team cultural profile was created by entering team members’ nationalities and their 
education levels into the model, which then utilised Hofstede’s default national culture scores 
to calculate the team cultural profile; this consisted of the team average cultural scores and 
team diversity score.  The mission profile was created by selecting the team’s location on a 
two-dimensional (2-D) team-type or mission grid that was partially populated by exemplar 
teams; this then generated a desirable cultural profile, based on the team’s location on the 2-
D grid.  This desirable cultural profile was compared to the actual (or proposed) team cultural 
profile and discrepancies between these two profiles were derived.  Figure 8-1 illustrates an 
idealised mapping directly from a selected location in multidimensional mission space to a 
location in cultural dimension space, as proposed in Subsection 4.4.2.  The distance in multi-
dimensional culture space, between the location of the actual team and the cultural location 
resulting from the projection from the mission space, represents the cultural discrepancy. 
 
Figure 8-1:  The underlying basis for the third model and culture tool (TCT3) 
Figure 8-2 presents an outline flow diagram of the model.  
                                            
50 The key context was that (or those) that had to be handled appropriately in order to guarantee (or at 
least promote) the success of the mission.  For example, the key context could relate to aspects of 
creativity or innovation in a scientifically advanced project or to rapid, appropriate responses following 
a major failure of a sociotechnical system in operation. 
 183 
 
 
Figure 8-2:  Flow diagram illustrating the model for the third team culture tool (TCT3) 
8.2.2 Underpinning assumptions of the third model 
The additional underpinning assumptions of the third performance prediction model (i.e. 
excluding those that were met in the second model) were as follows: 
(a) Capturing the desirable team cultural traits to achieve a mission:  It was 
assumed that the mission of a team could be captured sufficiently by placing the team 
or mission on a ‘grid’ or map containing a range of exemplar teams; this required the 
following:  
(i) Capturing the culture-sensitive elements of team missions:  It was 
assumed that a small number of mission dimensions could capture the key 
context (or contexts) of a mission or team with adequate accuracy to enable 
the cultural traits associated with optimum performance to be identified. 
(ii) Relating culture-sensitive aspects of mission contexts to culture traits:  
It was assumed that the cultural traits required for optimum performance of 
the teams/missions of (i) above could be adequately identified by the author 
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(based on the literature and his additional studies) and encapsulated in the 
model; these included the cultural traits of the exemplar teams. 
(iii) Placing a particular team or mission on a grid or map:  It was assumed 
that users had sufficient knowledge to locate their teams with adequate 
accuracy within the grid or map in relation to exemplar teams. 
(b) Obtaining useful information from the discrepancies between desirable and 
actual cultural traits:  It was assumed that the cultural discrepancies between actual 
and desirable cultural traits, when combined with the associated comments 
generated by the model/tool, would be meaningful, i.e. that they would inform the 
user of something useful about potential team performance and/or team problems.  
Note:  As stated in Subsection 7.2.2, the terms ‘adequate’ and ‘adequately’ related to the 
effects of inaccuracy on the performance of the model and tool.  It was difficult to judge the 
degree of adequacy of individual steps in the process; however, the overall performance 
could be adjudged from the tool’s effectiveness in the hands of users. 
The implications of the above assumptions and the degree to which they were found to be 
justified are discussed later in this chapter. 
8.3 A description of the key elements of the third model and tool 
The TCT3 team cultural profiler was identical to that used in the TCT2, which was described 
in Subsection 7.3.1 and illustrated in Figure 7-3.  Therefore, no further descriptions of the 
profiler and the resulting team cultural profile have been provided in this subsection. 
The mission profile, produced when the user placed the team (in terms of its mission) at an 
appropriate location in mission space, was mapped across to a desirable cultural profile.  
This desirable cultural profile was compared to the team cultural profile generated by 
entering team member nationalities, and discrepancies between the two were derived.  
These discrepancies, as in the second model, formed the basis for assessing mission fit. 
The proposed changes of Subsection 7.6 included the adaptation of the tool to incorporate a 
valid range of scores, rather than a single point optimum score.  This range would reflect the 
limited accuracy of the optimum culture scores and would provide several benefits:  
• It would enable users to find optimum team configurations more easily if that was 
their intent, 
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• It would enable the tool to cope with situations where a particular cultural trait was 
unimportant, simply by expanding the range of ‘optimal’ scores, 
• It would enable the tool to emulate a situation where a cultural trait reduced in 
importance over a particular range of scenarios (whether or not its optimum score 
changed); for example, this was the case with the organised action teams – the 
slower the required response time was, the less important power distance and 
masculinity were. 
On the basis of the limited accuracy of the cultural dimension scores, a decision was made to 
incorporate a default minimum range of +/-5.  That implied, for example, that an optimum 
cultural dimension score of 25 would become an optimum range of 20-30, and a team score 
of anywhere between 20 and 30 (for that dimension) would have a discrepancy score of 
zero. 
When this third and final model was initially developed, the aim was to profile all potential 
tasks/missions by locating them in three or four dimensions.  However, this proved extremely 
difficult for the following reasons:  
• It proved impossible to design a simple three/four-dimensional input tool that a user 
could utilise effectively.  It required the user to select a team twice, once on each pair 
of dimensions, and it proved difficult to place and explain the numerous exemplars 
required to guide the user in his or her selection. 
• Different team/mission types could not effectively be expressed via a common set of 
dimensions, as at least one dimension would be superfluous and distracting. 
As a result, a decision was taken to utilise different underlying dimensions and input forms 
for the different forms of team mission.  The decision to split team types greatly simplified the 
process of implementation, and produced a mission interface that was extremely simple to 
use. 
The two key team/mission types (and their dimension) selected were the ones of key interest 
to this research (see Sub-section 2.2.2), i.e.:  
• Project teams – typically designing, implementing or improving elements of socio-
technical systems. 
• Organised action teams – typically the crew or operators of safety-critical socio-
technical systems. 
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8.3.1 Project teams, primarily for the research, development and 
implementation of sociotechnical systems and products 
Section 3.3 of the literature review examined the effects of culture on the performance of 
teams involved in research, innovation, improvement, etc.  The main culturally-moderated 
issues that appeared to arise with project teams appeared from the literature to be the level 
of creativity/innovation, and the additional problems imposed by social complexities on larger 
projects – i.e. the parties involved, their cultural differences, etc.  Whereas the innovation/-
creativity issues had been quantitatively evaluated by many authors (with varying results and 
conclusions), the issue of social complexity and its effects on projects had been subject only 
to limited qualitative analysis.  However, the major social problems with complex projects, as 
identified in Subsection 3.3.1(a) (vii), were failures in communications and understandings 
across departmental and organisational boundaries.  In particular, the very masculine 
cultures associated with the management of large projects tended to result in impersonal 
problem-solving, and a failure to form relationships and to adopt a consensus-seeking 
approach.  It appeared that a low-power distance, low-masculinity culture would improve 
communication and encourage the building of consensual relations between partners, rather 
than the adversarial relationships that formed the basis of much current project work. 
The dimensions for sociotechnical system project teams were therefore defined as:  
• Creativity/innovation 
• Social complexity 
Note that, in addition to technically-focussed project teams, this configuration of dimensions 
also enabled the assessment of non-technical management teams.  These dimensions are 
discussed further in the following subsections.  
a) Creativity/innovation dimension 
The author has brought together the findings on innovation from the literature review and 
from his own studies in order to produce a best estimate of the relationships.  The author’s 
pilot study results (Subsections 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 & 5.4) broadly supported the innovation results 
that were obtained from the literature; in particular:  
• The student group results demonstrated that uncertainty avoidance was a detractor 
from innovation performance51. 
• The football results demonstrated that, in an environment of clearly-defined rules and 
                                            
51 Innovation formed a significant part of the student groups’ performance assessments. 
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no lethal surprises, high uncertainty avoidance (‘sticking to the plans and being 
cautious’) and high masculinity (high competitiveness) were of significant benefit.  
The cultural dimension scores of Figure 7-2 were utilised in the second model and tool 
(TCT2), and that figure has been reproduced here as Figure 8-3, as it is used further in this 
chapter.  As stated in Chapter 7, this figure is based on the innovation-related findings of 
Subsection 3.3 of the literature review, in particular Figure 3.2 and on the author’s pilot study 
findings, combined with the ‘low’ and ‘high’ cultural dimension scores as derived in Section 
5.5.  Also, as stated in Chapter 7, two of the relationships were particularly difficult to assess.  
Firstly, the results for masculinity appeared strongly positive for low innovation but unclear for 
high innovation, with different researchers reporting strong positive and negative effects.  
Secondly, the results for cultural diversity were highly variable, although there appeared to 
be some degree of consensus on the positive benefits that multiple points of view brought for 
high innovation, but not low innovation. 
 
Figure 8-3:  Culture/innovation relationships deduced from the literature and pilot studies 
b) Social complexity dimension 
As discussed in Subsection 3.3.1(a) (vii), the very masculine cultures associated with the 
management of large projects tended to result in impersonal problem-solving, and a failure to 
form relationships and to adopt a consensus-seeking approach.  It appeared that a low-
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power distance, low-masculinity culture could improve communications and could also 
encourage the building of consensual relations between partners, rather than the adversarial 
relationships that formed the basis of much current project work.  To this end, it was 
proposed that the ‘desirable’ MAS score associated with projects should decline to the ‘low’ 
value (‘4’) of Table 5-17 for socially complex projects.  Figure 8-4 illustrates this reduction in 
MAS score; the two values represent the extremes of MAS scores for innovation. 
 
Figure 8-4: Culture/social complexity relationship deduced from the literature and pilot 
studies52 
In order to produce a ‘desirable’ overall mission MAS value (one that conformed to Figure 8-
4), the culture tool applied the following adjustment to the MAS value associated with 
innovation53: 
MASCOMPLEX =  MASINNOV – (MASINNOV – MASLOW) * complexityScore/100 
Where:   
MASCOMPLEX = MASINNOV adjusted for project social complexity. 
MASLOW = The ‘low’ value for MAS from Table 5-17 (=4). 
MASINNOV = Masculinity score based on level of creativity/innovation required. 
complexityScore = a measure of social complexity ranging from zero to 100, as 
shown in Figure 8-4. 
                                            
52 The actual value for masculinity (on the right side of the figure) depends on the degree of innovation 
creativity/required. 
53 But note that the +/-5 range was applied to all culture scores including this MAS score; it was not 
shown here in order to avoid confusion.  
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8.3.2 Organised action teams - crews of sociotechnical systems 
Section 3.3.1(c) of the literature review examined the effects of national culture on the perfor-
mance of crews and operators of sociotechnical systems, in particular, aircraft crews.  
Although only limited publication data was available in this area, compared to that on 
innovation, that data was consistent across all researchers: national culture appeared to play 
a significant role in accident rates.  Accident recordings had revealed a range of intra-team 
issues; low accident rates were associated with low PDI, high IDV, low UAI and high MAS; 
high accident rates were associated with the opposite set of culture scores.  Cultural diversity 
was not given significant attention in the literature on organised action teams, but it would be 
reasonable to assume that, because it reduced communication rates and increased 
misunderstandings, cultural diversity would have added to the risk of accidents. 
The author’s analysis of aircraft accident data (Subsection 5.3.5(a)) confirmed that high 
accident rates in fast response time systems were associated with high PDI, low IDV, high 
UAI and low MAS.  In addition, the author’s analysis confirmed Hofstede’s assertion that per-
capita GDP was the most important factor relating to aircraft accident rates (low per-capita 
GDP is associated with high aircraft accident rates).  The author’s studies also indicated that, 
in slower response time systems, e.g. merchant maritime (Subsection 5.3.5(b)), per-capita 
GDP, MAS and PDI had much-reduced effects compared to IDV and UAI.  The author’s 
examination of automation issues (Subsection 3.3.1(c)) and analysis of attitudes to auto-
mation (Subsection 5.3.5(c)) provided further insights as to loss of flying skills, reduced 
situation awareness and complacency, which are all potential contributors to accident risks. 
Although no significant relationships were found in the literature between degree of special-
isation within a team and the effects of culture on accident rates, specialisation proved to be 
a useful way of discriminating teams in order to display them on a two dimensional grid, and 
to enable users to place their own teams’ missions. 
To summarise the above, the two dimensions selected were: 
• Mission response time requirements (rather than communication and co-ordination or 
situational awareness, which were team behavioural factors). 
• Mission specialisation amongst team members (a key team-differentiating dimension 
identified by Hollenbeck et al. (2012)). 
Figure 8-5 presents a best estimate of the optimum cultural values for sociotechnical system 
crews based on the accident-related findings of Subsection 3.3 of the literature review and 
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the author’s pilot study findings of Subsections 5.3.5(a), (b) & (c), combined with the ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ cultural dimension scores as derived in Section 5.5, (see also Tables 5-11 to 5-
18).  This forms the basis of the cultural scores in the TCT3 organised action team model. 
 
Figure 8-5:  Culture/response time relationships for sociotechnical systems (deduced from the 
literature and pilot studies) 
The basis of the culture/response time relationship illustrated in Figure 8-5 is described 
below. 
• Short response time axis:  This reflected the aircraft accident results:  
PDI=low=16; IDV=high=105; MAS=high=75; UAI=low=9. 
• Long response time axis:  This reflected shipping accident results; here, IDV and 
UAI remained as key predictors, but PDI and MAS were much reduced as predictors 
– this reduction was modelled by providing a high and low value for PDI and MAS, 
rather than a single optimum value for each.  In each case, this was calculated as half 
of the cultural dimension’s range between its low and high values54 (these low and 
high values were calculated in Subsection 5.5.1): 
                                            
54 This was a pragmatic decision because there was insufficient data to estimate an accurate value; 
note that the +/-5 score range would also be applied (as is the case throughout the model). 
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PDILOW=16 & PDIHIGH=16+(73-16)/2=45; IDV=high=105; MASHIGH=75 & MASLOW=75-
(75-4)/2=40; UAI=low=9. 
The issues associated with the operation of high-reliability sociotechnical systems relate to 
relatively rare situations where events combine or failures occur such that the operators or 
crew must ‘reframe’ and, typically, abandon their normal standard operating procedures 
(SOPs).  However, operators that are willing to abandon their SOPs at an earlier stage may 
abandon them when such a course may not be necessary.  Where the balance of risk is 
weighted towards the consequences of failure to follow SOPs, for example when carrying out 
planned maintenance of an aircraft55 or of a section of a refinery, then high UAI (following 
SOPs), high PDI (obeying orders) crews may perform better.  Note that low IDV (high 
collectivism) does not guarantee the following of SOPs or orders.  Although sport may 
appear at first consideration to have little to do with sociotechnical systems, the issues 
associated with a willingness (or otherwise) to take a low uncertainty (high predictability) 
course of action have been demonstrated in the author’s English Premiership pilot study; 
here, the key contributory cultural dimension to successful performance was found to be high 
UAI.  Due to a lack of publications and data on maintenance operations in sociotechnical 
systems, this topic has not been included in the TCT3. 
8.4 A description of the methodology and tool operation 
As stated in the previous chapter, in order to assess the suitability of a team in cultural terms, 
it was necessary to be able to profile the team in terms of its culture, to profile the team 
mission (including relevant environmental aspects), and to provide a mapping between the 
team mission and cultural traits that would enable an assessment of team suitability or 
mismatch to be carried out.  The main difference in the third methodology and tool was that 
the team mission was selected as a location in multidimensional mission space, rather than 
described via weighting a set of factors and their sub-factors; Figure 8-1 illustrates an 
idealised mapping directly from a selected location in multidimensional mission space to a 
location in cultural dimension space. 
Knowing the desirable location in ‘culture space’ and the actual team’s location in the same 
space, the separation (or discrepancy) along each cultural dimension could be determined.  
The following subsections describe the activities and profiles in more detail; as in the last 
                                            
55 For an example of the failure of a UK aircraft maintenance organisation to follow standard operating 
procedures, see AAIB (2013). The UK score for uncertainty avoidance is low, but is not necessarily a 
contributing factor to this serious incident. 
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chapter, the descriptions are presented in terms of tool usage and processes. 
8.4.1 Profiling the team 
The team cultural profiler was identical to that of the TCT2, and was utilised in an identical 
fashion.  See Figure 7-3 for the TCT2 and TCT3 team cultural profiler. 
8.4.2 Profiling the mission 
In order to utilise the tool, the user was required to place the team mission in the space 
formed by the two mission dimensions.  Note that, in the case of organised action teams, one 
of the utilised dimensions was there primarily to help the user in his/her selection and 
produce a more readable spread of exemplars; see Appendix 9 for information on the 
creation of exemplars. 
Figure 8-6 illustrates the engineering/management project mission profile selector. 
 
Figure 8-6:  Profiling the mission by locating it on the grid – eng’g/mgmt. project teams 
Figure 8-7 illustrates the organised action team mission profile selector.  
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Figure 8-7:  Profiling the mission by locating it on the grid – organised action teams 
The locating/profiling process was very quick, and it was easy to place the team amongst the 
exemplars of different types of action team. 
8.4.3 Mapping the mission profile into a cultural profile and deriving 
discrepancies 
Each of the active dimensions had an associated set of cultural relationships.  Following the 
selection of a location in task/mission space, a desirable score (expressed as a range) was 
generated for each cultural dimension and for cultural diversity, see Figure 8-8.  
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Figure 8-8:  The result of a mapping from mission to desirable cultural profile 
The elements of the actual team cultural profile (i.e. the team’s cultural dimension and 
diversity scores) were then compared to the desirable profile for the mission to ascertain 
whether they lay inside or outside each range; if outside, the distance was displayed as a 
positive or negative discrepancy; if inside the range, the discrepancy was set to zero.  See 
example below: 
If UAI desirable range = 21 to 31, then:  
If team UAI = 15, then UAI discrepancy = -6 (6 below bottom of range). 
If team UAI = 29, then UAI discrepancy = 0    (within range). 
If team UAI = 43, then UAI discrepancy = 12    (12 above top of range). 
The overall discrepancy in the standard model underlying the TCT3 was simply the average 
of the individual discrepancies.  However, a modified version of the TCT3 was also 
developed, which applied relative weights (based on the values presented in Table 5-20) to 
the individual discrepancies.  This led to some issues with two users who noticed that the 
discrepancy values ‘didn’t add up’.  Face validity is important for this tool, therefore the 
modified version was not used further in the main validation exercise. 
8.4.4 Interpreting the results 
Following selection of the team/mission profile from one of the two TCT3 mission grids, 
depending on mission type (Figure 8-6 or 8-7), the TCT3 updated a radar diagram in order to 
present an overview of the degree of fit and to highlight the areas of greatest discrepancy, 
see Figure 8-9.  
The radar diagram example of Figure 8-9 was based on a project team; we can see that the 
actual team PDI and cultural diversity (Cdiv) scores, represented by the green line in the 
diagram, were outside the desirable range.  Note that it had not been feasible to generate a 
radar diagram for the TCT2, as there were no unique desirable culture scores to plot. 
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Figure 8-9:  Radar diagram showing an overview of cultural fit 
The discrepancies between the desired mission cultural profile and the actual team cultural 
profile were also shown at the base of the TCT3 Table 1 – team culture profile table, see 
Figure 8-10.  In this particular example, as the team’s power distance (PDI) and cultural 
diversity were significantly higher than was desirable, the team’s overall discrepancy was a 
somewhat high score of 9.4. 
In order to improve the situation, we would need to exchange high PDI team members for 
low PDI members.  The three Russian members have the highest PDI and diversity scores, 
therefore replacing them with (say) Nordic or German members, would cause both PDI and 
diversity to fall to within the ‘desirable’ range.  However, this may not be feasible due to 
knowledge/skill/experience constraints or political constraints. 
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Figure 8-10:  Applying the tool to a project team - note the discrepancy scores (TCT3 Table 1) 
8.5 Validation and user evaluation of the third prototype tool 
As with the second prototype, initial testing was carried out on the third prototype tool (TCT3) 
before asking potential users to apply it.  
8.5.1 Initial testing and validation 
The commercial aircraft incident data that was collected to test the TCT2 was also used to 
test the TCT3, see Appendix 5 for more details of this data.  Table 8-1 presents this aircraft 
incident data and the TCT3 discrepancy scores based on crew nationalities. 
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Date & 
aircraft 
details 
Incident Fatalities & damage 
Crew 
performance 
Crew 
nation-
ality 
Degree 
of error/-
recovery 
Discr-
epancy 
scores 
Jan 2009, 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD82 
Instrument failure, crew 
became lost 
No fatalities, 
no damage: 
Disorientated – 
loss of situation 
awareness 
Argentina Moderate 
error 
14.8 
Jan 2009, 
Boeing 737 
Not warned of landing 
conditions, river at end of 
runway  
No fatalities, 
little 
damage 
Quick reaction 
with max thrust 
reversers 
USA Good 1.7 
Jan 2009,US 
Airways Airbus 
Total engine loss  over 
NY, river landing 
No fatalities, 
a/c total loss 
Exemplary flight 
skills 
USA Excellent 1.7 
Jan 2009, 
Boeing 757 
FMC misbehaviour, 
should have aborted 
No fatalities, 
minor 
Suboptimal 
decisions, poor 
communications 
Ghana Moderate 
error 
18.7 
Feb 2009, 
Airbus A321 
Poor landing conditions, 
did not abort or use thrust 
reversers 
No fatalities, 
minor 
Poor decision 
making 
France Moderate 
error 
14.8 
Feb 2009, 
Boeing 737 
Faulty altimeters, FMC 
reduced thrust 
9 fatalities, 
a/c total loss 
Lack of situation 
awareness 
Turkey High error 19.5 
March 2009, 
Airbus 340 
Tail strike during 
dangerous take-off due to 
erroneous calculations 
0 fatalities, 
minor 
damage 
Failure to follow 
SOPs 
Arab 
world 
Moderate-
to-high 
18.4 
April 2009, 
BAe-146 
Flew into terrain despite 
repeated instr. warnings 
All crew 
killed, a/c 
total loss 
Lack of SA, cap-
tain ignored co-
pilot’s warnings 
Indonesia High error 18.8 
April 2009, 
Boeing 767 
Firm landing, nose 
damage 
No fatalities, 
structural 
damage 
Erroneous flight 
control 
Arab 
world 
Moderate 
error 
18.4 
Apr 2009, De 
Havilland DHC-
8 
Aft fuselage grounded on 
landing 
No fatalities, 
minor 
damage 
Lack of situation 
awareness 
Canada Moderate 
error 
1.9 
Apr 2009, 
McDonnell-
Douglas MD-81 
Left wing tip struck 
runway on landing 
No fatalities, 
minor 
damage 
Poor flight 
control 
Japan Moderate+ 
error 
16.9 
May 2009, 
Airbus A320 
Tail strike after bounced 
landing 
No fatalities, 
minor 
damage 
Poor flight 
control 
USA Moderate 
error 
1.7 
May 2009, 
Boeing 747 
Flaps retracted with-out 
warning on T/O 
No fatalities, 
no damage 
Exemplary flight 
skills 
UK Excellent 0.2 
Table 8-1:  Data set for evaluation of action team option of TCT3 
Note that this table is similar to Table 7-1, except that the discrepancy scores (in the last 
column) were generated via the TCT3 methodology rather than via the TCT2 methodology. 
The results from this limited evaluation of the TCT3 have been plotted in the graph of Figure 
8-11.  As was the case with the TCT2, there appeared to be a significant positive relationship 
between discrepancy score and flying performance/accident rate, as one would expect.  Note 
that, as stated in the previous chapter,  all modern passenger jet incidents (from the first six 
months of data from the accident website) where the flying crew unambiguously contributed 
in a significant way to the outcome of the incident (positively or negatively) were selected.  
Incident reports that provided insufficient details were omitted. 
The graph of Figure 8-11 also contains the greyed-out results for the TCT2 (which utilised 
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the same data).  The results are very similar in this case although the TCT3 discrepancies 
are smaller; this is in part due to the implementation of an optimum culture score (or 
desirable culture score) range, see Figure 8-9, rather than a single point optimum culture 
score, as was the case with the TCT2. 
 
Figure 8-11:  Evaluation of TCT3 organised action team option via aircraft incident data (TCT2 
results for the same data greyed out) 
Several managers who had been involved in various industrial or commercial projects were 
asked to fill in a team questionnaire (see Appendix 7); in addition, a highly-experienced 
aircraft pilot (who was also a crew trainer and examiner) was asked to fill in the same 
questionnaire.  The purpose of this questionnaire was to collect information on team mission 
activities, team members (including their performances as team members), overall teaming 
performances, delivery performances and other teaming aspects.  The management & 
engineering design team results and action team (aircraft crew) results from the team 
questionnaires have been plotted in the graph of Figure 8-12.  As can be seen, there 
appears to be a negative relationship between teaming efficiency and cultural discrepancy 
score, i.e. the greater the cultural discrepancy (the difference between desirable and actual 
team culture scores), the less well the team was likely to perform in its key mission areas.  
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Figure 8-12:  Evaluation of TCT3 via data provided by industrial managers and aircraft pilot 
Originally, the author was intending to use external measures of team performance, e.g. 
output (against requirements) and timeliness, in his evaluation of the TCT3.  However, 
several managers indicated in their questionnaire returns that actual achieved performance 
was significantly adversely affected by external constraints (e.g. company politics or project 
partner issues) and, as a result, they did not consider ‘performance’ always to be a reliable 
measure of team ability.  Therefore, the author used the user-scored measures of teaming 
ability weighted by the user-perceived importance of each measure to give an overall 
teaming efficiency measure.  Teaming efficiency was based on the first six ratings in the 
‘Team Performance’ section of the team questionnaire (Appendix 7) that had been filled in by 
managers, see Figure 8-13. 
 
Figure 8-13:  The basis for calculating teaming ability (the first six items in the above list) 
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Note that the seventh and eighth ratings of Figure 8-13 provided a measure of actual team 
performance (as would be externally measured).  The ‘Rating’ and ‘Importance’ values were 
selected from dropdown lists by the user; there were five options in each dropdown list, each 
assigned a percentage score from 10 to 9056.  The measure of teaming performance was 
calculated as: 
∑(𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑅𝑅 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼)
∑𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑅𝑅
 
The above measure of teaming, when applied to the example of Figure 8-13, produced a 
teaming ability score of 42%.  Note that the same rating (the middle column of Figure 8-13) 
can produce a wide range of teaming ability scores depending on the relative importance of 
each factor (right-hand column). 
The organised action team and project team results provide positive validation for the 
discrepancy-based model underlying the TCT3. 
Discussions with several of the above managers about their questionnaire responses 
revealed additional interesting information.  One manager brought up the issue of the 
‘macho’ behaviours amongst the predominantly British team members, who defended their 
‘positions’ excessively, delaying progress (they were from a range of departments in a very 
large company).  The introduction of female members to the team produced a much 
improved level of behaviour in the team, with more consideration being given by the men to 
all other team members. 
8.5.2 User testing and evaluation of the third team culture tool (TCT3) 
Following the initial testing of the TCT3 on a range of team and mission types, the tool was 
made available to individuals who were or had been involved with British, other-national 
and/or multinational teams; where feasible, they were given an explanation and demon-
stration of the TCT3 prior to evaluating it by entering their team and project details.  
Following their evaluation exercises, users were each asked to fill in a team culture tool 
questionnaire (see Appendix 8).    Information on numbers of users and cases (teams) is 
summarised in Table 8-2.  User feedback on the tool (obtained from their questionnaire 
responses) is summarised in Table 8-3; note that answers based on dropdown lists have 
                                            
56 As stated in Chapter 7, the number of options in each drop-down list was used as the basis for 
converting answers into percentage scores on the basis of an equi-spaced division of the range of 
answers.  For three options, the answer options (from worst to best) were placed in the centres of 0-
33.3%, 33.3-66.7% and 66.7-100%, i.e. at 16.7%, 50.0% and 83.3%.  For five options, the answer 
options were placed at 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90%. 
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been converted into average percentage scores, as for the case with the earlier-described 
team questionnaire. 
Users Qty Mission cases Qty 
Had used the TCT2 5 Project/design teams 11 
Had not used the TCT2 3 Organised action teams 3 
Total 8 Total 14 
Table 8-2:  User and case numbers 
a) Ease of use 
From the TCT3 questionnaire answers, it appeared that all users found the cultural profiling 
of the team members and team to be straightforward, as with the previous model. 
Users found the mission profiling exercise faster and easier than had been the case with 
TCT2 as, instead of weighting a significant range of factors and sub-factors in order to 
produce the profile, it was only necessary to locate the mission context amongst exemplars 
in a two-dimensional grid.  This also had the advantage of avoiding issues relating to the 
users’ cultural backgrounds, which had been a problem with the TCT2.  However, several 
users commented on the need for a wider range of exemplars.  
b) Clarity and transparency 
From the team culture tool questionnaire returns, it appeared that a majority of users 
considered that it was fairly clear as to what the TCT3 was doing and where the results (in 
terms of discrepancies) came from, see Table 8-3 for details of the responses.. 
User 
answers 
Team cultural profiler Team mission profiler Discrepancy results Useful? 
Easy, 
under-
standable 
to use 
Quick/-
efficient 
to use? 
Meaningful 
team profile 
results? 
Easy, 
clear to 
use 
Quick/-
efficient 
to use? 
Did the overall 
results make 
sense? 
Was the 
improvement 
advice helpful? 
Was the radar 
diagram 
helpful? 
Could a 
TCT3-type 
tool be 
useful? 
AL Fairly easy Fairly fast Yes OK OK To some extent To some extent Yes Yes 
AMJ Very easy Very fast Yes Fairly easy Very fast Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEJ Fairly easy Fairly fast To some extent OK Fairly fast To some extent Yes To some extent Yes 
JB Fairly easy Fairly fast Yes Fairly easy OK Yes Yes Yes Yes 
JV OK Fairly fast To some extent OK OK To some extent To some extent To some extent To some extent 
MW Fairly easy Very fast Yes Fairly easy Very fast Yes To some extent Yes Yes 
SN Fairly easy Very fast Yes Fairly easy Fairly fast Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TW Fairly easy Fairly fast Yes OK OK Yes To some extent To some extent To some extent 
No. of 
answer 
options 
5 5 3 5 5 3 3 3 3 
Average 
score (%) 70 78 75 60 65 71 67 71 75 
Table 8-3:  Summary of TCT3 user questionnaire answers 
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c) Flexibility and adaptability 
Users did not comment directly on this aspect.  
d) Errors and accuracy 
Based on the TCT3 questionnaire answers, four of the five users who had used both the 
TCT2 and TCT3 considered that they were less likely to make errors with the TCT3.  As with 
the second tool, most users considered that the TCT3 would be an adjunct to the team-
picking process, rather than the basis of it and that high accuracy was unimportant.  The only 
potential issue associated with accuracy was considered to lie with the locations of the 
projects/missions on the grids and the resulting desirable cultural profiles.  
e) Other user comments 
One user commented about the issue of longevity of a team and changing attitudes due to 
familiarity – something that the culture tools did not adjust for.  Another user suggested that 
additional help in terms drop-down boxes to help chose level of technical complexity or 
innovation, and more guidance for the social dimension.  
Some users again commented about the (political) risks in using a culture tool, particularly 
one based on stereotypes. 
8.6 Limitations to the tool 
Limitations were imposed on the scope of the research at an early stage of the study; 
however, it is worth reiterating these and other limitations that subsequently arose during the 
study. 
8.6.1 Scoping limitations 
Team analysis and performance prediction is a very wide area of research, which has been 
active since the 1950s.  In order to complete a meaningful research project on the effects of 
culture, it had been necessary, from the beginning, to impose severe scoping limitations.  As 
a result, most factors relating to team performance, such as personality (and team member 
types), leadership, training and stages in team development, were not considered, except 
where they directly impinged on cultural aspects of team performance.  Therefore, the tool 
had limited applicability in terms of identifying a ‘good’ team, but could act as a ‘warning light’ 
that might lead to reconsideration in circumstances where culture would be likely to lead to 
reduced performance. 
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8.6.2 Data availability 
In addition to scoping limitations, the very limited availability of detailed data from culture-
related studies constrained the degree of progress and tool development that could be 
achieved, and also the accuracy of any tool. 
8.6.3 A re-examination of the underpinning assumptions of the TCT3 
A set of underpinning assumptions was listed in Subsection 8.2.2; it is worth reconsidering 
these at this stage. 
(a) Capturing the cultural traits of actual or proposed teams:   
Comments:  Feedback and brief discussions with two of the managers had indicated 
that they felt that the actual behaviours within their teams (in particular, within multi-
cultural teams) could vary significantly based on the constraints and cues (and 
perhaps implied expectations) within the team and the environment, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of culture-based prediction tools such as the TCT3. This is probably 
true; however, cultural traits would provide a baseline and, given certain mission-
related contextual cues, should trigger certain behaviours. 
(b) Capturing the desirable team cultural traits to achieve a mission:  It was 
assumed that the mission of a team could be captured sufficiently by placing the team 
or mission on a ‘grid’ or map containing a range of exemplar teams; this required the 
following:  
(i) Capturing the culture-sensitive elements of team missions:  It was 
assumed that a small number of dimensions could capture the description of a 
mission or team with adequate accuracy to enable the cultural traits 
associated with optimum performance to be identified.  
Comments:  The two dimensions chosen for each scenario appeared to 
capture sufficient aspects of missions to enable useful culture-based 
predictions, if the culture-related data was available (see (ii)). 
(ii) Relating culture-sensitive elements of teams/missions to culture traits:  
It was assumed that the cultural traits required for optimum performance of 
the teams/missions of (i) above could be adequately identified by the author; 
these included the cultural traits associated with the exemplar teams. 
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Comments:  The data from published studies varied widely, and there were 
no definitive, high quality studies that could be relied on.  As a result, only 
limited confidence could be placed in the accuracy of the mission   cultural 
trait score transformation57.  However, the evaluation results appeared overall 
to support the relationships between mission context and the cultural traits 
that were encapsulated in the TCT3. 
(iii) Describing a particular team or mission in terms of the above factors:  It 
was assumed that users had sufficient knowledge to locate their teams with 
adequate accuracy within the grid or map. 
Comments:  In the case of the user evaluation, they appeared to be able to 
locate their teams, but several expressed the opinion that more exemplars 
were required.  These were, in the main, sophisticated managers with whom I 
had previously discussed the TCT3 and its purpose; most had also utilised the 
TCT2.  It was therefore clear that more work needed to be done on exemplars 
(more of them, validation of their placing on the grid, and descriptions of their 
essential qualities).  It was probable that practical versions of a tool such as 
the TCT3 would need to be specialised for software projects, civil engineering, 
etc, where the exemplars would be much more meaningful to users. 
(c) Obtaining useful information from the discrepancies between desirable and 
actual cultural traits:  It was assumed that the cultural discrepancies between actual 
and desirable cultural traits, when combined with the associated comments 
generated by the model/tool, would be meaningful, i.e. that they would inform the 
user of something useful about potential team performance and/or team problems. 
Comments:  The absolute values of the discrepancies probably meant little to the 
users at first.  However, after experimenting with the TCT3, e.g. entering differing 
team member nationalities and selecting differing team types, the users appeared to 
have a feel for the relationships between the discrepancies and the associated 
messages (which were generated by the tool).  
In the above assumptions the words ‘adequate’ and ‘adequately’ appeared several times.  
These should not be confused with accurate/accuracy.  Given the potentially large cultural 
and personality variations between individuals, any team culture tool can at best only offer 
generalised information about potential team characteristics, the effects of which can be 
                                            
57 In particular, with regard to masculinity and cultural diversity. 
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mollified or encouraged by training, appropriate management and leadership, or by other 
steps.  Many internationally-experienced different-culture or multicultural teams would not be 
represented accurately (in cultural terms) by any general culture tool. 
8.7 Summary of the third model and team culture tool 
A dimensionally-based approach (as opposed to a factor-weighting or taxonomic approach) 
to team mission profiling was implemented in the third model and team culture tool (TCT3).  
The dimension-based approach to missions had three advantages compared to the TCT2: 
• Ease of use:  The mission profiler was much easier and quicker to use, as it only 
required the user to select a location in mission space, guided by pre-existing 
exemplars.  However it needed more, and more appropriate exemplars, with more 
associated explanation, to be an effective general user tool. 
• Reduced cultural bias on the part of the user:  Users no longer selected factors 
that were subject to cultural bias (e.g. management and communication styles); 
however, the approach may have increased the risks associated with tool designer 
cultural bias (i.e. the author’s western biases). 
• Direct associations between mission context and cultural traits:  This avoids 
issues associated with tasks and behaviours. 
The dimension-based approach to missions had two disadvantages compared to the TCT2:  
• Limited range of teams/missions:  The mission profiler only covered a limited 
range of teams – if the mission did not lie within one of the two environments 
(design/project teams or organised action teams) then it could not be culturally 
assessed. 
• Tool inflexibility in a changing world:  The mission   desirable culture 
transformation was fixed – i.e. team members of particular cultural backgrounds were 
and would remain discrepant to a particular degree, depending on the mission.  
However, in the ‘real world’, changing systems, in particular the development of 
intelligent ‘automation-as-a-crew-member’ systems could obviate, or at least reduce, 
cultural issues.  As long as the tool is only used as a rough guide to potential 
culturally-related problems, this should not be a major issue. 
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It proved impracticable to implement a single comprehensive multidimensional system, as 
the dimensions required by different teams varied to such a degree that a comprehensive 
system would have been effectively unusable; also additional dimensions were required to 
assist the user to place the team58.  It would be worth investigating a ‘dimension-hiding’ 
approach using a sophisticated programming environment at a later stage (a topic for future 
work).  
Two dimension-based team types – design/project teams and organised action teams (or 
swift-start action teams) were successfully validated and user-evaluated. These were the key 
teams of interest to the stakeholders identified in this thesis. 
The TCT3 could be regarded as an implementation of a theory about the culture-
performance relationship, based on the pragmatist principle (Charles Teddlie & Abbas 
Tashakkori 2009, Table 4.1, p.74), i.e.:  
 “Theories are viewed instrumentally (they are “true” to differing degrees based on 
how well they currently work; workability is judged especially on the criteria of 
predictability and applicability).”  
  
                                            
58 As an example, a dimension relating to team member specialisation was introduced for action team 
mission selection; this spread the team types out and enabled the user to differentiate his/her mission, 
and place it effectively.  In this case, specialisation did not play a significant part in deriving the 
desirable cultural profile. 
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9 Discussion and analysis 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and critically analyse the ‘research path’ for 
readers, then to highlight the key achievements, problems and limitations of the research 
against the objectives and, finally, to detail the contributions to knowledge, limitations, novel 
outputs and further research opportunities.  These will be summarised in the conclusions of 
the following and final chapter. 
The use of teams in industry and commerce has increased rapidly over the last several 
decades.  In the case of multinationals, they have increasingly utilised ‘other culture’ or 
‘different culture’59 teams and, in their home countries, multicultural teams.  Whereas much 
research has been carried out on team theory, particularly in the English-speaking world, this 
has tended to be applied to single culture, typically ‘Anglo’60 teams.  The research commu-
nity’s theoretical understanding of the performance of ’other-culture’ teams and multicultural 
teams is much less developed, and many of the earlier-developed team-related assumptions 
do not apply.  
The purposes of the research described in this thesis were to gain an improved knowledge of 
the relationships between team member cultural traits and team performance for various 
team/task situations, and to encapsulate this knowledge in models and tools that offered the 
potential for practicable application by managers and engineers.  
9.2 A brief overview of the research activities 
Chapter 2 provided a problem statement, identified the key stakeholders and described the 
research methodology; the need to follow the pragmatist approach was emphasised in order 
to ensure that a tool of potential practicable use emerged out of the work.  The chapter then 
provided an overview of the solution approach, including the key topic areas for investigation 
                                            
59 ‘Different culture’ as in the majority of subsidiaries of multinational companies being of different 
national cultures to the head office and to each other, resulting in implications for the effective place-
ment of various forms of research, development and manufacture.  
60 As stated earlier in this thesis, the term ‘Anglo’ refers to people of British descent, e.g. British, Irish, 
Canadian, Anglo-American, New Zealander, Australian, Anglo-South African. 
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in the literature review.  Chapter 3, the literature review, examined the effects of culture on 
the performance of teams, the availability of culture-based tools to predict the performance of 
teams, and evidence to support the validity of such tools.  Although much evidence of the 
effects of culture on team performance was found, it was inconsistent, in particular with 
regard to the cultural traits of masculinity and diversity.  Very few national culture based 
performance prediction tools were found, and those that were identified did not relate to team 
activities; however, several cultural frameworks were identified that could form the basis of 
such a tool. No suitable task/mission classification was identified in the literature (an essen-
tial part of any performance prediction tool), nor was a suitable diversity measure for the 
capture of cultural differences between team members. However, the review had earlier 
identified five culturally-moderated behaviour-related factors that could be used to describe 
tasks or missions. 
Based on the review of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 described the researcher’s choice of a cultural 
framework – Hofstede’s original four-dimensional framework, chosen due to the large 
number of validation and application studies associated with the framework – probably more 
than all other cultural frameworks combined.  However, there was also a requirement for an 
expression for cultural diversity, and for a classification of teams/tasks/missions that could be 
utilised for the exploration of cultural aspects of team performance; nothing suitable had 
been found in the literature.  As a result, the author was required to develop and evaluate an 
alternative measure of team cultural diversity based on member cultural separations in each 
of the four dimensions (see Sub-section 4.3.2).  The expression produced a separate 
measure of diversity for each cultural dimension; an average could be taken if an overall 
diversity figure were required.  The expression for cultural diversity along cultural dimension 
‘’x’ (CDteamx) was: 
Cdteamx = ∑ ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑖=1 �𝑁 × (𝑁 − 1)��  
Where:  Dix, Djx = Scores for cultural dimension ‘x’ for team members ‘i’ and ‘j’ 
                     N = Total number of team members (including member ‘i’) 
As stated earlier, no team or task/mission classification had been found in the literature that 
could be utilised for the purpose of distinguishing team performances on the basis of cultural 
traits.  Therefore, the author developed a task/mission classification that was based on the 
five key culturally-moderated factors that had been identified in the literature review (see 
Sub-sections 3.3.3 and 4.4.1).  As an alternative to the above task/mission factors, an ideal 
team/task/mission framework was identified to be a continuous multidimensional space 
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(rather than a taxonomy), but it was not clear as to the nature of the minimum set of culture-
sensitive dimensions.  Three research questions relating to masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance and cultural diversity were also posed in Chapter 4; these cultural dimensions and 
diversity measures were relatively under-researched compared to those of power distance 
and individualism, and the available evidence of their effects had tended to be contradictory; 
it was important to include them in the culture models and tools, therefore an improved 
understanding of their effects on team performance was needed. 
Chapter 5 described the data collection and analysis activities.  These included the collection 
of qualitative anecdotal and questionnaire-based data to provide validation (or otherwise) for 
some of the assumptions behind the proposed models and tools and the completion of a 
range of pilot studies into the performances of ‘other-culture’ and multicultural teams.  Based 
on the analysis of all the collected data (both qualitative and quantitative), several novel 
outputs were produced in answering the three research questions posed in Chapter 3.  The 
analysis also enabled the elaboration of the relationships between cultural dimensions and 
performance factors, including the identification of optimum ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture scores; 
further details of these novel outputs are provided in Section 9.7.  
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 described the three culture models and team culture tools developed as 
a key part of the author’s research.  All models were based on the concept of profiling the 
team culture to provide estimates of team average culture scores and cultural diversity 
scores for each cultural dimension (see Table 4-7, and Figure 7-3 for example cultural 
profiles), but each model utilised a different approach to the generation and application of a 
team/task/mission profile.  The culture model described in Chapter 6 (TCT1) aimed to derive 
a direct culture-based measure of team efficiency (expressed as a percentage).  However, 
the complex, interrelated calculations were difficult to justify on a theoretical basis; also, the 
model was not flexible enough to cover an adequate range of teams, nor was it discrimin-
ating enough to distinguish between different levels of innovation. 
The culture model described in Chapter 7 (TCT2) utilised a more sophisticated version of the 
team cultural profiler that had been utilised in Chapter 6; this enabled bicultural and 
culturally-unique team members to be entered into the profile.  However, the model adopted 
a very different approach to the evaluation of the effects of team culture on team 
performance.  A task/mission was profiled by applying weights to the standard set of five 
task/mission factors and their sub-factors that had been identified in Chapter 3 and 
elaborated in Chapter 4 (see Section 7.4.2 and Figure 7-4); these user-entered weights 
indicated which culturally moderated behaviours and capabilities where important and which 
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were not.  Each sub-factor in the task/mission profile was associated with a set of desirable 
culture dimension scores; by determining the differences between actual team dimension 
scores and desirable scores, and factoring these by both the sub-factor and factor 
weightings, a set of cultural discrepancy scores was obtained.  This set of discrepancies 
formed the basis of the assessment of the team’s fit to the task/mission.   Whereas the team 
culture profiler was easy to use, the task profiler was difficult and unclear for those who had 
not worked on the model and, as a result, had low face validity amongst users.  Also several 
users commented on the efficacy of utilising task or behavioural factors which, some 
considered, were probably context-dependent anyway (this is discussed later). 
Taking into account the difficulties encountered when using the second tool and user 
concerns about the use of behaviours or behaviourally-related tasks, the culture model 
described in Chapter 8 (TCT3) utilised a new dimension-based mission context profiler (as 
suggested in Chapter 4); users merely placed their mission on a two-dimensional grid that 
included exemplars to aid with the placement process. The TCT3 continued to utilise the 
same culture profiler as that of the TCT2.  The validations of the TCT3 demonstrated positive 
discrepancy/accident relationship for organised action team accident rates, and negative 
discrepancy/project performance relationship for project team performances, i.e. both 
relationships were confirmatory of the tool’s prediction capabilities.  Users found this tool to 
be easy to use, and the underlying model to be logical and understandable (see Section 
8.5.2 and Table 8-3 for details).  
9.3 A critical analysis of the research 
Several factors imposed constraints on the research, presented issues, raised requirements 
for additional work due to the absence of research results, suitable tools or representations, 
or reduced the effectiveness of the research or accuracy of the tools that were developed 
during the research.  These are discussed further in this section. 
9.3.1 The research/creativity/invention/innovation/improvement 
conundrum 
The creation and application of new knowledge is a key part of the work of teams associated 
with the design and development of sociotechnical systems.  The lack of a suitable creativity 
classification methodology in the literature was a major problem – the researchers carrying 
out culture/creativity studies could not place their studies accurately, and their co-
researchers could not place their results accurately in the context of other work.  Basic 
research, invention, innovation and improvement were significantly different activities that 
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appeared (from the literature) to be performed optimally in different cultures.  Therefore, a 
failure to associate the performance results of a study with an appropriate form of creativity 
would result in a similar failure to connect particular cultural traits with that form of creativity. 
As an indication of the critical nature of this creativity conundrum, there are now problems 
with the utilisation in many studies of patents (pending or granted) as measures of creative or 
innovatory output.  An increasing proportion of patents have recently been sought (and 
granted) for designs or functions that, in themselves, were not the products of creativity or 
innovation but were ‘spoilers’ designed to prevent rivals from utilising intuitive or simple 
actions on new technology devices (e.g. smart phones).  Such trivial patents have started to 
distort the conclusions of studies that have used patents as output measures of team or 
country performance.  Evidence has emerged from recent patent-based studies that low 
individualism appeared to be positively associated with creativity rather than improvement – 
a reversal of the results of earlier studies.  Although it is highly likely that Eastern Asian 
countries have been significantly improving their innovation performances, the recent 
changes (which are associated with very large increases in the number of Eastern Asian 
patents) have happened very suddenly. 
The author of this thesis has proposed a three dimensional framework, for the placement of 
creativity/innovation activities.  Such a framework would be designed specifically to enable 
the placement of creativity-linked activities, for the purpose of being able adjudge the nature 
of any project61 (note that projects may migrate over time in certain directions within this 
space). 
 
                                            
61 Any classification system must have a purpose, which effectively defines it.  In this case, the 
purpose is specifically to place creativity-related activities in relation to each other.  If it were a 
classification intended to assist with the flow of steps through to completion of creativity-related 
activities, it would be substantially different. 
Placing projects in 
a 3-D creativity-
innovation space
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Such a framework could enable a considerable improvement in the classification of creativity-
related activities, leading to a better understanding of the cultural aspects of creativity, and 
an improved allocation of projects around the World.  Note that the vertical axis reflects an 
Eastern view of associating creativity with the search for, or a revealing of, a truth that is 
temporarily hidden from view; the successful collaborations of 113 nationalities of scientists 
and engineers at CERN implied that the search for truth (as in fundamental research) was a 
task that all nations could excel at.  Recent history would suggest that the British have been 
more effective at creativity/lateral-thinking/invention than adaptation-to-markets/innovation, 
whereas the Japanese have perhaps been the opposite. 
To summarise:  The lack of an adequate classification that covered the various forms of 
creativity-related activities has resulted in reduced accuracy of the creativity-linked aspects of 
this thesis, in particular, the prediction reliability of the sociotechnical project team aspect of 
the TCT2 and TCT3 team culture tools was reduced. 
9.3.2 The representational accuracy of Hofstede’s and others’ cultural 
frameworks 
Selection of Hofstede’s framework: As stated earlier, Hofstede’s cultural framework was 
selected as the basis for culture measurement because of the large number of evaluations of 
it over the previous two decades, and the large number of studies that had used the 
framework – more than all other quantitative frameworks combined.  When the author’s PhD 
studies began, a wide range of national scores was available for only four of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions – power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.  
A fifth dimension, long term orientation was available, but with only twenty-eight or so 
national scores; in addition, there were criticisms of the validity of this dimension.  A revised 
fifth dimension (LTO-WVS) and a sixth dimension, indulgence vs. restraint (IVR), were 
identified and published in 2010, eighteen months after the author’s PhD research had 
started.  Although many national scores have now been determined for the latter two 
dimensions, these scores became available too late for incorporation in the work described in 
this thesis; note also that the author could not locate any quantitative cultural studies that had 
utilised these two additional dimensions62.  See Appendix 10 for a brief discussion of the fifth 
and sixth dimensions of Hofstede’s framework. 
Limitations of any dimensional framework: As elaborated in Section 4.2, a small number 
of quantitative cultural dimensions cannot explain every cultural difference between groups 
                                            
62 In commenting on the lack of studies here, I am referring to the later version of LTO (LTO-WVS) and 
IVR, not to the earlier version of LTO, for which a limited number of studies were located. 
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or nations, and Hofstede’s framework is no different to others in this respect; Subsection 
4.2.2 provides some surprising examples of cultural bedfellows and strangers.   
Extension of the Hofstede framework: There was an obvious issue, commented on in 
Subsection 5.6.1, about the incremental extension of cultural frameworks – two further 
dimensions had been added to Hofstede’s framework.  New dimensions cannot realistically 
be ‘tacked on’ to existing frameworks without reducing the independence between 
dimensions.  Ideally, the introduction of the two new dimensions would have resulted in a re-
examination of all the original and new factors/questions, and an optimal reassignment of all 
of them into potentially new dimensions.  
Limited meanings of cultural dimension scores:  Hofstede’s cultural dimension scores 
were normalised so that the range between the lowest and highest scoring countries in each 
dimension was 0 to 100 (this changed with the addition of new countries).  How low was low 
power distance, how high was high? It was difficult to utilise these scores to produce default 
values for the ‘high’ and ‘low’ values claimed in the studies of the literature, as the scores 
had little intrinsic meaning. 
The ecological fallacy:  Hofstede repeatedly reminded readers that his cultural framework 
applied only at the level of social systems, and that users of his framework should avoid 
falling into the ecological fallacy trap, i.e. by making inferences about individuals based on 
his data.   However, as stated in Section 4.2 of this thesis, a key aspect of the research 
described in this thesis related to the prediction of the mismatch between the cultures of 
operators of sociotechnical systems and the cultural requirements of those sociotechnical 
systems. In many cases, the only knowledge available about operators was their likely 
nationalities and (perhaps) their educational levels; it was therefore necessary to work with 
the default national culture scores.  It would only be possible to determine, on the basis of 
actual culture tool performance, whether these default aggregate national scores provided a 
useful basis for predicting performance problems.  One might reasonably expect that taking 
account of national culture when designing systems would produce a more culture-friendly 
product or system than not taking account of national culture.   
The author of this thesis suggested, in Section 4.2.2, that whereas individuals within a culture 
might vary significantly in terms of their own preferences, these individuals would be likely to 
vary far less in terms of their expectations of the behaviour of others, and in their actual 
behaviours in social situations within their own cultures.  This lower variance in behaviour 
was likely because cultures imposed a behavioural straitjacket that was particularly strong in 
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low-individualism, high-power distance or high-uncertainty avoiding cultures, where non-
conformance was heavily discouraged.  This view appeared to be supported by the 
anecdotal evidence collected by the author (see Section 5.2 for a summary). No doubt, the 
use of Hofstede’s default country scores for members of small teams (e.g. two or three 
member crews) could introduce errors, but there was no alternative but to use the default 
cultural scores.  
An alternative to Hofstede’s framework:  Hofstede’s cultural framework was probably the 
only one with a sufficient number of associated studies; therefore it was the only feasible 
choice to enable the route that was taken in this PhD.  An alternative approach would have 
been to eschew cultural frameworks.  Instead, it may have been feasible, firstly, to access 
raw (or semi-processed) data on human populations, for example via the World Value 
Survey, in order to build culture-related constructs.  Secondly it would have been feasible to 
access raw data on innovation, industrial outputs, accident rates and other statistics, for 
example via The Global Innovation Index, World Intellectual Property Organization, 
European Patent Office, US Patent & Trademark Office, Airsafe.com and World Health 
Organization.  These would have allowed the building of culture models based on large 
databases.  It would have required considerable statistical analysis, and would probably have 
been a high risk strategy for a PhD study. 
To summarise:  It was unlikely that there would have been sufficient research study results 
available with any other framework but Hofstede’s to enable the evidence-based assessment 
of culture-performance relationships and the consequent building of the culture tools 
described in this thesis.  However, the above points, taken together, imply that the default 
culture scores, as used in the work of this thesis, were less accurate than would be 
desirable.  An alternative, rather different approach would have been to use large information 
sets such as that of the World Value Survey (WVS) to build cultural constructs, innovation 
models, accident models, etc., and to produce predictive tools based on these. 
9.3.3 The choice of ‘cultural profile discrepancies’ as the basis for 
prediction of team performances 
Since the 1950s, a very large body of research has been carried out into team performance, 
resulting in the identification of many performance-affecting factors and the development of 
many frameworks, models and theories, for example Tuckman’s stages model (Tuckman & 
Jensen, 1977), Tubbs’ systems model (Tubbs, 1995), Belbin’s team role theory (R M Belbin, 
1993) and the balanced team generating model (van de Water, van de Water, & Bukman, 
2007).  It was impossible, within the constraints of a PhD, to incorporate, adapt and evaluate 
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these and other team models as part of a larger model and, in any case, such models are not 
culture-free.  
After evaluating the first team culture model and tool, it became clear that a practicable team 
culture tool should not attempt directly to forecast overall team performance because this 
performance depended on too many non-cultural factors, including those modelled by the 
above-listed frameworks.  Instead, following analysis of the first culture tool, the TCT1, it was 
decided that the team cultural tool should determine the gaps or discrepancies between the 
actual team cultural profile and an ‘ideal’ or ‘desirable’ cultural profile that was generated by 
the tool; these discrepancies could form the basis for forecasting the likely effects of the 
team’s cultural traits on performance. 
To summarise:  The choice of some of form of discrepancy between actual and desirable 
team cultural profile appeared to have been the only practicable option, given our current 
limited understandings of culture. 
9.3.4 Task classifications 
From an external perspective (e.g. the viewpoint of the customer, the enterprise or the 
department), the key team performance measures typically related to the effectiveness or 
safety and/or timeliness with which the team carried out its tasks or missions.  It was there-
fore considered necessary, when defining a team, to consider the key tasks that it had to 
perform successfully and the behaviours that were required; this appeared to necessitate the 
adoption of some form of task/behaviour classification scheme.  The literature review (Sub-
section 3.4.4) revealed that there were no team task classification systems that could be 
adapted to provide a culture-sensitive team task scheme.  It also revealed that a taxonomic 
approach was likely to be ineffective, as it would introduce both complexity and inaccuracy 
(Hollenbeck et al., 2012).  As stated earlier, five task factors were identified and their sub-
task/behavioural factors were also identified; each of these behavioural sub-factors had an 
optimum or ideal set of culture scores associated with it, based on the literature and the 
author’s pilot studies.  The first team culture tool (TCT1) task representation was based on 
three of these factors, the second team culture tool (TCT2) task/mission representation was 
based on all five of these factors and their sub-tasks/behaviours (see Section 4.4.1 for 
details). 
Evaluations of the five-factor/behavioural sub-factor approach utilised in the TCT2 produced 
results that were in line with the literature and with the author’s expectations.  However, two 
users who evaluated the TCT2 had concerns about the direct associations between sub-
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factor behavioural requirements and cultural traits, as they felt that these links were 
conditional on situations.  These concerns are discussed further in the next subsection.   
9.3.5 Implications of the critical analysis for the validity of the initial 
assumptions 
The initial assumptions (stated originally in Chapter 1) are listed below.  Some comments are 
made as to the individual assumptions.  However, these assumptions are effectively inter-
linked, and it is the performance of the overall tool that reveals the validity (or otherwise) of 
the set of assumptions; therefore, a separate discussion of the overall performance is 
presented at the end. 
The cultural properties (i.e. ‘cultural profiles’) of teams could be usefully modelled63 by 
quantifying team member cultural values along a limited number of ‘cultural 
dimensions’: 
Based on the analysis of Subsection 9.3.2, the framework is almost certainly less accurate 
than was originally thought.  However, it is probably the way in which the researcher applies 
the framework that is more important than its accuracy, Therefore this assumption largely 
held true. 
The tasks that teams performed (i.e. their task profiles) could be modelled in terms of 
behavioural factors that were directly affected by team culture: 
As stated earlier, a five-factor/behavioural sub-factor generic representation of mission tasks 
was produced, the sub-factors of which were clearly identified in the literature as being 
affected by cultural traits, therefore this assumption largely held true. 
Relationships between culture dimension scores and the performance of task 
behavioural factors could be established: 
Based on the literature and on the results of author’s own studies, ‘optimum’ cultural 
dimension scores were identified and associated with behavioural factors.  This assumption 
effectively held true. 
Models that incorporated team cultural profiles and task/behavioural profiles could be 
used to predict the effect of team culture on team performance:  
                                            
63 In this context, ‘usefully modelled’ implies that the cultural profiles capture some significant 
differences between teams that influence relative team performance. 
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The second team culture tool incorporated the team cultural profile and task/behavioural 
profile, and the results of applying these to team and their tasks were appeared encouraging 
– increasing discrepancies were generally indicative of decreasingly effective performance.  
However, comments from and discussions with former project team managers who had 
evaluated the second tool, the TCT, revealed an issue relating to the initiating – or not – of 
culturally-modified behaviours by contextual cues.  Following these discussions, the author 
looked at the literature in this area.  It was realised that the actual triggering of culturally-
modified behaviours cannot be assumed – it depends on the contextual cues, and degree of 
prior priming.  This implies that the previously assumed culture  behaviour relationships are 
not as rigid (or reliable) as has been thought.  The relationships are still there, but cannot be 
assumed to cause the expected behaviour in all circumstances. 
Unfortunately, it was also clear from the literature that researchers’ understandings of the 
effects of contextual cues for culture-related behaviour were concentrated on the collectivism 
– individualism dimension.  A decision was therefore made to replace the task/behavioural 
factors with direct associations between cultural traits and key mission contexts.  Relation-
ships were established for two major team/task/mission types – organised action teams, and 
a limited range of project teams.  It was not possible to disentangle the many contextual cues 
that might pay a part, as our research-based understanding is not adequate. 
Although the second tool, based on these assumptions, demonstrated reasonable predictive 
power in terms of showing associations between cultural discrepancies and reduced 
performance or safety, the basic assumption of a direct link between culture and behaviour 
was not strictly true. 
To summarise:  The original fourth assumption of a direct link between cultural traits and 
behaviours was an oversimplification, and would lead to inaccuracy under some, perhaps 
many, circumstances. 
9.4 What could have been done differently with hindsight? 
The author underestimated several aspects of the research and, with hindsight, could have 
achieved more.  Problem areas included:  
Lack of access to published study data:  Although it initially appeared that a significant 
amount of quantitative data was available in published form, few studies were directly 
comparable to each other due to the differing combinations of input and output variables, 
correction factors, etc.; also, in most cases, the datasets used by other authors were not 
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available.  The author contacted several researchers with a view to obtaining the raw data 
that would enable comparative analysis, without success.  This is, perhaps, understandable, 
as the author spent many months collecting, processing and analysing data, and would 
probably be less than happy to hand that data over to a stranger unless there was an option 
of collaborative work. 
With hindsight, the author would spent more time at an early stage familiarising himself with 
the key international data sources, e.g. United Nations (UNSD/UNdata), European Union 
(Eurostat), World Values Survey (WVS) World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
United States Patent  and Trademark Office (USPTY), and the European Patent Office 
(EPO).  The WVS is the only source (as far as this author is aware) of international 
comprehensive, timeline data on attitudes.  A better understanding of the above (and other 
similar) data sources would have enabled the author to develop a wider range of statistical 
studies of his own, although this work would have been very time-consuming.  The author did 
access and utilise some international data sources, for example air accident databases. 
Team/task/mission classifications:  The lack of a suitable classification was a major 
delaying factor in the research.  With hindsight, the author would have spent more time 
developing and analysing a multidimensional team/task/mission representation.   The work 
on this was started relatively late in the PhD, partially driven by issues that arose with the 
classification approach that had been initially adopted. 
Cognitive neuroscience aspects of culture:  The author has, for many years, been 
interested in the cognitive neuroscience of affect, the associated behaviour, and (more 
recently) the culturally-shaped modifications to that behaviour.  He spent a significant part of 
the early phase of the PhD studying this area; in particular, the work of Jaak Panksepp and 
Peter Richerson appeared to offer a basis for new theories of affect and culture.  With 
hindsight, the author recognises that this, though fascinating, was a step too far.  The time 
should have been devoted to more accessible culture-related work. 
9.5 Meeting the research aims and objectives 
The original aims of the research were to develop an improved understanding of the factors 
(in particular cultural factors) that influenced the effectiveness of teams, and to create a 
methodology and toolset for the evaluation of project teams and sociotechnical system 
operators and crews.  The associated objectives are listed below, with brief descriptions of 
the associated achievements:  
 219 
 
• To identify the cultural dimensions which contribute most to variances in team 
attitudes, behaviours and performances:  This was achieved for a limited range of 
team types, including project teams involved in creative and innovatory work (e.g. 
sociotechnical system design), sociotechnical system operators and crew.  However, 
due to the extreme variance in the results from published research studies, the 
effects of the cultural dimension ‘masculinity’, and the effects of cultural diversity on 
team performance were less clear than those of the others (power distance, 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance). 
The author considers that he has only partially met this objective as the highly 
variability for masculinity (in particular) in the published study results has limited the 
accuracy of the work 
• To identify a task classification relevant to culturally-moderated team 
performance:  This proved difficult, as no team/task classification found in the 
literature was either broad enough or could reasonably be linked to culturally-modified 
behaviours.  The author developed a five factor team/task/mission classification 
(based on the literature, see Sub-sections 3.3.3 and 4.4.1); although there were 
minor user difficulties and face validity issues, these could have been tackled. Issues 
associated with the link between culture, contextual cueing and behaviour reduced 
the potential reliability of the second model; therefore, a dimension-based mission 
representation was introduced in the third model. 
The author considers that he has partially achieved this objective. 
• To build a model that incorporates the above factors for the prediction of the 
effects of culture on team performance when tackling specified types of task:  
Two detailed culture/mission models and their associated tools were developed 
based on results from the literature and the author’s pilot studies (see Figures 5-1 
and 5-2); one of these models covered organised action teams (including socio-tech-
nical system operators and crews), the other covered project teams carrying out 
various levels of innovation (including socio-technical system design & build projects). 
The author considers that he has achieved this objective, subject to the limitations 
associated with cultural contexts. 
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• To encapsulate the above model(s) in a methodology and tool in order to:  
o Facilitate the selection of successful teams in given situations. 
o Enable the prediction of the effects of culture on team performance, and 
likely success or failure, of existing or proposed teams. 
The first team culture tool attempted directly to predict team performance; however, 
this was not considered to be based on a viable model. The second and third tools 
encapsulated the above models (in different forms) to enable the selection of team 
members and the prediction of potential performance reduction, based on cultural 
discrepancies between actual and desirable team culture.  It is considered that, for a 
restricted set of teams (engineering/management project teams and organised action 
teams) the tools have successfully encapsulated the models, and have been verified 
and validated to a limited extent. 
9.6 Contributions to knowledge and novel outputs  
The contributions to knowledge and novel outputs are listed and described below.  
1. An improved understanding of the relationships between uncertainty 
avoidance and cultural diversity (as measured by cultural dimension scores) 
and team performance factors (see Section 5.4).  
The above results were important, in particular the findings with regard to cultural 
diversity.  The confirmation of the effects of uncertainty avoidance on creative 
performance, and importantly in situations where ’sticking to the rules’ was important 
were valuable.  In the literature, cultural diversity was typically measured as a single 
crude value based on the number and proportion of different nationalities.  Such a 
measure was highly insensitive to actual cultural diversity between individuals of 
different cultures64, so it is hardly surprising that study results were contradictory.  
Research by the author indicates that it was specific forms of diversity (e.g. 
masculinity diversity or uncertainty avoidance diversity) that affected specific 
task/mission situations; the author’s statistical results also showed that overall cultural 
diversity (taken across the four original Hofstede dimensions) seldom appeared as 
                                            
64 A team consisting of one each of British, Irish, Canadian and Australian members would typically be 
considered maximally diverse, despite the extremely similar cultural dimension scores amongst its 
members; a team consisting of two Saudi Arabian and two Swedish members would be considered 
less diverse despite the almost completely opposite cultural dimension scores associated with the two 
nationalities. 
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statistically significant.  This result was important and, if other researchers were to 
adopt similarly sensitive measures, consistent results relating to the effects of cultural 
diversity might begin to emerge. 
2. Significantly greater detail in the relationships between cultural dimension 
scores and team performance factors:  These were encapsulated in the graphs of 
Figures 8-3 to 8-5. 
3. A theoretically-justifiable model of the effects of team culture on team 
performance:  The discrepancy-based approach sidestepped the potential issues 
caused by the many other factors associated with team performance.  It enabled the 
prediction of the effects of team culture of the team’s potential performance. 
4. A practicable user-orientated team culture tool:  The author did not come across 
any practicable, quantitative culture tools that provided a prediction capability for 
user-specified teams.  The third team culture tool (TCT3) enabled the creation of a 
culture profile for any real team (of up to sixteen members), simply by entering team 
members’ nationalities and education levels65, and enabled the creation of a 
desirable cultural profile based on the team’s task/mission by a single mouse click on 
a two-dimensional grid that includes exemplar teams.  
5. A recognition of the limits inherent in simple dimension-based quantitative 
cultural frameworks:  The issue of contextual cueing (or priming) of culturally-
moderated behaviours has yet to be recognised in mainstream research.  The author 
makes no claim to have advanced the understanding of contextual cues on culture-
moderated behaviours, but feels that the work described in this thesis has drawn 
attention to it. 
The author claimed, in Chapter 1, that the main contribution to knowledge would be a cultural 
theory of work team performance and a validated, quantitative methodology and tool that 
would enable the culturally-based assessment and improvement of teams.  It is considered 
that these contributions have largely been achieved, but see point 5, above. 
                                            
65 The user may instead enter dual cultural nationalities (for example to reflect a team member’s 
immigrant background), or may directly enter cultural values based on an individual’s answers to a 
questionnaire or based on knowledge of the person. 
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9.7 What questions can we now ask (that we couldn’t get an 
answer to before)?  
The team culture tool enabled engineer and management users to obtain answers to 
questions such as: 
• All other things being equal, would it be better from a cultural point of view to move 
our early-stage R&D to the subsidiary in the USA, or the subsidiary in Singapore? 
• Why? 
• Which countries do current flight deck layouts and automation systems pose the 
biggest cultural threats to? 
• Why? 
9.8 Meeting the requirements of the (primary) stakeholders 
The main stakeholders were identified, in Section 1.6, as:  
• Organisations that design and build complex sociotechnical systems:  
The third team culture tool can demonstrate the designers/builders cultural profiles 
and contrast these with the users’ (operators’, crews’) profiles – enabling 
designers/builders to recognise the differences between them and the potential 
resulting issues; it can also show the discrepancies between the demands of such 
systems and the culture-moderated abilities of the users. 
• Organisations that use complex sociotechnical systems:   
The tool can, via the discrepancies, indicate where crew resource management and 
other training programmes could potentially reduce cultural mismatches and thereby 
improve safety. 
• Organisations that assemble and utilise multicultural and other-cultural teams 
for problem solving and project work: 
The tool can demonstrate the effects of different team cultural profiles on proposed 
projects of varying levels of creativity and innovation.  This will enable them to decide 
where to place projects and who to select for particular teams. 
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• Education and training organisations:  
The tool will be useful as a general culture teaching aid, and for training students to 
deal with other cultures. 
Note:  The current tool is still very much a prototype and will need to have improved data 
collection and storage capabilities to be acceptable for regular use. 
9.9 Further work  
The work described in this thesis has produced a methodology and tool that enable users to 
explore to a limited degree the effects of team member cultural traits on team performance in 
certain environments, for certain team/task types.  There are several logical avenues for 
further development, both pragmatic and theoretical. 
On a pragmatic basis, extensions of the current work could include the following: 
1. Expansion (or substitution) of the cultural framework   
During the work described in this thesis, Hofstede’s cultural framework was expanded 
to include a sixth dimension, that of indulgence vs. restraint; in addition, culture 
scores for this and a modified form of the fifth dimension (long term orientation) are 
now available.  Despite the reservations expressed earlier about long term orien-
tation, it would be useful to explore the effects of these two additional dimensions on 
performance; this could be done initially by statistically reanalysing the existing data 
used in this thesis with the addition of the two extra cultural dimensions.  A search for 
relevant publications, conducted shortly before the completion of this thesis, revealed 
no studies utilising either of the two additional Hofstede cultural dimensions that 
would be relevant to the team types discussed in this thesis.  However, this could be 
considered to indicate a fertile new area of investigation. 
The more recent framework of Minkov (2011) may offer an interesting alternative. 
2. Developing the dimensional representation of tasks/missions   
Different sets of task/mission dimensions have been used for the two key team/task/-
mission types currently available in the third team culture tool.  It is desirable to 
develop a wider scope set of common dimensions, perhaps incorporating a 
dimension-hiding technique so that, for a given task/mission type, only dimensions 
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and exemplars of relevance to that type would be displayed. 
3. Incorporating a model of the contextual cueing of culturally-moderated 
behaviour   
This is a fascinating area, as there are several directions of development currently 
taking place.  It may be rewarding to explore the cueing (or suppression) of 
uncertainty-avoiding behaviours, as an understanding of this would be beneficial to 
safety and safety training. 
4. Developing an organisational culture tool 
Although there is currently little in the way of effective quantitative organisational 
culture models or tools, Hofstede discusses the power distance/uncertainty 
avoidance matrix as a basis for different national and company types.  A pragmatic 
approach based on a power distance/uncertainty avoidance matrix grid could be 
tested against industrial project data in order to assess the potential of the approach; 
industrial colleagues have commented several times on the problems caused by 
projects involving multiple organisations. 
On a more theoretical basis, new developments in tools and analytic techniques are offering 
the scope for the development of completely new understandings of culture, personality, 
affect and behaviour.  These developments provide opportunities to move from statistical 
correlation-based models to explanatory, causation-based models: 
1. Cognitive neuroscience theories of affect, culture and behaviour 
Cognitive neuroscience theories and tools have progressed to the stage where we 
are able to observe in real time, and understand, some of the culture-based emotion 
moderating pathways and feedback cycles in the brain.  The development of causal 
explanations of culture will help us to understand culture-based limitations, and also 
help us to develop training techniques to reduce or remove such limitations, or work 
environments that are more sympathetic to these limitations.  
2. Gene/culture interaction and culture-moderating pathways 
Clear evidence has already emerged of culture-based selection pressures on human 
genes, e.g. the S-allele of the serotonin transporter gene SLC6A4; this example hints 
at relationships with uncertainty avoidance and collectivism, and could lead to a 
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better understanding of the physical and neurochemical pathways through which 
uncertainty avoidance is played out.  It is likely that there are other culture/gene 
interactions that could reveal further details of the fundamental structures behind 
cultural and personality traits; in some cases, these interactions could reveal that 
certain traits are not fundamental, but are statistical ephemera. 
3. Epigenetics and the multigenerational expression of early cultural influences 
The discovery of epigenetic changes in gene expression that are triggered by 
environmental conditions has enabled the study of cultural influences on gene 
expression.  The yet-little-understood mechanisms that carry such changes across 
generations have major ramifications for culture-based changes. 
These are exciting times for culture researchers who are willing to look beyond the conven-
tional fields and methods of study. 
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10 Conclusions and recommendations for further work 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the findings of the previous chapter.  The statements below are 
intentionally brief, more detailed descriptions and supporting material can be found in the 
previous chapter. 
10.2 Meeting the aims and objectives of the research 
The original aims of the research were to develop an improved understanding of the factors 
(in particular cultural factors) that influenced the effectiveness of teams, and to create a 
methodology and toolset for the evaluation of project teams and sociotechnical system 
operators and crews.  The associated objectives are listed below, with brief descriptions of 
the associated achievements:  
• To identify the cultural dimensions which contribute most to variances in team 
attitudes, behaviours and performances:  
This was achieved for a range of team types.  
The author considers that he has partially met this objective 
• To identify a task classification relevant to culturally-moderated team 
performance:  
Team/task classifications presented in the literature were neither broad enough nor 
could they reasonably be linked to culturally-modified behaviours; therefore, the 
author developed a five factor team/task/mission classification and later a dimension-
based task/mission representation.  
The author considers that he has partially achieved this objective. 
• To build a model that incorporates the above factors for the prediction of the 
effects of culture on team performance when tackling specified types of task: 
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Two detailed culture/mission models were developed based on results from the 
literature and the author’s pilot studies.  These covered organised action teams and 
innovation-related project teams.  
The author considers that he has largely achieved this objective, subject to the 
limitations associated with cultural contexts. 
• To encapsulate the above model(s) in a methodology and tool in order to:  
o Facilitate the selection of successful teams in given situations. 
o Enable the prediction of the effects of culture on team performance, and 
likely success or failure, of existing or proposed teams. 
The second and third team culture tools encapsulated the above models (in different 
form) to enable the selection of team members and the prediction of potential 
performance reduction, rather than absolute performance.   
The author considers that he has largely achieved this objective, albeit with limited 
validation and verification of the tools. 
10.3 Summary of research findings and contribution to knowledge 
The author claimed, in Chapter 1, that the main contribution to knowledge would be a cultural 
theory of work team performance and a validated, quantitative methodology and tool that 
would enable the culturally-based assessment and improvement of teams.  The key research 
findings are considered to be: 
1. Further relationships between uncertainty avoidance (UAI), MAS-diversity and 
UAI diversity and various aspects of team performance.  
The results associated with cultural diversity were novel and of particular importance.  
They demonstrated that team performance was affected by cultural diversity 
constructs that were constrained to single cultural dimensions and were sensitive to 
cultural distance. 
2. Detailed relationships between cultural dimension scores and team 
performance factors were derived for two key types of task/mission. 
The two team/task/mission types - sociotechnical system project teams, and socio-
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technical system operators or crew (organised action teams), were the key types of 
concern to the research of this thesis. 
3. A theoretically-justifiable model of the effects of team culture on team 
performance 
No other equivalent model was found in the literature.  In particular, the incorporation 
of discrepancies (between actual team culture and desirable culture) sidestepped the 
issues that made team performance prediction extremely difficult. 
4. A practicable user-orientated team culture tool encapsulating the above model 
and relationships 
The author did not come across any other practicable, quantitative culture tool that 
provided a prediction capability for user-specified teams. 
The discrepancy-based model of point 3, above, and the team culture tool of point 4, 
combined to achieve the projected contribution to knowledge stated in Chapter 1. 
10.4 Further work 
New tools and discoveries are now transforming our understandings of the human mind, and 
culture is one of the areas that are likely to benefit from these advances.  There are several 
avenues for further development, some pragmatic and related to the models and tools 
described in this thesis; others are more theoretical and take advantage of new research in 
the fields of cognitive science, genetics and epigenetics. 
On a pragmatic basis, extensions of the current work could include the following: 
1. Expansion of the cultural framework used in the team culture tool to include all 
six of Hofstede’s dimensions 
This should improve the accuracy of the team culture tool; it would also assist in the 
re-evaluation of prior statistical results in the light of the new dimensions66 and in the 
search for new culture/performance relationships. 
2. Development of the dimensional representation of tasks/missions to achieve a 
                                            
66 In order to process various datasets, including a large football dataset, the author developed a 
range of spread sheet tools that automatically allocate and process national cultural dimension scores 
for the original four Hofstede dimensions.  These tools could be extended to process the current six 
dimensions. 
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single set of (say) four or five dimensions that covers all teams 
This would enable the tool to tackle almost any task/mission configuration. 
3. Development of an organisational culture tool that enables examination of the 
issues faced by multiple organisations working together on large projects 
The development of a practical, empirical, successful tool should encourage the 
development of a supporting theory in its wake.  Also, this what industry wants, now. 
On a more theoretical basis, tracking the work and adapting the results of cognitive neuro-
scientists and others could enable major contributions to the field of human culture: 
1. The development of explanations for culture-moderated attitudes and behaviours, 
based on emerging results from cognitive neuroscience and from simulation tools. 
2. The identification of further evidence of culture-based gene selection in order to 
understand better the physical and neurochemical pathways through which cultural 
and personality traits interact with behaviour. 
3. Determination of the effects of epigenetic changes on the reinforcement of cultural 
traits and the transmission of those traits across generations. 
The author considers the above work as providing an alternative causal-based model of 
culture, rather than the current correlation-based model, which explains little, in itself, about 
human behaviour. 
10.5 Exploitation of the tool 
The team culture tool is now part of a package of systems engineering tools that are utilised 
in soft systems courses at Loughborough University, and has been used by an M.Eng. 
project student for determining team cultural discrepancies at a major consultancy company. 
The author has been in discussion with other researchers with regard to combining ‘form’ 
data with culture data improve the prediction of sports results. 
The second and third versions of the Team Culture Tool will be made available to the 
Engineering System of Systems (ESoS) Group’s industrial collaborator partners, via the 
ESoS website.  
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Appendix 1: The literature review – additional information 
This appendix provides additional information associated with some aspects of the literature 
review the literature review methodology and also provides a more detailed view of the data 
collected from the review, and its analysis.  
APPENDIX 1A: Literature review resources and search engines 
The following literature search engines and thesauruses were accessed and evaluated, in 
part by targeting previously-identified research papers in relevant areas:  
• CiteSeerX:  This was a free-to-use search engine that accessed publically available 
websites, not publisher websites; although this reduced the number of articles 
accessed, it was claimed that it provided a higher proportion of open-access than 
other search engines.  However, when tested by the author, CiteSeerX was found to 
be exceedingly poor at retrieving previously-identified papers, and was therefore not 
frequently utilised. 
• EBSCO:  Initial test searches on the EBSCO database confirmed that it would only 
retrieve literature from a limited range of subject areas; highly relevant papers on 
culture were not retrieved if published in non-social science/anthropology journals.  
EBSCO was therefore not frequently utilised. 
• ERIC (Education Resources Information Center): Following detailed examination 
of the thesaurus of ERIC descriptors, several search tests were carried out on the 
ERIC database using various descriptors and non-descriptor search terms.  Although 
many descriptors within the ERIC thesaurus were related to culture, only two 
potentially-relevant papers (both on creativity) were returned by the ERIC database, 
due probably to its extreme focus on education-related research.  ERIC was therefore 
not frequently utilised. 
• Google/Google Scholar:  The Google/Google Scholar free-to-use search engine 
suffered from the opposite problem to EBSCO and ERIC, in that it retrieved 
information from all sources and in all forms (e.g. blogs, wikis, bulletin boards, 
discussion forums, newsletters, in addition to the standard academic sources).  As a 
result, searches required careful ‘tuning’ in order to limit the number of search results 
to a manageable level.  However, the ability to express the search logic more 
precisely in Google searches than was the case with the other sources, combined 
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with the extreme breadth of disciplines within which culture-related articles appeared, 
resulted in Google/Google Scholar being the most useful search engine, overall. 
The citation tracking feature of Google Scholar proved to be very fast and efficient for 
retrieving abstracts of citing articles for publications, although these were not always 
accurate.  In addition, Google Scholar’s ‘live’ author citation-tracking facility allowed 
the selection of key authors, following which, regular updates were sent via email as 
new citations of those authors’ works were discovered by Google Scholar.  In the 
case of Hofstede, this was somewhat overwhelming (new citations added daily to the 
100,000-plus existing citations list) but, for other authors – e.g. Salas, Helmreich, 
Hollenbeck, this was found to be a useful facility. 
• Mendeley:  Mendeley was a reference manager system with access to a large 
database of publication details.  The author used this system to maintain his 
collection of references and to organise the references in this thesis because the 
university-recommended reference manager proved unreliable.  Mendeley’s 
publication database was found to be incomplete - the author had to enter 
approximately 25% of references manually, rather than just to select them from the 
Mendeley database.   In addition, a higher proportion of publications retrieved by 
Mendeley’s search engine were irrelevant than was the case with most alternative 
sources.  However, it was convenient to conduct searches within Mendeley because 
relevant search results could be entered into the author’s list of references at the 
touch of a button; in addition, Mendeley offered good (full) document retrieval facilities 
via its links to Google Scholar and other sources. 
• PubMed:  PubMed was a free-to-use search engine that accesses the MEDLINE 
references and abstracts database.  When evaluated against a range of articles of 
relevance to author’s work, PubMed produced a surprisingly high return rate 
considering the apparent limited range of sources, and was therefore frequently 
utilised by the author. 
• PsycINFO:  The PsycINFO bibliographic database provided abstracts and citations 
covering scholarly literature in the fields of psychology, social sciences, behavioural 
sciences and health sciences.  The student was only able to access a limited subset 
of the PsycINFO database, as the university did not have a full subscription to the 
database.  
• ResearchGate:  ResearchGate was a networking site for scientists and academics.  
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It enabled members to enter details of their publications on the site, to upload copies 
of them and any associated statistical or other datasets, and to make them available 
to other ResearchGate members.  The site’s increasing membership has resulted in it 
becoming an increasingly useful source of publications.  Even in the case where a 
publication had not been uploaded to the site due to copyright restrictions, it could be 
requested via the website and would usually be made available to the requestor by 
the author within a few days.  The author of this thesis has found an increasing 
number of papers (rather than just citation details) on ResearchGate, usually via a 
Google search.  A further benefit of visiting ResearchGate to download a paper is the 
opportunity to rifle through the particular ResearchGate author’s other papers 
• Scopus:  The Scopus bibliographic database was claimed have access to 20,000 
journals and 5.5 million conference proceedings.  It provided abstracts and citations 
of peer-reviewed literature in the fields of science, technology, arts, humanities, social 
sciences and medicine.  However, it appeared to have less coverage of earlier 
articles than Web of Science. 
• SSCI (Social Science Citation Index):  This was accessed only as part of the Web of 
Science. 
• Web of Science:  The Web of Science was claimed to have access to 12,000 
journals and 150,000 conference proceedings.  It provided advanced search facilities 
for its ‘core’ collection, but only basic search facilities for the full collection. It also 
provided (via the Web of Knowledge citation mapping tool) a capability to produce 
one- or two-level forward and backward citation trees, presented in graphical form; 
these could be inspected in order to follow up promising authors and titles.  This 
graphical citation tree tool proved to be very effective and fast for discovering further 
research via citations.  In addition, the search facility was efficient.  
• Individual journal searches:  In the late stages of the literature review, the student 
wished to ascertain the thoroughness of the literature search process.  He located 
several journals with relevant coverage, for which all issues (or all modern issues) 
were available on-line.  These journals were then subjected to a 100% article-by-
article examination of abstracts (when in doubt, the whole paper was perused); the 
results were as follows:  
o International Journal of Cross Cultural Management (all issues, i.e. 2001 
to 2013): 31 papers of potential interest were identified, of which 26 had 
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previously been located and selected via forward or backward citations or 
keyword searches.  One of the ‘new’ five papers offered a sufficient 
contribution to be cited in the final literature review. 
o Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (all issues, i.e. 1970 to 2013):  77 
papers of potential interest were identified, of which 72 had previously been 
located via references, citations or keyword searches.  None of the ‘new’ five 
papers offered a sufficient contribution to be cited in the final literature review. 
Whereas it is impossible to guarantee complete coverage in a literature review, the 
above 100% check of journals in the field of national culture provided a degree of 
confidence that the keyword and citation based searches had been reasonably 
thorough.  Clearly, such an article-by-article search was not dependent on citation 
chasing ‘starting points’, nor was it dependent on the choice of appropriate search 
key words. 
Further comments on Google 
Over the period of this author’s research, Google Scholar (GS) has started to change the 
landscape of literature reviewing and citation following.  Earlier publications on the relative 
performance of citation sources tended to identify GS as less reliable and accurate, e.g. 
Jacso (2005) and Falagas et al. (2008), although others identified Google’s greater coverage 
of non-English language journals and conference proceedings in certain disciplines, e.g. 
Meho & Yang (2007).  
Following the launch of Google Scholar Metrics in 2012, Repiso-Caballero & Delgado-López-
Cózar (2013) carried out a comparative survey of GS Metrics, Web of Science (WoS) and 
Scopus in the field of communication studies.  They concluded that GS Metrics had twice the 
coverage of WoS and Scopus, less bias towards English language publications, and that its 
results were as reliable and valid as those of WoS and Scopus.  However, Giustini & Boulos’ 
review of retrieval performance in the field of social media in health led them to the 
conclusion that GS was less effective than the traditional citation databases in the case 
where the titles and authors of articles were already known (Giustini & Boulos, 2013), 
Google/GS’ comprehensive indexing of ‘everything’ on the Web has brought further benefits 
to researchers because it has enabled them to gain free access to authors’ personal copies67 
and research institutions’ pre-published copies of academic publications.  This free access 
                                            
67 For example, via the author’s ResearchGate account.  
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has been directly beneficial to researchers, but it has also been the catalyst for a rapid 
increase in open access publications. 
  
 258 
 
APPENDIX 1B: Keywords and their synonyms 
There were significant overlaps of keywords between the three literature review areas; 
however, the keyword/key phrase combinations tended to differ between the review areas. 
Although they were not strictly synonyms, it was important to interchange a range of similar 
terms and phrases when carrying out keyword searches; examples of these are provided 
below (inverted commas signify phrases): 
• “national culture”/”ethnic culture”/”regional culture” 
• tools/methodologies/instruments 
• “action teams”/”organized action teams”/crews/operators 
• multicultural/multinational 
Note that in the following list of keywords, inverted commas signify phrases, and forward 
slashes (‘/’) signify alternative phrases, e.g. “culture/cultural frameworks/tools” implies a total 
of four phrases – “culture frameworks”, “culture tools”, “cultural frameworks” and “cultural 
tools”,  Example keywords and phrases are listed below: 
Culture, cultural, “cultural traits”, “cultural diversity”, “culture tool(s)”, “culture/cultural 
frameworks/methodologies/methods/tools”, “cultural dimensions/factors/attributes”, 
“national culture”, multicultural, tool(s), team, crew(s), operator(s), “team culture”, “team 
type(s)”, teamwork, task(s), “task type(s)”, performance, “team/operator/crew 
performance”, effects, effectiveness, “team/operator/crew effectiveness”, “organized 
action teams”, “research teams”, aviation, aerospace, marine, shipping, refineries, 
power generators, creativity, invention, innovation, “product development”, “product 
improvement”, “process improvement”. 
Keywords and key phrases were assembled to direct the search, depending on whether the 
author was ‘painting a broad brush’ as in the early stages, or focusing on a limited area, as in 
the late stages of the literature review.  Examples, expressed in Boolean logic are presented 
below, but the actual form of a submitted search query would vary depending on the targeted 
database, as each database (or search engine) had its own representation of logic. 
Literature review area 1 – Example query when searching for publications on the effects of 
culture on team performance: 
• “national culture” AND  “team performance” AND prediction 
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• “national culture” AND “team performance” AND tool 
• culture AND (framework OR tool OR methodology) AND team AND performance 
NOT (“safety culture” OR “organizational culture”) 
Note the requirement (specified in the above search phrase) to exclude safety culture and 
organisational culture, for which there are many checklists and tools – these had been 
retrieved and examined in earlier searches. 
Literature review area 2 – Example query when searching for publications on frameworks, 
methodologies and tools for the (culture-based) prediction of team performance: 
• “national culture” AND tool AND performance 
• culture AND (framework OR tool OR methodology) AND team AND (performance 
OR assessment OR prediction) NOT (“safety culture” OR “organizational culture”) 
Queries such as the first example typically returned hundreds or thousands of unhelpful 
citations.  Unfortunately, none of the search engines appeared to be able to handle complex 
queries such as the second example above, and it was necessary to break it down into 
smaller, simpler queries. 
Literature review area 3 – Having identified specific frameworks methodologies and tools, 
their descriptions and/or authors were entered into search engines with additional terms such 
as validity: 
• Hofstede AND (validation OR evaluation OR criticism) 
• culture AND dimension AND (validation OR evaluation OR criticism) 
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APPENDIX 1C: Main literature sources cited in this thesis 
A very wide range of literature sources was accessed.  Due to the nature of the work, it was 
necessary to extend the range of sources beyond academic journals and conferences to 
include accident reports, government statistical websites, blogs, etc.  
The following tables contain an incomplete list of the peer-reviewed journals, learned society 
publications, professional journals and (occasional) magazines, totalling 109 different 
publications.  They do not include refereed conferences, formal accident reports, government 
papers, national and international data sources or private communications. 
Publication title No. of papers 
Academy of Management Executive 1 
Academy of Management Journal 4 
Academy of Management Perspectives 2 
Academy of Management Review 5 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 2 
Administrative Science Quarterly 3 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology  1 
Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive Engineering Research  1 
Aerosafety World  1 
African Journal of Business Management 1 
American Journal of Sociology 1 
American Psychologist 3 
American Sociological Review  1 
Annual Review of Psychology 1 
Applied Psychology: An International Review 2 
Armed Forces Society 1 
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 1 
(BMC) Health Services Research 1 
Communication Research 1 
Comparative Sociology 1 
Creativity Research Journal 1 
Criticism 1 
Cross Cultural Management 2 
Cross-Cultural Research: The Journal of Comparative Social Science  1 
Current Science 1 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1 
Educational Research and Reviews 1 
Engineering Project Organization Journal 1 
European Journal of Innovation Management 1 
European Journal of Operational Research 1 
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 1 
Flight International 1 
Group and Organizational Studies 1 
Harvard Business Review 1 
Human Factors 4 
Human Factors and Aerospace Safety 1 
Human Organization 1 
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Publication title No. of papers 
Human Relations 2 
Human Resource Development Review 1 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 2 
IEEE Transactions in Human Machine Systems 1 
International Business Review 1 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology 5 
International Journal of Conflict Management 1 
International Journal of Cross Cultural Management 5 
International Journal of Human Resource Management 1 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 4 
International Journal of Managing Projects in Business 1 
International Journal of Project Management 3 
International Journal of Value-Based Management 1 
International Marketing Review 3 
Journal of Air Transportation 2 
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research 1 
Journal of Applied Psychology 2 
Journal of Business Venturing 2 
Journal of College Student Development 1 
Journal of Consumer Marketing 1 
Journal of Creative Behavior 1 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 3 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 
Journal of Euromarketing 1 
Journal of Evolutionary Ergonomics 1 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1 
Journal of Global Information Management 1 
Journal of Global Marketing 1 
Journal of High Technology Management Research 1 
Journal of International Business Studies 4 
Journal of International Management 1 
Journal of Management 2 
Journal of Marketing 1 
Journal of Organizational Behavior 1 
Journal of Organizational Change Management 1 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1 
Journal of Product Innovation Management 1 
Journal of the Royal Society – Interface 1 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 1 
JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology 1 
Leadership and Organizational Development Journal 1 
Language 1 
Management and Organization Review 3 
Management International Review 3 
Management Science 1 
Marine Policy 1 
Marketing Letters 1 
Methods 1 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1 
Organizational Dynamics 2 
Organization Science 1 
Organization Studies 1 
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Publication title No. of papers 
Papers in Regional Science 1 
Patient Education and Counseling 1 
Personality and Individual Differences 1 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 1 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London – Series B: Biological 
Sciences 1 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 1 
Psychological Review 2 
Public Administration Review 1 
Public Productivity Review 1 
Research in Organizational Behavior 1 
Response 1 
Review of Public Personnel Administration 1 
Scandinavian Journal of Management 1 
Science Journal 1 
Small Group Research 2 
Social Geography 1 
Technovation 2 
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science 1 
Total Quality Management Business Excellence 1 
Vision – the Journal of Business Perspective 1 
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APPENDIX 1D Evidence of the effects of culture on external 
aspects of team performance (expansion of Subsection 3.3.1) 
Particular attention is paid to the two key areas of interest for this research thesis, i.e. 
complex sociotechnical system design, and sociotechnical system operation. 
A1D.1  Teams involved in creativity and innovation 
Complex, automated sociotechnical systems are the products, directly and indirectly, of 
various levels of research, invention and technical development.  As producers of sociotech-
nical systems have become increasingly multinational (e.g. via expansion, takeover or 
merger), they have gained access to a wider range of choices when placing research, 
development and manufacturing activities.  This subsection examines evidence about 
relationships between national cultural traits (or scores) and various levels of research and 
innovation performance.  
The term ‘creativity’ has had differing meanings in different cultures (Berthrong, 1998; Lubart, 
1999; Niu & Sternberg, 2002).  In many western cultures, creativity was considered to be 
associated with the creation of new knowledge, paradigms, novel systems, products or 
processes; in many eastern cultures, creativity was considered to be associated with the 
search for, or a revealing of, a truth that is temporarily hidden from view.  Even where a 
degree of common understanding was reached, there were likely to be cultural differences in 
emphasis, for example Morris & Leung (2010) claimed that there was evidence that 
westerners prioritised novelty over usefulness whereas easterners prioritised usefulness over 
novelty.  Simonton & Ting (2010) suggested a definition of creativity as the product of novelty 
x usefulness, i.e. that creativity only occurred where the result was both novel (or original) 
and useful.  However, the concept of innovation was already associated with usefulness, as 
it was the process of developing an idea or invention into a product or service that customers 
wanted; therefore Simonton & Ting’s definition merely added confusion.  The lack of a 
universal classification or agreement about the various forms of knowledge creation and 
application has made it difficult to accurately categorise differing forms and levels of creative 
output.  For example, the following capabilities or activities produced new knowledge and/or 
led to new products or services: Academic/fundamental/blue-skies research68, industrial 
research & development (R&D), creativity/creation, inventiveness, innovation, improvement, 
implementation.  Could we identify differing human capabilities associated with each of these 
                                            
68 In many ways, blue-skies research could be associated with the eastern view of creativity, i.e. the 
search for, or a revealing of, a truth that is temporarily hidden from view. The (western) creative 
aspects of fundamental research are perhaps associated with the development of tools to carry out 
the research, rather than with the research itself. 
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dimensions?  Simple subdivisions, e.g. of R&D activities into basic research, applied 
research, and development activities (as suggested by Pearce (1990) and others) were 
inadequate because they did not cover the full gamut of activities that led to new products 
and services. 
The author of this thesis did not have the resources to explore further the issues of research, 
creativity, inventiveness and innovation.  Therefore, the Western view of ‘creativity-as-
novelty’ (rather than creativity-as-usefulness’) was chosen, as this emphasis on ‘novelty’ 
helped to differentiate between creativity and innovation, each of which required different skill 
sets as suggested earlier. 
Education has played a major part in enabling the creativity and innovation potential of a 
population.  However, the primary purpose of education in high-individualism nations has 
been to ‘learn how to learn’, whereas the primary purpose in low-individualism (highly 
collectivist) nations has been to ‘learn how to do’ (Geert Hofstede, 1986); most nations could 
be placed somewhere on the continuum between the above two ‘educational extremes’.  
‘Learning how to learn’ encouraged the search for new ideas, i.e. western-type creativity and 
innovation, whereas ‘learning how to do’ encouraged the implementation of prior innovations 
and improvements in tangible products and services.  In support of this view, Herbig & 
Palumbo (1996) suggested that western cultures favoured breakthrough innovations, and 
eastern cultures fostered incremental innovations.  Kirton’s adaptation – innovation inventory 
of cognitive styles (Kirton, 1976) was informative, as its extremes appeared to describe some 
of the strengths of eastern and western approaches to innovation.  Kirton described an 
adapter as one who reduced problems via incremental improvements, utilised tried and 
tested means, was cautious, sensitive to people and maintained cooperation; he described 
an innovator as one who tried to do things differently, was undisciplined, created dissonance 
and shock, challenged rules and did not require consensus. 
Published studies on the effects of national culture on the generation and development of 
new ideas (by both academic and industrial teams) are examined in this subsection.  Such 
studies covered basic (or blue skies) research, applied research, product and process 
development and improvement.  Some studies, for example that of Mihaela, Ogrean, & 
Belascu (2011) grouped countries into regions prior to the examination of cultural effects; 
such studies have been omitted from the following examination because of the wide 
intraregional ranges in culture scores (in some cases much wider than those of the corres-
ponding interregional ranges.  Other studies, for example that of Vecchi & Brennan (2009) 
concentrated on the relationships between national culture and innovation-related inputs; 
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such studies have also been omitted. 
A1D.1.1 Research 
Barjak (2006) reported on a study of the effects of cultural and disciplinary diversity on the 
performance of academic research teams in the life sciences.  The outperforming teams had 
20-25% of foreign-educated members69; low cultural diversity teams and high cultural 
diversity teams (those containing 40-45%) performed less well, resulting in an inverted ’U’-
shaped performance curve.  
Following the above study, a larger study was carried out on a representative sample of life 
science teams, based on 468 usable questionnaire returns (Barjak & Robinson, 2008).  
Research performance was based on numbers of papers per researcher and average 
number of citations.  Research team diversity was measured separately for PhD students 
and post-docs, based on the Shannon diversity index applied to countries of origin; 
international collaboration was based on papers co-authored with researchers based in the 
USA, EU and other foreign countries.  Twelve regression models were produced that 
variously included inputs relating to knowledge pooling (from internal cultural diversity and/or 
external collaboration), characteristics of team leaders, team size, etc., and included 
measures of performance based on output quantity, output quality.  The results of Barjak & 
Robinson’s (2008) analysis indicated that the most successful academic life science 
research teams had a strong domestic base (with a minority of foreign team members), a 
moderate amount of collaboration with foreign research teams and a small proportion of 
research students.  They also found that small teams (optimum size seven members) 
produced the maximum number of publications per capita, and also the highest number of 
citations per paper.  The average cultural diversity of post-docs (based on Shannon’s 
diversity index) was 0.38; based therefore on the qualitative recommendations (limited 
cultural diversity within team), it would appear that academic research teams in the life 
sciences should have a Shannon’s diversity index of  somewhere below 0.38, in line with 
Barjak’s earlier findings. 
Kedia et al. (1992) carried out a study of eight hundred industrial and academic research 
units in four countries – Austria, Belgium, Finland and Sweden.  This revealed higher 
research productivity for high masculinity/low power distance countries than for low 
masculinity/low power distance countries, i.e. high masculinity appears to contribute to help 
researchers contribute to ideas initiation.  
                                            
69 Foreign-educated in the sense that the team member’s last degree was obtained outside the host 
country. 
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A1D.1.2 Industrial research & development 
Cozzi & Giordani (2011) carried out an analysis of the effects of ambiguity aversion on 
countries’ R&D performances; they utilised OECD and United Nations data sources to 
highlight a strong negative relationships between national uncertainty avoidance scores and 
research performance as exhibited by the level of R&D intensity and the proportion of 
researchers in each country.  They found that the negative correlation between uncertainty 
avoidance scores and research performance was stronger across European countries than 
across OECD or a wider range of countries.  Niebuhr (2010) carried out a regression 
analysis of innovation performance in the various German regions, the results of which 
suggested that diverse cultural backgrounds in the team or workforce could enhance R&D 
performance.  The maximum proportion of high-skilled workers (those that we would 
associate with R&D) in any region was 12.92 percent, the lowest was near-zero; even the 
highest figure (12.92%) would be considered low in terms of diversity within an R&D team.  
Because Niebuhr’s work was carried out at the regional, rather than team level, there are 
issues with its validity.  Also, when time lags were applied (to represent delayed outputs), the 
correlations between cultural diversity and R&D performance were significantly lower.  In 
addition, the measure of cultural diversity appeared to be based on the proportion of non-
German workers in each region; this is a poor measure of diversity. 
Jones & Davis (2000) produced a taxonomy of company (or subsidiary) R&D focus, with 
associated optimum cultural scores (all other things being equal) based on their analysis of 
studies:  
• Locally-supported support/adaption – low individualism, high power distance, high 
masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and long term orientation. 
• Locally-orientated R&D - medium/high individualism, low/medium power distance, 
low/medium masculinity, low/medium uncertainty avoidance and long term 
orientation. 
• Globally-orientated R&D – high individualism, low power distance, low masculinity, 
low uncertainty avoidance and long term orientation. 
Rinne et al. (2013) analysed the relationships between cultural dimension scores and two 
creativity indices, the Global Creativity Index (GCI) and the Design and Creativity Index 
(DCI).  They found a strong positive relationship between individualism and the two creativity 
indices, but no significant relationship between power distance, uncertainty avoidance and 
the creativity indices.  Willems ( 2007) investigated the relationships between national 
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culture, social capital and innovation (as measured in terms of patents registered in Europe 
(EPO) and the USA (USPTO); he found that individualism had the highest correlation 
(positive) with innovation, followed by power distance (negative), masculinity (positive) and 
uncertainty avoidance (negative).  
A1D.1.3 Innovation 
Herbig and Miller (1992) considered several levels of innovation, concluding that higher order 
innovation was best served by high individualist, low uncertainty-avoidance societies.  
Shane’s (1992) investigation of early stage per-capita inventiveness and innovation rates 
across 33 countries indicated that power distance (negative) and individualism (positive) had 
strong correlations with per-capita inventiveness and innovation. 
Bouncken & Winkler (2008) found that differences in power distance among team members 
were particularly damaging to the performance of bicultural global innovation teams.  
Rothwell & Wissema (1986) presented two models of the process of technical innovation and 
discussed the role that culture played in these models with particular reference to the 
innovation diffusion process.  They identified characteristics associated with low power 
distance, long term orientation and low uncertainty avoidance as promoting technical 
innovation.  Herbig & Dunphy (1998) found that national culture played a significant role in 
the adoption of innovative technologies, in particular if the adoption implied changes in 
behaviour; they cited several studies that identified high individualism, low power distance 
and low uncertainty avoidance scores as promoting technical innovation. 
Halkos & Tzeremes (2011), who studied the effects of national culture on innovation 
efficiency, found that masculinity was positively correlated with innovation up to a score of 
70-80.  The emphasis on relationships and agreement-seeking within a low-masculinity 
culture, rather than on externally-measured goals, was similar to that of low-individualism 
communities; such an emphasis could lead to reduced performance when faced with high 
creativity or blue-skies research goals.  The same authors later carried out analyses of the 
innovation efficiency and performance of 25 European countries (G. E. Halkos & Tzeremes, 
2013); these analyses revealed that high uncertainty avoidance had the greatest effect on 
innovation, followed by high power distance – in both cases, the effects were negative.  As 
part of a three-decade multi-level review of the application of Hofstede’s cultural framework, 
Taras, Kirkman & Steel (2010) found that uncertainty avoidance was strongly negatively 
related to innovation. 
Efrat (2014) examined the impacts of national culture on innovation in 35 countries for the 
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years 1998, 2004 and 2008; innovation output measures were based on patents, journal 
articles and high-technology exports (obtained from the World Bank database).  He found 
that power distance had little effect, high individualism contributed positively to publications 
but negatively to patents, uncertainty avoidance had a general negative effect, and that high 
masculinity contributed negatively to publications and positively to patents.  There were a 
number of issues with the results of Efrat’s study.  Firstly, the results were based on national, 
not team values; research teams often contain many foreign members, therefore the default 
national default values may not be accurate.  Secondly, journal articles tend to be produced 
by academic research teams, patents by industrial innovation teams, and high technology 
exports (the end of a long chain) often depend significantly on lower level process and 
product improvements; these three outputs represent significantly different levels of creativity 
or innovation, and should be distinguished from each other.  
A1D.1.4 Product development (initiation) 
Nakata & Sivakumar (1996) carried out a literature review in order to understand the relation-
ships between national culture and new product development.  They split the product 
development process into two stages, as suggested by Johne (1984), i.e. initiation (idea 
generation, screening, concept testing) and implementation (product development, test 
marketing, product launch).  Nakata & Sivakumar found that the best-performing national 
cultures at the initiation stage had high individualism, low power distance, low uncertainty 
avoidance and low masculinity scores (i.e. as in Nordic cultures); the low masculinity scores 
contrast with the findings of Kedia et al. and Halkos & Tzemeres.  They found that the best-
performing national cultures at the implementation stage had low individualism, but high 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity scores (e.g. Japan, Taiwan and 
Mexico).  
D’Iribarne et al. (1998, Ch.IV) reported on a joint venture between Renault of France (high 
power distance, high masculinity and high uncertainty avoidance) and Volvo of Sweden (low 
power distance, low masculinity and low uncertainty avoidance) for the development of a 
new car.  According to d’Iribarne, the hierarchically-organised French team members 
produced the most innovative designs and defended them aggressively; the democratically-
organised Swedish team members sought consensus to such a degree that they were limited 
in the range of ideas that they could even conceive.  The joint venture failed and was 
subsequently dissolved.  D’Iribarne highlighted the fact that the French, with their supposedly 
creativity-limiting high uncertainty avoidance, were able to out-innovate the Swedes.  Geert 
Hofstede referred to this case during a conversation with the author of this thesis at a 
Loughborough University workshop (Fellows, 2011), highlighting the Swedish high femininity 
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(low masculinity) score; he suggested that this had caused the need for consensus to 
overrule the purpose of the joint venture.  This low masculinity/inadequate product 
development result contradicts that of Nakata & Sivakumar (above). 
Rinne et al. (2012) utilised Hofstede’s cultural framework to investigate the effects of national 
culture on innovation in 66 countries, as measured by the 2008-2009 Global Innovation Index 
(INSEAD, 2009).  A multiple linear regression analysis highlighted that power distance was 
strongly negatively related to innovation performance, whereas individualism was strongly 
positively related; no statistically significant relationship with uncertainty avoidance was 
found.  The 2008-2009 Global Innovation Index measure of performance was based on five 
input measures (institutions, human capacity, uptake of infrastructure, market sophistication, 
and business sophistication) and two output measures (scientific outputs, and creative 
outputs & wellbeing).  
Kaasa and Vadi (2010) analysed the effects of culture on innovation in European countries, 
using patenting activity as a measure.  They found a strong negative relationship between 
national uncertainty avoidance scores and indicators of patenting intensity; however, the 
relationship did not appear to be linear.  In addition, high power distance and masculinity 
scores reduced innovation, but their effects could be counteracted to some extent by high 
individualism scores. 
Shane (1993) utilised Hofstede’s cultural framework to investigate the effects of national 
culture on the innovation rates of 33 countries over the period 1975 to 1980, using (this time) 
trademarks filed in the USA as a measure of the countries’ innovation rates.  He included two 
economic independent variables that are known to influence innovation rates – per capita 
income, and percentage of total value added accounted for by industries that typically 
generated large numbers of innovations.  A least squares multiple regression analysis 
highlighted uncertainty avoidance as the most important cultural variable (it was also more 
significant than either of the two economic control variables; a low uncertainty avoidance 
score promoted innovation.  High individualism and low power distance scores each also 
promoted innovation to a lesser extent.  Shane later examined the effects of culture on 
attitudes towards the role of innovation champions, finding, again, that a low uncertainty 
avoidance score was an indicator of high support (Shane, 1995).  Shane’s measures of 
innovation performance were very different from those used by Rinne et al. (see earlier), 
which might at least partially explain why the results of the two investigations, in terms of 
cultural influences, differed to so much. 
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A1D.1.5 Product and process implementation 
Herbig & Miller (1992) proposed that low-IDV, high PDI (collectivist) societies are pre-
eminent in lower order innovations, in particular those societies with high MAS.  Ambos & 
Schlegelmilch (2008) carried out a study of 139 R&D laboratories (located in 21 countries) 
and found that the optimum ‘cultural environment’ for capability-exploitation laboratories 
(those whose aim was to bring that technology to market) was high power distance, low 
individualism, high masculinity and high uncertainty avoidance. 
Nakata & Sivakumar’s (1996) literature review found that the best-performing national 
cultures at the implementation stage had low individualism, high power distance, high 
uncertainty avoidance and high masculinity scores (e.g. Japan, Taiwan and Mexico).  
Lin’s (2009) study examined major car manufacturers in fourteen countries in order to assess 
the impacts of national culture on their process management and technical innovation.  
However, from his description of technical innovation and its measurement, the study 
appears to relate primarily to automobile and process detailed development and 
implementation, rather than any form of novel innovation.  Lin found that high uncertainty 
avoidance and long term orientation positively influenced performance.   
Herbig and Jacobs (1998) described Japanese culture in detail and explained the strengths 
and weaknesses of Japanese research and development.  Japan excelled in improving 
process and product technology but, with the exception of a small number of scientists, did 
not produce radical innovations or extend basic knowledge.  This was reflected in technology 
transfers to Japan from the USA and Europe, which were almost four times greater than 
transfers from Japan.  High masculinity (and the resultant aggressive competitiveness) 
tended to be regarded as a hindrance to the performance of low/medium-creativity improve-
ment processes; however, in the case of Japan, the country’s history and its cultural 
combination of high power distance, low individualism, high uncertainty avoidance and high 
masculinity resulted in a fierce competitiveness at the company level, rather than at the 
individual level. 
A1D.1.6 Acceptance and promotion of new technologies 
Although this subsection does not specifically refer to project teams, such teams are typically 
involved in the adoption and implementation of new technologies.  
Hasan and Ditsa (1999) analysed attitudes to the take-up of new technologies across 
Australia, West Africa and the Middle East.  They found that West Africans were more 
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favourable to the adoption of information technology than were Middle Easterners, and 
considered that this was due to the much lower level of uncertainty avoidance in West Africa.  
Van Everdingen and Waarts (2003) carried out a large study on the effects of national culture 
on the adoption of enterprise resource planning software in ten European countries.  They 
concluded that high national scores for power distance, uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity negatively influenced the adoption of enterprise resource planning; individualism 
appeared to play a positive role in only the early adoption of enterprise resource planning 
software. 
Menzel et al. (2006) analysed the literature on the wider topic of entrepreneurship as the 
basis of support and technical knowledge required for radical innovation.  Based on their 
analysis, they proposed an ideal supportive culture, which included very low power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance scores, medium individualism and masculinity scores, and 
medium-to-high long-term orientation scores (the latter cultural dimension is not used in the 
research of this PhD). 
A1D.1.7 Complex projects involving significant political or social issues 
Almost every large, complex sociotechnical project was unique and, in addition to technology 
issues, many such projects had significant additional complexities imposed on them due to 
political or social issues (D. Hodgson & Cicmil, 2008).  These complexities could have been 
due to the involvement of multiple partners, for example in the negotiation of large 
international defence contracts involving commercial rivals and civil service organisations, or 
they could have been due to multiple customer stakeholders, or both.  Examples of such 
projects included new generation strike aircraft, aircraft carriers, nuclear power stations, high-
speed rail links, airports, bypasses and motorways.  However, many smaller projects also 
had significant cultural, personal and vested interests (often undisclosed), which could add to 
complexity, time delays and costs.  It was almost impossible to analyse such projects on a 
comparative, quantitative basis, as there was no equivalent of a ‘level playing field’ on which 
we could gauge their performances.  We could, however, examine qualitatively the key 
reasons why complex projects have often failed. 
A large proportion of complex technical and social projects failed to a greater or lesser 
degree – cost and time overruns were ‘the norm’; the 2012 UK Olympics project was (of 
course) delivered on time, but the costs had escalated by 200% over the original estimates.  
The Bull Survey (Spikes Cavell Research Company, 1998) revealed that the largest single 
cause of project failure was poor communications between the relevant parties on the 
project.  The UK government’s OGC best practice report entitled ‘Common Causes of Project 
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Failure’ (Office of Government Commerce, 2005) identified two of the eight major causes of 
failure in government-funded projects as lack of understanding/lack of contacts at senior 
levels, and lack of project team integration between clients and supplier team.  Anderson 
(2011) identified bad communications as the largest single root cause of project failure.  It 
appears from the above (and from many other references) that failures in communication and 
understanding, particularly across departmental and organisational boundaries, were the 
leading causes of failure in complex projects. 
Buckle & Thomas’ (2003) study of the Project Management Body of Knowledge, PMBOK, 
(PMI, 2000) revealed an embedded masculine set of values.  Masculine cultures tended be 
highly competitive assertive and aggressive (G H Hofstede 2001, Ch.6), and tended to apply 
impersonal problem-solving approaches (Daley & Naff, 1998) and decision-making styles 
(Baxter Magolda, 1992); contrastingly, feminine cultures tended to value relationships and 
seek consensus (G H Hofstede 2001, Ch.6).  However, project management typically 
attracted masculine-orientated individuals (Cartwright & Gale, 1995), even from within more 
feminine cultures.  Given the earlier-described primary causes for the high rates of project 
failure, it is probable that personnel with lower masculinity scores, perhaps applying 
alternative project management methods, e.g. the Scandinavian approach (Lichtenberg, 
1983), would perform more effectively in socially or politically complex projects. 
A1D.1.8 Conclusions – teams involved in creativity and innovation 
The results are summarised in Table 3-1 (of the main body of the report).  Note that this table 
attempts to cover a range of types of creativity, from blue-skies research (top of the table) to 
product implementation (at the bottom of the table).  As there are no ‘hard and fast’ 
definitions of what is meant by innovation, nor are all forms of product initiation likely to 
require the same levels of innovation, it is unsurprising that there are some contradictory 
results.  However, despite these contradictory results, there are some clear trends in terms of 
culture trait values vs. levels of creativity. 
From a synthesis and evaluation of the literature on creativity and innovation, taking into 
account the ‘majority vote’ from Table 3-1, it appeared that: 
• High creativity – research and early innovation (original thinking):  These 
benefited from high individualism, low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance (but 
this may not have had a large effect) and low-to-medium diversity (optimum of under 
30% non-nationals). 
The results with regard to masculinity were extremely inconsistent, with optimal 
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values varying from low to high; however, evaluations such as that of D’Iribane (and 
Hofstede’s supporting comments) suggested that low masculinity resulted in group-
think that prevented beneficial conflict and exploration of options.  Overall, a medium-
high masculinity (optimum score of approximately 70) appeared to be the optimum, 
avoiding both group-think and excessive conflict. 
• Medium creativity/innovation:  The results appeared to show benefit from medium/-
high individualism, low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance (again, this 
probably has only a limited effect); no results with regard to diversity.  Masculinity 
appeared to have little effect on performance. 
• Low creativity process and product improvement (implementation):  These 
appeared to benefit from low individualism, high power distance, high masculinity and 
high uncertainty avoidance.  No results were available for diversity, although it 
appeared unlikely that the wider breadth of knowledge and experience that diversity 
could bring would counteract for the loss in output due to reduced communication.  
Note that high masculinity could be detrimental if not counterbalanced by low 
individualism (see later comments on interaction between cultural traits). 
• Projects associated with complex social issues:  There was very little culture-
related literature associated with this area but, based on the many qualitative 
analyses of the high failure rates of large, complex projects, the greatest single cause 
of failure appeared to be communication and understanding.  It appeared likely that 
low masculinity project teams would perform significantly better in terms of communi-
cation, compromise-seeking and working together than high masculinity teams. 
Note that there appeared to be interactions between cultural traits, for example:  
• Low masculinity might counteract the positive effects of high-individualism/low-
uncertainty avoidance (willingness to disagree, to think differently) when in a situation 
that demanded creative thinking. 
• Low individualism might counteract the negative effects of high masculinity 
(aggressive competitiveness) when in the low-innovation stage of product 
implementation. 
These interactions could either overcome or confound (to some extent) the limitations or 
benefits of cultural traits, and add to the complexity of forecasting performance on the basis 
of culture. 
To summarise the above:  It appeared that, as the requirements placed on a team shifted 
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from original thinking, high creativity activities to low innovation, routine activities (e.g. minor 
product or process improvements), the optimum team cultural traits shifted from high 
individualism, low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance to low individualism (high 
collectivism), high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance.  Of the above three cultural 
dimensions, individualism appeared to have the strongest effects, followed by power 
distance, then uncertainty avoidance. 
With regard to masculinity, the picture was less clear than with the other cultural dimensions. 
Low masculinity appeared to impede the expression of original, novel ideas, and high 
masculinity appeared to benefit the performance of relatively routine team requirements.  
The picture was complicated further when considering projects that faced complex social 
issues, where qualitative evidence suggested that reduced masculinity enhanced the 
likelihood of success. 
 
Estimate of optimum culture values for innovation teams from the literature review 
The above figure presents an initial estimate of the optimum culture scores based on the 
literature review of innovation teams.  The reviewed studies of higher creativity situations, 
presented some contradictory results, in particular with regard to masculinity (MAS). 
Finally, the lack of a widely-accepted framework for categorising creativity-related activities 
has made the task of this part of the literature review more difficult. 
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A1D.1.9 Issues linked to the validity of published study results 
Lack of a practicable research/creativity/innovation framework 
As stated earlier, the author found it difficult to place the various studies (and their results) in 
the spectrum of creative/innovative activities, as there was wide variation in the studies’ 
usage of creativity/innovation-linked terms; this difficulty affected the accuracy of the results 
of this review.  A wide range of innovation frameworks have been proposed, for example 
Balachandra & Friar’s (1997) contingency cube, Jones & Davis’ (2000) three levels of R&D, 
Cooper’s (1998) three-dimensional model or Baragheh, Rowley, & Sambrook’s (2009) six-
component model; however, these were typically too limited in scope (e.g. concentrating on 
innovation to market), or covered organisational, administrative and societal factors, resulting 
in excessive complexity.  A framework was needed that enabled the positioning of 
innovation-related activities, rather than the planning and execution of such activities.  Taking 
into account the eastern and western viewpoints introduced in the discussion at the begin-
ning of this subsection on creativity and innovation (A1D.1)), three potentially independent 
activities or processes could be identified – searching for truth, creativity/lateral thinking/-
invention, and adaptation to needs/markets; these or similar groupings could form the basis 
of a three (or more) dimension framework, such as the example illustrated below. 
 
A potential 3-D framework 
Each of the above three activities could require significantly different skillsets and, as such, 
would probably be optimised in different cultures; however none, in isolation, would benefit 
society. As an example, one could suggest that nuclear fusion research has relied exten-
sively, to-date, on searching for truth (understanding the fundamentals of fusion in all its 
aspects) and creativity/lateral-thinking/invention (conceiving, producing and testing a wide 
range of novel ideas for the achievement of controlled fusion); now, with the achievement of 
Placing projects in 
a 3-D creativity-
innovation space
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the technical milestone of energy-breakeven, fusion has arrived at the stage where the long 
process of adaptation to meet the World’s energy needs could begin (S. Lee & Saw, 2011; 
Tokimatsu, Fujino, Konishi, Ogawa, & Yamaji, 2003).  
The placing of projects and project studies in a multidimensional framework such as that of 
Figure 3-3 would enable improvements in the generalisation of study results, and a conseq-
uent better understanding of the effects of culture on various types and levels of creativity.  
However, note that each of these dimensions could be subject to more detailed structuring. 
Use of patents as a measure of innovation output 
Patenting rates were utilised in many published innovation-related studies as a measure of 
innovation output.  Where patent quality was taken into account, e.g. in terms of citations and 
income generated, patents may have represented a reasonable measure of innovation.  
However, the raw number of patents per head of population has become increasingly 
susceptible to changing governmental and industrial policies.  For example, in recent years 
the Chinese government has strongly encouraged and supported its universities to increase 
the level of patenting of their outputs; this has resulted in a large increase in the  quantity of 
patents without a commensurate increase in their quality or potential value (Fisch, Block, & 
Sandner, 2013).  Patenting rates have increased far more rapidly in the Far East than in the 
West - in 2012, Asia filed 56% of all patents and 70% of all industrial designs (WIPO, 2013); 
in 2013, three of the World’s top five patenting countries were Far Eastern.  As patenting 
rates increased, so did the proportion of patents relating to minor design features; in many 
cases, such features (both in the East and West) had little intellectual content, but served the 
purpose of preventing rivals from competing on a ‘level playing field’.  Examples of minor 
patents included mobile phone responses to finger-tapping on a touch sensitive screen, and 
icons with rounded corners.  Litigation arising over such design-based patents has increased 
recently, for example see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc._v._Samsung_Electronics_Co.,_Ltd.   
For the research described in this thesis, the key implication of the above changes in 
patenting patterns was that raw patent data for recent years has shown at best a small and 
decreasing correlation with innovation levels.  This was demonstrated in a recent study by 
Efrat (2014) that revealed a negative correlation between innovation and individualism based 
on raw patents (the opposite of most previous study results), but showed a positive correl-
ation between individualism and innovation based on journal publications.  A mobile phone-
related patent for ‘image icon associated with caller’ is hardly comparable, in innovation or 
creativity terms, to a patent for ‘a method of characterizing genomic DNA to create a genetic 
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fingerprint’; however, as a ‘raw’ patent, it is potentially weighted the same.   
A1D.2  Student groups 
Research into the performance of student groups has been rightly criticised in the past 
because neither the students, nor their group environments, were representative of non-
student group or team situations.  However, such students could be considered to be 
representative of the sociotechnical system design team members of the future; also, the 
availability of multiple groups with similar targets in similar settings provided the equivalent of 
controlled laboratory experiments.  Although many academic publications on student groups 
were retrieved, there were relatively few studies that represented quantitative analyses of the 
effects of culture on group performances.  In many cases, these studies examined other 
variables than performance, e.g. self-efficacy and satisfaction; these have been found to be 
poor predictors of performance, in particular where creativity has been required (Paletz et al., 
2003).  In other cases, studies have split student groups into two categories – homogenous 
and culturally-diverse, e.g. Daily et al. (1997), Watson et al. (1993); such a split was too 
coarse to capture the nuances associated with the varying degrees and different aspects of 
cultural diversity. 
Published studies of culturally-moderated performances of student groups are examined in 
the following paragraphs. 
D.C. Thomas (1999) examined the effects of national diversity on the performances of 
undergraduate student groups.  The study results were based on 24 groups, each of which 
was tasked to evaluate five business case studies. Thomas reported that culturally 
homogeneous groups produced better quality solutions for all five case studies than did 
culturally heterogeneous groups; no improvement in the relative performances of the 
culturally heterogeneous occurred over the period of the study.  Cultural distance was used 
as a measure of diversity (as is used by the author of this thesis); however, this cultural 
distance was only measured in terms of collectivism/individualism, based on an eight-item 
scale developed by Maznevski et al. (1997). 
Dahlin et al. (2005) examined the effects of team educational and national diversity on team 
information use, an important component of potential team performance.  Their study results 
were based on data from 19 MBA student teams that had each been set the task of carrying 
out four case analyses involving organisational problems.  Dahlin et al. reported that national 
diversity had a ‘U’ shaped relationship with range of information use, but an inverted ‘U’ 
shaped relationship with depth and integration of information use.  Range of information has 
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ramifications for the size of the potential solution space, i.e. for the level of creativity of a 
group; depth and integration probably have greater ramifications for detailed design and 
implementation.  Blau’s index (Blau, 1977), which was based on the relative proportions of 
different nationalities rather than the cultural difference between them70, was used to 
calculate both educational and national diversity. 
Goncalo & Staw (2006) examined the effects of individualism (vs. collectivism) on the 
creativity of undergraduate student groups.  A total of 68 groups were split into four sets 
(primed to act individualistic or collectivistic and instructed to act creatively or practically).  
Individualist (high IDV) groups, when instructed to be creative, were more creative than 
collectivistic (low-IDV) groups in both the number of ideas generated and the creative quality 
of the ideas selected. 
Wodehouse et al. (2011) examined the effects of average national culture scores on the 
concept design performance (concept generation and selection) of culturally-diverse student 
groups.  For idea generation, individualism (positive) was the strongest factor, followed by 
uncertainty avoidance (negative), then power distance (negative).  For idea selection (from 
the previously-generated idea set), individualism (positive) was again the strongest factor, 
followed by power distance (negative), then uncertainty avoidance (negative).  Masculinity 
appeared to have little effect on the results.  Surprisingly, the authors did not take the 
opportunity to examine the effects of different levels of cultural diversity in the groups. 
                                            
70 As a result, Blau’s index is insensitive to actual cultural differences within and between teams.  A 
team consisting of three very similar nationalities (e.g. German, Austrian and Swiss-German 
members) would have the same Blau’s index score as a team consisting of three very different 
nationalities (e.g. Japanese, Serbian and Costa Rican members). 
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Researchers Group and task types 
Optimum cultural dimension scores 
(low, moderate, high, or [optimum 
value]) 
PDI IDV MAS UAI Diversity 
Thomas (1999) Undergraduate student groups, business 
case studies. N/E* N/E N/E N/E 0 
Dahlin et al. (2005) 
 
MBA student groups, business case studies 
– range of info used. N/E N/E N/E N/E 
Low or                                           
high** (‘U’) 
MBA student groups, business case studies 
– depth & integration of information. N/E N/E N/E N/E Mod*** (‘∩’) 
Goncalo & Staw 
(2006) 
Undergraduate student groups, creativity of 
solutions. N/E High N/E N/E N/E 
Wodehouse et al. 
(2011) 
(small sample) 
Student groups, design idea generation Low High Little effect Low N/E 
Student groups, design idea selection Low High Little effect Low N/E 
* N/E: Not evaluated. 
** U-shaped – low and high diversity teams perform better than moderate diversity teams. 
*** Inverted U-shaped – moderately diverse teams perform better than low or high diversity teams. 
Summary of study results – student groups 
Evaluating the above literature and the results summarised in the above table, it appeared 
that the most creative student groups were high in individualism, low in power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance.  Masculinity appeared to have little effect, and the results for cultural 
diversity were inconclusive. 
Although the above evaluation of student creativity appeared to confirm the earlier results for 
creativity in academic and industrial teams, there were grounds for caution.  In the above-
described cases, collectivist (low individualist) students were at a disadvantage in that they 
were typically situated in a foreign environment; this could have had a negative effect on their 
group performances.  It would therefore be informative to be able to compare the above 
results with those of diverse student groups that were performing in a collectivist 
environment. 
A1D.3  Culture, safety and sociotechnical system accidents 
National culture plays a significant role in accident rates (in particular in complex socio-
technical systems such as large transport aircraft, oil refineries and power stations).  There 
are, however, very few quantitative studies of the effects of culture on safety-critical socio-
technical systems other than aircraft, and some of these have been criticised due to the 
potential impacts of external factors that were not taken into account, leading to issues with 
the generalisability of the results (Strauch, 2010).  In addition, other studies contain errors 
that negate their usefulness, for example a paper by H. Park (2011), in which there were 
errors associated with uncertainty avoidance. 
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A1D.3.1 Accident rates in commercial aviation 
When carrying out investigations during the 1990s into aircraft accidents, Boeing found a 
significant relationship between national cultures and accident rates of Western-built comm-
ercial passenger jet aircraft, even after taking account of differing fleets, ground facilities and 
training.  In particular, Weener’s study of aircraft losses between 1952 and 1992 (E. F. 
Weener, 1993) linked national scores on several of Hofstede’s cultural factors to increases in 
accidents per million departures. 
Also during the 1990s, Merritt & Helmreich conducted a five-year project that surveyed more 
than 17,000 airline staff, including 8,000 pilots, from 23 countries (A. C. Merritt & Helmreich, 
1995); the range of staff included captains, first officers, flight attendants, maintenance staff, 
managers and trainers.  Pilots chose to compete for a high status cross-cultural occupation 
that requires specific combinations of skills, and were therefore not typical members of their 
ethnic populations.  In addition they were subject to regular training and retraining regimes, 
including simulator-based flying training and crew resource management (CRM).  These 
training facilities were supplied internationally, with minor adaptations.  However, despite the 
large amount of common training across countries, Merritt & Helmreich’s surveys of attitudes 
amongst the 8,000 pilots showed close agreement with three of Hofstede’s original national 
culture results for IBM staff - individualism (vs. collectivism), power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance.  In terms of questions relating to their occupation, pilots across all sampled 
nations were in closer agreement than would be expected purely from the above cultural 
survey results71.  Nevertheless, in specific areas, Merritt & Helmreich reported significant 
differences between cultural groups; examples of these are listed below:  
• Asian pilots preferred order and predictability, whereas most Anglo and North 
European pilots preferred flexibility and challenging tasks. 
• Anglo and North European pilots were the most willing to make their views known in 
the cockpit, whereas Moroccan, South American and most Asian pilots were the least 
likely to make their views known; this distinction is associated in part with power 
distance (low in the case of Anglo and Scandinavian pilots, high in the case of most 
Asian pilots).  The unwillingness of crew members to draw the captain’s attention to 
errors or problems has been a significant factor in many commercial aviation 
accidents. 
• Asian and South American pilots were, in general, neutral or agreed that written 
procedures should be provided for all in-flight situations and that rules should be 
                                            
71 This closer agreement reflected their shared professional (or occupational) culture. 
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obeyed at all times; Anglo pilots strongly disagreed that written procedures should be 
provided for all in-flight situations and also disagreed that rules should be followed 
when the situation suggested otherwise.  
Crew resource management (CRM) training encompasses communication skills, team-
working, situational awareness, problem-solving and decision-making in order to ensure the 
optimum use of all resources, in particular when working under pressure or operating in 
unusual conditions.  Regular CRM training is now mandatory for commercial flying crew 
covered by most of the World’s regulatory bodies, and is also mandatory for an increasing 
proportion of military crew across the World.  However, CRM was pioneered in the USA, and 
was further developed primarily in the USA and Northern Europe.  Because of these origins, 
CRM is culturally bound (Helmreich et al., 1999) as it is based on the assumption of a culture 
where junior members of the crew are willing to query issues with, or challenge, the captain.  
As a result, CRM training has been most effective when applied to crews of high 
individualism, low power distance cultures.  Flight crews from collectivist, high power 
distance cultures, e.g. South Korea and China, have considerable barriers to overcome in 
order to develop the cultural cockpit environment in which subordinates are willing to 
challenge the captain when they recognize problems or errors.  Harris & Li (2008) 
commented on the much higher commercial aviation accident rates of Asia and Africa 
compared to the USA and Europe, in particular drawing the reader’s attention to the fact that 
in Asia and Africa, the most frequent circumstantial factor in accidents was a failure in crew 
resource management.  An earlier paper of theirs (Li et al., 2008) described an analysis of 
Taiwanese aircraft accidents that utilised the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS); poor CRM was found to result in a 30-to-40-fold increase in decision-
making errors, perceptual errors and violations of procedures. 
Jing et al. (2000; 2001) examined accident rate information for airlines around the World 
during the previous twenty years (information is available at 
http://planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm).  They found that the most important cultural variable 
was authoritarianism, which was positively correlated to accident rate and appeared to 
account for over half the variance (in accident rates) between cultures.  From Jing et al.’s 
descriptions and definitions of authoritarianism, high authoritarianism appeared to be a 
combination of high power distance and low individualism.  Jing et al. stated that authoritari-
anism was very high in mainland China, Taiwan and Korea; Chinese subordinates in the 
cockpit would typically agree without query to the captain’s demands, even if it meant 
deviating from the standard procedures.  Jing et al. commented that most commercial aircraft 
and most systems associated with these aircraft were designed by Westerners who had low 
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levels of authoritarianism. Therefore, these Western designers did not understand authoritari-
anism and were unaware of the degree to which aircraft operations were vulnerable to 
distortion by authoritarianism. 
USA airlines, European airlines and their pilots now largely take for granted their incident 
reporting programmes; the purpose of these programmes is to improve safety before acci-
dents occur.  An example of such a programme is the American Aviation Safety Action 
Program (ASAP) (Gibbons et al., 2005), implemented at airline companies with the 
agreement of the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and the pilots’ unions.  Safety reporting 
programmes have been developed elsewhere with similar success to those of the U.S. 
ASRS, e.g. the British Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) 
(CHIRP, n.d.) and the British Airways Safety Information System (BASIS) (Holtom, 1998); 
CHIRP is also widely used in the international maritime environment, and BASIS is used by 
over one hundred airlines. Where these incident reporting and analysis programmes have 
been effectively implemented, they have made significant contributions to the reduction of 
serious aircraft accidents (in terms of losses per million flights), and to the improvement of 
training and standard operational procedures (SOPs). 
The assumption behind incident reporting programmes is that all humans make errors, 
usually unintentionally; therefore aircrew should be encouraged to report errors and incidents 
within a blame-free environment.  Following analysis of these errors and incidents, changes 
can be put in place to prevent them in the future, or to enable their detection and correction 
before a safety issue arises.   However, unlike the situation in European and USA airline 
organisations, a significant blame and shame culture exists in many Asian organizations.  
Therefore Asian pilots are much less willing than their Western counterparts to reveal any 
errors on their own part if there is a perceived risk of being exposed.  Taiwan provides an 
insight to the effects of culture on the performance of incident reporting programmes.  In 
1999, the Taiwanese government introduced the TACARE voluntary incident reporting 
programme in order to improve the country’s very poor airline flight safety record.  The level 
of incident reporting was low, therefore Lee & Weitzel (2003) conducted a study of 
Taiwanese flight crew members’ acceptance and usage of TACARE and found that carriers 
would attempt to identify and punish flight crews responsible for (reported) incidents, rather 
than seek to establish and eliminate the root causes of incidents.  Lee & Weitzel also 
commented in their paper that there was a very high power distance between Taiwanese 
flight crew captains and first officers, a cultural factor value known to be strongly, positively 
correlated with flying incidents; this high power distance would also discourage lower ranking 
officers from reporting incidents associated with their captains’ behaviours.  A decade-later 
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review of the utilisation of the TACARE system by maintenance personnel (Y.-F. Chen et al., 
2014) revealed that fear of punishment and lack of feedback still discouraged personnel from 
submitting safety reports. 
It has become clear that Western-designed training, crew resource management and 
incident reporting systems do not fully meet the needs of non-individualist, high power 
distance cultures.   In addition, aircraft cockpit layouts and standard operating procedures 
are based on Western individualist cultural assumptions.  
A1D.3.2 Accident rates in NATO air forces 
Studies of the effects of cultural factors on military aircraft crew performance have revealed 
very clear links between national cultures and accident rates.  Soeters & Boer (2000) 
conducted a comparative study of fourteen NATO air forces using data based on the years 
1988 to 1995.  These air forces used similar or identical aircraft and underwent similar 
training.  They used operating procedures and regulations that had been largely harmonized 
across all NATO countries, and they were also involved in the exchange of personnel 
between NATO air forces and took part in combined exercises with other NATO countries.  
The range of NATO aircraft includes single-seat tactical fighters and tactical ground attack 
aircraft (typically operating in pairs of groups of four), two-seat trainers and strategic 
penetration aircraft and large multiple-crewed aircraft; however, all work in a larger team 
environment (i.e. including command & control).  Despite the commonality of training, 
operating procedures and aircraft, strong positive, statistically-validated correlations were 
found between low individualism, high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance scores 
and increased accident rates.  As the NATO-wide standardization of training, operating 
procedures, exchange of personnel, etc., should clearly have produced similar professional 
cultures and (to a lesser extent) similar organisational cultures, it is likely that the underlying 
national (or ethnic) cultures exerted a major influence on aircrew behaviour.  It is important to 
note that the NATO standards, regulations, operating procedures, etc., are based on the 
US/British model; this model has built-in assumptions with regard to aircrew cultures, i.e. that 
they have an Anglo culture (which scores high in individualism, low in power distance and 
low in uncertainty avoidance).  
A1D.3.3 Automation of sociotechnical systems 
Over recent decades, sociotechnical systems have become increasingly automated, and it is 
therefore worth examining automation-related issues in a separate subsection; a more 
detailed examination can be found in Hodgson, Siemieniuch & Hubbard (2013).  These 
issues go beyond the cultures of specific groups or nationalities, although they are affected 
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by certain cultural traits.  As sociotechnical systems have become increasingly automated, 
their very complexity has ensured that not all modes of failure can be predicted.  Therefore, 
given the severe consequences of failure (e.g. for modern passenger transport aircraft or 
nuclear power stations), it has been necessary to back up these automation systems with 
humans.  However, this automation has brought changes to the activities, workloads, 
situation awareness and skill levels of human operators or crew.  The issues arising from 
these changes are considered below, with particular reference to the aviation environment. 
Automation systems, including flight deck automation, changed the role of the operator from 
that of active, in-the-loop ‘doer’ to that of passive, out-of-the-loop monitor.  Humans proved to 
be poor system monitors, in particular if a system was highly reliable (Parasuraman et al., 
1993), and they reacted more slowly to deviations than when inside the control loop (Kaber & 
Endsley, 1997).  Acting as out-of-the-loop monitors of automation, flight crews typically had 
reduced situation awareness not only with regard to the current ‘flying state’ of the aircraft but 
also, critically, with regard to the detailed mode of the automation system, its constraints and 
its likely future behaviour (Sarter & Woods, 1995a).  
During the 1990s, increasing concerns were expressed about the large number of incidents 
and accidents arising from pilot confusion with flight automation systems (Kaber & Endsley, 
2004), in particular mode confusion (Sarter & Woods, 1995b).  In 1996, a U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) report (Federal Aviation Administration Human Factors Team, 
1996) stated that flight crew/automation interface vulnerabilities adversely affected the crews’ 
situation awareness and management of automation; the report quoted incidents and 
crashes due to the automation system changing flight modes without informing the pilots.  
The level and complexity of flight automation has increased significantly since 1996, and 
evidence has emerged that even highly-experienced crews are experiencing increasing 
difficulties with automation (Sarter et al., 2007).  An updated FAA report on flight path 
management systems (FAA, 2013) found that systemic vulnerabilities remained in the 
design, user training and operation of modern flight path management systems; the resulting 
excessive complexity and pilot skill degradation had led to many incidents and accidents.  
Recent examples of such incidents and accidents include Hamburg (BFU, 2010), Learmouth 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2011) and Schipol (Dutch Safety Board, 2010).  
Evidence of flight crew loss of skills associated with automation (and automation policy) has 
been widely reported, for example the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority report about flight crew 
reliance on automation (Wood 2004), the loss of manual flying skills (Ebbatson, 2009; Gillen, 
2010), and the relationship between automation experience and manual flying skills 
(Ebbatson et al., 2010).  Following a study of the performance of pilots during refresher 
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training courses, Young et al. (2006) reported that the flight crews who utilized the most flight 
deck automation also exhibited poorer manual flying skills than others.  A recent survey 
(Zimmermann et al., 2011) revealed that commercial pilots and air traffic controllers believed 
that flight safety was decreasing.  Cases such as the uncontained engine failure on a Qantas 
Airbus A380 in 2008 (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2010) and the successful ditching 
of an Airbus A300 on the River Hudson after engine failure in 2008 (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2010) are indicative of the very high manual skill levels required to survive a 
major failure – skill levels that few of the latest generation of pilots possess.  
Researchers have highlighted the paucity and low quality of interaction between crews and 
automation systems (Norman, 1990), the need for context-aware systems that emulate CRM 
principles (Geiselman et al., 2013) and the need for multisensory feedback to crews (Sarter, 
2000).  To-date, the automation element of most sociotechnical systems has acted as a 
poorly trained, incommunicative member of the system’s crew – thus defeating the purpose 
of crew resource management (CRM) training.  In order for a crew to achieve the level of 
shared situation awareness required for safe operation, researchers argue that the auto-
mated system must become to an adequate degree part of the crew (Christoffersen & 
Woods, 2002), (G. Klein et al., 2004).  
Sherman et al. (1997) surveyed the attitudes of a sample of 5,879 airline pilots from 12 
nations towards flight deck automation.  They listed 15 automation-related statements (e.g. ‘I 
am concerned that automation may cause me to lose flying skills’, ‘I look forward to more 
automation – the more the better’, ‘I prefer flying automated aircraft’) and, for each country 
and for each statement, calculated the percentage of pilots who agreed (Sherman et al., 
1997), Table 4.  Sherman et al. reported that the influence of national culture on the pilots’ 
agreement (or otherwise) was far greater than that of organizational culture or pilot 
experience72.  Cultural differences in attitudes to automation are important because they 
affect crew utilisation of automation and thereby their levels of trust, manual skills and 
situation awareness. 
A summary of sociotechnical system automation safety issues:  To-date, increased 
automation of sociotechnical systems, in particular aircraft automation, has resulted in 
changes to primary crew functions from ‘doing’ to ‘monitoring’, reductions in crew situation 
awareness and downgrading of crew ‘hands-on’ skills.  As a result of these changes, when 
                                            
72 The author of this thesis carried out a further analysis of Sherman’s results (see Chapter 5 for more 
details) in order to gain further insights, for example ‘More automation is better’ scores were positively 
correlated with national power distance scores, and ‘I prefer automation’ scores were positively 
correlated with national PDI and UAI scores. 
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failures of automation systems occur, manual recovery is compromised. Developments in 
automation, combined with airline crew flight training policies, are resulting in an increasing 
gap between actual and required crew capability and situation awareness.  In terms of 
Reason’s ‘Safety Space’ model (Reason, 2008), flight automation systems are moving 
rapidly in the direction of increasing vulnerability; similar issues can be found in other 
complex sociotechnical systems, for example nuclear power stations and refineries.  
A1D.3.4 Accident rates in industry 
Not all industrial accidents relate to team activities, but many do.  Infortunio (2003) carried 
out a study of the correlations between international industrial fatal accidents and Hofstede’s 
original cultural dimensions, i.e. power distance (PDI), individualism (IDV), masculinity (MAS) 
and uncertainty avoidance (UAI).  Due to the high correlations between PDI and IDV in his 
initial results, he subsequently utilized the combined factor ‘log PDI/IDV’.  Chi-squared tests 
showed no significant correlation between log PDI/IDV and UAI. 
Infortunio’s results showed that industrial fatal accident rates were correlated with high UAI 
scores and high PDI/IDV ratios; they were not correlated with MAS scores. Infortunio 
commented on the particularly high industrial injury rates that were experienced in 
Guatemala (PDI=95, IDV=6, UAI=101, MAS=37). Note that Infortunio (on page 115) warned 
that other factors, including country wealth levels, could moderate the results of his study; 
see Subsection III.B.4 of his thesis for further comments on this. 
A1D.3.5 Road traffic accidents 
Although traffic accidents are not typically the result of team activities, they are worth 
studying because the cultural factors in road accidents also play a part in other forms of 
accident and failure.  Ozkan & Lajunen (2007) carried out regression analyses on traffic 
accident data from 46 countries, and identified gross national product (GNP) per capita 
(negatively related), neuroticism and uncertainty avoidance (both positively related) as being 
significantly correlated with accident rates.  Masculinity (positive) and individualism 
(negative) were identified as being correlated to a lesser degree. 
A1D.3.6 Reaction times to anomalies 
G.A. Klein et al. (1999) stated that uncertainty avoidance influenced the threshold for initial 
reaction to an anomaly, which occurred when an observer mentally ‘reframed’; personnel 
with low uncertainty avoidance scores reframed with less information than did personnel with 
high uncertainty avoidance scores, i.e. they responded quicker to anomalies.  In the context 
of a complex sociotechnical system, this could provide valuable additional time in which to 
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respond to a deteriorating situation, though it could also lead to false alarms,  Vincent and 
Dubinsky (2004) reported that high-uncertainty-avoidance French students exhibited more 
maladaptive coping than did low/medium-uncertainty-avoidance USA students.  
A1D.3.7 Summary – safety-critical sociotechnical teams 
The results of the review of the effects of national culture on the safety of sociotechnical 
systems are presented in the table below; these include studies of reactions to anomalies.  
High accident rates appear to be associated with a particular pattern of cultural dimension 
scores - low individualism, high uncertainty avoidance and, in most cases, high power 
distance scores.  In the case of uncertainty avoidance, performance in emergency situations 
is also typically hampered by inadequate practical training and a reluctance to react 
promptly.  A high masculinity score might have been expected to increase the rate of 
accidents caused by competitiveness and bravado, but there is little evidence of this from the 
statistics, other than in (non-team) road accidents.  
 
Researchers 
 
Sociotechnical system type 
or reactions to threats and 
anomalies 
Optimum cultural dimension 
scores* (low, high, or 
[optimum value]) 
IDV PDI MAS UAI Diver-
sity 
Jing et al. (2001) Commercial transport aircraft High Low N/E** N/E N/E 
Soeters & Boer 2000) Military aircraft High Low Little 
effect 
Low N/E 
G. A. Klein et al. (1999) Thresholds for quick reactions to 
anomalies 
N/E N/E N/E Low N/E 
Vincent & Dubinsky Maladaptive coping with threats N/E N/E N/E Low N/E 
* Optimum scores: These refer to busy or abnormal situations where the risk to safety is greatest. 
**N/E: Not evaluated. 
Summary of study results – safety-critical sociotechnical systems  
Finally, a caveat:  Wealth (per-capita GDP) is closely correlated with high IDV; therefore it is 
important to account for wealth before ascribing correlations to cultural traits or scores. 
A1D.3  Professional sports teams 
Professional sports teams may appear at first, in terms of tasks and targets, to be distant 
from both sociotechnical system design teams and the users of such systems.  However, 
sport provides an opportunity to study the effects of culture and diversity in depth due to the 
detailed records of multiple projects (i.e. games) for which player details and outcomes are 
available; indeed Kahn (2000) describes professional sport as a ‘labour market laboratory’ 
because the life history of every worker (and supervisor) is available (… along with the team 
performance data).  In addition, there are many levels of cultural diversity (heterogeneity) 
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across teams in most professional leagues. 
Although many studies have taken place on sports performance and team diversity, very few 
studies have examined the effects of team member national culture on performance. 
A1D.3.1 Football 
Haas & Nüesch collected data on the performance of the (German) Bundesliga over seven 
seasons from 1999/00 until 2005/06 (Haas & Nüesch, 2012).  They took into account 
measures of team member skill levels and team national diversity and found that increased 
national diversity resulted in reduced team performance.  Haas & Nüesch utilised the 
Shannon diversity index as the basis for calculating diversity73.  On the basis of the 
researchers’ choice of diversity index, the author considers the results to be of limited value.  
Note: The author requested access to the raw data on which the conclusions were based, 
but this was not forthcoming. 
In order to further assess the results obtained by Haas & Nüesch (in the absence of further 
data from them), the author obtained aggregate Bundesliga player nationality data for the 
1999/00 to 2005/06 seasons from a football website (see 
http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/en/2-bundesliga/gastarbeiter/wettbewerb_L2_1999.html and 
linked web pages).  Based on this data, an analysis of the default national cultural dimension 
scores of Bundesliga players was carried out, which is summarised in the table below. 
 
Average cultural dimension scores of non-German Bundesliga players 
As can be seen from the table, over the seven years of Haas & Nüesch’s survey the 
                                            
73 As was the case with Blau’s index (see earlier footnote), the Shannon diversity index was based in 
this case on the number or proportion of different nationalities and was, as a result, insensitive to 
actual cultural differences within and between teams. 
IDV PDI MAS UAI
1999/00 39.8 52.9 66.6 43.7 66.6
2000/01 38.1 49.7 67.4 46.5 66.9
2001/02 38.2 51.3 67.0 46.6 66.5
2002/03 36.9 46.0 69.3 44.9 66.2
2003/04 40.9 47.9 68.7 47.3 69.6
2004/05 40.5 54.8 64.8 47.3 65.7
2005/06 41.6 52.0 65.0 44.5 64.0
50.7 67.0 45.8 66.5
67 35 66 65
-16.3 32.0 -20.2 1.5
German culture scores:
Differences:
Mean weighted cultural dimension scores 
for non-German nationalsSeason
Fraction non-
German (%)
Average non-German culture 
scores over 7 yrs:
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weighted average non-German player individualism (IDV) score was 16 points less than that 
of the Germans, the average power distance (PDI) score was 32 points greater and the 
average masculinity (MAS) score was 20 points less; however, the average non-German 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI) score was only 1.5 points (~1.5%) more than the national 
German uncertainty avoidance score.  It would therefore be reasonable to conclude that, on 
average, high German team national diversity would result in significant differences in team 
individualism, power distance and masculinity scores, compared to teams consisting only of 
German nationals; these differing cultural dimension scores may have influenced match 
performances as much as the diversity itself.  Increased national diversity would have had 
little effect on German team uncertainty avoidance scores, but the distrust of foreigners (or 
‘strangers’) implied by the higher than average uncertainty avoidance scores of the German 
players, managers and coaches (G H Hofstede 2001, Ch. 4) would have played a part in 
reducing the effectiveness of integrating non-nationals into Bundesliga teams compared to, 
for example, the case with English Premiership teams.  
Brandes et al. (2009) collected and analysed the effects of national diversity on the perfor-
mance of German Bundesliga teams over the period 2001/02 to 2005/06, as measured by 
their end-of-season position in the league.  They hypothesised that different cultures could 
bring differing skills to teams.  Despite finding skill differences between nationalities, the 
results of the analysis indicated that these skill differences (and the associated national 
diversities) did not appear to have a bearing on team performance over a season.  This 
result is in contrast to that of Haas & Nüesch (see above), who analysed the Bundesliga 
performances and national diversity over approximately the same period to find that cultural 
diversity reduced team performances. 
Brandes et al.’s measure of national diversity was similar to that of Haas & Nüesch in that it 
was based on the number of different nationalities and, therefore, did not reflect the cultural 
distance between team individuals.  Brandes et al. determined players’ skillsets from 22 
factors (e.g. goals scored, assists, tackle success rate, clearances), and found that there 
were differences between nationalities.  They developed a linear regression model that 
explained teams’ final league position (or rank) in terms of the above 22 factors.  One of the 
problems with these 22 factors was that they were not equally applicable to the various 
player roles, for example, ‘clearances’ were more important in the defender role than in the 
striker role.  Therefore, the associations between these factors and team performances were 
likely to be unclear. 
A1D.3.2 Hockey teams 
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Phillips & Phillips (2011) tested Blau’s paradox of heterogeneity (Blau, 1977) on the USA 
NHL hockey teams over the ten year period from 1988 to 1998.  There was a wide range of 
heterogeneity across the league, with team heterogeneity from a single nationality to more 
ten nationalities, representing a total of 28 nationalities. Phillips & Phillips confirmed their 
hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between heterogeneity and (winning) performance, i.e. 
low and high heterogeneity teams were found to win more games than moderate heterogen-
eity teams, after taking account of control variables. 
A1D.3.3 Summary – sports teams 
There were very few quantitative studies on had typically concentrated on the effects of 
diversity, and had utilised measures of diversity that took into account only the number of 
different nationalities in a team, rather than the actual cultural differences between players 
(and teams); the results were therefore not very informative.  In addition, their results were to 
some extent contradictory, as can be seen from the table below. 
 
Researchers 
 
Sport and league 
Optimum cultural dimension 
scores (low, high, or 
[optimum value]) 
IDV PDI MAS UAI Diver-
sity 
Haas & Nüesch (2011) Football (German Bundesliga) N/E N/E N/E N/E 0 
Brandes et al. (2009) Football (German Bundesliga) N/E N/E N/E N/E No 
effect 
Phillips & Phillips (2011) Hockey (United States NFL) N/E N/E N/E N/E U* 
N/E: Not evaluated. 
* U-shaped – low diversity and high diversity teams perform better than moderate diversity teams. 
Summary of study results – team sport 
A1D.4  Further issues of relevance to this review 
A1D.4.1 The effects of per-capita income on outcomes 
Culture was only one of several potential reasons for differences in performances between 
countries.  It was therefore important to consider alternative hypotheses in order to avoid 
misleading results.  In particular, per-capita income had a strong negative correlation with 
accident rates.  For example, two research studies demonstrated significant correlations 
between national power distance scores and aircraft accident rates (Ramsden, 1985; E. F. 
Weener & Russell, 1994); Hofstede re-analysed the data with the addition of per-capita gross 
national product (Hofstede 2001, p.115) and found per-capita GNP to be the dominant 
variable, rather than power distance.  Similarly, Helmreich and Merritt (2001) drew readers’ 
attention to the potential effects on accident rates of non-cultural factors, including facility 
quality and government regulation (pp.104-5). 
A1D.4.2 Studies that utilised multiple cultural frameworks 
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Several published studies on national culture appeared to ‘mix-and-match’ cultural 
dimensions from two or more cultural frameworks, for example that of Hasan & Ditsa (1999).  
Because the introduction of non-orthogonal (i.e. overlapping) dimensions would tend to 
reduce the strengths of relationships between cultural dimensions and outcomes, or even 
reverse them, such studies were for the most part discarded. 
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APPENDIX 1E Tools that are available to evaluate ‘other culture’ 
teams and multicultural teams (expansion of Section 3.4) 
The primary objective of this part of the literature review was to identify any existing 
frameworks, tools etc., as a potential basis for the adaptation or development of a culture-
based team performance prediction tool, and to identify what gaps were present.  A key 
requirement was that any method or tool should not depend on knowledge about individuals 
in post (e.g. actual team members) as, in most cases where the tool would be used, such 
information would not be available; only team member national culture, organisation or 
organisation type and, potentially, team member training or educational level would be 
available in most cases.  
In the case that the literature review revealed researchers that had devised a significantly 
different approach (from that shown in Figure 3-5, see main text) to the prediction or 
assessment of team performance of specific tasks or roles based on their cultural traits, then 
such an approach would, of course, be examined in detail. 
A1E.1 Methods, models and tools for the prediction of team 
performance or allocation of tasks based on national culture 
The purpose of this section was to review methods, models and tools that could predict (or 
could be adapted in whole or part to predict) team performances at key tasks based primarily 
on national culture.  Such tools would carry out most or all of the functions illustrated in 
Figure 3-4.  Due to the sparsity of material on national culture, the review was extended to 
include organisational culture and safety culture-based models and tools. 
A1E.1.1 National culture models and tools 
Only one academic peer-reviewed publication was found on national culture-based methods, 
models or tools for the prediction of team performance or the allocation of tasks.  This 
publication, by Sivakumar & Nakata (2003), split the product development process into two 
stages (initiation and implementation) as recommended by Johne (1984).  Using Hofstede’s 
cultural framework74, Sivakumar & Nakata found that cultures with scores similar to those of 
the Nordic countries performed best at the initiation stage, whereas cultures with scores 
similar to those of the Japan, Taiwan and Mexico performed best at the implementation 
stage.  Sivakumar & Nakata then developed a series of mathematical models that optimised 
                                            
74 Hofstede’s original cultural framework consisted of four cultural dimensions - individualism, power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity; Hofstede provided national (average) numeric scores 
for these dimensions for many countries, enabling these countries to be compared on a cultural basis.  
Further details of Hofstede’s framework are provided later in this review. 
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product development success, based on the relative weightings of the initiation and 
implementation stages of product development; these models assumed that the same team 
would carry out both stages, leading to significant compromise.  Overall, the Sivakumar & 
Nakata model was too limited (new product development only), only produced a set of values 
for an ‘optimum culture’, and relied on a set of culture ‘slope coefficients’ that were not clearly 
justified in the paper.  A subsequent examination of all 17 citations of this paper revealed no 
further culture modelling or culture tool related publications other than one by this author (A. 
Hodgson, Hubbard, & Siemieniuch, 2013).  A precursor paper by the above researchers 
(Nakata & Sivakumar, 1996) reviewed the area and proposed a general framework for 
relating national culture values to new product development; an examination of the abstracts 
of the 470 citations of this paper revealed several studies of the effects of culture on various 
forms of team performance, but no ‘culture tool’ related publications. 
Earley and Gibson (2002) developed a qualitative, two-level model of multicultural teams that 
incorporated six factors at the level of the individual team member (role identity processes, 
trust and expectations of others, moral character and respect for self and others, inter-
personal affect, confidence and efficacy, and social awareness) and five factors at the group 
level (within-group competition, fractionation, development of a hybrid culture, shared under-
standing and meaning, and shared goals and priorities).  Some very general guidance was 
provided that particular factors (e.g. high competitiveness) will tend to cause certain affects 
(e.g. fragmentation), but little more.  
As a result of the dearth of academic publications of relevance to national culture-based 
tools, the search was widened to include non-academic sources, and to review 
organisational culture and safety culture tools.  These would not be directly utilisable, but 
could perhaps offer insights into the measurement of culture, the construction of task 
typologies and the effects of other factors on team performance.  
An examination of non-academic sources of culture tools, in particular, commercial web sites 
and business management books, revealed three ‘national culture’ tools.  The first, ‘The 
CULTURE Tool’ by Catholic Health was a very simple paper-based checklist; it appeared to 
be targeted primarily at U.S. health workers travelling abroad.  This tool was presented as a 
table which, for three regions and eight countries, listed information under four headings – 
belief practices, nutritional preferences, communication awareness and patient care.  The 
aim of the tool appeared to be the avoidance of the most obvious cultural blunders and, due 
to its simplicity and limited coverage, it did not offer a basis for further development. 
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The second national culture tool was a software-based tool by Hofstede75 and the 
consultancy company itim international, and was called ‘The Culture Compass Survey’ (see 
http://geert-hofstede.com/cultural-survey.html); due to its commercial nature, only a limited 
amount of information about its underlying methods could be gleaned.  The Culture Compass 
Survey enabled an individual to state his/her home country, country of interest and to select 
one of eight roles, then to take a survey (consisting of 42 pairs of statements) that revealed 
his/her cultural preferences.  Scores were then produced internally that indicated cultural 
differences between the individual and both his/her own country’s (default) national culture 
and that of the country of interest; based on these differences, feedback comments were 
generated that highlighted potential pitfalls and problems that might occur in both countries. 
The ranking of these comments appeared to be based on the stated role of the participant.  
This tool appeared to carry out, to some degree, several of the activities presented in Figure 
3-4; it produced a cultural profile (for an individual, not a team), and took limited account of 
the individual’s role (rather than tasks).  The tool was aimed at the determination of the 
degree of fit of an individual ‘outsider’ to another culture, rather than the degree of fit of a 
team’s culture to a task set.  Interestingly, Hofstede has in the past repeatedly warned about 
the ecological fallacy arising from assigning cultural scores (or cultural preferences) to an 
individual (Hofstede 2001, p.16).  Note that the Culture Compass Survey was released at a 
late stage of the work described in this thesis.  
The third national culture tool, by DFA Intercultural Global Solutions, was an online software-
based tool called ‘CultureCompass’ (see http://dfaculturecompass.com/).  As a commercial 
tool, only a limited amount of information was available about the underlying methods, but it 
appeared to utilise cultural dimensions from more than one cultural framework.  This tool was 
similar to the Hofstede-based Culture Compass Survey (above), it asked the user to select a 
role, to take a survey consisting of ten questions (each with a sliding scale between two 
extremes), and then to enter his/her nationality.  The tool then displayed the differences 
between the user and the national average, and reproduced standard material on the 
particular dimensions.  
A1E.1.2 Organisational culture models and tools 
Two published reviews of organisational culture instruments for commerce and industry, 
public administration (Jung et al., 2009) and health and social care (Scott, Mannion, Davies, 
& Marshall, 2003) were initially examined.  A number of the more interesting instruments 
were assessed, for example, the Organizational Culture Inventory (Cooke & Szumal, 1993), 
                                            
75 Hofstede’s academic contributions will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 295 
 
Competing Values Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  Typically, following the utilisation 
of checklists, questionnaires, interviews, discussion groups or a combination of these, the 
organisation’s current or proposed culture was allocated into one of several types (via a 
taxonomic or dimensional scheme); these types were clearly related to or affected by 
national culture, but very little reference was made as to the potential relationships to, and 
effects of, national culture. 
Most of the organisational tools appeared to employ checklists, questionnaires, interviews, 
discussion groups or a combination of these, in some cases with computer support.  There 
was some overlap in the above reviews, but there were differing criteria, e.g. competitive 
performance improvement in commerce and industry, vs. quality of care in healthcare and 
intercultural competence in social care.  Quantitative organisational culture measurement 
tool assessments were typically based on typologies (i.e. allocating the culture to one of 
several predefined types), or on dimensions, where the assessments resulted in scores 
along each of several dimensions.  None of the organisational culture tools contained 
elements that could be adapted to a national-culture-based tool; in particular, these tools did 
not enable the consideration of relationships between cultural elements and task 
performance requirements.  
The majority of non-academic sources presented commercial variants on organisational 
culture tools.  Examples included ‘lean culture’ tools, ‘cultural transformation’ tools, ‘culture 
alignment’ tools and ‘customer culture’ tools; many of the commercial culture tool web sites 
offered user training courses.  
Only a minority of the publications on organisational culture acknowledged the overriding 
influence of national culture on organisational culture and most of those that did 
acknowledge it paid little more than ‘lip service’.  For example, the book “Diagnosing and 
Changing Organizational Culture based on the Competing Values Framework”, which goes 
into considerable detail on the processes of assessing, diagnosing and changing culture, 
does not allude to national culture. 
Few (if any) of the commercial tools, took account of national cultural differences and, as a 
result, would have little relevance outside western cultures.  In addition, the organisational 
culture tools appeared not to consider task-related requirements of organisations, rather a 
target corporate culture that was thought to be conducive from specific viewpoints (e.g. ‘the 
customer’). 
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A1E.1.3 Safety culture models and tools 
Several published reviews of safety culture tools were examined.  These included a safety 
culture tool selection guide by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP, 
2010a), a review of the main safety culture assessment approaches and a selection of tools 
by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (Eeckelaert, Starren, van 
Scheppingen, Fox, & Bruck, 2011), and a review of patient-related safety culture tools as part 
of a European Network for Patient Safety project (EUNetPaS, 2010).  These tools had many 
similarities to the organisational culture tools, again employing checklists, questionnaires, 
interviews, discussion group, etc.  However, none of the safety-related dimensions, nor any 
task-related aspects, appeared to offer any contribution to the culture tool requirements of 
the author’s research. As was the case with organisational culture, none of the safety culture 
tools could be adapted to a national-culture-based tool, nor did these tools enable the 
consideration of relationships between cultural elements and the task performance 
requirements associated with the teams’ purposes. 
A1E.1.4 Summary on culture tools 
To summarise this section, no national culture-based models or tools were found that could 
enable the prediction of the performance of a proposed or current team in a range of 
team/task situations.  No organizational or safety culture tools were found that could be 
adapted effectively to meet the requirements of the research described in this thesis; indeed, 
few of the academic or commercial publications on organisational culture appeared to 
recognise the constraints that national cultures place on organisational and safety cultures.  
The tool that came nearest to meeting the requirements was that of Hofstede and itim 
international.  There appears to be a significant gap, in both academia and commerce/-
industry, in the provision of tools or guidance for culture-based team selection, adaptation 
and performance prediction for critical tasks. 
A1E.2 Cultural frameworks 
In the absence of national culture-based models, methods and tools for the estimation or 
prediction of team performance, the purpose of this section was to ascertain the availability 
and capabilities of frameworks, models, methods or tools for the capture of national cultural 
traits of individuals and/or teams.  These could form the basis of, or at least provide guidance 
in the construction of, the ‘cultural side’ of a performance prediction model and tool . 
Over the last half century, researchers in human culture have developed a variety of quanti-
tative instruments for the measurement of culture.  Typically, these instruments or frame-
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works encapsulated sets of cultural factors, attributes, orientations or dimensions that were 
presented as a binary or ternary choice between qualitative alternatives, or in terms of a 
quantitative scale between two extremes, and appeared to capture meaningful differences 
between people of different nationalities.  Although there was no universally-agreed set of 
cultural dimensions, certain dimensions (and minor variations on them) appeared in several 
of the cultural frameworks, and have been found to be statistically robust.   
A review of cultural frameworks has been carried out by the student, for which the initially-
identified authors were Hofstede, House et al., Triandis and Schwartz.  Academic books 
detailing many of these frameworks represented a useful starting point; these initially-
perused academic books included “Culture’s Consequences” (G H Hofstede, 1980), 
“Cultures and Organizations” (Geert Hofstede, 1991), “Culture, Leadership and Organi-
zations” (House et al., 2004), “Culture and Social Behavior” (Triandis, 1993), “Beyond 
Individualism/Collectivism” (S H Schwartz, 1994) and “Multinational Work Teams: A New 
Perspective” (Earley & Gibson, 2002).  Academic papers by these authors, and reviews by 
other authors of their work, were then retrieved and examined before expanding the review 
via forward- and backward-citations.  Following reading and commenting on these further 
papers, sets of keywords and phrases were identified, and utilised via the databases/search 
engines described in Subsection 3.2.2.   
There are now too many culture-measurement instruments (or frameworks) for all of them to 
be detailed in this thesis, for example, a recent review paper (Taras et al., 2009) identified 
121 such instruments.  Therefore, this review was limited to the higher impact cultural frame-
works, as only these could offer the range of study results that would enable the researcher 
to extract useful, predictive relationships between culture and performance. 
In providing a form of ‘cultural location’ (see top box of Figure 3-5), the above frameworks 
could, if combined with task/skill frameworks, provide the basis for a culture-based team 
performance prediction methodology. 
Note that most of the descriptions of cultural dimensions in this section are, of necessity, 
limited; the references provide access to detailed definitions and explanations. 
A1E.2.1 National or ethnic culture frameworks 
National (or ethnic) culture typically reflects the most profound aspects of culture (compared 
to occupational, organisational, etc.), as it is inculcated in individuals from a very age.  This 
section describes the higher impact frameworks. 
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Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck’s value orientations method (VOM) (Hills, 2002; Kluckhohn & 
Strodtbeck, 1961) has been utilised to identify cultural differences between groups; it 
encapsulated the work of the Harvard Values Project that took place during the 1940s and 
1950s (Bahr, 2006).  The method was based on five concerns or cultural orientations, each 
with three descriptive values or responses – human nature (good, mixed, evil), man-nature 
relationship (dominant, in harmony, subordinate), time sense (past, present, future), activity 
(doing, becoming, being) and social relations (individual, collateral, hierarchical).  The 
associated VOM assessment survey tool enabled members of communities to rank the 
responses for each of the above concerns, thus describing their own cultures as they saw 
them.  Unsurprisingly, people of different cultures chose different responses, for example, as 
shown in the table below; this is based on Carter (1990) and Russo (2000). 
Cultural 
group 
Responses (values, beliefs, preferences, aspirations) 
Human nature Man-nature 
relationship 
Time sense Activity Social 
relations 
Euro-
American 
People are mixed Dominant over 
nature 
Future-oriented Focussed on 
doing 
Individual 
Native 
American 
People are good Harmony with 
nature 
Past-oriented Focussed on 
being 
Collateral 
relations 
Comparison of two cultures 
The VOM was successfully applied in a range of cross-cultural situations including higher 
education, healthcare and conflict resolution in public resource management (Gallagher, 
2001b), and could be used to train people to be aware of cultural differences. 
Triandis’ cultural framework (Triandis 1995; 1996) was composed of five cultural 
syndromes (or dimensions) – cultural complexity, cultural tightness, individualism, horizontal 
collectivism and vertical collectivism, each with two descriptive values76 (the equivalent of low 
and high) to choose from, i.e. a total of 32 (25) cultural categories.  Whereas many cultural 
frameworks treated individualism/collectivism as expressing the extremes of a single 
dimension, Triandis treated individualism and collectivism as three separate syndromes, 
including two types of collectivism – horizontal (‘interdependence and oneness’) and vertical 
(‘serving the group’).  
Hofstede’s cultural framework (1984) emerged out of a series of research investigations 
into culture at IBM sites in forty countries, between 1967 and 1973.  Based on statistical 
analyses of responses to a large set of questions, four largely independent cultural 
dimensions were originally identified and, for these, national scores were derived and 
normalised to a range between 0 and 100.  These four cultural dimensions are listed, with 
                                            
76 E.g. cultural tightness has the values ‘loose’ and ‘tight’. 
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their extreme (descriptive) values, in the following table.  More detailed descriptions and 
explanations of the four dimensions of the table can be found in Hofstede (2001), chapters 3 
to 6 and Hofstede & Hofstede (2004), chapters 2 to 5.  Since Hofstede’s original analyses, 
many further countries have been evaluated and, at the start of this research, scores were 
available for 76 countries and regions (representing a large proportion of the World’s 
population). 
Cultural 
dimension Extreme values - descriptions 
Power 
distance 
(PDI) 
Low PDI:  Those in authority tend to be 
consultative, with communications occurring 
relatively freely up and down the command 
chain.  Decisions are more likely to be made by 
agents with appropriate knowledge and 
experience, irrespective of roles. 
High PDI:  Subordinates accept (and even 
prefer) being ordered with little consultation 
on the part of leaders.  Decisions are made 
by those in authority, are dispatched down-
wards through the organization, are rarely 
questioned and are never overridden.  
Individualism 
(vs. collec-
tivism) (IDV) 
Collectivism (low IDV):  Individuals belong to 
tightly-knit groups and in return for unquestioning 
loyalty, gain the protection of their group.  
Collectivists try to avoid direct, confrontational 
approaches and speak indirectly (the information 
is in the context). Hierarchies tend to be rigid, 
and losing face must be avoided at all costs. 
High IDV:  Ties between individuals (other 
than immediate family members) tend to be 
loose.  Individualists take personal respon-
sibility for their actions, typically speak in a 
direct manner (the information is in the 
message), and are willing to argue and to 
question others’ views. 
Masculinity 
(vs. 
femininity) 
(MAS) 
Low MAS (high femininity):  There is greater 
fluidity in roles between the sexes, less 
differentiation than in high masculinity societies.  
Quality of life, good relationships and co-
operation are important. 
High MAS: The difference in roles between 
the genders is high.  Competition and 
recognition are important than quality of life 
and relationships. 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
(UAI) 
Low UAI:  Members have a high tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity, in many cases 
preferring situations that offer some uncertainty. 
High UAI:  Members feel discomfort with 
uncertainty and will seek to reduce it (or at 
least its apparent manifestation) via laws, 
rules and other measures. 
Hofstede's original four cultural dimensions 
Following work by Chinese researchers, Hofstede (2001, Ch.7) added a further cultural 
dimension, long term orientation; this dimension measured the willingness of a cultural group 
to persevere over a long time period.  However, at the time the author began this body of 
research, LTO values were only available for 23 countries; in addition, a number of criticisms 
had been made of the dimension (Fang, 2003; Jacob, 2005).  A sixth cultural dimension, that 
of indulgence vs. restraint (IVR), was added following Minkov’s detailed analysis of the World 
Values Survey, see Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov (2010, Ch.8); however, at the time the 
author began his research, no IVR scores were available.  More recently still, the term 
pragmatism has replaced that of long term orientation. 
Trompenaars’ cultural framework (F. Trompenaars et al., 1997) was based on his 
consultancy experiences.  From these, he concluded that cultures are distinguished from 
each other by the ways that their members solve three fundamental problems - their relation-
ships with other people, with (or to) time, and with nature.  Trompenaars developed a 
questionnaire based on the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and Parsons and Shils 
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(1951), and used it to collect data from his international business clients and their 
employees.  In particular, Trompenaars wished to know how these people, from a range of 
countries, resolved dilemmas.  From an analysis of the data, he developed seven cultural 
dimensions that appeared to explain most of the variations in behaviour that he had 
observed via the questionnaires (Fons Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997).  These 
dimensions are listed, with brief extreme value descriptions, in the following table. 
Cultural 
dimension Extreme values - descriptions 
Universalism vs. 
particularism 
Universalism:  Rules - all should be 
treated equally, the law should not 
differentiate.  
Particularism:  Relationships - it matters who 
you are; you might testify falsely for a friend in 
court. 
Individualism vs. 
communitarianism 
Individualism:  The individual is placed 
before the community; self-reliance and 
initiative are important. 
Communitarianism:  The community is 
placed before the individual, who must serve 
the community to satisfy his/her needs. 
Specificity vs. 
diffusion 
Specificity:  Plain-speaking, specific, 
analytic, self-controlled, factual. 
Diffusion:  Mysterious, holistic, and 
passionate. Relationships are key.  
Affectivity vs. 
neutrality 
Affectivity:  People do not hide their 
feelings, and display their emotions. 
Neutrality:  People are discouraged from 
displaying feelings and expressing emotions. 
Achieved status 
vs. ascribed status 
Achieved status:  Achieving your status 
by your continuing accomplishments. 
Ascribed status:  Achieving your status by 
privilege (e.g. by birth, age or wealth). 
Inner direction vs. 
outer direction 
Inner direction:  People can control and 
change their environment. 
Outer direction:  People should live in 
harmony with their environment, an organic 
view. 
Sequential time vs. 
synchronous time 
Sequential time:  Time as an arrow, 
proceeding irreversibly; do one thing at a 
time. 
Synchronous time:  Time as circular, with 
opportunities repeating them-selves; do 
several things at once. 
Trompenaars’ seven cultural dimensions 
The GLOBE cultural framework was based on one of the largest recent studies of national 
culture (House et al., 2004); it examined the attitudes and beliefs of more than 17,000 
managers from 950 organisations in 62 countries.  The study was primarily focused on 
cultural influences on organisational leadership.  Based on detailed analyses of 
questionnaire results, the GLOBE researchers classified societies into ten regional clusters - 
Anglo, Latin Europe, Nordic Europe, Germanic Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia and Confucian Asia.  The GLOBE study 
identified nine cultural dimensions, which are described in the following table. 
Assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism and 
power distance originated from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Geert H. Hofstede, 1984).  
The GLOBE power distance and uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions were virtually 
identical to Hofstede’s similarly-named dimensions.  A factor analysis of the items intended 
to measure collectivism (Hofstede’s individualism vs. collectivism) resulted in two GLOBE 
dimensions - institutional collectivism (a new construct) and in-group collectivism.  Based on 
Hofstede’s description of his masculinity vs. femininity dimension, the GLOBE researchers 
developed two dimensions – gender egalitarianism and assertiveness; this enabled them to 
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remove items from the masculinity (gender) dimension that were considered not to be 
properties of masculinity. 
The GLOBE future orientation cultural dimension was based on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s 
time sense (past, present, future) cultural orientation (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961); future 
orientation was also related in concept to Hofstede’s long-term orientation cultural dimension.  
The GLOBE humane orientation was based on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s human nature 
(evil, mixed, good) cultural orientation, Putnam’s civil society work (Putnam, 1993) and 
McClelland’s affiliative motive work (McClelland, 1985).The GLOBE Study was subsequently 
extended to include in-depth studies of 25 societies (Chhokar et al., 2008).  
Cultural 
dimension Extreme values - descriptions 
Assertiveness Low:  Individuals are non-confrontational 
and deferential in social relationships. 
High:  Individuals are assertive, aggressive and 
confrontational in social relationships. 
Future 
orientation 
Low:  Individuals ‘live for the day’, with 
relatively little thought for the future. 
High:  Individuals sacrifice some of their current 
benefits to plan and invest for the future,  
Gender 
egalitarianism 
Low:  There are significant role differences 
and inequalities between the genders.  
High:  Society minimises gender role 
differences and inequality. 
Humane 
orientation 
Low:  Society does not encourage 
individuals to exhibit altruism, fairness, etc. 
High:  Society awards individuals well for 
exhibiting fairness, altruism, generosity and 
kindness. 
Institutional 
collectivism 
Low:  Institutions do not significantly reward 
collective behaviour. 
High:  Institutions reward collective action and 
distribution of resources. 
In-group 
collectivism 
Low:  Individuals do not display significant 
loyalty, pride and cohesiveness in their 
families and organizations. 
High:  Individuals display significant loyalty, 
pride and cohesiveness in their families and 
organizations. 
Performance 
orientation 
Low:  Society does not reward individuals 
for performance improvement and 
excellence. 
High:  Society awards individuals for 
performance improvement and excellence. 
Power distance Low:  Individuals expect that power will be 
delegated as appropriate to the situation. 
High: Individuals expect that power should be 
concentrated at higher levels, 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Low:  Individuals and society tolerate 
uncertainty. 
High:  Individuals and society strive to avoid 
uncertainty via social norms, practices and 
rules. 
The GLOBE Study cultural dimensions 
Schwartz’s culture-level value scale (or cultural values framework) was based on data 
collected and analysed data from 49 nations (Shalom H Schwartz, 1999, 2006).  He 
identified seven ‘cultural level value types’, which could be structured or condensed as 
‘cultural orientations’ along three polar dimensions, seethe following table.  
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Cultural 
dimension Extreme values - descriptions 
Mastery vs. 
harmony 
Mastery:  self-assertion, seeking to 
change the world. 
Harmony:  At one with nature and a world at 
peace. 
Embeddedness vs. 
autonomy 
Embeddedness:  People see themselves 
in terms of the group, and it is important to 
maintain the status quo. 
Autonomy:  People see themselves 
separately from the group, capable of 
expressing their own opinions and acting 
independently. 
Hierarchy vs. 
egalitarianism 
Hierarchy:  Roles are ascribed, and rules 
must be obeyed.  Inequality is accepted. 
Egalitarianism:  Members are socialised to 
co-operate and pursue the wellbeing of all. 
Schwartz’ three cultural orientations 
A summary of national culture frameworks:  The most commonly referenced culture 
frameworks (described earlier) have been compared to each other via a table, enabling the 
reader to observe the differing ‘cultural coverage’ of the various researchers’ offerings.  The 
six vertical columns of the following table represent the cultural dimensions, orientations or 
syndromes of the six cultural frameworks that are being compared.  The table rows associate 
dimensions that are similar, based on the descriptions of their authors.  It can be seen from 
the table that, for these six publicised and widely used cultural frameworks, individualism vs. 
collectivism (or its near equivalent) is the only cultural dimension common to all.  Power 
distance (or its near equivalent) appears in four of the six frameworks.  Uncertainty 
avoidance and man-nature relationships (or their near equivalents), appear in three of the 
frameworks.  
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Researcher/research team/model/method cultural dimensions 
Kluckhohn & 
Strodtbeck’s 
VOM 
Hofstede’s 
original cultural 
dimensions 
Triandis’ 
cultural 
syndromes 
Trompenaar’s cultural 
dimensions 
The GLOBE 
Study cultural 
dimensions 
Schwartz’s 
cultural 
orientations 
Social 
relations 
Individualism vs. 
collectivism (IDV) 
Individualism Individualism vs. 
communitarianism 
Institutional 
collectivism 
Embeddedness 
vs. autonomy 
Horizontal 
collectivism 
Universalism vs. 
particularism 
In-group 
collectivism 
 
Vertical 
collectivism 
 Assertiveness  
Specificity vs. diffusion Performance 
orientation 
 
 Power distance 
(PDI) 
 Achieved status vs. 
ascribed status 
Power distance Hierarchy vs. 
egalitarianism 
 Masculinity vs. 
femininity (MAS) 
  Gender 
egalitarianism 
 
Assertiveness  
 Uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) 
Cultural 
tightness 
 Uncertainty 
avoidance 
 
Time sense Long term 
orientation (LTO) 
  Future orientation  
Man-nature 
relationship 
  Inner direction vs. outer 
direction 
 Mastery vs. 
harmony 
   Sequential time vs. 
synchronous time 
  
   Affectivity vs. neutrality   
Activity (being 
or doing) 
   Humane 
orientation 
 
Human nature      
  Cultural 
complexity 
   
Note that dimensions in italics indicate at best an approximate fit. 
A comparison of national cultural dimensions, orientations and syndromes 
The frameworks of Hofstede and the GLOBE appear to achieve the greatest commonality 
across all cultural dimensions. 
A1E.2.2 Organisational culture frameworks 
A brief review was carried out of organisational culture tools in Section A1E2.2, but this was 
with a view to extracting useful features for application in the national culture tool.  The 
reason for this review was to determine whether it was possible, or reasonable, to adjust 
default national culture values to take account of organisational differences (where known).  
Ideally, it should be possible to allocate certain default organisational culture properties to 
certain sectors of activity, e.g. to aircraft transport, refining, power generation, medical 
facilities.  These could then have been used to adjust national culture values.   
The Competing Values Framework (CVF) emerged out of research work by Cameron and 
Quinn  (Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, 1983).   The CVF utilised two 
dimensions - focused vs. flexible (differentiating between stability, order and control on the 
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one hand, and flexibility, discretion and dynamism on the other) and internal vs. external 
(differentiating between an internally orientated focus on unity, integration and collaboration 
on the one hand, and a focus on competition, rivalry and differentiation on the other).  The 
associated organization culture assessment instrument (OCAI) covered six categories of 
organisation-related statements.  By allocating a total of 100 points across the four 
statements in each category (a total of 600 points), a set of scores emerged that located the 
organisation within the four CVF quadrants.  This allocation exercise was typically carried out 
for the ‘as-is’ organisation, and again for the ‘would like to be’ organisation.  The two 
orthogonal dimensions produced four quadrants; companies falling into these four quadrants 
were identified as hierarchy (focus/internal), market (focus/external), clan (flexible/internal) 
and adhocracy (flexible/external). 
Although the CVF was informative in terms of identifying broad organisational features, it was 
difficult to see how it could be adapted (or linked in) to the national cultural traits of team 
members for the purpose of the research work of this thesis. 
Deal & Kennedy’s organisational culture framework (1988) utilised two cultural 
dimensions - rapidity of feedback and reward (the speed with which companies learned 
whether their actions and strategies have been successful), and degree of risk or uncertainty 
(the amount of risk (or uncertainty) associated with the organisation’s key activities).  These 
two dimensions produced four quadrants of culture (as with the earlier-presented CVF); 
companies falling into these four quadrants were identified as possessing process culture 
(slow/low-risk), bet-the-company culture (slow/high-risk), work-hard-play-hard culture 
(rapid/low-risk) and tough-guy-macho culture (rapid/high-risk).  Each of these company 
cultures fitted a particular type of business.  For example, the ‘tough-guy’, macho culture 
(high risk, rapid feedback) was associated with high-stress organizations that focused 
primarily on the present, facing constant risk of failing to achieve targets and losing rewards, 
for example sports and hospital surgery.  By way of contrast, the process culture (slow 
feedback/reward, low risk) was typically a slow plodding bureaucracy intent on maintaining 
the status quo (past=present=future). 
As is the case with the earlier-presented CVF, it was difficult to see how the Deal & Kennedy 
organisational culture framework could be adapted (or linked in) to the national cultural traits 
of team members for the purpose of the research work of this thesis. 
Harrison’s organisational culture framework:  Harrison (1972) argued that there were six 
‘interests’ associated with organisations, which formed the basis of ideological tension and 
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struggle.  He proposed four organisational ideologies that emerged out of these: 
• Power orientation:  Power oriented organisations aspired to dominate their environ-
ments and eliminate all opposition.  Those who were in positions of power attempted 
to maintain total control over their subordinates.  Although their autocratic structures 
enabled power-oriented organisations to make quick decisions, the lack of rapid, 
reliable information flow meant that they were not very flexible or responsive to 
changes in complex environments. 
• Role orientation:  Role-oriented organisations aspired to rationality and orderliness, 
and the maintenance of legality, legitimacy and responsibility.  Rules and procedures 
were developed and adhered to.  Role oriented organisations were unable to respond 
quickly to threats and changes in their environments because they were heavily 
constrained by their rules and standard procedures. 
• Task orientation:  Task-oriented organisations were goal-driven, and all aspects of 
such organisations were evaluated in terms of their contributions to the goal(s).  They 
typically had a decentralised structure, delegated decisions to those with the appro-
priate knowledge, and could react quickly to changes in complex environments. 
• Person orientation:  Person-oriented organisations existed to serve their members; 
only a minimum level of authority was accepted over individual members.  Person 
oriented organisations tended to be slow to respond as they did not have adequate 
means to organise their members to deal with threats.  
Although Harrison did not specify any dimensions associated with the above orientations, 
there was a degree of exclusivity between two pairs that have some of the qualities of 
dimensions, i.e.:  
• Role vs. task orientation:  This was very similar to the CVS internal vs. external and 
Hofstede’s process vs. results dimensions (see later). 
• Person vs. power orientation:  This was very similar to Hofstede’s organisational 
culture dimension of employee vs. job-orientation (see later). 
Looking to national culture dimensions, Harrison’s power orientation could (from its 
description) be associated with high power distance, his role orientation could be associated 
with uncertainty avoidance.  However, in the absence of associations between the above 
orientations and particular sectors, it was not feasible for it to be adopted for the research 
work described in this thesis. 
Hofstede’s six dimensional model of organisational culture (Hofstede et al. 1990) was 
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based on studies of organizational cultures in twenty units of ten companies in Denmark and 
the Netherlands.  Following a detailed analysis of the results Hofstede et al. developed a 
model of organizational cultures consisting of the following dimensions: 
• Process vs. results:  Concern with means (processes, techniques, etc.) vs. concern 
with the achievement of goals. 
• Employee vs. job-oriented:  Concern about people/employees, delegation of 
decision-making vs. concern about getting the job done, centralized decision-making, 
impersonal. 
• Parochial vs. professional:  Employees who derived their identities from the 
organisation (e.g. ‘the company man’) vs. employees who derived their identities from 
their professions (who separate their external lives from the job). 
• Open vs. closed:  Open, welcoming to new employees, easy to gain an insight vs. 
closed to outsiders; people took a long time to fit in. 
• Loose vs. tight:  Flexible with regard to attitudes, times and budgets vs. highly 
controlled, serious, adhere to times, budgets. 
• Normative vs. pragmatic:  Implementation of (inviolable) rules vs. maintaining 
flexibility in order to serve the customer. 
Hofstede et al. ( 2010), p.370, emphasized that, as the research data behind the above six 
dimensions was based on twenty organisational units in two European countries, it could not 
be claimed that that the above six dimensions adequately described all types of organis-
ations in all countries.  However, they suggested that all organisational cultures could 
usefully be described by a number of dimensions that would have some resemblance to the 
above six dimensions. 
The above six-dimensional framework was not sufficiently tested, nor were there sufficient 
applications in the research literature for it to be adopted for the research work described in 
this thesis.  
Schein’s organisational culture framework (1996a; 1996b) consisted of the following six 
dimensions: 
• Relationship to the environment:  The organisation was dominant vs. harmonising 
vs. niche-seeking within its business environment. 
• Nature of human activity within the organisation:  The accepted model of 
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behaviour was to control via proactive behaviours vs. to harmonise relationships via 
passive/fatalistic compromises.  
• Nature of time within the organisation:  Organisation members preferred looking to 
the past vs. living for the present vs. looking to the future. 
• Reality and truth in the organisation:  Organisation members assessed reality and 
truth via systematic formulae of motive, means and opportunity vs. experience, 
wisdom and intuition.  
• The nature of people:  Organisation members assumed that people were good, evil 
or lazy and perhaps able to change vs. assuming that people were trying to do their 
best, even when they failed.  
• Distribution of power and affiliation:  Organisation members competed, grabbed 
resources, worked primarily to further their own goals, and managers were autocratic 
or paternalistic vs. members cooperated, worked in a team-oriented manner and 
shared resources.  
The reality in most organisations was that they were ‘somewhere in the middle’ for most of 
the above dimensions and, also, there would be large differences across different levels and 
functional areas.  As with the other frameworks, there were insufficient applications, and no 
relationship between the above and various industrial sectors, so it could not be adopted for 
the research work described in this thesis. 
A summary of organisational culture frameworks: The most commonly referenced 
organisational culture frameworks (described earlier) are compared to each other via a table, 
enabling the reader to observe the differing ‘organisational cultural coverage’ of the various 
researchers’ offerings.  The five vertical columns of the following table represent the cultural 
dimensions, orientations or syndromes of the five organisational culture frameworks that are 
being compared.  The table rows associate dimensions that are similar, from the five frame-
works. 
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Organizational cultural framework 
Competing 
values 
(organisational 
culture) 
framework 
Deal and Kennedy’s 
organisational culture 
framework 
Harrison’s 
organisational 
culture 
framework 
Hofstede’s 
organisational culture 
framework 
Hofstede/-
Mintzberg’s 
organisation 
configurations 
Focused vs. 
flexible 
  Loose vs. tight Uncertainty 
avoidance? 
Role vs. task 
 
Normative vs. pragmatic 
Internal vs. 
external 
 Process vs. results 
 Rapidity of feedback    
 Degree of risk or uncertainty    
  Person vs. 
power 
Employee vs. job-oriented Power distance? 
   Parochial vs. professional  
   Open vs. closed  
Note that dimensions in italics indicate at best an approximate fit. 
A comparison of organisational cultural dimensions, orientations and syndromes  
A summary: It can be seen from the above table that, for this sample of organisational 
culture frameworks, there is little common ground across them in terms of cultural 
dimensions.  No dimensions emerge as ‘clear winners’, nor is there common guidance as to 
the likely ‘default’ dimension scores or values for given organisation types.  Also, none of the 
frameworks provided a basis for an association of organisational culture traits with sectors 
and, other than the competing values framework, they had not been widely applied.  It 
appeared that organisational culture cannot be used as a contributory input to the work of 
this thesis. 
A1E.2.3 Professional culture frameworks – measuring professional culture 
There have been few studies of professional culture, compared to organisational culture.  
The majority of studies appeared to be comparisons between professions, or comparisons 
between the culture dimension scores of professionals and the national cultural dimension 
scores of their compatriots.  It was, however, clear that there was a significant degree of self-
selection in many professions – different personality types chose to be accountants, 
teachers, doctors, etc.; this was likely to be reflected to some degree in their quantitative 
culture scores. 
The only study that appeared to offer a replicable, quantitative approach was one by Bosland 
(G H Hofstede 2001, pp.493-494; Bosland 1985).  This adjusted Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension scores based on years in full time education.  As most professions demand long 
periods in education, this provided a valid means of adjusting national culture scores 
indirectly for professions, although it did not capture the differences between ‘conservative’ 
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and ‘outgoing’ professions that both required degree-level qualifications.   
A summary: Bosland’s adjustment of the four dimension scores of Hofstede’s original 
national cultural framework was the only quantitative approach found that was related (via                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
years of full time education) to professional culture.  As it adjusted Hofstede’s national culture 
scores, it would be simple to incorporate into a method and tool that utilised Hofstede’s 
national culture framework. 
A1E.3 Measures of team cultural diversity 
For the purposes of the work described in this thesis, a measure of cultural diversity of team 
members was required that provided a quantitative value reflecting the mean cultural 
differences between team members.  It was important that any measure utilised by the 
researcher would take account, not only of the number of different cultures (e.g. national 
cultures) in a team, but also the degree of difference between each of those cultures.  In 
addition, it was important that such a measure would enable users of a tool incorporating the 
measure to identify the diversity associated with each team member. 
A review of the literature revealed three main approaches to the determination of diversity, 
examples of which are briefly discussed below. 
The Blau Index of racial and ethnic diversity (Blau, 1977) , the Herfindhal-Hirschmann 
Index (HHI) (Rhoades, 1993), the Shannon (or Shannon-Wiener) Diversity Index (SDI) 
and Simpson’s Index (Simpson’s D) were based on the number of different types (e.g. plant 
species, nationalities) and their relative weightings, not the degree of difference (diversity) 
between types.  
Greenberg’s Diversity Index (also known as the linguistic diversity index, LDI) was primarily 
utilised to measure the diversity of a country’s languages.  In his paper on the measurement 
of linguistic diversity (Greenberg, 1956), Greenberg described a simple index based on the 
probability of two speakers from the selected population speaking the same language, 
GDI(A), and also described an alternative that included a weighting for each language pair 
based on their linguistic similarities, GDI(B).  He then described an approach that takes 
account of multilingual speakers.  The weighted monolingual index was defined as:  
GDI(B) = 1 - ∑m,n (mn) (rMN) 
where m, n were the proportions of speakers of languages M and N in the population, 
and rMN was a measure of the resemblance between languages M and N. 
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The Greenberg monolingual weighted index (type B) took account of the level of disparity 
between object types (species, languages, etc.).  It was therefore able to distinguish between 
teams with members of different but similar cultures from those of very different cultures.   
The Stirling Index (Stirling, 1999; Stirling, 2007) took account of the level of disparity 
between object types (different species, languages, cultures/countries, etc.) by assuming that 
they were located in Euclidean space, and the distance between any two object types 
represented their mutual disparity.  The Stirling index was defined as: 
SI =  ∑i,j dij pi pj 
for  i,j = 1 to the number of species (or team member countries), 
 dij = distance (disparity) between species (or country) ‘i’ and ‘j’ 
and pi = the proportion of the population belonging to species or country ‘i’. 
The Stirling index took account of the level of disparity between object types (species, 
languages, etc.).  
The standard statistical measures of mean and variance, as used by Elron (1997) could 
be utilised to derive a value for team cultural diversity.  Elron calculated the mean and 
standard deviation of team members based on Hofstede’s default national culture scores for 
team members, the standard deviation providing a measure of team cultural diversity. 
To summarise the above:  There appeared to be three main approaches to the derivation 
of diversity within a team or population.  The most common approach took account of the 
number of different members based on some nominal value (e.g. gender, profession or 
nationality), an  accurate for binary differences such gender, it was unsatisfactory as a 
measure of diversity because cultures could be very similar (e.g. Germany, Czech Republic) 
or very different (e.g. Guatemala, Australia).  The second approach utilised a measure of 
distance or separation in Euclidean space between members (e.g. based on their national 
culture scores, education and/or ages).  However, to combine (in our case) the cultural 
separation along several axes into a single (Euclidean) distance was to imply that each factor 
or dimension had a similar effect to each other in every circumstance.  The third, statistical 
approach to the derivation of team or population diversity placed an overemphasis on 
outliers. 
A1E.4 Team and task classifications 
For the purposes of the work described in this thesis, it was necessary to be able to describe 
teams and/or their tasks in terms of the behavioural capabilities required for successful 
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performance.  Such behavioural capabilities (for want of a better term) could then be 
associated with team member cultural scores to form the basis of an assessment 
methodology and tool.  The following five culture-modified areas of behaviour/behavioural 
requirements were identified in Subsection 3.3.3: Management and decision-making, 
creativity and innovation, interaction (communication and co-ordination), uncertainty handing 
and achieving shared situation awareness.  It was therefore important to examine the 
literature in order to evaluate team and task typologies (taxonomies, classifications) in terms 
of their abilities to represent the above culture-related requirements. 
There have been many detailed reviews of the literature on team theory, in particular on 
team classifications, for example Guzzo & Dickson (1996), DeMatteo et al. (1998), Wildman 
et al. (2012) and Hollenbeck et al. (2012).  It appeared from an examination of these reviews 
that team classifications varied greatly depending on the ‘central’ team type (the classifier’s 
starting point) and on the purpose of the classification.  Some of the more interesting 
approaches to team/task classification (from the point of view of the author’s research) are 
briefly described below. 
Cohen and Bailey (1997) carried out a review of research on teams and groups published 
between January 1990 and April 1996.  Their team classification was unsuitable for the 
approach in this thesis, as they appeared to place some types of organised action team in 
the same category as routine manufacturing teams.  However, they defined team 
performance along three dimensions – output quantity and quality, member attitudes, and 
behavioural outcomes.  The latter category was of interest, as it could contribute to a link 
between culture and some aspects of performance.  Marks, Mathieu and Zaccaro (2001) 
appeared to concentrate on the classification of industrial and commercial work teams but 
did not provide sufficient details on the task or behavioural aspects of teams to be useful to 
the work of this thesis; however, their ‘team maintenance’ processes could perhaps offer a 
basis for ‘layering’ the effects of culture onto team performance. 
Fernandez et al.’s emergency medicine team taxonomy (2008) utilised the input-process-
output (I-P-O) model that is widely used in industry and academia.  Inputs represented the 
team member characteristics (abilities, experience, etc.), processes represented the 
behaviours and collaborations required to achieve successful outputs in terms of task 
outcomes and team performances; the various sets of ‘task-work’ went through the I-P-O 
cycle, the output of one cycle being an input to the next.  The emergency medicine process 
model was proposed as having (in temporal sequence) a planning and preparation phase, 
action processes and reflection processes.   In particular, the taxonomy’s ‘action process’ 
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phase and ‘support mechanisms’ might have been the locations for culture-affected 
tasks/behaviours, but insufficient details were available to consider it further.  Steiner (1972) 
recognised that the task was one of the key factors in team or group performance.  He split 
unitary (indivisible) tasks into disjunctive, conjunctive, additive and discretionary tasks, and 
divisible tasks into self-matching, (pre-)specified and organisationally (externally) allocated 
tasks; however, the basis of his classification was to enable the optimum allocation of team 
members on the basis of their technical or experience-based proficiencies, and it would be 
difficult to associate such tasks with the effects of culture. 
McGrath’s circumplex (McGrath 1984, Ch. 5) integrated the work of Hackman & Morris 
(1975), Shaw (1973), Davis and Laughlin, to produce his ‘task circumplex’ classification 
framework for group tasks.  This circumflex was represented as a circle with eight segments, 
each segment being one of eight mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive task 
categories - planning, creativity, intellective (have ‘correct’ answers), decision-making (have 
no ‘correct’ answers), cognitive conflict, mixed motive, competitive and performance/psycho-
motor tasks.  McGrath’s circumflex listed some of the areas where problems might occur in 
teams due to the effects of culture, for example in creativity tasks, cognitive conflict tasks, 
mixed motive tasks and competitive tasks.   
Gluesing & Gibson (2003), Chapter 11:  Designing and Forming Global Teams, pp. 199-
226, claimed that the complexity that global teams, in particular, faced could be described 
along five dimensions – task, context, people, time and technology.  Task complexity 
appeared to be the most relevant for cultural issues, and could be described in terms of four 
elements - workflow interdependence (based on the degree of interaction required between 
team members), task environment (varying from a static, stable, predictable environment to 
one that was highly dynamic and unpredictable, causing disruptions and re-evaluations of 
activities), external coupling (which appeared to overlap task environment), and internal 
coupling (which appeared to overlap workflow interdependence).  Gluesing & Gibson’s 
approach was extremely complex, but it was perhaps only the communication ramifications 
of workflow interdependence and the uncertainty ramifications of task environment that had 
clear links to culture. 
Hollenbeck et al. (2012) reviewed the literature of team taxonomies and classifications, and 
demonstrated the weaknesses of taxonomies and other categorical systems when 
attempting to categorise concepts such as team types, which can be placed on a continuum.  
They proposed three dimensions as forming the basis for a wide range of team types - skill 
differentiation (the degree of knowledge or skill specialisation, which made it difficult to 
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substitute team members), authority differentiation (the degree to which decision-making was 
concentrated, or distributed) and temporal stability (the degree to which team members had 
a shared history and expectations of a shared future).  This three-dimensional approach 
offered a limited degree of flexibility in categorising industrial and commercial work teams, 
but could not capture the key differences between teams that are related to culture, e.g. 
creativity or handling uncertainty.  Although the dimensions chosen by Hollenbeck et al. were 
not suitable for a culture-based team performance prediction methodology, the authors 
presented a very cogent case for a dimensional, rather than categorical (e.g. taxonomic) 
approach to team/task classification. 
To summarise the above: Most of the team/task classifications were concentrated on a 
very small range of teams, and did not include the factors that were mediated by culture.  
Steiner’s approach to task classification was valid for research and production-type teams, 
but was not very relevant to rapid-reaction (and similar) teams.  McGrath’s task circumplex 
contained several potentially useful task categories, Gluesing & Gibson’s dimensions of 
complexity covered too few of the factors that influence culture-related performance to be 
usable.  The multidimensional approaches of Hollenbeck et al. and Gluesing & Gibson 
appeared to be the most flexible, but the chosen dimensions excluded most of the key team 
types of relevance to this author’s research, and also did not capture nuances of relevance to 
culture; however, the workflow interdependence and task environment of Gluesing and 
Gibson’s approach could (in theory) be adapted.  None of the team and task typologies 
identified in the literature covered the range of factors required for this research work.  
However, the reviews, in particular that of Hollenbeck et al., highlighted the severe limitations 
of any taxonomic approach – some concepts fit into rigid taxonomic hierarchies (e.g. flora 
and fauna), others do not (e.g. team and task types, games, word definitions).  Therefore, it 
was necessary to devise an alternative team/task typology, based on a non-taxonomic 
classification.  
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Appendix 2: Anecdotal – interviews and personal 
conversations 
Note that, as the examples in this section are anecdotal, no claim is made to the effect that 
they are typical or representative.  The sources of most of the anecdotes below are the 
conversations that the author has had with other research staff, foreign students, lecturers, 
fellow footballers and others about their experiences on coming to Britain or travelling 
elsewhere.  In many cases, the anecdotes that I obtained were potentially traceable to their 
sources, and in other cases I was asked not to quote them; such anecdotes have not been 
listed in the selection below. 
English indirectness:  A Swedish PhD student who had spent some time in the USA 
recounted his initial difficulties on coming to the UK.  He commented to me that his British 
supervisors or managers would never tell him to do anything, but would use phrases such as 
“It would be useful if a summary of the data was available by …”, “It would be helpful …”.  
Just tell me what you want me to do! 
English yob culture:  A Palestinian student commented on his shock at both the number of 
young men and women behaving in a drunken manner most evenings near his UK Midlands 
accommodation, and at the number of single young women with children.  Middle-Eastern, 
Indian and Chinese students have all asked me “Why do you allow this?” 
Expectations violated:  Two high power distance research colleagues have commented to 
me (and to other British colleagues) that they found it offensive when people junior to them-
selves from the same region (typically research students who had spent several years in the 
UK) did not acknowledge their seniority when addressing them. 
Face and politeness (China):  A Chinese fellow student/footballer remarked to me that I 
would have difficulty obtaining useful answers from his countrymen because they would not 
be willing to make critical comments about China, as that was an issue of losing face, nor 
would they make critical comments about the UK as that would be considered to be rude to 
their British hosts. 
Face and politeness (Singapore):  I lectured for many years on the topic of manufacturing 
management; the second year course had a large intake of Singaporean students.  Most UK 
students would regularly ask questions, and would answer my questions; however, the 
Singaporeans avoided such interaction in front of the class, even when encouraged by me.  
However, during the break in the middle of a two hour lecture presentation, they would 
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quickly confer and send a delegate to me with a list of questions to be answered.  I never 
had time to grab that desperately needed cup of coffee!  The issue was apparently about 
face – no Singaporean student would risk asking a question for which, in retrospect, the 
answer appeared obvious.  
Face, meetings (China):  When arranging academic and administrative meetings at a 
Chinese mainland university, the Chinese secretary of an English professor that I worked for 
had to plan the seating arrangements very carefully in order to avoid offence, which would 
hinder the purpose of the meeting.   Face issues were associated with where a person sat in 
relation to the head of the table, whom he or she sat next to, and whether another person of 
perceived lower status sat further up the table. 
Jobs (China):  A Chinese PhD student, who was completing his write-up, told me that he 
hoped to obtain a lectureship at a university near his home.  However, it all depended on 
guanxi - the influence that his relatives would be able to bring to bear on the university 
decision-makers.  
Meetings (UK):  I was the only British member of a multinational research group at a UK 
university.  It was difficult to persuade some Middle-Eastern student-members to contribute 
to meetings, so we instigated a policy that every attendee at the meeting was required, in 
turn, to state his or her views on each significant item discussed at the meeting.  This had the 
additional benefit that most of us made more effort to prepare for the meeting.  
Meetings (UK and Eastern Europe):  An Eastern European commented to me that when he 
first came to this country, he was very surprised to find that things were achieved at meetings 
in Britain; this had not been the case in his country, where meetings were somewhat of a 
charade, and the real decisions were made elsewhere.  He was also surprised, when he first 
joined a university department, by the high level of concern that members of staff at meetings 
showed for individual (usually struggling) students. 
Rote education (Egypt):  An Egyptian commented on the tradition of rote education in 
Egypt – the need to score in the mid-90’s or better in order to gain a place at a prestigious 
university resulted in parents and students concentrating on the ability to regurgitate the 
material they had learned verbatim. 
Trust (Egypt):  An Egyptian former construction engineer commented to me that one of the 
first things Egyptian workers would do when operating on a new construction site was to hide 
vital construction-related items in order to ensure that they (the workers) could not be 
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dismissed without inflicting pain on the management. 
Trust (UK):  An East European colleague remarked that the British were too trusting, and the 
opportunities for cheating were quite obvious; the British needed to adjust their tax and 
welfare systems to accommodate immigrants, many of whom would have no compunction 
about cheating the system. 
Uncertainty avoidance - rules and regulations (Germany-1):  A German former co-
researcher commented to me that the British seemed to consider any action legal unless a 
rule forbad it, whereas the Germans considered any action illegal unless a rule allowed it.  
He also commented that both the Germans and British made plans, but the British seemed to 
abandon them almost as soon as work started.  Note that the British and Germans have very 
similar culture dimension scores except for uncertainty avoidance (UAI), where the Germans 
score is much higher. 
Uncertainty avoidance - rules and regulations (Germany-2):  We had been ‘bumped off’ 
our regular slot on the University football pitches without warning.  As we were all kitted up, 
eight of us decided to play on a spare grass pitch; however, our German footballing 
colleague was very nervous about this and insisted that we play on the grass next to the 
pitch, as we did not have permission to play on the pitch. 
Uncertainty avoidance?  At a research establishment where I had previously worked, we 
researchers were asked to attend a meeting to plan new research activities.  A number of 
research areas were considered, and researchers were asked to come up with general 
topics and, within them, specific examples of potential research projects.  Following 
presentations, formation into groups and further discussions, the various topics were put to 
the vote.  I was disappointed to see that not a single radical proposal survived; all the 
successful proposals seemed to contain nothing more mysterious than ‘known unknowns’, 
usually continuations of current research activities.  Perhaps I am reading too much into the 
low individualism, high uncertainty avoidance cultures of the majority of our researchers at 
that time. 
Unfriendly British:  A female Thai PhD student told me that Italian men seemed much 
friendlier and open than British men.  I made no comment.   
Unfriendly British:  A Scandinavian PhD student remarked that initial friendliness on the 
part of the British never ‘carried through’ – they never invited one over to their house, and 
seldom arranged out-of-work activities. 
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Unfriendly British:  An East European PhD student commented similarly to the above, in 
that raised expectations on the basis of initial friendliness never came to anything. 
Unfriendly British:  A Middle-Eastern colleague also commented on the fact that he was 
never invited over to British colleagues’ homes whereas, when he had lived and worked in 
the USA, he had frequently been invited to colleagues’ homes. 
Internationally-shared stereotypes - the Euro (or EuroSwiss) joke – Heaven vs. Hell:  
National differences and stereotypes, widely recognised across Europe, are captured in 
various versions of this joke; to avoid potential copyright issues, it will not be quoted here.  
Please visit one of the following URLs: 
http://ploum.net/post/the-european-joke 
http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/european-stereotypes-and-jokes/ 
In the case of the latter URL, scroll down the page to “In Heaven, the police are British …” 
The World’s most important inventions – the myth:  A widely-quoted survey by MITI 
(Japan’s DTI) concluded that, of the world’s most important inventions, 54% were British, 
25% were American and 5% were Japanese.   
The World’s most important inventions – a little closer to reality:  I carried out a Web 
search to locate the original MITI survey, but was unsuccessful; I did, however, find an article 
in the New Scientist (Budworth, 1986) that traced the myth back to an original 1976 article by 
the US National Science Foundation. The NSF article presented innovation-related estimates 
for the period 1953 to 1973, split into “radical breakthrough,”, “major technical shift”, 
“improvement” and “unclassified”.  The UK’s percentage split between these categories was 
55/40/5/0, respectively, the USA 25/28/38/7, West Germany 13/47/34/4, France 23/64/11/0 
and Japan 7/51/37/3.  Note that in actual numbers of radical breakthrough innovations (the 
UK’s best performing category), the USA produced almost six times as many innovations as 
the UK.  However, the NSF based the above figures on new introductions to the market – a 
stage in the invention/innovation chain at which the UK appears to be particularly poor. 
The interesting aspect of the invention myth is just how many UK publications and other 
articles assumed the myth’s validity without checking the origin of the claims.  I discovered 
over fifty “… according to MITI … “ articles in a few minutes of ‘googling’.  
A British pilot’s experiences – an unstructured interview 
The author carried out an interview with a pilot with more than twenty years flying experience 
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on flag carriers, budget airlines and private flying services.  As a regular trainer, the pilot 
described one of his key tasks as attempting to minimise the ‘power slope’ in the cockpit as, 
for crews of many nationalities, the captain was a considerable distance above the first 
officer.  Following further discussions it became clear that ‘power slope’ was the equivalent of 
power distance.   
The pilot also described the issues he had come across with regard to the issue of following 
standard operational procedures (SOPs) yet retaining flexibility of action when needed.  He 
described the preparations to land at difficult airports in bad weather conditions, and how 
some co-pilots would become agitated when he explained that he was going to deviate from 
SOPs in order to maintain a safe margin of control.  He went on to comment on the Swissair 
MD-11 crash of 1998, which he considered likely to be due in part to the pilots’ decisions to 
follow SOPs and to go through detailed checklists, rather than to turn immediately and head 
for the nearest airport; interestingly Carley (1998) expressed the same view, which appeared 
to be supported by Cocklin (2004).  The pilot mentioned that the members of the civil aircrew 
community frequently discussed accidents and read and commented on them on a range of 
on-line blogs; in some cases, he and others had been at a loss to understand the behaviours 
of pilots in the stages leading up to accidents.  Following this part of the discussion, I 
introduced and described the uncertainty avoidance dimension which, he suggested, 
explained some of the above differences he had found between various nationalities of pilot. 
The pilot commented on the increasing levels multinational employment in the aviation 
industry, as a result of which some airlines employed more than seventy nationalities of flying 
crews.  In at least one such case, the company had implemented, very rigidly, a comprehen-
sive set of watertight SOPs in order to cope with crew national diversity; the pilot expressed 
concerns about this SOP-fixation (as he saw it) and the safety issues that would arise when 
internal or external conditions deviated excessively from the norm, resulting in a loss of 
margins. 
The pilot went on to describe issues of face that came to the fore when he had to correct 
pilots of some nationalities, in particular when training or testing pilots; he also commented 
on the ‘gungho’ attitudes of US pilots, in particular.  We discussed this latter point further and 
it appeared to relate to masculinity; it appeared that this attitude was not common amongst 
other nationalities.  As the USA default masculinity score was lower than that of the UK and 
many other countries, this supported Merritt’s findings that Hofstede’s masculinity scores 
were not closely replicated amongst aircrew (A. C. Merritt, 2000). 
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I asked the pilot about automation preferences amongst his colleagues, and he said that he 
had noticed that, whereas most British (plus other Anglos and North Europeans) preferred a 
more hands-on approach, most other pilots were keen to utilise the FMC as much as 
possible.  He also commented, unprompted, about the loss of skill associated with 
automation, particularly as the generation of pilots with pre- or low-automation experience 
was retiring.  In addition, unlike the older generation of pilots, new recruits typically had no 
other significant flying experience to fall back on. 
To summarise the above, it appeared that national culture played a significant role in civil 
aviation crewing, although the default masculinity scores appeared to be an unreliable 
indicator of attitudes and behaviour.   
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Appendix 3: On-line culture survey form 
 Culture Survey 
 
This survey is part of a PhD project, and will help me to understand the effects of cultural 
differences.   
The survey aims to collect information about what people find most different when they travel 
to another culture e.g. as a student or worker. 
 
1. What is your nationality? 
 
 
2. What country did you travel to? 
 
 
3. What differences did you notice (compared to home) about your boss' or teacher's 
behaviour to you? 
 
 
4. What differences did you notice about other workers' or students' behaviour to you 
(compared to home)? 
 
 
5. In what way were meetings different from meetings in your home country (e.g. more casual, 
more formal)? 
 
 
6. Did you work in a team? If so, was that different from teams at home? 
 
 
7. What differences (compared to home) surprised you the most? 
 
 
8. What were the biggest differences compared to home? 
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9. What did you like about the country or the people that you met there? 
What did you DISLIKE? 
 
 
10. Please add any other comments about your experiences 
 
 
Done
 
Powered by SurveyMonkey  
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Appendix 4: Detailed statistical results 
Appendix 4A:  Loughborough 2nd year student group data 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change 
1 .873a .762 .745 4.43596 .762 45.786 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UAIdiversity, Individual_marks, UAI 
b. Dependent Variable: GroupPerformance 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 2702.882 3 900.961 45.786 .000b 
Residual 846.144 43 19.678   
Total 3549.026 46    
a. Dependent Variable: GroupPerformance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UAIdiversity, Individual_marks, UAI 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 42.619 12.045  3.538 .001 18.329 66.909 
Individual_marks 1.136 .101 .845 11.238 .000 .932 1.340 
UAI -1.711 .414 -.658 -4.131 .000 -2.546 -.876 
UAIdiversity .536 .193 .441 2.778 .008 .147 .925 
a. Dependent Variable: GroupPerformance 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model UAIdiversity Individual_marks UAI 
1 
Correlations 
UAIdiversity 1.000 .016 -.582 
Individual_marks .016 1.000 -.078 
UAI -.582 -.078 1.000 
Covariances 
UAIdiversity .037 .000 -.070 
Individual_marks .000 .010 -.003 
UAI -.070 -.003 .172 
a. Dependent Variable: GroupPerformance 
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Appendix 4B:  UK physics & astronomy department RAE2008 data 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change 
1 .836a .698 .671 .16473 .698 25.438 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MASdiversityOpt, MAS 
b. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1.381 2 .690 25.438 .000b 
Residual .597 22 .027   
Total 1.978 24    
a. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MASdiversityOpt, MAS 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 10.180 1.088  9.353 .000 7.923 12.437 
MAS -.142 .020 -1.670 -6.997 .000 -.184 -.100 
MASdiversityOpt -.114 .017 -1.631 6.811 .000 -.149 -.079 
a. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model MASdiversityOpt MAS 
1 
Correlations MASdiversityOpt 1.000 .572 
MAS .572 1.000 
Covariances 
MASdiversityOpt .000 .000 
MAS .000 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
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Appendix 4C:  UK chemical engineering department RAE2008 data 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change 
1 .810a .656 .613 .19922 .656 15.237 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MASdiversity 
b. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .605 1 .605 15.237 .005b 
Residual .318 8 .040   
Total .922 9    
a. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MASdiversity 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 3.276 .148  22.186 .000 2.936 3.617 
MASdiversity -.054 .014 -.810 -3.903 .005 -.086 -.022 
a. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model MASdiversity 
1 
Correlations MASdiversity 1.000 
Covariances MASdiversity 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: RAE2008 
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Appendix 4D:  UK English Premiership football match performance 
data 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .645a .416 .413 4.001 .416 134.606 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HomeAdv, MASdiff, TalentDiff, UAIdiff 
b. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 8617.78 4 2154.445 134.606 .000b 
Residual 12084.222 755 16.006   
Total 20702.000 759    
a. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff  
b. Predictors: (Constant), HomeAdv, MASdiff, TalentDiff, UAIdiff 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) -1.609 .205  -7.828 .000 -2.012 -1.205 
TalentDiff .140 .012 .3776 11.402 .000 .116 .164 
MASdiff .099 .025 .157 3.968 .000 .050 .149 
UAIdiff .134 .015 .368 8.973 .000 .105 .163 
HomeAdv 3.217 .291 .308 11.059 .000 2.646 3.788 
a. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model HomeAdv MASdiff TalentDiff UAIdiff 
 1 
Correlations 
HomeAdv 1.000 -.005 -.068 .027 
MASdiff -.005 1.000 .159 .609 
TalentDiff -.068 .159 1.000 -.308 
UAIdiff .027 .609 -.308 1.000 
Covariances 
HomeAdv .085 -3.95E-005 .000 .000 
MASdiff -3.95E-005 .001 4.89E-005 .000 
TalentDiff .000 4.89E-005 .000 -5.630E-005 
UAIdiff .000 .000 -5.630E-005 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff 
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Appendix 4E:  UK English Premiership football team performance 
data 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .916a .838 .825 1.20986   
a. Predictors: (Constant), UAIdiff, HomeAdv, TalentDiff 
b. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 273.439 3 91.146 62.268 .000b 
Residual 52.696 36 1.464   
Total 326.135 39    
a. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff  
b. Predictors: (Constant), UAIdiff, HomeAdv, TalentDiff 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) -1.619 .271  -5.697 .000 -2.170 -1.069 
TalentDiff .123 .026 .405 4.772 .000 .071 .175 
HomeAdv 3.239 .385 .567 8.414 .000 2.458 4.020 
UAIdiff .107 .025 .366 4.329 .000 .057 .158 
a. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model UAIdiff HomeAdv TalentDiff 
 
Correlations 
UAIdiff 1.000 .071 -.611 
HomeAdv .071 1.000 -.110 
TalentDiff -.611 -.110 1.000 
Covariances 
UAIdiff .001 .001 .000 
HomeAdv .001 .148 -.001 
TalentDiff .000 -.001 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: ShotsOnTargetDiff 
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Appendix 4F:  Aircraft accident data (accidents per million flights) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .698a .487 .486 1.30776 .487 472.771 
a. Dependent Variable: AccPerMillflights 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PerCapGDP, UAI, MAS, PDI, IDV 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 4042.736 5 808.547 472.771 .000b 
Residual 4254.367 2488 1.710   
Total 8297.103 2493    
a. Dependent Variable: AccPerMillflights 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PerCapGDP, UAI, MAS, PDI, IDV 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 6.390 .316  20.241 .000 5.771 7.009 
PDI .009 .003 .067 2.740 .006 .003 .016 
IDV -.016 .002 -.215 -7.587 .000 -.021 -.012 
MAS -.013 .002 -.100 -6.490 .000 -.017 -.009 
UAI .011 .002 .105 5.168 .000 .007 .015 
PerCapGDP .000 .000 -.428 -20.707 .000 .000 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: AccPerMillflights 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model PerCapGDP UAI MAS PDI IDV 
1 
Correlations 
PerCapGDP 1.000 -.419 .063 .338 -.400 
UAI -.419 1.000 -.241 -.170 .526 
MAS .063 -.241 1.000 -.095 -.316 
PDI .338 -.170 -.095 1.000 .457 
IDV -.400 .526 -.316 .457 1.000 
Covariances 
PerCapGDP 1.450E-010 -1.086E-008 1.504E-009 1.361E-008 -1.037E-008 
UAI -1.086E-008 4.639E-006 -1.036E-006 -1.223E-006 2.440E-006 
MAS 1.504E-009 -1.036E-006 3.995E-006 -6.377E-007 -1.359E-006 
PDI 1.361E-008 -1.223E-006 -6.377E-007 1.120E-005 3.292E-006 
IDV -1.037E-008 2.440E-006 -1.359E-006 3.292E-006 4.636E-006 
a. Dependent Variable: AccPerMillflights 
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Appendix 4G:  Aircraft accident data (FLE per million flights) 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .667a .445 .444 .96910 .445 398.460 
a. Dependent Variable: FLErate 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PerCapGDP, UAI, MAS, PDI, IDV 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1871.088 5 374.218 398.460 .000b 
Residual 2336.254 2488 .939   
Total 4207.342 2493    
a. Dependent Variable: FLErate 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PerCapGDP, UAI, MAS, PDI, IDV 
 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 4.128 .234  17.646 .000 3.669 4.587 
PDI .007 .002 .071 2.801 .005 .002 .012 
IDV -.010 .002 -.192 -6.509 .000 -.014 -.007 
MAS -.006 .001 -.069 -4.349 .000 -.009 -.004 
UAI .009 .002 .115 5.450 .000 .006 .012 
PerCapGDP .000 .000 -.416 -19.335 .000 .000 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: FLErate 
 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model PerCapGDP UAI MAS PDI IDV 
1 
Correlations 
PerCapGDP 1.000 -.419 .063 .338 -.400 
UAI -.419 1.000 -.241 -.170 .526 
MAS .063 -.241 1.000 -.095 -.316 
PDI .338 -.170 -.095 1.000 .457 
IDV -.400 .526 -.316 .457 1.000 
Covariances 
PerCapGDP 1.450E-010 -1.086E-008 1.504E-009 1.361E-008 -1.037E-008 
UAI -1.086E-008 4.639E-006 -1.036E-006 -1.223E-006 2.440E-006 
MAS 1.504E-009 -1.036E-006 3.995E-006 -6.377E-007 -1.359E-006 
PDI 1.361E-008 -1.223E-006 -6.377E-007 1.120E-005 3.292E-006 
IDV -1.037E-008 2.440E-006 -1.359E-006 3.292E-006 4.636E-006 
a. Dependent Variable: FLErate 
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Appendix 4H:  Maritime fatality rate data (per 100k seafarer years) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .762a .581 .505 30.1993 .581 7.624 
a. Dependent Variable: FatalAccidentRate 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI, IDV  
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 13905.441 2 6952.720 7.624 .008b 
Residual 10031.988 11 911.999   
Total 23937.429 13    
a. Dependent Variable: FatalAccidentRate 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI, IDV  
 
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 92.118 28.959  3.319 .007 32.379 159.857 
IDV -1.275 .368 -.677 -3.470 .005 -2.084 -.466 
UAI .503 .267 .367 1.880 .057 -.086 1.092 
a. Dependent Variable: FatalAccidentRate 
 
Model UAI IDV 
1 
Correlations 
UAI 1.000 -.026 
IDV -.026 1.000 
Covariances 
UAI .072 -.003 
IDV -.003 .135 
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Appendix 4I:  Aircraft automation preferences 
(i) Preference A01: “I am concerned that automation will cause me to lose flying skills” 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .779a .606 .519 11.232 .606 6.931 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1748.680 2 874.340 6.931 .015b 
Residual 1135.320 9 126.147   
Total 2884.000 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 86.771 11.964  7.252 .000 59.706 113.836 
PDI -.279 .130 -.455 -2.153 .060 -.573 .014 
UAI -.440 .164 -.568 -2.687 .025 -.810 -.069 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A01; b. Predictors: (Constant), PDI, UAI 
 
(i) Preference A02: “There are modes and features of the FMC that I do not fully 
understand” 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .793a .629 .592 5.134 .629 16.965 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 447.114 1 447.114 16.965 .002b 
Residual 263.553 10 26.355   
Total 710.667 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 53.199 4.737  11.230 .000 42.644 63.754 
UAI -.305 .074 -.793 -4.119 .002 -.469 -.140 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A02; b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI 
 
 331 
 
(i) Preference A03: “When workload increases, it is better to avoid reprogramming the 
FMC” 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .574a .330 .263 9.494 .330 4.922 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 443.668 1 443.668 4.922 .051b 
Residual 901.332 10 90.133   
Total 1345.000 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 70.961 8.761  8.100 .000 51.441 90.481 
UAI -.303 .137 -.574 -2.219 .051 -.608 .001 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A03; b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI 
 
(i) Preference A04: “It's easy to forget how to do FMC operations that are not 
performed often” (no correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .533a .284 .213 11.811 .284 3.970 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 553.809 1 553.809 3.970 .074b 
Residual 1395.108 10 139.511   
Total 1948.917 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 72.348 8.462  8.549 .000 53.493 91.204 
PDI -.269 -1.992 -.533 -1.992 .074 -.569 .032 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A04; b. Predictors: (Constant), PDI 
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(i) Preference A05: “Under abnormal conditions, I can rapidly access the information I 
need in the FMC” 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .642a .412 .353 10.478 .412 7.006 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 769.174 1 769.174 7.006 .024b 
Residual 1097.826 10 109.783   
Total 1867.000 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 58.193 9.668  6.019 .000 36.650 79.735 
UAI .400 .151 .642 2.647 .024 .063 .736 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A05; b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI 
 
(i) Preference A06: “In order to maintain safety, pilots should avoid disengaging 
automated systems” (no correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .593a .351 .286 16.468 .351 5.416 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1468.862 1 1468.862 5.416 .042b 
Residual 2712.055 10 271.205   
Total 4180.917 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 5.493 15.196  .361 .725 -28.366 39.352 
UAI .552 .237 .593 2.327 .042 .024 1.081 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A06; b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI 
 
  
 333 
 
(i) Preference A07: “Under abnormal conditions, I can rapidly access the information I 
need in the FMC” (no correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .373a .139 .053 17.337 .139 1.614 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 485.044 1 485.044 1.614 .233b 
Residual 3005.873 10 300.587   
Total 3490.917 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 76.525 12.422  6.161 .000 48.848 104.202 
UAI -.252 .198 -.373 -1.270 .233 -.693 .190 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A07; b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI 
 
(i) Preference A08: “In order to maintain safety, pilots should avoid disengaging 
automated systems” (no correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .441a .194 .114 10.951 .194 2.414 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 289.526 1 289.526 2.414 .151b 
Residual 1199.141 10 119.914   
Total 1488.667 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 67.234 6.655  10.103 .000 52.406 82.062 
IDV .184 .118 .441 1.554 .151 -.080 .447 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A08; b. Predictors: (Constant), IDV 
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(i) Preference A09: “My company expects me to always use automation” (no 
correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .326a .106 .017 19.875 .106 1.188 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 469.317 1 485.044 1.614 .233b 
Residual 3950.350 10 300.587   
Total 4419.667 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 42.846 18.340  2.336 .042 1.982 83.711 
UAI .312 .286 .326 1.090 .301 -.326 .950 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A09; b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI 
 
(i) Preference A10: “The effective crew member always uses the automation tools 
provided” 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .907a .823 .784 8.511 .823 20.922 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 3030.803 2 1515.401 20.922 .000b 
Residual 651.864 9 72.429   
Total 3682.667 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 117.941 17.622  6.693 .000 78.077 157.805 
PDI .392 .101 .565 3.880 .004 .163 .620 
MAS -1.028 .262 -.572 -3.929 .003 -1.620 -.436 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A10; b. Predictors: (Constant), PDI, MAS 
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(i) Preference A11: “I make sure the other pilot acknowledges programming changes I 
make in the FMC” (no correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .416a .173 .091 5.135 .173 2.095 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 55.233 1 55.233 2.095 .178b 
Residual 263.683 10 26.368   
Total 318.917 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 94.558 3.121  30.301 .000 87.605 101.511 
IDV -.080 .055 -.416 -1.447 .178 -.204 .043 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A11; b. Predictors: (Constant), IDV 
 
(i) Preference A12: “Automated cockpits require more verbal communication between 
crew members” (no correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .447a .200 .120 15.476 .200 2.500 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 598.861 1 598.861 2.500 .145b 
Residual 2395.139 10 239.514   
Total 2944.000 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 68.087 9.405  7.239 .000 47.131 89.042 
IDV -.264 .167 -.447 -1.581 .145 -.636 .108 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A12; b. Predictors: (Constant), IDV 
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(i) Preference A13: “Automated cockpits require more cross-checking of crew member 
actions” (no correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .258a .067 -.027 12.450 .067 .715 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 110.823 1 110.823 .715 .418b 
Residual 1550.093 10 155.009   
Total 1660.917 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 76.213 7.566  10.073 .000 59.355 93.071 
IDV -.114 .134 -.258 -.846 .418 -.413 .186 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A13; b. Predictors: (Constant), IDV 
 
(i) Preference A14: “I look forward to more automation-the more the better” (no 
correlations) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .778a .605 .565 16.193 .605 15.306 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 4013.485 1 4013.485 15.306 .003b 
Residual 2622.181 10 262.218   
Total 6635.667 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) -.375 11.602  -.032 .975 -26.226 25.475 
PDI .724 .185 .778 3.912 .003 .311 1.136 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A14; b. Predictors: (Constant), PDI 
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(i) Preference A15: “I prefer flying automated aircraft” 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change statistics 
R Square Change F Change 
1 .666a .444 .389 14.167 .444 7.992 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1603.987 1 1603.987 7.992 .018b 
Residual 2006.930 10 200.693   
Total 3610.917 11    
 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
(Constant) 45.815 13.072  3.505 .006 16.688 74.942 
UAI .577 .204 .666 2.827 .018 .122 1.032 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: A15; b. Predictors: (Constant), UAI 
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Appendix 5: Test data - aircraft accidents and issues 
This dataset forms part of a suite of test data based on information from the website 
http://aviation-safety.net for the purpose of evaluating the performance of the team culture 
tool (TCT), versions 2 and 3. 
The records in this dataset relate to aircraft incidents during the first six months of 2009, and 
are selected on the following basis: 
• It represents an incident that occurred (or was exacerbated) due to crew behaviour, 
or 
• It represents an incident that was mitigated due to crew behaviour and/or abilities.  
Jan 2009, Andes Lineas Aereas McDonnell Douglas MD-82 (LV-BHF) 
No fatalities.  Had to be guided to safety after loss of instruments and became seriously 
disorientated:  Loss of situation awareness (Argentinian crew). 
13 Jan 2009, Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-400 () 
No fatalities.  Runway more slippery than crew were told by airport; applied max reverse 
thrust for much longer to avoid ending up in Buskin River:  Excellent quick reaction to safety 
problem (United States crew). 
15 Jan 2009, US Airways Airbus A320-214 
No fatalities, lost both engines at 3,200ft over New York and had to make an emergency 
landing in the River Hudson:  Exemplary practice by all crew (United States crew). 
28 Jan 2009, Ghana International Airlines Boeing 757-258 (G-STRZ)  
No fatalities.  Problems with a blocked pitot lead to FMC misbehaviour and problems of 
shared situation awareness; A rejection of takeoff would have been more appropriate:  
Suboptimal decision-making and inadequate communication between crew (Ghanaian crew). 
09 Feb 2009, Air Mediterranee Airbus A321-211 (F-GYAJ) 
No fatalities.  The aircraft overran the runway in light snowfall.  The accident was due to the 
continuation of the landing on discovery of the conditions, exacerbated by non-use of thrust 
reversers:  Poor decision-making (French crew). 
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25 Feb 2009, THY Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-8F2 (TC-JGE) 
9 fatalities.  Faulty altimeters led to the aircraft’s autopilot throttling back AND raising the 
nose to maintain lift; the crew realised too late what was happening:  Autopilot error and lack 
of situation awareness (Turkish crew). 
20 Mar 2009, Emirates Airlines Airbus A340-541 (A6-ERG) 
No fatalities.  Tailstrike – due to incorrect take-off weight calculations which were not 
checked; the crew failed to carry out all pre-departure SOPs: Failure to follow SOPs (Arabian 
crew). 
09 Apr 2009, Aviastar Mandiri British Aerospace BAe-146-300 (PK-BRD) 
All crew killed.  Crew did not respond to repeated ‘terrain terrain’, ‘pull up’, ‘sink rate’ and ‘too 
low terrain’ aural alerts, and the aircraft flew into the ground:  Captain lacked situational 
awareness, and was unwilling to react to co-pilots warnings (Indonesian crew). 
20 April 2009, Royal Air Maroc – RAM Boeing 767-36NER (CN-RNT) 
No fatalities.  During a firm landing, the first officer’s input of full nose down elevator caused 
substantial structural damage to the aircraft:  Erroneous flight control (Moroccan crew). 
21 Apr 2009, Porter Airlines de Havilland Canada DHC-8-402 q400 (C-GLQD) 
No fatalities.  Aft fuselage touched the runway on landing (minor damage); power settings 
were not checked leading to an excessive descent rate:  Lack of situation awareness 
(Canadian crew). 
22 Apr 2009, Japan Airlines (JAL Express) McDonnell Douglass MD-81 (JA8260) 
No fatalities.  The aircraft struck its left wing tip on the runway during a landing in steady 
winds of 10kts (minor damage):  Poor flight control (Japanese crew). 
04 May 2009, Northwest Airlines Airbus A320-211 (N311US) 
No fatalities.  There was an 11 knot tailwind which necessitated a higher approach speed, 
and the aircraft suffered a tail strike after a bounced landing:  Poor flight control by first officer 
(USA crew). 
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11 May 2009, British Airways Boeing 747-436 (G-BYGA) 
No fatalities.  Spurious thrust reverser lock signals caused the flaps to retract without warning 
or (significant) signal during the take-off run (faults in the flight control logic); the crew were 
commended for their flight skills:  Exemplary practice by crew (UK crew). 
10 August 2009, Air Nippon Boeing 737-881 (JA56AN) 
No fatalities.  Multiple tail strikes caused damage to lower tailpiece, three major scratch 
marks on runway.  Poor flight control (Japanese crew). 
22 August 2009, Aeroflot-Don Boeing 737-400 (VQ-BAN) 
No fatalities.  Very heavy landing and tail strike causing substantial damage to the aircraft.  
Poor flight control (Russian crew). 
29 August 2009, Air Algerie Boeing 737-8D6 (7T-VJK) 
No fatalities.  The aircraft left the runway, continued on the grass for 250 meters, rejoined the 
runway and took off; minor damage occurred to right engine, airframe and nose gear:  
Inadequate control and failure to follow SOPs (Algerian crew). 
04 September 2009, Air India Boeing 747-437 (VT-ESM) 
No fatalities, 21 passenger injuries, aircraft damaged by fire.  Fuel leak from no. 1 engine, 
crew had turned off company channel (against SOPs) and also switched from ground 
frequency to tower frequency; engineer signalled CCIC, who ignored him; by the time the 
flight crew reacted, engine 1 was on fire and the passengers panicked; the cabin crew 
evacuated the passengers successfully, but both pilots evacuated the upper deck (did not 
come down to the lower deck) and left the aircraft before the evacuation of passengers was 
complete:  Failure to follow SOPs, poor CRM (Indian crew). 
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Appendix 6: TCT2 questionnaire/survey form 
The questionnaire form below was used to obtain feedback on the experiences of users of 
the second team culture tool (TCT2). 
   
Date: 7
© Allan Hodgson
Any other comments, e.g. on improving the tool, issues with using it, or other factors?
Anything that distinguishes between employees on the basis of nationality is likely to be a hot potato.  Irrespective of the 
tool's benefits, we might be seen as discriminatory - someone is guaranteed to pick up on it and embarrass us (or 
worse).  This may be the biggest limitation of the culture tool.  It may be safer to do a tool based on company culture 
and professional culture.
Any further comments on the results from the tool?
I'm not convinced about the way the task/mission profile works. For instance, I have to deal with industrial engineers 
and academics. The tasks they carry out may be the same in many ways if they collaborate on a project, but their 
environments are different and the way they actually respond and carry out the work is different.  When one of my 
experienced academic colleagues works at the industrial partner's premises, his behaviour is different from when at 
university - and so is mine - I wear my industrial hat! 
Any further comments on using the tool?
It was easy to put the team in, and it was interesting running through some other teams that I had been involved in.  It 
was very difficult to use the task-mission profile table, and it would be easy to misinterpret what the subfactors meant 
and end up with a wrong task-mission.  I think that training would be required to do this part reliably.
Did the grey boxes ('w hat the score means' & 'to improve the team') help in explaining w hat to do? To some ex tent
General questions
Have you come across any culture-related problems w ith any form of team? To some ex tent
Could a tool like the team culture tool (TCT2) be useful in reducing or anticipating problems? To some ex tent
How  quick and eff icient did you f ind  the task/mission profile table to use? Slow
The discrepancy results
Did the discrepancy results (show n at the bottom of the team culture profile table) make sense? To some ex tent
Did you f ind the team cultural scores meaningful (show n at the bottom of Table 1 in yellow  highlight)? To some ex tent
Team task/mission profiler
How  diff icult w as it to use the task/mission profile table? Somew hat difficult
Team cultural profiler
How  easy and understandable w as it to use the team culture profiler (to input the team member details)? Fairly  easy
How  quick and eff icient did you f ind  the team culture profiler to use? Fairly  fast
No. in team:
Team type: Academic/industrial collaboration project (communication)
Team description - 
purpose, longevity, etc.:
3 y ears + 3 y ears (poss)
USING THE TEAM CULTURE TOOL (TCT2)
 Team Culture Tool (TCT2) User Questionnaire
Purpose of this questionnaire:  To find out the views of users of the culture tools, in order to enable changes and 
improvements.
Please fill in pale blue boxes - most of the small boxes have dropdown lists to select from. 
TEAM DESCRIPTION Information provider: PB 23/04/2012
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Appendix 7: Team questionnaire/survey form 
The questionnaire form below was used to obtain team-related information. 
   
Date:
1 5 y ears+ M
2 5 y ears+ M
3 5 y ears+ M
4 5 y ears+ M
5 F
6 F
7 M
8 M
9 M
10 5 y ears+ F
11
12
13
14
15
16
FURTHER COMMENTS THAT YOU THINK ARE RELEVANT 
Although there were some technical issues, these were relatively small - the organisational/people issues were much more important. A failure of organisation and 
trust due in part to the personalities of the key people involved. 
© Allan Hodgson
Process conflict (disagreements about HOW the team should do the work) Occasionally
Rate the team with regard to fragmentation (where the team breaks up into disagreeing 
subgroups or factions)
A minority of members split into 
subgroups
Relationship conflict (not getting on with others in the group) Occasionally
Task conflict (disagreements about the team goals and WHAT the team should do) Occasionally
Looking in detail at conflict within the team … Rating
Delivering the right quality and quantity of output (achieving goals or targets) Poor Very important
Delivering in a timely fashion (getting the job done in time) Very poor Very important
Decision-making/selecting courses of action Poor Quite important
Organising and allocating activities Adequate Quite important
Trusting and getting on with each other Poor Very important
Creativity/coming up with novel ideas Adequate Moderately important
Rapid communication of situational factors needing urgent or prompt attention Adequate Not important
Communication between team members of complex factors and concepts Poor Very important
TEAM PERFORMANCE
Rate the team performance as a whole with regard to … Rating Importance
Financial planning & control English BSc. or BA degree Poor
Subcontractor (n/w) English UNKNOWN Good
Subcontractor (s/w) Poland UNKNOWN Good
S/w analysis English BSc. or BA degree Ex cellent
Business analysis English BSc. or BA degree Good
Stakeholder (customers) English BSc. or BA degree Poor
Stakeholder (service providers) English BSc. or BA degree Adequate
Liaison (stakeholder) English                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    16 Poor
Liaison (technical) English BSc. or BA degree Ex cellent
Project manager English BSc. or BA degree Adequate
TEAM MEMBER DESCRIPTIONS (maximum 16 team members)
I/D Team role
Exper-
ience
Gen-
der Nationality 2nd nationality
Occupational back-
ground
Age or qual's  
w hen left FT 
education
Ability to do team 
tasks
Insufficient Were adequate personnel & resources prov ided? Plenty enough
How often did external interference occur? Frequently Was the team given adequate time? Plenty enough
On average, how long have team members known each other? 3 years
EXTERNALLY IMPOSED CONSTRAINTS & PROBLEMS How realistic were the team objectives? Utterly unrealistic
   
Team Questionnaire
    
Purpose of this survey:  To collect anonymous data on many different types of teams in order to find out what factors affect 
the performance of multicultural teams (we also need to collect data on single-culture teams for comparison).
Background to our research:  Teams containing people from many cultural backgrounds are used widely in service and 
manufacturing industries. These multicultural teams typically perform less effectively than single-culture teams; however, 
sometimes multicultural teams perform extremely well due to the wide range of points of view and experience of team 
members. If we can better understand the effects of culture on single-culture and multicultural team performance, we can 
build better teams. 
TEAM DESCRIPTION Information provider: JT-SI 08/11/2011 No. in team:
Team type: A major integration project to bring disparate services under integrated control
Team description - 
purpose, longevity, etc.:
A five year project that involved a range of organisations and authorities.  Although significant software development was 
required, it was essential to bring all key parties onboard, in part by ensuring that their core requirements were met.   Note - team 
roles and nationalities are those of group leaders (over 100 people involved).   
What can/could/did go 
wrong:
Project failure.  Too many egos, not enough serious negotisating.  No-one with enough authority to ensure that negotiations 
and project activities stayed on track.  Team leaders lacked the qualities required for the complex balance required between 
stakeholders. 
Was the team given adequate authority?
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Appendix 8: TCT3 questionnaire/survey form 
The questionnaire form below was used to obtain feedback on the experiences of users of 
the third team culture tool (TCT3). 
  
Date: 7,10
 Team Culture Tool (TCT3) User Questionnaire
Purpose of this questionnaire:  To find out the views of users of the culture tools, in order to enable changes and 
improvements.
Please fill in pale blue boxes - most of the small boxes have dropdown lists to select from. 
TEAM DESCRIPTION Information provider: AMJ 05/02/2013 No. in team:
Team type: 1.  Sales/mktg team  2. Softw are/w eb project team
Team description - 
purpose, longevity, etc.:
Mktg teams - w eb sales partnerships
Integr w eb bkg sy stem specification
USING THE TEAM CULTURE TOOL (TCT3)
Did you f ind the team cultural scores meaningful (show n at the bottom of Table 1 in yellow  highlight)? Yes
Team task/mission profiler
How  diff icult w as it to use the team task/mission profiler? Fairly  easy
Did the grey boxes ('w hat the score means' & 'to improve the team') help in explaining w hat to do? Yes
Did the radar diagram (spider's w eb below  grey boxes) provide useful information about the team?
Team cultural profiler
How  diff icult w as it to use the team culture profiler (to input the team member details)? Very  easy
How  quick did you f ind  the team culture profiler to use? Very  fast
Did the discrepancy results (show n at the bottom of the team culture profile table) make sense? Yes
Yes
How  quick and eff icient did you f ind  the task/mission profiler to use? Very  fast
Did you use the engineering management project team or action team option? Project team
The discrepancy results
Could a tool like the team culture tool (TCT3) could be useful in reducing or anticipating problems? To some ex tent
Any further comments on using the tool?
General questions
Have you come across any culture-related problems w ith any form of team? Yes
Any further comments on the results from the tool?
The results were again reasonably in line with my experience, reflecting the issues caused by certain members.  
Having said that, I have worked in multinational teams that caused none of the problems that we had with these two 
teams-not every one feels a need to behave in line with their nationality.  It seems to me that if the team leader is fair 
and considerate the rest of the team will follow his lead and junior members will behave themselves anyway. In one 
case, the guy with the power had a high power distance according to your program and he was obnoxious to everyone 
most of the time! Maybe it was just his personaility.
As before, the team cultural profile was easy to use. The task profiler was easier than the previous version but the 
teams were a bit difficult to place. It needs more examples in software and web areas.
© Allan Hodgson
Any other comments, e.g. on improving the tool, issues with using it, or other factors?
The new task mission matrix seems to get round the problem of who fills in the tool. The scores should be more 
consistent.
Yes.  Much easier to use (task profiler), but see comments about examples.
Have you used the previous culture tool (TCT2)?  If so, please comment on the different 'user experience', including 
ease of use, likelihood of errors and accuracy. 
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Appendix 9: Generating the exemplars for the TCT3 
The exemplars were an essential part of the TCT3 tool because they allowed users to place 
their teams or missions in an appropriate context based on relative rather than absolute 
assessments of that context – a much easier process that also reduced the likelihood of 
gross errors of assignment. 
In order to derive a set of exemplars and to locate them in each of the two mission areas 
(project and operation), the researcher initially collected a set of mission exemplars for each 
of the scenarios from the literature and from news articles and blogs.  It was important that 
these exemplars were as unambiguous as possible to the majority of users, so the 
researcher discussed this set of exemplars with a colleague and, having made minor 
changes, created two ‘grids’, similar in appearance to Figures 8-6 (projects) and 8-7 
(crews/operators).  Each of these grids was populated with just four ‘extreme’ exemplars; a 
set of explanations of the placement of each exemplar was written, and a list was provided of 
exemplars that might be placed on each grid. 
The researcher then organised meetings with former industrial acquaintances or emailed the 
project grids to them (as Excel files), and these acquaintances were persuaded  (a) to revise 
or add to the list of exemplars, (b) to place the set of revised exemplars on the grid, and (c) 
to move or remove the originally-placed exemplars as seemed appropriate.  The researcher 
then produced a composite version of the project grid based on the returned, populated 
‘mission grids’.  Following comments from one of the exemplar providers about the paucity of 
software projects, that provider was persuaded to produce a computer 
systems/software/webware grid; this was not used in this thesis, but was incorporated in an 
alternative version of the TCT3 and sent back to him.  
In the case of the crew/operator grid, there was less access to useful sources of information 
and advice.  The researcher utilised the earlier-interviewed pilot, who commented on his 
views with regard to various crews, but the main sources were from the general and 
academic literature, including comparative accident analyses. 
From the comments of the above provider of software-related exemplars, it would appear 
fruitful to produce more industry-focused mission grids, which would provide an enhanced 
user experience. 
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Appendix 10: Hofstede’s fifth and sixth dimensions 
As stated elsewhere in this thesis, when the research began, sets of national cultural scores 
covering the majority of nations were only available for four dimensions of Hofstede’s 
framework  – power distance (PDI), individualism (IDV), masculinity (MAS) and uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI).  For the fifth dimension, long vs. short term orientation (LTO), culture 
scores were available for only twenty-three nations (primarily Eastern), and attempts to 
extend the scores to other countries had produced disappointing results.  For the sixth 
dimension,  indulgence vs. restraint (IVS), a full set of national scores was not presented in 
any of Hofstede’s publications until the release of the third edition of Cultures and Organi-
zations (Geert H. Hofstede et al., 2010) approximately eighteen months after the start of this 
PhD.  However this dimension was included in the 2008 Values Survey Module (Geert 
Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, & Vinken, 2008b), along with a seventh dimension, 
monumentalism vs. flexhumility (MVF).  This latter dimension was found to be inversely 
correlated with long term orientation, see Chapter 4 of Minkov (Minkov, 2011).  Therefore, 
rather than adding MVF to the previous six dimensions, Hofstede introduced, in his 2010 
book, a modified form of long term orientation, LTO- WVS77, which took account of the MVF 
findings - see also Minkov’s analyses (Geert Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, & Vinken, 2008a) . 
Due to time pressure, the author was not able retrospectively to include the fifth (revised) 
dimension and sixth dimension of Hofstede’s framework into his statistical work; in addition, 
there was very little published material on these dimensions that was of relevance to the 
author’s studies.  A further literature review at the time of thesis completion, revealed no 
publications on LTO-WVS/pragmatism or IVS that were of relevance to the research work of 
this thesis. 
 
                                            
77 This was later renamed ‘pragmatism’. 
